So you understand, then, that an exclusively evolutionary story about our development isn't correct? — Bartricks

I understand you are saying it. I see you presenting no evidence.

and note, I didn't mention God once during that explanation — Bartricks

It's incredible that you think this is a positive and not the glaring hilarity that it is.

"I didn't mention God one single time in the entirity of my argument. This is how I came to the conclusion that God is necessary for evolution. This is how arguments work. I am very smart".

Dunning-Kruger in full effect :point:

I use word i no understand. I think it mean being in France. But I not sure. I use anyway. I am be clever. I using wordings I not know meaning of. That clever.

No, I was simply pointing out that God is mentioned in the solution to the puzzle, not the setting-up of the puzzle.
But you don't even understand the puzzle. So we're really not off to a good start, are we? You just saw the word God and thought "God is bad. I no like God. I no understand argument. But I no like God. I will say my thoughts"

No, I was simply pointing out that God is mentioned in the solution to the puzzle, not the setting-up of the puzzle. — Bartricks

I couldn't care less about the setting-up of the puzzle because it's clear that neither do you. The "solution" has exactly nothing to do with the set up. This is something you admitted as a point of pride!

So who do you think is the better qualified of the two of us on this subject? Me or you?

For example, how familiar are you with the literature on evolutionary debunking arguments?

Describe the puzzle

It is literally irrelevant - not to me, to you.

But I think you don't even know what it is. I think you just saw the word God and then decided to say some stuff. You didn't take the time to understand the puzzle, did you? Now that's naughty.

And it isn't irrelevant. It's what this thread is about. The thread you're happily derailing.

Ok, if it makes you feel better about making things up, I'll let you have it.

Read the OP then.

Do you understand what a self-refuting argument is?

Anyway, quick reminder that the only relevant part of this OP is this and it is hilarity itself:

Well, the case for evolution by natural selection presupposes that there are reasons to believe things. And reasons to believe things require God. Sorry, but they do. — Bartricks

Well, the case for evolution by natural selection presupposes that there are reasons to believe things. — Bartricks

Do you understand why this bit is true?

It doesn't matter. Because it doesn't matter in your OP. Because you followed it up with a non-sequitur pulled from your arse. It's name is God.

Do you understand what a self-refuting argument is? — Bartricks

Yes, I do.

Great OP!

Our brains look like they've adapted to something and that something is an external world. Ergo, there is an external world. Why would our brains have to calibrate themselves to their own creation? They could've simply modded it to suit their own nature, idiosyncracies and all. In other words why is there dukkha (dissatisfaction) if it isn't the case that there is an external world independent of our brains/minds?

:snicker:

Intuitions are more harmful than helpful when it comes to truths but the converse is true when it comes to survival (re cognitive biases). My hunch is that certain patterns in our thinking gave some of us an edge over the others and these subroutines were automated, occuring subconsciously rather than consciously, in order to enhance its benefits (to our wellbeing).

Paradoxically, irrational folks should live longer, healthier, and happier lives than rational peeps. If not then the mad and the foolish should have thrilling albeit shorter and unhealthier lives. It's a tradeoff you see. :grin:

I'm off-topic aren't I? Oh well!

I'm off-topic aren't I? Oh well! — Agent Smith

Yes. What I am doing is raising a well-known puzzle and then suggesting how to solve it.

What's the puzzle? The puzzle is that an evolutionary explanation of our rational intuitions seems to debunk them. Why? Because we seem able to provide an explanation of why we are disposed to get such intuitions without having to suppose that what they're intuitions 'of' actually exist.

Compare this to sight. Does an evolutionary explanation of the development of our faculties of sight debunk that faculty? No, because our evolutionary explanation will mention what our sight gives us apparent awareness of. Humans who saw the lions in the field would not picnic in that field. Thus those humans would be the ones more likely to survive long enough to procreate. We actually have to posit what the sight gives us an awareness of in order to explain its adaptive value. So, that's a vindicatory explanation. The evolutionary explanation of how sight developed does not give us grounds to think it is not telling us about anything real. On the contrary, it provides us with reason to think it does tell us about something real.

