No. Transcendental means the condition for experience. A Kantian term. Clearly this is not W. meaning. — Jackson
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
— T 6.41[/]
So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
— T 6.42
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
— T 6.421
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.
They are what is mystical.
— T 6.522
Logic is transcendental.
— T 6.13
Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form.
— T 4.12
Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical (unsinnig) … Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.
— T 4.003
Ethics is just the idea of how we want people to act around each other. Nothing mystical or transcendental about it. — Jackson
What he says, as quoted, is that ethics/aesthetics is transcendental. It is only once this is acknowledged that we can discuss what it means. — Fooloso4
The Tractatus uses "transcendental" twice. — Jackson
You might benefit by taking a look at that book. — Jackson
Then tell me about Wittgenstein's discussion of the transcendental in the Philosophical Investigations. — Jackson
… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena.
[ The conclusion about ethics in the Tract ] was not a matter of certainty, but of propositions having a sense, a meaning; they represent some state of affairs in the world. Ethics/aesthetics do not represent what is the case. Ethics/aesthetics are not a matter of certainty but of personal experience. — Fooloso4
No. Just the opposite [Witt did not want ethics to be reducible to logic]. He said that ethics/aesthetics are transcendental. They stand outside the relations of things in the world, outside logical relations. — Fooloso4
he is using [transcendental] in Kantian sense of the condition for the possibility of experience — Fooloso4
The conditions for such possibilities are, however, no longer regarded as a priori. — Fooloso4
By the logic of our language he means a priori logical form. But logical form cannot be represented, there can be no propositions about logic form. — Fooloso4
Ethics/aesthetics are not a matter of certainty but of personal experience — Fooloso4
The picture of "representation" of the world, or what is the case, is what is taken apart in the PI as the product off the requirement for a crystalline purity (to give us the certainty we desire). It is representationalism that creates the idea of objective/subjective (personal "experience"), of fact/value. — Antony Nickles
You are not allowing a distinction between what he says and the reasons he says it. He says the things about ethics in the Tract because of the requirement he has for us (him) in that work in order to be said to say anything. — Antony Nickles
As he shows in the PI, these criteria (the logical form of a thing) are already there, in our language, which holds our culture, which is the history of all the ways we are in the world. — Antony Nickles
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