The notion of desert I am appealing to is retributive. A retributivist believes that sometimes a person can come to deserve to come to harm.

One does not have to do anything to deserve things. A person who has done nothing deserves respect, good will, happiness and so on.

But in order to deserve to come to harm, one needs to do things (and one needs free will).

And in order to void one's deservingness of respect, good will, happiness one also needs to do things.

There are some who, for no good reason, deny that anyone can ever deserve to come to harm. This will not affect my argument, however. For if no-one deserves to come to harm, then all harm is undeserved, And thus an innocent person will not deserve to come to harm.

So, believers in retribution should agree with me, for any plausible view on when a person comes to deserve to come to harm is going to make mention of freely performed actions, and a newly created person has not performed any free actions and so does not deserve to come to any harm.

And someone who (irrationally) disbelieves in retribution should also agree with me, for if no one is ever deserving of harm, then newly created persons do not deserve to come to harm.

To object to my claim that people are born innocent and thus do not deserve to come to any harm at all, the objector would need to argue that we are not created by procreative acts, but pre-exist and, furthermore, have previously done evil things of our own free will, such that we are born deserving to come to harm.

But that view is one few would defend and furthermore it would still not really work to overcome my argument, for we seem obliged to operate on the assumption that others are innocent, even if they are not. And thus we would still be obliged to assume that those whom procreative acts create are innocent for deliberative processes.

So, you're not a Christian, but you believe there's a natural moral law. What is the justification for that? Why do you think it's a matter of what is or isn't deserved, as distinct from something that simply happens through no agency? — Wayfarer

You're not focusing on my argument but raising broader questions to do with the nature of morality.

Moral desert is a feature of morality. Any plausible analysis of morality would need to accommodate it.

Now, my own view about the nature of morality is that it is made of the attitudes of God (by which I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person). But that's not a premise of my argument, is it? So you don't need to worry about my metaethical views. All you need to worry about are the premises of my argument.

OK, then.

A person who has done nothing deserves respect, good will, happiness and so on. — Bartricks

Says who? From whom? On what basis?

You're not focusing on my argument but raising broader questions to do with the nature of morality. — Bartricks

Because your arguments rely on broader issues to do with the nature of morality. It's all about what ought to happen, what should be case, what is deserved, all of which are moral considerations.

Do you dispute it? Do you think that others do not deserve respect, good will and happiness? Consult your reason.

Says who? From whom? On what basis? — Wayfarer

God. I just told you that. Pay attention and stop asking questions you don't care to hear the answer to.

Because your arguments rely on broader issues to do with the nature of morality — Wayfarer

That's dumb. You'd raise the same questions no matter what moral position I was defending.

Learn to distinguish between normative claims and metaethical claims. My claim that antinatalism is true is a 'normative' claim. It is a claim about how we ought to behave. And the premises I appealed to are normative and can be assessed by whether or not they answer to what our reason tells us about these matters.

THe claim that morality is made of God's attitudes is a metaethical claim.

Now, FOCUS on the argument I made and stop trying to change the subject.

Look at the premises of my argument. DO any of them mention God? No. So you don't need to either.

Do you think that others do not deserve respect, good will and happiness? — Bartricks

Very cunning. If I don't agree with you, then I'm culpable, I believe the innocent ought to suffer.

It is incumbent on you to make a case. You're simply cashing out the generally-accepted notion of human rights - borne of the Christian social philosophy in large part- as it if is a natural law and an obvious conclusion. But you're not offering any grounds for that. Why does anyone deserve anything? And besides, in the Christian religion, there *is* a reason why the innocent come to harm, namely, the doctrine of original sin - you may not agree with it, but it is part of that framework, it provides a rationale for why humans are liable to suffer.

You said:

To procreate is to create a huge injustice. It is to create a debt that you know you can't pay. — Bartricks

Which I paraphrased as

why should anyone be born in the first place, given that life often sucks. — Wayfarer

And it is a direct paraphrase, it simply re-states the sentiment in different words.

Very cunning. If I don't agree with you, then I'm culpable, I believe the innocent ought to suffer. — Wayfarer

No. I am simply asking you to acknowledge that your reason confirms that innocent people deserve good will, respect, and happiness.

