To be clear, it is not that you are still using god, but that you hav replaced god in the argument with a something that takes on the same roll. My objection is not to the content but the structure of that argument. The "supernatural" element, even if "immanent", is introduced using a fraught transcendental argument*. It is the transcendental argument that is objectionable.

If information is not a pattern, what is it? But if instead you are using difference, then the argument continues: a differencein what? You make the same error, repeatedly: "He begins with difference and shows how we derive things from change" - change in what? if "singularities are only what they are in reciprocal interaction with other singularites" then there are other singularities. Each account you give remains dependent on a something "external" to mind.

I maintain that all this theoretical stuff can be removed via the simple expedient of proposing realism. There is a world in which we are embedded, and which includes things we do not know.

Your arguments appear sophistic. Reality is a simpler option.

*and I mean argument of the form:

P; P only if Q; therefore Q.

It's valid, but only true if the second premiss can be demonstrated.

Nice work.

In previous discussions along these lines. the end point is where the account the antirealists present begins to look so much like realism that it is difficult to see the distinction. Let's see that happens here.

Electrons and protons and photons explain why we see what we do, but they are not the what we see. The what we see is an emergent phenomena, brought about by a causal chain involving a multitude of these subatomic particles. — Michael

Indeed, thy might. My response would be along the lines of's post, following Austin. What we see is not the "emergent phenomena", but the cup...

But it's a model of a cup, so there must be a cup for it to be a model of, it is not this actual cup which directs our behaviour, it's the model (it must be, otherwise we couldn't account for those errors). So when I say "pass me the cup" I'm referring to the actual cup, but I'm using my model of the cup to do so. — Isaac

And I think this a very strong argument.

To have a model of a cup necessarily implies there's a cup. Otherwise it's a model of what? It can't be a model of noumena - I've no idea what noumena even are, so I couldn't attempt a model of them. — Isaac

:up:

You're only approving that because the subject of the discussion has returned to cups. If we now introduce cupboards, you will feel that all is complete. :-)

(What I find interesting about Pinter's book is his proposal that the 'bare bones' of material or physically-measurable objects don't have any intrinsic identity, but that identity is imposed upon them in the form of gestalts, meaningful wholes, which are the basic primitives of animal and human cognition.) — Wayfarer

Commonality of experience shows that the gestalts or meaningful wholes do not arise arbitrarily, not merely on account of the individual perceiver, taken in isolation. So the possibilities are that either real existents, including the objects perceived, the environmental conditions and the constitutions of the perceives all work together to determine the forms of perceptions. or else there is a universal or collective mind which determines the perceptions and their commonality.

How could we possibly know the answer to that question? Which seems more plausible? How do we choose between them? Does it not come down to personal presupposition and/ or preference? If so, then what could be the point in arguing over the question?

So the possibilities are that either real existents, including the objects perceived, the environmental conditions and the constitutions of the perceives all work together to determine the forms of perceptions. or else there is a universal or collective mind which determines the perceptions and their commonality. — Janus

Neither. There is an external reality, according to Pinter, but the way (or the sense) in which it exists is incomprehensible to us. It can be modelled scientifically, because scientific measurement only takes into account the measurable attributes. But the modelling of all those measurable attributes still does not comprise an object - it's not an object until it is designated as such by the observer. And you can see how that has an exact parallel in physics - that prior to the act of measurement the object has no real existence other than as a distribution of possibilities. This is why Pinter mentions QBism, which I've already mentioned several times.

The point of Pinter's analysis is that objects do not exist as such outside the gestalts of perceivers. When we look at the world, what we are seeing is the product of the evolved brain which is like a fantastically sophisticated VR display superimposed over a domain that otherwise lacks inherent features or structure.

Sensations, beliefs, imaginings and feelings are often referred to as figments, that is, creations of the mind. A mental image is taken to be something less than real: For one thing, it has no material substance and is impossible to detect except in the mind of the perceiver. It is true that sensations are caused by electrochemical events in a brain, but when experienced by a living mind, sensations are decisively different in kind from electrons in motion. They are indeed “figments” because they exist nowhere except in awareness. As a matter of fact, they exist only as claims made by sentient beings, with no material evidence to back up those claims. Indeed, brain scans reveal electrical activity, but do not display sensations or inner experience.

An animal’s Sensorium is the repository of all its sensations and sensory experience. The Sensorium does not correspond to a specific area of the brain, but is a widely distributed collection of innate sensibilities and capacities. One of the central tasks of the brain is to code all sensory input so it gives rise in the organism to specific impressions and sensations. Everything that comes into the field of our awareness, every shading and nuance of feeling, is coded so as to have its unique, highly specific effect on consciousness.

Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 52). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.

The instrumentalist takes on an unjustified degree of doubt.

So they think "It looks like a cup, so I will defeasibly assume that it is a cup, until proven otherwise".

Two replies: first, this is only done after attending philosophy 101 - it is a learned response; our first position is simply that there is indeed a cup, and when not doing philosophy that is how we treat of cups and the various other things that make our world interesting. That is, it's not how we actually are in the world.

Secondly, as @Isaac points out, the process of recognising the cup is a Bayesian weighing of signal strengths, not a rational process of deduction.

The instrumentalist take is post-hoc.

