So, you're not a Christian, but you believe there's a natural moral law. What is the justification for that? Why do you think it's a matter of what is or isn't deserved, as distinct from something that simply happens through no agency? — Wayfarer
A person who has done nothing deserves respect, good will, happiness and so on. — Bartricks
You're not focusing on my argument but raising broader questions to do with the nature of morality. — Bartricks
Says who? From whom? On what basis? — Wayfarer
Because your arguments rely on broader issues to do with the nature of morality — Wayfarer
Do you think that others do not deserve respect, good will and happiness? — Bartricks
To procreate is to create a huge injustice. It is to create a debt that you know you can't pay. — Bartricks
why should anyone be born in the first place, given that life often sucks. — Wayfarer
Very cunning. If I don't agree with you, then I'm culpable, I believe the innocent ought to suffer. — Wayfarer
It is incumbent on you to make a case. — Wayfarer
You said:
To procreate is to create a huge injustice. It is to create a debt that you know you can't pay.
— Bartricks
Which I paraphrased as
why should anyone be born in the first place, given that life often sucks.
— Wayfarer
And it is a direct paraphrase, it simply re-states the sentiment in different words. — Wayfarer
And they do not deserve to come to harm either, do they? — Bartricks
. Note too that death is a harm, so your example is terrible. — Bartricks
First, it is grotesquely implausible to suppose that someone will live without suffering any harm whatsoever until 14 — Bartricks
And then there's death, which you seem to think doesn't constitute a harm even though it is probably the biggest harm of all. Innocent people deserve to die, do they? — Bartricks
You have failed. — Bartricks
So, say which premise you are disputing and then explain how what you're saying raises a reasonable doubt about the premise in question. — Bartricks
Thinking in terms of deserving or not deserving is a category error when it is taken out of the context of what is earned and of reward and punishment. — Janus
You speak just as much gibberish. — I like sushi
People do not deserve harm nor good. — I like sushi
people just end up laughing and leaving the discussion because the discussion cannot begin if those posing some idea cannot grasp the most simplistic criticisms throw at their half-baked ideas. — I like sushi
I can argue better for antinatalism than both of you combined. The question is have either yourself or batricks bothered to argue against antinatalism? I doubt it. — I like sushi
:smirk:If we all stopped wasting time here the whole place would grind to a halt. :lol: — Wayfarer
:up:Thinking in terms of deserving or not deserving is a category error when it is taken out of the context of what is earned and of reward and punishment. — Janus
:up:It is a bit like preventing someone from being murdered by killing them. — I like sushi
I think this argument can be subsumed in a more general one of simply not using people. That is to say, no one deserves to be harmed for X reasons, and unnecessarily, period. — schopenhauer1
People DO NOT derserve either harm nor good. Agree or not? If not why? If you do then why are you focused on harm being deserved rather than good? — I like sushi
Anyway, until I write it have fun not having fun or have no fun having fun. Whatever just don’t expect others to sit idle when people are punching themselves in the face and hitting ‘innocent’ bystanders too. — I like sushi
Except the bolded is not an argument. It's just a statement. Therein lies the basic problem. You keep just declaring this moral rule to be the case, but it clearly isn't, literally everyone here is disagreeing with you about it, they clearly don't feel that way, so your assertion that it's a moral instinct is clearly false. — Isaac
If I decide that you NEED (whether you could tell me or not.. maybe I even have a hunch you would just love it) to play this game I think is really cool, and you are harmed by it (and I full well know that there are many harms in this game, often ones I didn't even expect that you would encounter) and it wasn't necessary to force you to play it, it was wrong.
Widening the scope a bit..
If I had a set of games you can CHOOSE from, but you could not get out of this choice other than death itself, that would still be wrong.
You can see where this is going in its parallels...
The idea of choice (illusory or otherwise), does not give procreation a pass, period. — schopenhauer1
The point is it is the MISAPPLICATION to procreation of a moral intuition. — schopenhauer1
Yes, I get that that's your point. It's just completely wrong. — Isaac
It clearly isn't misapplied. People have children all the time and virtually no one judges it to be moral problem, so the application (to this unique circumstance) is clearly faultless. — Isaac
Unless you're reaching for some magical, or supernatural source of moral rules, you've got nothing to go on to judge intuition other than how people actually behave. — Isaac
Introduction
I am a moral particularist and an antinatalist. That is, I believe in the inherent variability
of moral valences, and I believe that, exceptional circumstances aside, acts of human
procreation are most likely wrong.
