Deduction is part of determining what's really there. — Tate
What happens is that the eyes and associated neurones build a model, and this is not what we see, but the very act of our seeing. — Banno
The first is a variation on the homunculus. The brain constructs a model that the homunculus observes, giving rise to the mistaken notion that what we see is the model constructed by the brain. — Banno
We don't know enough about consciousness to rule out some sort of homunculus. As long as we don't end up with an infinite regress of them, there's no good reason not to consider the possibility. — Tate
But my understanding is that despite this, for Isaac and other neuroscientists it's neural nets all the way down. The homunculi are only there to simplify the calculation, and are ultimately dispersed. — Banno
This is what I think Schopenhauer was commenting on - he is accusing Kant of ignoring this classical distinction and instead appropriating the term 'noumenal' to serve a different purpose in his own philosophy, without respecting the sense in which 'noumenal' was used in Greek philosophy. — Wayfarer
The noumenal object is, then, an object of the intellect (nous, noetic), in that it is something - a principle, or a deductive proof - which is understood by the intellect in a manner different to that of sensory knowledge. — Wayfarer
Isn't the body/world collaboration a dualism? If we're asking whether there's an external material world, then we have to go beyond just the world as presented to ourselves and ask about the world itself. The world that's presumably much larger and older than we are. — Marchesk
What happens is that the eyes and associated neurones build a model, and this is not what we see, but the very act of our seeing. — Banno
The second removes the homunculus. The model is our seeing. What we see is the things in the world (as modeled). — Banno
Which brings us back to the point you made earlier, of explaining how it is that you and I seem to see the same stuff as we look out of our little cages. Why should that be? — Banno
Which brings us back to the point you made earlier, of explaining how it is that you and I seem to see the same stuff as we look out of our little cages. Why should that be? — Banno
the difference seems to be that for you this capacity is entirely distinct from our neurones, but I suspect it is just something they do. — Banno
Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Edward Feser
You were programmed you to think that, Smith. — Tate
Most interesting! — Ms. Marple
Am I alone in being thus programmed or is everyone in the same boat? — Agent Smith
Everybody in the matrix is a program except for the real people. — Tate
If I understood him aright, Isaac uses the notion of homunculi for methodological purposes in working on neural nets. So (doubtless this is a poor example) for the purposes of examining the net of the optic nerve, it may be understood as sending an image to the homunculi further in the brain.
But my understanding is that despite this, for Isaac and other neuroscientists it's neural nets all the way down. The homunculi are only there to simplify the calculation, and are ultimately dispersed. — Banno
our thoughts do have inherent meaning — Edward Feser
Thoughts aren't entities capable of possessing inherent properties, and even if they were, what kind of analysis produced the conclusion that they had inherent meaning? — Isaac
I think it's that the brain uses models that enhance the competence of the organism by creating expectations, which is just a theory. — Tate
Sensations, beliefs, imaginings and feelings are often referred to as figments, that is, creations of the mind. A mental image is taken to be something less than real: For one thing, it has no material substance and is impossible to detect except in the mind of the perceiver. It is true that sensations are caused by electrochemical events in a brain, but when experienced by a living mind, sensations are decisively different in kind from electrons in motion. They are indeed “figments” because they exist nowhere except in awareness. As a matter of fact, they exist only as claims made by sentient beings, with no material evidence to back up those claims. Indeed, brain scans reveal electrical activity, but do not display sensations or inner experience. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 52) Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition
One of the most important insights of contemporary brain science is that the visual world is a constructed reality. When we look, what we hold in awareness is not an optical array but a mental construct, built from information in the array, which presents us with all that is of value to us in a scene. — ibid
One alternative is something like Wayfarer may be proposing; a distinctly spiritual entity haunting the brain. — Banno
In Aristotle's influential works, which are the main source of later philosophical meanings, nous was carefully distinguished from sense perception, imagination, and reason, although these terms are closely inter-related. ...In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. For him then, discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways. — Wikipedia
I don’t think we’re brains. So I don’t see how it is possible that an experience is in the head — NOS4A2
We are conscious of the world, not of consciousness. We experience the world, not experience. We perceive the world, not perception. — NOS4A2
All evidence points to there being no such veil between the boundary of the self and the rest of the world. Where the body ends the rest of the world begins. There is nothing between them. The contact is direct. — NOS4A2
I do wonder though, what is visualization if it's not "pictures in the head"? — Marchesk
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.