Compare sight to a disposition to believe in gods and afterlives. Well, a plausible evolutionary explanation can be provided of such a disposition. Those who believe in gods and afterlives are likely to be happier than those who do not and are better motivated to behave morally, which in turn will increase their likelihood of creating trusting relationships and so on, all of which is likely to enhance one's chances of successfully reproducing people who will in turn successfully reproduce.

Is that a vindicatory explanation of the disposition to believe in gods and afterlives? No, for we have not had to posit any actual gods or afterlives. Thus the disposition's adaptive value does not turn crucially on the existence of what it is a disposition to believe in. And this means that the evolutionary explanation debunks the beliefs that were formed in this way. We can explain why humans are disposed to believe in gods and afterlives without having to suppose there are actually any gods or afterlives.

Those are just standard examples of vindicatory evolutionary explanations and debunking evolutionary explanations. When it comes to the development of faculties of awareness or faculties of belief formation, a 'vindicatory' explanation is one where we need to posit what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of (or belief in) in order to explain its development. A 'debunking' explanation is one where we do not have to posit what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of (or belief in) in order to explain its development.

Now for the puzzle: when it comes to our faculty of reason the evolutionary explanation seems to be a debunking one, not a vindicatory one. We seem able to explain why we developed a faculty that produces in us the belief that we have reason to believe things without having to suppose that there are actually any reasons to believe things in reality. So we can explain the development of the faculty without having to suppose the reality of what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of.

Yet that now means that we've undermined our own case, as any case for anything depends on there being actual reasons to believe things (not the mere belief in such things).

I hadn't ever thought of an evolutionary debunking argument against reason itself, but I think you present a good case for it. I posted here a while back about the metaphysics of reason/logic (what "reasons" do we have to trust reason?), which got me thinking about this, albeit in a tangential way. I do think the theist has a strong answer to this question that the naturalist does not, which is that we were born into a universe that is rationally intelligible, and through our use of reason we can understand it. In fact, while typing this, I found this quote from the IEP:

Aquinas [influenced by Plato and, perhaps even more so, Aristotle] and others grounded the scholastic synthesis of knowledge in the view that truth, morality, and God himself could be known by reason because the divine will itself is guided by reason. What is reasonable is therefore what is true and right.

My guess is Kant had something similar to say about reason.

I think maybe this is where foundationalism comes in with saying we need to have properly basic beliefs to avoid infinite regress, with perhaps a trust in the process of reason being one of those.

Because we seem able to provide an explanation of why we are disposed to get such intuitions without having to suppose that what they're intuitions 'of' actually exist. — Bartricks

But such intuitions are rooted in sensory faculties which tell about something external. A sensory faculty, by definition, senses something outside itself; they tell us of the external world. An intuition is about something sensed and therefore about an external world.

We seem able to explain why we developed a faculty that produces in us the belief that we have reason to believe things without having to suppose that there are actually any reasons to believe things in reality. — Bartricks

There is a reason to believe things, and it is that sensory faculties tell us exclusively about something external to the sensory faculty. No matter the nature of the external, the sensory faculty necessarily tells us about something external.

Yes, I think those others are talking about the reliability of our faculty of reason in telling us about the non-rational world. So our reason tells us what to believe (and what to do). And their point - or the gist of their point - is that the faculty would need to be designed in order to reliably do that (or that the world would need to be designed to answer to it, or some such).

But their points seem fundamentally different to mine. I hope so anyway, for I think their cases are undermined by evolutionary accounts. There seems no problem in explaining how a faculty that reliably generated accurate - or fairly accurate - beliefs about any external reality there may be would be selected for. There does not need to be a designer, evolution by natural selection alone will explain what needs to be explained on that front. I think their cases are quite weak, then.

My case is quite different. My focus is on reasons themselves, rather than the reliability of the faculty that tells us about them. The evolutionary account of the development of our faculty leaves us with no need to posit any actual reasons corresponding to the intuitions that the faculty generates. Thus, an evolutionary account of our faculty of reason - even if it succeeds in explaining how such a faculty would generate accurate beliefs about the material world - would leave us not having to posit any actual reasons. And thus we should not posit them. Which then means that we have a self-refuting case. We can't really explain why such a faculty would be selected for if we end up having to conclude that there's no reason to believe anything.