At first glance this seems like an odd combination of views. Most acts of human procreation appear to be morally permissible to most people. Other things being equal, this is
excellent evidence that this is precisely what they are. Even if I can locate in them many
features that in other contexts seem typically to operate as wrong-makers—and this is
exactly what I will be doing in what follows—the fact that procreative acts themselves appear morally permissible suggests that those features are not operating as wrong-makers
in the context of procreative acts in particular. So, of all plausible views about the nature
of ethics, moral particularism seems especially inhospitable to antinatalism.
However, I shall argue that such appearances are deceptive. The widespread intuition
that, in the main, procreative acts are morally permissible, lacks any real probative force.
By contrast, there is no similar reason to believe the same thing about the intuitions that
find many of the features of procreative acts to be wrong-makers. As this is now our most
reliable source of insight into the ethics of human procreation, I conclude that it is most
likely immoral.
Moral Particularism
I call myself a normative particularist because I am at present convinced that any consideration that generates a positive normative reason—which I, in line with most others,
would characterize as a favoring of doing or believing something—in one context can
just as easily generate a negative normative reason—a disfavoring—in another, and no
favoring or disfavoring at all in others. That is, to put it in the terminology that some
prefer, a consideration that has a positive normative valence in one context can have a
negative normative valence in another, and no normative valence whatsoever in others.
By itself this does not entail normative particularism, because it is consistent with this
thesis that there may be a rigid pattern to how any particular feature’s normative valence
behaves, such that one could, in principle, formulate rules that describe it.1
But, and for me this is essential to being a normative particularist, I believe there is no necessity to any pattern there may be. That is, there is both no necessity to there being a pattern—so though there may be a pattern, there does not have to be—but even if there is a pattern, it
does not have to be rigid across time and space. Normative patterns, if patterns there be,
are always contingent, not necessary. So, even if consideration P seems to have a negative
normative valence in every situation we can conceive of, this does not entail that it must
do so, and will always and everywhere continue to do so.2
For clarity, consider an analogy. Put aside the favoring relations constitutive of moral
and other normative reasons and consider instead the favoring relations constituted by
my (or your) attitudes toward things. There is normally going to be a loose-ish pattern
to them, though one shot through with exceptions. For example, in the main I like chili
because, in most cases, adding chili to a dish leads me to like it more. But it is not as if
I have to like a dish more just because chili has been added to it. There are some dishes
to which adding chili has the reverse effect—its presence makes me like the dish less, or
not at all. And there is an amount of chili which, if added to almost any dish, will make
me dislike it. Nevertheless, there remains a pattern of sorts to when I like and do not like
chili and, as such, it seems true to characterize me as someone who likes chili, because
typically I do. There is no necessity to any of my tastes—they can and have changed—
and I am not being inconsistent if I like chili in one dish and not in another, or if I like
chili one day and not the next. So I am a particularist regarding my own favorings and
disfavorings. Yet this doesn’t stop me, or anyone else, from being able to make informed
judgments about what I might like—it doesn’t stop anyone from making statistical generalizations, or inferring that I will most likely enjoy dish p because I enjoyed dish q, and
dish q seemed relevantly analogous to p.
I think everything I have said about my favorings is also true of the favorings constitutive
of normative reasons, and thus of moral reasons.3
We are primarily aware of normative
reasons through a faculty of rational intuition—we call it “our reason” or “intuition”—
and the job of work of our theories is, I think, to characterize the clearest and most
widely corroborated deliverances of our reason, other things being equal. As a moral
particularist, moral reasoning about difficult and unclear cases—cases where rational
intuitions conflict, or are unclear or untrustworthy—is akin to the kind of reasoning a
good chef might engage in when trying to devise an original menu for someone whose
tastes he/she has a fairly good grasp of. The chef will have to make informed judgments
about what to concoct, based on their understanding of the client’s attitudes toward other
dishes. The chef will no doubt try and build a mental picture of the client’s taste personality and use this as an imaginative simulation against which to test proposed dishes and
flavor combinations. But no matter how careful the reasoning, the proof of the pudding
is going to remain in the eating.