And they do not deserve to come to harm either, do they?

So, my premises are rock solid. They are extremely well confirmed by reason. You can deny them. Hell, you can claim that babies deserve to suffer. But you'd just be saying things that fly in the face of what our reason says. It'd be like insisting 3 + 4 = 78. It's just silly.

So, again, do babies deserve to suffer?

Answer: no.

Will they?

Answer: yes.

Do they deserve happiness?

Answer: yes

Will they live a happy harm-free life?

Answer: no.

It is incumbent on you to make a case. — Wayfarer

I did. See the OP.

You said:

To procreate is to create a huge injustice. It is to create a debt that you know you can't pay.
— Bartricks

Which I paraphrased as

why should anyone be born in the first place, given that life often sucks.
— Wayfarer

And it is a direct paraphrase, it simply re-states the sentiment in different words. — Wayfarer

No, you clearly don't understand what words mean. Don't try and paraphrase me. You don't have the comprehension skills necessary.

Typical of you - when argument fails, resort to ad hominems.

So, my premises are rock solid. — Bartricks

They are vacuous. Your op says nothing.

And they do not deserve to come to harm either, do they? — Bartricks

An innocent may fairly be said not to deserve coming to deliberate harm, and that is a moral issue for the person who deliberately harms and for society itself. It seems absurd to say that the idea that innocents do not deserve to come to harm tout court comes from God, when it is God as creator who purportedly created this world wherein innocents may indeed, due to misfortune, be harmed.

You're not taking account of the point that several have now made that innocents don't in any absolute sense deserve to be harmed or protected from all harm. Another point is that maybe we all need to experience some pain in order to grow and mature.

In any case as compassionate beings, we have a natural tendency to want to protect innocents from deliberate or even random 'bad luck' harm; we don't need to invoke the idea of deserving or not deserving to feel that.

Thinking in terms of deserving or not deserving is a category error when it is taken out of the context of what is earned and of reward and punishment.

. Note too that death is a harm, so your example is terrible. — Bartricks

So your argument is that we shouldn't live cause we will die? That's Antinatalist final argument? Then tell that from the beginning as to know not to take you seriously.

First, it is grotesquely implausible to suppose that someone will live without suffering any harm whatsoever until 14 — Bartricks

No it isn't.There are numerous cases .You find it impossible for 14 year old to have not experienced any actual harm? Make it even less then,10,6,5,2 you choose!
Except if falling from the bike and scratching your shoulder counts as "serious harm" for you. Cause sorry but that is what sounds idiot. Or even crying as a baby cause you want to eat ,maybe that counts as harm also for you then.

So we have to deprive ourselves from enjoying the life experience cause we can't be 100% happy all the time.Great.

And then there's death, which you seem to think doesn't constitute a harm even though it is probably the biggest harm of all. Innocent people deserve to die, do they? — Bartricks

All people die. What that has to do with being innocent or not? Innocent people should be immortals??So again your argument is that we shouldn't live at all cause one day we will die.So only if people were immortals we should procreate. Really solid premise. You are right.

You have failed. — Bartricks

Yeah sure, why not? if that makes you happy.

Anyway I have noticed other times in various threads that in general it's impossible for someone to discuss with you.
See the thread here for example. Whoever replied and disagreed with you(almost all by the way), you offended him immediately and started a fight. That says everything for the nudity of your arguments.

So, say which premise you are disputing and then explain how what you're saying raises a reasonable doubt about the premise in question. — Bartricks

The problem is that there is a deeper premise on which your premise is contingent. I didn't want to bring it up if i didn't have too, but it's the issue of free will. I just don't assume that people have that freedom no matter how much they FEEL they do. If we don't see eye to eye on that issue then any discussion beyond that is pointless and fruitless. For me it's not even a question, because of the biological imperative (survival and reproduction).

If i were to ignore the free will issue however i would have to consider the extreme conclusion of what you're suggesting. Your only criteria that i can gather is that according to your personal notions of morality we should preemptively "kill" or stop babies from being born because they will suffer. Taking if further now, what should we do with the rest of the people already and still existing? I assume you would think that many or all of these people will continue to harm themselves and others. According to your morality should we kill or eliminate those people, since it may not be moral to allow human suffering to exist in any way? Should the whole planet commit mass suicide?