What this tells us, I think, is that evolutionary accounts presuppose not just an external world, but also presuppose the reality of reasons. And thus an evolutionary account must not challenge the reality of what it presupposes, else it will be incoherent.

It's not actually clear to me what a naturalist analysis of reasons would amount to (to the discredit of the naturalist, of course). If the naturalist is someone who believes that among the natural features of the world are reasons, then their account will certainly fall foul of the evolutionary explanation, for there would be no need to posit such strange things. The naturalist will therefore find themselves with an incoherent position.

The same would apply to the non-naturalist about reasons. Again, there would be no need to posit such things.

The only exception is my kind of divine command theory of reasons. For if reasons are the attitudes of God, then we have independent reason to think that God would provide us with a faculty of reason that would tell us fairly reliably about the superficial nature of the world we are living in.

But such intuitions are rooted in sensory faculties which tell about something external. A sensory faculty, by definition, senses something outside itself; they tell us of the external world. An intuition is about something sensed and therefore about an external world. — Daniel

First, our senses are impotent to 'tell' us anything about anything. It is our reason that tells us to suppose our sensations are 'of' things. That is, the 'representing' is done by our reason. It is our reason that tells us to suppose that colour sensations are of something out there that is coloured and shaped, and so on.

Second, our faculty of reason or intuition represents us to have reasons to do and believe things. And it is those - those reasons - that I am talking about. One must not confuse an intuition with what it is an intuition of. One can give purely evolutionary accounts of the development of the intuitions. The problem is that one can do so without having to posit any reasons themselves. And thus the explanation will debunk those intuitions.

The result: one will have to conclude that there are no reasons to do or believe anything in reality. There are just impressions of such things. But the things themselves - the reasons - do not exist.

And that's incoherent. For concluding something is to do as one thinks Reason bids. Someone who thinks they have reason to believe there are no reasons seems confused.

There is a reason to believe things, and it is that sensory faculties tell us exclusively about something external to the sensory faculty. No matter the nature of the external, the sensory faculty necessarily tells us about something external. — Daniel

You are confusing the basis upon which we have a reason to believe something with the reason itself.

We do indeed have reason to believe what our senses are telling us (though note, they tell us nothing in themselves, it is our reason that tells us what to make of them). I have not denied this. My point is that if one gives a purely evolutionary account of how we have come to believe we have reason to believe things one will not have to posit any actual reasons.

I gave an example: if you can explain why people are disposed to believe in God without having to posit God, then that explanation debunks those beliefs, doesn't it? (it doesn't debunk belief in God, just beliefs in God formed by that disposition). It doesn't vindicate them. It gives one reason to think there's no God, for we can explain the belief in God without having to posit God.

Now, the same applies to reasons to believe things - indeed, all reasons to do and believe things - if one gives a purely evolutionary explanation of why we are disposed to believe there are reasons to do and believe things.

Now for the puzzle: when it comes to our faculty of reason the evolutionary explanation seems to be a debunking one, not a vindicatory one. We seem able to explain why we developed a faculty that produces in us the belief that we have reason to believe things without having to suppose that there are actually any reasons to believe things in reality. So we can explain the development of the faculty without having to suppose the reality of what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of.

Yet that now means that we've undermined our own case, as any case for anything depends on there being actual reasons to believe things (not the mere belief in such things). — Bartricks

Oh! So, you mean to say that just because we have the
faculty of reason it doesn't necessarily follow that there are any real reasons (to believe anything). An intriguing statement based on the example you gave, which drives the point home viz. our proclivity to believe in god(s) doesn't imply the actual existence of god(s).

Your thesis, if it is yours, jibes with what Brian Greene says in an interview (paraphrasing): The brain evolved for survival, but truth and survival are different things. Hence also my view that so-called cognitive biases & fallacies (thinkos) have a purpose viz. to keep us alive (only) long enough to reproduce & care for our progeny till they too attain puberty-adulthood; post that these flaws in reasoning tend to be a liability. Mind you, this is my opinion; I don't have anything to back it up.

