I would say that your existentialism is of a conservative religious variety , as opposed to the later Wittgenstein’s or Sartre’s existentialism. — Joshs
Yes, what you call the "genuine conundrum" is metaphysical, not physics. — Banno
The Reductionist ignores the context - the purpose of the buildings and their use. Whereas the Duplicationist supplements the context with an invisible extra thing. — Andrew M
Does a subject or being have uniform properties? — Harry Hindu
It interest me that in this discussion we get bogged down in parsing notions of realism and rarely explore the idea of mind-at-large, which seems to me to be unavoidable and a god surrogate. And when I say unavoidable, I am not referring to its reality but to it's explanatory power in idealism. Any thoughts on this? — Tom Storm
You're saying that in this, our Age of Mechanism, we give precedence to the physiological, and treat first person data like some sort of foam on top?
When the two are actually bound by their relationship in the opposition? — Tate
The GPS on my iPhone uses the equations of special relativity. Is that just a "linguistic convention and set of shared practices"?
That is the conceit of idealism: that all there is are such conventions. It disengages our narratives from the world. But it is only in their engagement with the world that these narratives are true or false. — Banno
Does this mean that only these principles will allow the plane to fly? — Joshs
My reply is that the "convention" is what allows you to find your location with your iPhone. It's more than just a convention.Einstein’s work should neither be held up as the resolution of an error nor as proof of an error. Rather, it should be seen as an invitation to participate in a certain linguistic convention and set of shared practices. — Joshs
truth only makes ense with regard to a particualr convention. After all it is statements that are true or false, and statements are conventions of language. You can say whatever you like, but only some of what you might say is of use. — Banno
Sure.Use is not necessarily the same thing as true. — Joshs
The Einsteinian convention allows you to find your phone in a particular way. It works , not simply as true , but as true in its particular way of working. One could come up with a different way for a gps to work. This way wouldn’t be more true than the Einsteinian way, it would be a different way of being true. — Joshs
What is it, then, that creates 'res actual' from 'res potentia' if not 'res cogitans' — Wayfarer
measurement is a real physical process that transforms quantum potentiae into elements of res extensa, in a non-unitary and classically acausal process, and we offer specific models of such a measurement process.
That coheres with the Platonist idea that number is real - not real as an object or 'something in the world' but as what Augustine calls 'an intelligible object'. — Wayfarer
As to the sense quantum objects don't obey the 'law of the excluded middle', this doesn't make logical principles any less real in their domain of application - but shows that logic is not all-encompassing or omniscient, that it has limits. — Wayfarer
Fuchs argued, the wave function does not describe the world — it describes the observer. “Quantum mechanics,” he says, “is a law of thought.
The direct connection I theorize, and can observe, is the skin touching the tea cup, the hand grasping it, the arm lifting the hand, the light hitting the eye, and so on. — NOS4A2
Einstein’s work should neither be held up as the resolution of an error nor as proof of an error. Rather, it should be seen as an invitation to participate in a certain linguistic convention and set of shared practices. — Joshs
I'm not sure about Ryle's assessment of the University. Take the emergent complex behavior of ant colony and apply that to human social structures. There is something more than the organization structure of the colony or the university. — Marchesk
Again I refer to the problem implied in the 'reification of the subject'. To reify is to 'make into a thing', from the Latin 'res' (same term as used in 'res cogitans'). When you look for such a thing, there is nothing to be found, no 'invisible extra thing' - but at the same time, the reality of the subject is implicit in every act and utterance. (That is a topic much more discussed and debated in European philosophy than English-speaking, see this article). — Wayfarer
I think the authors answer that when they say... — Isaac
Space and time, or spacetime, is something that “emerges from a quantum substratum,” as actual stuff crystalizes out “of a more fluid domain of possibles.”
What criteria does a thing have to meet to be counted as 'real'? — Isaac
The argument is that our classification of what is real needs to include possibility. — Isaac
Restating without the subject/object terms, aren't you just saying that a human being is implicit in a human being's actions and utterances? — Andrew M
It's about Fitch's paradox. — Banno
Only some of what one might say actually works. There is a way in which reality does not care what you say about it. Believe what you will, you cannot walk through walls. — Banno
If it is true in an over-mind, it remains true in a mind. I don't see any accrued advantage in such speculation. — Banno
Then why bother with it? — Banno
even though a measurement is a physical act it’s also a cognitive one. — Wayfarer
consider something like the principles of logic, or Pythagoras’ theorem. We would generally agree that they are real, I hope — Wayfarer
‘social construct — Wayfarer
Yes, I'd agree they're real, but only in the same way unicorns are real. — Isaac
mathematics possesses a kind of reality which I’m sure you will agree doesn’t pertain to fairy tales. — Wayfarer
How does something which possesses a "different kind of reality" differ from something which is merely different? — Isaac
What kind of work is this classification doing - essentially is what I'm asking. — Isaac
In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is. — IEP
Do you apply that to mathematical and logical statements as well? — Andrew M
I’m saying what we call third personal , like physiological concepts, and ‘inner’ concepts like sensation, are the same ‘stuff’, and by stuff I don’t mean substances , either objective or mental. What I mean is that all experiences are interactions that are neither purely subjective nor objective They are inextricably both perspectival and about something. Every experience is a performance or act that is personally situated as relevant to me in some way , and the introduction of an outside element. — Joshs
I think that classical philosophy understood there are different levels or modes of being — Wayfarer
But I think the question needs to be asked, in what sense do possibilities exist? — Wayfarer
Measurement can be just a physical process and that can be enough to actualise probabilities from their res potentia. — Isaac
the actualization of possibilities, at the moment of the present, is caused by "the Will of God". — Metaphysician Undercover
Classical philosophy said there are different levels or modes of being. They only understood there are different levels or modes of being if you already agree with the conclusion. Otherwise it begs the question. — Isaac
We're asking if there actually are different levels or modes of being, and you're offering, by way of evidence, that somebody once said that there were. — Isaac
What are its merits? — Isaac
Apart from the many other arguments which you here disregard. — Wayfarer
It is what philosophy is about. — Wayfarer
When you speak of 'evidence', surely you grasp that in this case, empirical evidence is not a question at issue, but that the relevance of it to this issue is one of the claims at stake. — Wayfarer
When observing another's brain activity, how can you tell if the visual sensation you experience of another's brain activity is your own brain activity or theirs?Yes. What's wrong with: brain activity is sensations? — bongo fury
But it's not. It is your own use of language that reifies subject and being. Are subject and being simply scribbles you've put on this screen, or do the scribbles refer to something that isn't scribbles? If the latter, then what is it the scribbles refer to? Or are you saying that there is no distinction between subject and non-subject? If that is what you're saying then you haven't actually said anything useful. It seems more like how Christians explain that their God is undefinable and not a thing that can be accessed by science in an effort to protect the idea of God from being falsified. You're doing the same thing here in regards to subject and being.Again I refer to the problem implied in the 'reification of the subject'. To reify is to 'make into a thing', from the Latin 'res' (same term as used in 'res cogitans'). When you look for such a thing, there is nothing to be found, no 'invisible extra thing' - but at the same time, the reality of the subject is implicit in every act and utterance. (That is a topic much more discussed and debated in European philosophy than English-speaking, see this article).
Does a subject or being have uniform properties?
— Harry Hindu
That is also a question that tends to reify the subject. — Wayfarer
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