Likewise then, though I am a normative particularist—and so, by extension, a moral
particularist—this does not mean I deny that there is any kind of pattern whatever to
the normative aspect to reality, nor does it mean I deny that we can make statistical generalizations based on how some feature or features have behaved in other contexts. Just
as the fact I typically like a savory dish more when chili has been added to it gives me
default but defeasible reason to believe I will like dish p more if some chili is added to it,
so too the fact that typically consideration X has, intuitively, operated as a wrong-maker
in those actions in which it has featured gives us some default but defeasible reason to
believe that it will operate as a wrong-maker in some other action in which it is featuring. But if it appears, intuitively, not to be doing so, then, other things being equal, that
is good evidence that it is not doing so in this particular context.
Typical Wrong-Makers
In this section I will describe numerous features possessed by (typical) procreative
acts, and will draw attention to the fact that in other contexts these features seem,
at least in the main, to operate with negative moral valences.4
That does not, of
course, entail that they operate with negative moral valences in the context of procreative acts—not given the truth of moral particularism, anyway. Nevertheless,
the fact they typically operate with a negative moral valence makes it reasonable to
suppose that they will operate this way elsewhere as well, other things being equal.
Again, and to stress, other things may not be equal in the case of procreative acts.
But whether this is the case will be the matter addressed in the subsequent section
and not this one. The point of this section is simply to highlight that a) procreative
acts standardly possess all of these features and b) these features typically operate
as moral negatives.
Consent
No one gives their prior consent to be born. To procreate is therefore inevitably to
subject someone to a life. And to subject someone to a life is, fairly obviously, to have
subjected them to something very significant. To procreate is therefore to subject
someone to something of great significance.
In other contexts, the fact an act will significantly affect another person without their
prior consent typically operates as a powerful wrong-making feature of such deeds.
For example, if someone has not consented to have sex with you—a significant activity—then, other things being equal, that generates a powerful moral reason not to
have sex with that person.
It should also be noted that even when an act is likely to benefit the affected party, an
absence of prior consent still seems, in the main, to operate negatively. For instance,
if you hack into my bank account and start gambling with my money, then even if
you make me a fortune, the fact you did not have my prior consent to do so seems
to be an ethical negative. And this seems to remain the case even where consent is
not possible, and even when the act seems overall justified. For example, imagine an
unconscious patient needs an arm removed if they are not to die of septicemia. Due
to their unconsciousness, they cannot consent. Strange circumstances aside, it is no
doubt morally justifiable to remove the arm because of the great harm that would
befall the person otherwise. Nevertheless, the absence of prior consent still seems to
operate negatively in this context, for it is regrettable that consent was not possible
and it would have been better had it been given. It is just that in this case the positive
moral valence possessed by the fact removing the arm will prevent the person from
dying outweighed the negative moral valence of the fact they did not consent to it.
Of course, it is “in principle” possible to consent to have one’s arm removed in a way
that it is not even in principle possible to consent to be created. But affecting another
significantly without their prior consent seems to operate negatively even in cases
where consent is more robustly impossible. For instance, if I want someone to work
for me against their will, then clearly the very nature of what I want prevents me
from getting anyone to consent to it. Yet this doesn’t mean it is ethically okay for me
to make someone work for me against their will. Other things being equal, it would
be wrong to make someone work for me against their will, and wrong in no small
part because it would involve significantly affecting someone without their prior
consent. The fact it was impossible to get their prior consent does not seem to alter
this.
It would seem, then, that the fact an act will significantly affect another without
their prior consent is a fact that can reasonably be expected to operate with a negative moral valence in an act that features it, other things being equal. As has already
been noted, procreative acts possess this feature. Yes, it is not possible to give one’s
prior consent to be created, but we have already seen that in other contexts this
does not seem to alter the negativity of this feature’s moral valence. And yes, maybe
procreative acts are ones that are likely to benefit most of those they affect. But we
have also seen that in other contexts this does not seem to alter the negativity of this
feature’s moral valence either. In summary, then, procreative acts subject someone
to a life—which is a very significant thing to do to someone—and they do so without
the prior consent of the affected party. In other contexts to subject someone to something significant—even when consent is not possible, and even when it is likely to
be overall beneficial to them—seems to operate with a negative moral valence. And
thus if other things are equal, we have reason to believe it operates with a negative
moral valence in the context of procreative acts as well.5
Harm
Living a life is a job of work, and a considerable one at that. Granted, the odds are
that most parts of the job will be enjoyed by most of those who have been made to
do them (though there is absolutely no guarantee of this). But by no means is all of
the work pleasant. Indeed, large parts of the job are extremely painful, demeaning,
undignified, and frightening.