Oh! So, you mean to say that just because we have the
faculty of reason it doesn't necessarily follow that there are any real reasons (to believe anything). — Agent Smith

Yes. That you have the impression or belief that there is a reason to do something does not entail that there is. The reason and the impression of the reason are distinct, just as an impression of a tree and a tree are different.

which drives the point home viz. our proclivity to believe in god(s) doesn't imply the actual existence of god(s) — Agent Smith

That's not what I said. I said that if we can provide an explanation of the development of a disposition to believe in God without having to posit God himself, then that explanation debunks the belief. That is, it gives us grounds for thinking that the belief is false, or at least that we have no reason to think it true.

Another example: I jab a pencil in my ear and I start hearing a ringing sound. Now, what's the best explanation of why I am hearing a ringing sound? That something is ringing out there in the world? No. The best explanation is that I am hearing a ringing sound because I jabbed a pencil in my ear. That explanation makes no mention of any actual ringing out there in the world. And thus it debunks the impression. I am getting the auditory impression that there's a loud ringing in the room I am in, but because this impression is a product of me pushing a pencil into my ear I now have grounds to think the impression is false: there is no ringing in the room, there is just a pencil in ear.

Now, does that mean that I am saying that if one gets an auditory impression of a ringing sound that this does not imply that there is any ringing going on?

No. On the contrary, if one gets the auditory impression of a ringing sound the default is that this is excellent evidence that there is some ringing going on.

And likewise, if one finds that one has an intuition that God exists, that is default excellent evidence that God exists.

But if - if - we can provide an evolutionary account of that intuition that makes no mention of God himself, then we would have debunked the credibility of the intuition.

So, you get a ringing impression. That gives you default reason to believe that there is some ringing going on out there in the world. You then remember that you just jabbed a pencil in your ear. That information provides you with reason to believe that there is no actual ringing going on corresponding to your impression, but that your impression is false as it is the product of a pencil stabbing and not the product of any sound 'out there'.

The puzzle arises becasue we can give an evolutionary account of the development of our faculty of reason without having to posit any actual reasons. And thus such an account debunks our impressions and beliefs that we have reasons to do and believe things. Yet we have to presuppose that there really are reasons to believe things. So the atheist who believes they have reason to believe in evolution by natural selection has an incoherent set of beliefs. They believe there is reason to believe in evolution by natural selection, yet if evolution by natural selection alone (unassisted by God, that is) is true, then there are no reasons to believe anything.

Can you give an example of one of these reasons you talk about. The most simple you can think of. To be honest after reading and re-reading many of your posts, I just don't understand what your point is.

A reason to believe something is known as a 'normative' reason or 'justifying' reason. You want examples? Well, you have reason to believe you exist, don't you? That is, you don't just believe it, you think there's reason to believe it, yes? Well, that's what I am talking about. Those: reasons to believe things.

Consider these two statements: a) there are trees; b) there is reason to believe there are trees.

Those aren't equivalent, are they? One is about trees, the other is about what I am talking about: reasons to believe things.

Note, the entire of philosophy is concerned with them. Philosophy is the enterprise of trying to figure out what we have reason to believe (including what we have reason to believe about reasons to believe things)

A reason to believe something is not under evolutionary constraint directly, I think. If I understand correctly, these reasons you mention are complex traits, meaning they are the result of many things working together. A reason is not a single entity, but a collection of things. The fear of fire is your experience of the shape of fire, your experience of the colour of fire, your experience of heat, your experience of pain cause by hot stuff, etc. Fear of fire is not shaped by evolution. The molecular machinery that allows you to see, feel, smell fire is.

Give me a reason you believe you are alive. Don't reply to my previous post.

A reason to believe something is not under evolutionary constraint directly, I think. If I understand correctly, these reasons you mention are complex traits, meaning they are the result of many things working together. A reason is not a single entity, but a collection of things. The fear of fire is your experience of the shape of fire, your experience of the colour of fire, your experience of heat, your experience of pain cause by hot stuff, etc. Fear of fire is not shaped by evolution. The molecular machinery that allows you to see, feel, smell fire is. — Daniel

You are confusing intuitions and beliefs with what they're intuitions of and/or beliefs about.

What we can provide an evolutionary explanation of are the intuitions and beliefs.

An evolutionary explanation of the intuition that we have reason to believe things is not an explanation of why we have reason to believe things.

That would be akin to thinking that an evolutionary explanation of why people believe in God is an explanation of God.

Give me a reason you believe you are alive.