You don't know or see the point of existence so you project your ignorance on to the world, and with your flawed understanding make final conclusions as to who should live or not. Sounds kinda "evil" don't you think. Isn't that the real cause of human evil and suffering in the world (imposed morality)? Your solution to life is death, which is not a solution but a negation of it.

Where or how do you get your morality? Do you really know what morality is, or do you just think you know for no god reason? Do you believe in God?

That doesn’t follow. If harm is caused by not having children, or being able to have children, then you are wrong. Many would claim that not having children can and is a greater harm than having children.

We could also rightly state that mass euthanasia would prevent all human harm eventually as there would be no more humans left to suffer. It is a bit like preventing someone from being murdered by killing them.

Evil lurks in the guise of ‘just deserts’.

Not only would mass euthanasia cease all current human suffering; it would prevent all future human suffering. Makes a ton of sense if we follow the logic of anti-natalism. There'd also be no more "non-consensual births." It's just a matter of picking the most painless gas. Humanity wiped out. Problem solved.

Ugh I get Bartricks frustration and turning aggressive. The ethics is NOT based on ends justifies the means reasoning. That’s in fact quite the opposite of the argument based on not using people.

Yeah same bro. See reply to sushi.

Thinking in terms of deserving or not deserving is a category error when it is taken out of the context of what is earned and of reward and punishment. — Janus

I think this argument can be subsumed in a more general one of simply not using people. That is to say, no one deserves to be harmed for X reasons, and unnecessarily, period.

If I decide that you NEED (whether you could tell me or not.. maybe I even have a hunch you would just love it) to play this game I think is really cool, and you are harmed by it (and I full well know that there are many harms in this game, often ones I didn't even expect that you would encounter) and it wasn't necessary to force you to play it, it was wrong.

Widening the scope a bit..
If I had a set of games you can CHOOSE from, but you could not get out of this choice other than death itself, that would still be wrong.

You can see where this is going in its parallels...

The idea of choice (illusory or otherwise), does not give procreation a pass, period.

Cake and eat it syndrome.

You speak just as much gibberish.

People do not deserve harm nor good. It is literally that simple. Jumping back and forth between some disembodied ‘ethics’ and then back into human reality as and when suits to avoid any criticism is why people just end up laughing and leaving the discussion because the discussion cannot begin if those posing some idea cannot grasp the most simplistic criticisms throw at their half-baked ideas.

It is WAY more frustrating to see literally dozens of people voice the same criticisms and those criticisms being ignored.

I can argue better for antinatalism than both of you combined. The question is have either yourself or batricks bothered to argue against antinatalism? I doubt it.

You speak just as much gibberish. — I like sushi

You can say whatever you want. Not true though.

People do not deserve harm nor good. — I like sushi

People don't deserve to unnecessarily be harmed..This implies not an impersonal thing, but by the action of others.....

people just end up laughing and leaving the discussion because the discussion cannot begin if those posing some idea cannot grasp the most simplistic criticisms throw at their half-baked ideas. — I like sushi

This is all rhetorical gibberish actually.

I can argue better for antinatalism than both of you combined. The question is have either yourself or batricks bothered to argue against antinatalism? I doubt it. — I like sushi

Big words little sushi..Prove it! :D.

Anyways, you guys make the bad arguments contra antinatalism again and again.. no reason for me to participate in what I see over and over.. Of course I anticipate the usual very predictable responses.. not hard.

But anyways, sushi-bro, the logic of moral reasoning has always been on the AN side.. It is the anti-ANs that are on poor footing.. All the moral intuitions that we usually apply to other areas of life are given a blind eye because procreation is a strong preference for many people.. and it is so engrained in our cultural practices and is a natural consequence of a pleasurable activity, so seems to give the impression of some sort of permissible act.

Again, the moral reasoning is in ANs favor.. Unnecessarily harming people and using them (For an agenda/purpose) is always wrong. Procreation doesn't get a pass. You can try to make rhetorical games to discredit the arguer (ad hom), but when it comes to the actual reasoning, you can't get around it. You can give non-analogous examples, you can obfuscate.. but it's all BS tactics to try to get out of it.