For instance, it begins badly. We emerge naked and screaming from the nether regions of another person. A less dignified way of beginning one’s career here is hard
to imagine. And then we find ourselves ignorant, uncultured, and unsophisticated.
We cannot feed or clothe ourselves for a considerable period of time, and will be dependent on the goodwill of others for our survival for many years. To stand any real
chance of thriving in the rest of our lives, we will need to be forced to endure years of
careful, dedicated schooling by a host of experts. And for many of us our ignorance
and dependency will return once more at the other end of life, as our bodies start
degenerating. And whether our bodies go to wrack and ruin or not, nearly all of us
will live in fear of this happening.
There is also the indignity of not knowing what our lives are about, if anything, and
yet being addicted to living them. Most of us would do virtually anything—including the most degrading of things—to stay alive. This, it seems to me, is an indignity
and therefore a harm. Life is a gift, it is said. But it is a gift in the way that injecting
someone with heroin and then providing them with a lifetime’s supply of the drug
is a gift.
Furthermore, and as anyone who has lived here for any period of time knows only
too well, this world is an extremely dangerous place. It contains large numbers of
murderers, rapists, and thieves and even greater numbers of lower-level mean-spirited, ungenerous, unkind people. It also contains almost every conceivable disease
and disaster. They happen all the time and they befall people largely arbitrarily, at
least from the perspective of justice. And as such it is practically impossible to avoid
these harms.
And anyone who lives here will, it seems, eventually die. So they will become invested in a life, and then they will lose it. And they will become invested in other people,
and then they will lose them.
I do not wish to catalog any further the harms that we all know lie in wait for anyone living a life. The point here is that there are many of them and that, other things
being equal, the fact that an act will subject another person to many harms is a fact
about an act that, typically, operates with a negative moral valence. The fact that
stepping on your toe will cause you the harm of pain provides me with a moral reason not to step on your toe. Likewise, then, the fact that procreative acts will subject
another to a catalog of harms of the kind mentioned above, and others besides, is a
fact that—other things being equal—can be expected to generate moral reason not
to perform the act in question.
Of course, life also contains many benefits. We fall in love with people it is good for
us to fall in love with, we enjoy ourselves a lot of the time (if we are lucky), and we
witness much beautiful scenery and often perform good deeds and exhibit fine character traits. And if an act promotes these sorts of benefits, then that is a fact about it
that, typically anyway, operates with a positive moral valence.
But importantly there seems to be an asymmetry between benefits and harms here.
Consider: if I know that, were I to have a child, the child’s life would be one characterized by intense suffering, then—other things being equal—that fact seems to
generate a powerful moral reason not to have a child. That is, it operates as a wrong-
maker, and, other things being equal, it would be wrong for me to create that child.
But by contrast, if I know that, were I to have a child, the child’s life would be characterized by intense joy, then—other things being equal—that does not seem to generate a positive obligation to have the child.
There are different diagnoses one might offer of this quandary. The most influential
has been offered by David Benatar, who draws the moral that absent benefits are not
bad unless there is someone for whom they constitute a deprivation, whereas—by
contrast—absent harms are good even though there may be no one for whom they
are a benefit.6
But for my purposes here it is enough that we merely note that though
procreative acts create benefits to those whom they create, in this particular context—that is, in the context of acts that create the person that they affect, as opposed
to acts that affect an already existing person—this fact does not seem to operate as a
right-maker. That is, the benefits contained in a potential life do not seem to generate moral reason to create the life in question. By contrast, the harms contained in a
potential life do seem to generate moral reasons not to create the life.
....... — Gerald K. Harrison- Antinatalism and Moral Particularism
They are vacuous. Your op says nothing. — Wayfarer
So your argument is that we shouldn't live cause we will die? That's Antinatalist final argument? Then tell that from the beginning as to know not to take you seriousl — dimosthenis9
Except if falling from the bike and scratching your shoulder counts as "serious harm" for you. — dimosthenis9
The problem is that there is a deeper premise on which your premise is contingent. I didn't want to bring it up if i didn't have too, but it's the issue of free will. I just don't assume that people have that freedom no matter how much they FEEL they do. If we don't see eye to eye on that issue then any discussion beyond that is pointless and fruitless. For me it's not even a question, because of the biological imperative (survival and reproduction). — punos
Your only criteria that i can gather is that according to your personal notions of morality we should preemptively "kill" or stop babies from being born because they will suffer. — punos
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