You're only approving that because the subject of the discussion has returned to cups. — Wayfarer

But I don't use tea cups, I use coffee cups. :wink:

They are indeed “figments” because they exist nowhere except in awareness. As a matter of fact, they exist only as claims made by sentient beings, with no material evidence to back up those claims. Indeed, brain scans reveal electrical activity, but do not display sensations or inner experience.

You see! This is why eliminativism claims that consciousness can't be real. Capiche? Those 'sensations and inner experiences' actually comprise the world of perception - but they can't be detected by scientific instruments.

Neither. There is an external reality, according to Pinter, but the way (or the sense) in which it exists is incomprehensible to us. — Wayfarer

I was presenting those as the coherently imaginable possibilities. For all we know one of those might be imagining "the way things really are" or something like it, or it might be the case that nothing we imagine could be anything like the real. But assuming the latter possibility to be true, then the question would be of no significance to us at all.

But I don't use ta cups, I use coffee cups. — Banno

Coffee cups are no good; it has to be mugs.

What we see is not the "emergent phenomena", but the cup... — Banno

This might be like saying "I'm not reading about words, I'm reading about wizards" in response to someone arguing that there's nothing more to stories about wizards than words.

But it's a model of a cup, so there must be a cup for it to be a model of, it is not this actual cup which directs our behaviour, it's the model (it must be, otherwise we couldn't account for those errors). So when I say "pass me the cup" I'm referring to the actual cup, but I'm using my model of the cup to do so. — Isaac

And I think this a very strong argument. — Banno

What am I referring to when I say "pass me the cup" when dreaming?

It must be understood that nature does not aim to deceive us, but the very opposite: We imagine objects to be in surrounding space because that’s where they’re supposed to be—that’s where we reach out for them. Likewise, we experience visual objects as “holographic” images because that is the most informative and practical way of getting the information about them into our mind. Surely, however, the physical world consists of solid three-dimensional objects, so it seems that we must be seeing them correctly. Again, we are mistaken: The appearance of a three-dimensional object such as a teacup is a product of the visual brain. The “cup in itself”, the real teacup in the unobserved physical world, consists of atoms and charged particles, and “appearance” is not a force of physics.

Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 81). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.

I like that.

What am I referring to when I say "pass me the cup" when dreaming? — Michael

What do you want to refer to? The dream-cup, perhaps, or the real cup that you are now dreaming of... there need be no "one right answer".

I find dream arguments strained. We are able to differentiate dreaming from being awake.

Coffee cups are no good; it has to be mugs. — Janus

For a short black?

To have a model of a cup necessarily implies there's a cup. — Isaac

Does a painting of a unicorn necessarily imply that there's a unicorn?

For a short black? — Banno

Taboo!

What do you want to refer to? The dream-cup, perhaps, or the real cup that you are now dreaming of... there need be no "one right answer". — Banno

Dream-cups are to dreams as real-cups are to waking experiences: objects found only within the mental phenomena. Dream-cups aren't whatever physical stuff is responsible for the dream and real-cups aren't whatever physical stuff is responsible for the waking experience.

Does a painting of a unicorn necessarily imply that there's a unicorn? — Michael

Neat.

A painting of a unicorn is not a model of a unicorn. The "models" here are weightings in neural networks.

Dream-cups are to dreams as real-cups are to waking experiences — Michael

Is that so? If you dream of driving your car, you are not really driving your car, anymore than when you imagine driving your car.

But in each case, it's still your car.

Is that so? If you dream of driving your car, you are not really driving your car, anymore than when you imagine driving your car.

But in each case, it's still your car. — Banno

And nothing in this says that my car is to be understand as being the mass of subatomic particles that is causally responsible for my experiences.

Is that so? If you dream of driving your car, you are not really driving your car, anymore than when you imagine driving your car.

But in each case, it's still your car. — Banno

And nothing in this says that my car is to be understand as being the mass of subatomic particles that is causally responsible for my experiences. — Michael

To borrow the way you like to argue, I don't drive subatomic particles, I drive a car.

Sure. And my car is real.

yep. You're getting it!

Sure. And my car is real. — Banno

Neither idealism nor anti-realism deny this. It's a mistake to equate "real" with "part of an external material world."

So I don't understand what relevance this has to the discussion.

Commonality of experience shows that the gestalts or meaningful wholes do not arise arbitrarily, not merely on account of the individual perceiver, taken in isolation. So the possibilities are that either real existents, including the objects perceived, the environmental conditions and the constitutions of the perceives all work together to determine the forms of perceptions. or else there is a universal or collective mind which determines the perceptions and their commonality.

How could we possibly know the answer to that question? Which seems more plausible? How do we choose between them? Does it not come down to personal presupposition and/ or preference? If so, then what could be the point in arguing over the question? — Janus

Absolutely. It comes down to personal preference, just like ethics. Each perspective is as rationally coherent as the other, making "consequence" the best criteria for choosing one over the other. What is the longterm result for a race which directly apprehends reality, versus a race that filters raw existence into reality as it appears?

What is the longterm result for a race which directly apprehends reality, versus a race that filters raw existence into reality as it appears? — Merkwurdichliebe

That, I couldn't say.

That, I couldn't say. — Janus

I can't either. Its a difficult question.