Evasion again in response to the first point. People DO NOT derserve either harm nor good. Agree or not? If not why? If you do then why are you focused on harm being deserved rather than good?

I will write something arguing for antinatalism. You will probably be able to follow it but batricks will be left a gibbering wreck I expect … am I being ‘mean’ and causing ‘harm’ by saying so? Who is the judge here? That is the underlying issue.

Anyway, until I write it have fun not having fun or have no fun having fun. Whatever just don’t expect others to sit idle when people are punching themselves in the face and hitting ‘innocent’ bystanders too.

If we all stopped wasting time here the whole place would grind to a halt. :lol: — Wayfarer

:smirk:

Thinking in terms of deserving or not deserving is a category error when it is taken out of the context of what is earned and of reward and punishment. — Janus

:up:

It is a bit like preventing someone from being murdered by killing them. — I like sushi

:up:

I think this argument can be subsumed in a more general one of simply not using people. That is to say, no one deserves to be harmed for X reasons, and unnecessarily, period. — schopenhauer1

Except the bolded is not an argument. It's just a statement. Therein lies the basic problem. You keep just declaring this moral rule to be the case, but it clearly isn't, literally everyone here is disagreeing with you about it, they clearly don't feel that way, so your assertion that it's a moral instinct is clearly false.

Even if we take a less controversial moral instinct about risking harm, conception is an exception. It's the only situation in which there is going to be a person, but isn't one yet. Because it's an exception, a unique set of circumstances, you can't just say the same rules apply to it as apply to other, categorically, different situations, you have to show that they do. But they self-evidently don't. Most people think having children is morally fine.

People DO NOT derserve either harm nor good. Agree or not? If not why? If you do then why are you focused on harm being deserved rather than good? — I like sushi

Not even my argument. People DO NOT deserve to be UNNECESSARILY harmed.. In other words, there's no good reason to harm that person (other than let's say AN AGENDA..aka using that person because YOU think you know what's best to happen to THEM).

As for "good" side of the equation... As some sort of purpose of the universe, no one "needs" to experience good. However, in a relative sense.. it is better to experience good than bad, as is obvious.

Anyway, until I write it have fun not having fun or have no fun having fun. Whatever just don’t expect others to sit idle when people are punching themselves in the face and hitting ‘innocent’ bystanders too. — I like sushi

Don't know what you're getting at. Are you saying, not to unnecessarily harm people? Actually, I probably don't care what you're getting at cause it probably won't be pertinent.

Except the bolded is not an argument. It's just a statement. Therein lies the basic problem. You keep just declaring this moral rule to be the case, but it clearly isn't, literally everyone here is disagreeing with you about it, they clearly don't feel that way, so your assertion that it's a moral instinct is clearly false. — Isaac

What, did you go to Mean Girls school.. Everyone's coloring their hair today, so should I.. Ridiculous.

Or perhaps it's more of a Carrie situation.."They're all going to laugh at you!".

The point is it is the MISAPPLICATION to procreation of a moral intuition. Did you read the article I sent going into greater detail about this?

It is a moral intuition.. Look again at the example I gave:

If I decide that you NEED (whether you could tell me or not.. maybe I even have a hunch you would just love it) to play this game I think is really cool, and you are harmed by it (and I full well know that there are many harms in this game, often ones I didn't even expect that you would encounter) and it wasn't necessary to force you to play it, it was wrong.

Widening the scope a bit..
If I had a set of games you can CHOOSE from, but you could not get out of this choice other than death itself, that would still be wrong.

You can see where this is going in its parallels...

The idea of choice (illusory or otherwise), does not give procreation a pass, period. — schopenhauer1

The articulation of that moral intuition is to not use people for your/an agenda.. Harming someone unnecessarily is certainly doing so.

The point is it is the MISAPPLICATION to procreation of a moral intuition. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I get that that's your point. It's just completely wrong.

It clearly isn't moral intuition - people disagree with you, so it can't be intuitive, can it.

It clearly isn't misapplied. People have children all the time and virtually no one judges it to be moral problem, so the application (to this unique circumstance) is clearly faultless.

Unless you're reaching for some magical, or supernatural source of moral rules, you've got nothing to go on to judge intuition other than how people actually behave.

