It's valid, but only true if the second premiss can be demonstrated.P; P only if Q; therefore Q.
Electrons and protons and photons explain why we see what we do, but they are not the what we see. The what we see is an emergent phenomena, brought about by a causal chain involving a multitude of these subatomic particles. — Michael
But it's a model of a cup, so there must be a cup for it to be a model of, it is not this actual cup which directs our behaviour, it's the model (it must be, otherwise we couldn't account for those errors). So when I say "pass me the cup" I'm referring to the actual cup, but I'm using my model of the cup to do so. — Isaac
(What I find interesting about Pinter's book is his proposal that the 'bare bones' of material or physically-measurable objects don't have any intrinsic identity, but that identity is imposed upon them in the form of gestalts, meaningful wholes, which are the basic primitives of animal and human cognition.) — Wayfarer
So the possibilities are that either real existents, including the objects perceived, the environmental conditions and the constitutions of the perceives all work together to determine the forms of perceptions. or else there is a universal or collective mind which determines the perceptions and their commonality. — Janus
Sensations, beliefs, imaginings and feelings are often referred to as figments, that is, creations of the mind. A mental image is taken to be something less than real: For one thing, it has no material substance and is impossible to detect except in the mind of the perceiver. It is true that sensations are caused by electrochemical events in a brain, but when experienced by a living mind, sensations are decisively different in kind from electrons in motion. They are indeed “figments” because they exist nowhere except in awareness. As a matter of fact, they exist only as claims made by sentient beings, with no material evidence to back up those claims. Indeed, brain scans reveal electrical activity, but do not display sensations or inner experience.
An animal’s Sensorium is the repository of all its sensations and sensory experience. The Sensorium does not correspond to a specific area of the brain, but is a widely distributed collection of innate sensibilities and capacities. One of the central tasks of the brain is to code all sensory input so it gives rise in the organism to specific impressions and sensations. Everything that comes into the field of our awareness, every shading and nuance of feeling, is coded so as to have its unique, highly specific effect on consciousness.
They are indeed “figments” because they exist nowhere except in awareness. As a matter of fact, they exist only as claims made by sentient beings, with no material evidence to back up those claims. Indeed, brain scans reveal electrical activity, but do not display sensations or inner experience.
Neither. There is an external reality, according to Pinter, but the way (or the sense) in which it exists is incomprehensible to us. — Wayfarer
But it's a model of a cup, so there must be a cup for it to be a model of, it is not this actual cup which directs our behaviour, it's the model (it must be, otherwise we couldn't account for those errors). So when I say "pass me the cup" I'm referring to the actual cup, but I'm using my model of the cup to do so. — Isaac
And I think this a very strong argument. — Banno
It must be understood that nature does not aim to deceive us, but the very opposite: We imagine objects to be in surrounding space because that’s where they’re supposed to be—that’s where we reach out for them. Likewise, we experience visual objects as “holographic” images because that is the most informative and practical way of getting the information about them into our mind. Surely, however, the physical world consists of solid three-dimensional objects, so it seems that we must be seeing them correctly. Again, we are mistaken: The appearance of a three-dimensional object such as a teacup is a product of the visual brain. The “cup in itself”, the real teacup in the unobserved physical world, consists of atoms and charged particles, and “appearance” is not a force of physics.
What am I referring to when I say "pass me the cup" when dreaming? — Michael
What do you want to refer to? The dream-cup, perhaps, or the real cup that you are now dreaming of... there need be no "one right answer". — Banno
Is that so? If you dream of driving your car, you are not really driving your car, anymore than when you imagine driving your car.
But in each case, it's still your car. — Banno
Is that so? If you dream of driving your car, you are not really driving your car, anymore than when you imagine driving your car.
But in each case, it's still your car. — Banno
And nothing in this says that my car is to be understand as being the mass of subatomic particles that is causally responsible for my experiences. — Michael
Commonality of experience shows that the gestalts or meaningful wholes do not arise arbitrarily, not merely on account of the individual perceiver, taken in isolation. So the possibilities are that either real existents, including the objects perceived, the environmental conditions and the constitutions of the perceives all work together to determine the forms of perceptions. or else there is a universal or collective mind which determines the perceptions and their commonality.
How could we possibly know the answer to that question? Which seems more plausible? How do we choose between them? Does it not come down to personal presupposition and/ or preference? If so, then what could be the point in arguing over the question? — Janus
What is the longterm result for a race which directly apprehends reality, versus a race that filters raw existence into reality as it appears? — Merkwurdichliebe
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