If you make the most basic behaviour of humans immoral, it's your judgement of moral intuition that's wrong, not humanity.

Yes, I get that that's your point. It's just completely wrong. — Isaac

Did you read the article? Shall I quote from it?

It clearly isn't misapplied. People have children all the time and virtually no one judges it to be moral problem, so the application (to this unique circumstance) is clearly faultless. — Isaac

That's the damn problem! Misapplication.. Because "people" do things "all the time" doesn't exempt the misapplication.

Unless you're reaching for some magical, or supernatural source of moral rules, you've got nothing to go on to judge intuition other than how people actually behave. — Isaac

Cool, I guess I will quote extensively then since you can't be bothered to learn.

Introduction
I am a moral particularist and an antinatalist. That is, I believe in the inherent variability
of moral valences, and I believe that, exceptional circumstances aside, acts of human
procreation are most likely wrong.
At first glance this seems like an odd combination of views. Most acts of human procreation appear to be morally permissible to most people. Other things being equal, this is
excellent evidence that this is precisely what they are. Even if I can locate in them many
features that in other contexts seem typically to operate as wrong-makers—and this is
exactly what I will be doing in what follows—the fact that procreative acts themselves appear morally permissible suggests that those features are not operating as wrong-makers
in the context of procreative acts in particular. So, of all plausible views about the nature
of ethics, moral particularism seems especially inhospitable to antinatalism.
However, I shall argue that such appearances are deceptive. The widespread intuition
that, in the main, procreative acts are morally permissible, lacks any real probative force.
By contrast, there is no similar reason to believe the same thing about the intuitions that
find many of the features of procreative acts to be wrong-makers. As this is now our most
reliable source of insight into the ethics of human procreation, I conclude that it is most
likely immoral.

Moral Particularism
I call myself a normative particularist because I am at present convinced that any consideration that generates a positive normative reason—which I, in line with most others,
would characterize as a favoring of doing or believing something—in one context can
just as easily generate a negative normative reason—a disfavoring—in another, and no
favoring or disfavoring at all in others. That is, to put it in the terminology that some
prefer, a consideration that has a positive normative valence in one context can have a
negative normative valence in another, and no normative valence whatsoever in others.
By itself this does not entail normative particularism, because it is consistent with this
thesis that there may be a rigid pattern to how any particular feature’s normative valence
behaves, such that one could, in principle, formulate rules that describe it.1
But, and for me this is essential to being a normative particularist, I believe there is no necessity to any pattern there may be. That is, there is both no necessity to there being a pattern—so though there may be a pattern, there does not have to be—but even if there is a pattern, it
does not have to be rigid across time and space. Normative patterns, if patterns there be,
are always contingent, not necessary. So, even if consideration P seems to have a negative
normative valence in every situation we can conceive of, this does not entail that it must
do so, and will always and everywhere continue to do so.2

For clarity, consider an analogy. Put aside the favoring relations constitutive of moral
and other normative reasons and consider instead the favoring relations constituted by
my (or your) attitudes toward things. There is normally going to be a loose-ish pattern
to them, though one shot through with exceptions. For example, in the main I like chili
because, in most cases, adding chili to a dish leads me to like it more. But it is not as if
I have to like a dish more just because chili has been added to it. There are some dishes
to which adding chili has the reverse effect—its presence makes me like the dish less, or
not at all. And there is an amount of chili which, if added to almost any dish, will make
me dislike it. Nevertheless, there remains a pattern of sorts to when I like and do not like
chili and, as such, it seems true to characterize me as someone who likes chili, because
typically I do. There is no necessity to any of my tastes—they can and have changed—
and I am not being inconsistent if I like chili in one dish and not in another, or if I like
chili one day and not the next. So I am a particularist regarding my own favorings and
disfavorings. Yet this doesn’t stop me, or anyone else, from being able to make informed
judgments about what I might like—it doesn’t stop anyone from making statistical generalizations, or inferring that I will most likely enjoy dish p because I enjoyed dish q, and
dish q seemed relevantly analogous to p.

I think everything I have said about my favorings is also true of the favorings constitutive
of normative reasons, and thus of moral reasons.3
We are primarily aware of normative
reasons through a faculty of rational intuition—we call it “our reason” or “intuition”—
and the job of work of our theories is, I think, to characterize the clearest and most
widely corroborated deliverances of our reason, other things being equal. As a moral
particularist, moral reasoning about difficult and unclear cases—cases where rational

intuitions conflict, or are unclear or untrustworthy—is akin to the kind of reasoning a
good chef might engage in when trying to devise an original menu for someone whose
tastes he/she has a fairly good grasp of. The chef will have to make informed judgments
about what to concoct, based on their understanding of the client’s attitudes toward other
dishes. The chef will no doubt try and build a mental picture of the client’s taste personality and use this as an imaginative simulation against which to test proposed dishes and
flavor combinations. But no matter how careful the reasoning, the proof of the pudding
is going to remain in the eating.
Likewise then, though I am a normative particularist—and so, by extension, a moral
particularist—this does not mean I deny that there is any kind of pattern whatever to
the normative aspect to reality, nor does it mean I deny that we can make statistical generalizations based on how some feature or features have behaved in other contexts. Just
as the fact I typically like a savory dish more when chili has been added to it gives me
default but defeasible reason to believe I will like dish p more if some chili is added to it,
so too the fact that typically consideration X has, intuitively, operated as a wrong-maker
in those actions in which it has featured gives us some default but defeasible reason to
believe that it will operate as a wrong-maker in some other action in which it is featuring. But if it appears, intuitively, not to be doing so, then, other things being equal, that
is good evidence that it is not doing so in this particular context.

Typical Wrong-Makers
In this section I will describe numerous features possessed by (typical) procreative
acts, and will draw attention to the fact that in other contexts these features seem,
at least in the main, to operate with negative moral valences.4
That does not, of
course, entail that they operate with negative moral valences in the context of procreative acts—not given the truth of moral particularism, anyway. Nevertheless,
the fact they typically operate with a negative moral valence makes it reasonable to
suppose that they will operate this way elsewhere as well, other things being equal.
Again, and to stress, other things may not be equal in the case of procreative acts.
But whether this is the case will be the matter addressed in the subsequent section
and not this one. The point of this section is simply to highlight that a) procreative
acts standardly possess all of these features and b) these features typically operate
as moral negatives.

Consent
No one gives their prior consent to be born. To procreate is therefore inevitably to
subject someone to a life. And to subject someone to a life is, fairly obviously, to have
subjected them to something very significant. To procreate is therefore to subject
someone to something of great significance.
In other contexts, the fact an act will significantly affect another person without their
prior consent typically operates as a powerful wrong-making feature of such deeds.

For example, if someone has not consented to have sex with you—a significant activity—then, other things being equal, that generates a powerful moral reason not to
have sex with that person.

It should also be noted that even when an act is likely to benefit the affected party, an
absence of prior consent still seems, in the main, to operate negatively. For instance,
if you hack into my bank account and start gambling with my money, then even if
you make me a fortune, the fact you did not have my prior consent to do so seems
to be an ethical negative. And this seems to remain the case even where consent is
not possible, and even when the act seems overall justified. For example, imagine an
unconscious patient needs an arm removed if they are not to die of septicemia. Due
to their unconsciousness, they cannot consent. Strange circumstances aside, it is no
doubt morally justifiable to remove the arm because of the great harm that would
befall the person otherwise. Nevertheless, the absence of prior consent still seems to
operate negatively in this context, for it is regrettable that consent was not possible
and it would have been better had it been given. It is just that in this case the positive
moral valence possessed by the fact removing the arm will prevent the person from
dying outweighed the negative moral valence of the fact they did not consent to it.

Of course, it is “in principle” possible to consent to have one’s arm removed in a way
that it is not even in principle possible to consent to be created. But affecting another
significantly without their prior consent seems to operate negatively even in cases
where consent is more robustly impossible. For instance, if I want someone to work
for me against their will, then clearly the very nature of what I want prevents me
from getting anyone to consent to it. Yet this doesn’t mean it is ethically okay for me
to make someone work for me against their will. Other things being equal, it would
be wrong to make someone work for me against their will, and wrong in no small
part because it would involve significantly affecting someone without their prior
consent. The fact it was impossible to get their prior consent does not seem to alter
this.

It would seem, then, that the fact an act will significantly affect another without
their prior consent is a fact that can reasonably be expected to operate with a negative moral valence in an act that features it, other things being equal. As has already
been noted, procreative acts possess this feature. Yes, it is not possible to give one’s
prior consent to be created, but we have already seen that in other contexts this
does not seem to alter the negativity of this feature’s moral valence. And yes, maybe
procreative acts are ones that are likely to benefit most of those they affect. But we
have also seen that in other contexts this does not seem to alter the negativity of this
feature’s moral valence either. In summary, then, procreative acts subject someone
to a life—which is a very significant thing to do to someone—and they do so without
the prior consent of the affected party. In other contexts to subject someone to something significant—even when consent is not possible, and even when it is likely to
be overall beneficial to them—seems to operate with a negative moral valence. And
thus if other things are equal, we have reason to believe it operates with a negative
moral valence in the context of procreative acts as well.5
Harm
Living a life is a job of work, and a considerable one at that. Granted, the odds are
that most parts of the job will be enjoyed by most of those who have been made to
do them (though there is absolutely no guarantee of this). But by no means is all of
the work pleasant. Indeed, large parts of the job are extremely painful, demeaning,
undignified, and frightening.
For instance, it begins badly. We emerge naked and screaming from the nether regions of another person. A less dignified way of beginning one’s career here is hard
to imagine. And then we find ourselves ignorant, uncultured, and unsophisticated.
We cannot feed or clothe ourselves for a considerable period of time, and will be dependent on the goodwill of others for our survival for many years. To stand any real
chance of thriving in the rest of our lives, we will need to be forced to endure years of
careful, dedicated schooling by a host of experts. And for many of us our ignorance
and dependency will return once more at the other end of life, as our bodies start
degenerating. And whether our bodies go to wrack and ruin or not, nearly all of us
will live in fear of this happening.

There is also the indignity of not knowing what our lives are about, if anything, and
yet being addicted to living them. Most of us would do virtually anything—including the most degrading of things—to stay alive. This, it seems to me, is an indignity
and therefore a harm. Life is a gift, it is said. But it is a gift in the way that injecting
someone with heroin and then providing them with a lifetime’s supply of the drug
is a gift.
Furthermore, and as anyone who has lived here for any period of time knows only
too well, this world is an extremely dangerous place. It contains large numbers of
murderers, rapists, and thieves and even greater numbers of lower-level mean-spirited, ungenerous, unkind people. It also contains almost every conceivable disease
and disaster. They happen all the time and they befall people largely arbitrarily, at
least from the perspective of justice. And as such it is practically impossible to avoid
these harms.
And anyone who lives here will, it seems, eventually die. So they will become invested in a life, and then they will lose it. And they will become invested in other people,
and then they will lose them.
I do not wish to catalog any further the harms that we all know lie in wait for anyone living a life. The point here is that there are many of them and that, other things
being equal, the fact that an act will subject another person to many harms is a fact
about an act that, typically, operates with a negative moral valence. The fact that
stepping on your toe will cause you the harm of pain provides me with a moral reason not to step on your toe. Likewise, then, the fact that procreative acts will subject
another to a catalog of harms of the kind mentioned above, and others besides, is a
fact that—other things being equal—can be expected to generate moral reason not
to perform the act in question.

Of course, life also contains many benefits. We fall in love with people it is good for
us to fall in love with, we enjoy ourselves a lot of the time (if we are lucky), and we
witness much beautiful scenery and often perform good deeds and exhibit fine character traits. And if an act promotes these sorts of benefits, then that is a fact about it
that, typically anyway, operates with a positive moral valence.
But importantly there seems to be an asymmetry between benefits and harms here.
Consider: if I know that, were I to have a child, the child’s life would be one characterized by intense suffering, then—other things being equal—that fact seems to
generate a powerful moral reason not to have a child. That is, it operates as a wrong-

maker, and, other things being equal, it would be wrong for me to create that child.
But by contrast, if I know that, were I to have a child, the child’s life would be characterized by intense joy, then—other things being equal—that does not seem to generate a positive obligation to have the child.
There are different diagnoses one might offer of this quandary. The most influential
has been offered by David Benatar, who draws the moral that absent benefits are not
bad unless there is someone for whom they constitute a deprivation, whereas—by
contrast—absent harms are good even though there may be no one for whom they
are a benefit.6

But for my purposes here it is enough that we merely note that though
procreative acts create benefits to those whom they create, in this particular context—that is, in the context of acts that create the person that they affect, as opposed
to acts that affect an already existing person—this fact does not seem to operate as a
right-maker. That is, the benefits contained in a potential life do not seem to generate moral reason to create the life in question. By contrast, the harms contained in a
potential life do seem to generate moral reasons not to create the life.
....... — Gerald K. Harrison- Antinatalism and Moral Particularism

There is no Ad Hom. I am quite capable of calling someone a complete cunt and yet taking their argument as an argument detached from said cunt.

They are vacuous. Your op says nothing. — Wayfarer

How are they vacuous?

It's not vacuous to say that a person who has done nothing is innocent and thus does not deserve to come to any harm. Such claims are basic.

And it is beyond a reasonable doubt that this world does not offer such a life to anyone. Thus, procreating creates an injustice. That just follows.

And we shouldn't create injustices, should we? You shouldn't create an undeserved harm, should you? And 'all' the harms that come from living here are undeserved because no one who is created is born deserving to suffer them.

There's nothing vacuous in the argument. You're just not addressing it, perhaps because its premises are beyond dispute.

So your argument is that we shouldn't live cause we will die? That's Antinatalist final argument? Then tell that from the beginning as to know not to take you seriousl — dimosthenis9

THe argument is in the OP. You people seem to have all the intellectual focus of a sparrow. The argument is that people are created innocent and thus deserve no harm at all. Death is one of the many harms that a life here subjects a person to. But any and all harms are undeserved if an innocent person suffers them. Christ, this really isn't difficult.

Now, which premise do you dispute? Do you think we are not created innocent? Or do you think we are and simply do not grasp the concept of innocence and thus do not understand that an innocent person does not deserve to come to any harm? Or are you incapable of seeing what follows from what?

Except if falling from the bike and scratching your shoulder counts as "serious harm" for you. — dimosthenis9

Life is full of harms and the risk of harm. Some are certain - such as death - and some not. But that a person will be subject to a great many harms in a lifetime is true beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course, recognizing that requires that one be reasonable, which you clearly aren't.

People like to do the old switcheroo and pretend that all harm in life is trivial harm. But only when debating against antinatalism :roll:.

The problem is that there is a deeper premise on which your premise is contingent. I didn't want to bring it up if i didn't have too, but it's the issue of free will. I just don't assume that people have that freedom no matter how much they FEEL they do. If we don't see eye to eye on that issue then any discussion beyond that is pointless and fruitless. For me it's not even a question, because of the biological imperative (survival and reproduction). — punos

My argument does not assume free will. Free will is something a person needs if they're to be able to affect what they deserve. And free will enables a person to make themselves deserve to come to harm. But the newly created have done nothing. So, if they have free will, then they do not deserve to come to harm for they have yet to do anything that could incur a desert of harm. And if they do not have free will, then they do not deserve to come to harm either. Either way they do not deserve to come to harm.

I would only be assuming free will if my argument asserted that some people deserve to come to harm. But no premise in my argument makes any such assertion.

Your only criteria that i can gather is that according to your personal notions of morality we should preemptively "kill" or stop babies from being born because they will suffer. — punos

How the hell do you get that from what I argued?!? I don't think we should kill babies! That's absurd. They don't deserve to die. Christ! Have you not been following this at all? They do not deserve to die. No one innocent does. So, one does wrong in creating them....for they are going to die, aren't they? But once created, you don't kill them! That would be to make a bad situation a thousand times worse! Think. It. Through.

An analogy to show you just how appallingly you're reasoning. Let's say there's an island with dangerous lions and tigers on it. I argue that you shouldn't send an innocent child to that island, as it's incredibly dangerous there and it's inevitable that the child will eventually be eaten by a lion or tiger. You respond "Oh, so you're saying that we should feed children to lions? That if there's a child on the island, we should feed it to a lion?" Unbelievable.