Ethics is just the idea of how we want people to act around each other. Nothing mystical or transcendental about it.

No. Transcendental means the condition for experience. A Kantian term. Clearly this is not W. meaning. — Jackson

What he says, as quoted, is that ethics/aesthetics is transcendental. It is only once this is acknowledged that we can discuss what it means.

I agree with you that he is using it in Kantian sense of the condition for the possibility of experience. In this case, he is talking about ethical/aesthetic experience.

In addition, it is clear that he also regards them as transcendent:

If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
— T 6.41[/]

So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
— T 6.42

It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
— T 6.421

But this does not mean he rejects ethics and aesthetics:

There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.
They are what is mystical.
— T 6.522

He also says that logic is transcendental:

Logic is transcendental.
— T 6.13

Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form.
— T 4.12

Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical (unsinnig) … Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.
— T 4.003

By the logic of our language he means a priori logical form. But logical form cannot be represented, there can be no propositions about logic form.

Ethics is just the idea of how we want people to act around each other. Nothing mystical or transcendental about it. — Jackson

That is one way in which the term is used. It is not the way it is used in the Tractatus.

What he says, as quoted, is that ethics/aesthetics is transcendental. It is only once this is acknowledged that we can discuss what it means. — Fooloso4

The Tractatus uses "transcendental" twice. What most readers of W. know is that he rejects the concept in the Philosophical Investigations. You might benefit by taking a look at that book.

The Wittgenstein chops on this forum are way beyond my ken.

I'd count @Fooloso4 in that group of people who I'd listen to.


....


IDK if you'd listen to more than that. :D

The Wittgenstein chops on this forum are way beyond my ken.

I'd count Fooloso4 in that group of people who I'd listen to.


....


IDK if you'd listen to more than that. :D — Moliere

Thanks for the personal attack. I mean, no, have some dignity.

I certainly didn't wish to attack you. I'm sorry to have done so.

I'm not sure why what I said was interpreted in that way...


but I accept responsibility for it. If there are amends I can make then please say them.

I only meant to suggest that Fooloso4 has certainly read the PI.

And, in the back of my mind, my motivation came from finally having an opinion on the relationships between the two, and I decided that they are different from one another.

I only meant to suggest that Fooloso4 has certainly read the PI. — Moliere

Then tell me about Wittgenstein's discussion of the transcendental in the Philosophical Investigations.

Why? To prove to you that I'm worthy of talking?

I'm ok with being unworthy.

Thank you for being honest.

Heh. You're welcome.

I was trying to build bridges... but I failed here. Maybe another time.

I was trying to build bridges... but I failed here. Maybe another time. — Moliere

Amazing you think making a personal attack is building bridges.

Well, I wouldn't say it like that -- rather, I'd say I made a personal attack, but I was trying to build bridges.

But I take your word for it.

Do you believe me in saying I was not trying to attack you?

For me, I just know Fooloso4 has read the PI. Like... that's a pretty basic document around these forums. Most of us have.

But I see I don't have that relationship to say such things.

Sorry.

hat's a pretty basic document around these forums. Most of us have. — Moliere

Yet you have no idea what Wittgenstein says about the transcendental in the Philosophical Investigations.

Nope. Not a one worth sharing.

I have ideas about what people know on this forum, though.

Nope. Not a one worth sharing. — Moliere

That answers that.

The Tractatus uses "transcendental" twice. — Jackson

Yes, as I just pointed out, with regard to ethics and again with regard to logic.

You might benefit by taking a look at that book. — Jackson

I have done considerably more than that. I wrote my dissertation on Wittgenstein. I do not say that in order to claim authority, but rather as a response to the suggestion that I "take a look". I have also posted quite extensively on PI and OC on this forum. Take a look.

There is a great deal of interpretive disagreement, which is what attracted me to do work on him. Although, like most everyone else, I want to be right, I am always open to the possibility that I am mistaken, and consider the opportunity to be shown things I have missed or misunderstood to be a welcome benefit.

Then tell me about Wittgenstein's discussion of the transcendental in the Philosophical Investigations. — Jackson

You are right. There is no discussion of the transcendental in PI. It is, however, fundamental to the Tractatus. But there is still in the later works a concern with possibilities:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena.

The conditions for such possibilities are, however, no longer regarded as a priori.

I have done considerably more than that. I wrote my dissertation on Wittgenstein. — Fooloso4

Where? Was it approved?

The conditions for such possibilities are, however, no longer regarded as a priori. — Fooloso4

Good, we agree. No need to debate it.

So... an answer for an answer.

Do you believe me in saying I was not trying to attack you?

Do you believe me in saying I was not trying to attack you? — Moliere

And Trump believes he is a nice guy.

Where? Was it approved? — Jackson

Temple University, 2000. Yes, it was unanimously approved.

Well... if that's where we're at, I'm sad. But then no amount of charity will matter.

Temple University, 2000. Yes, it was unanimously approved. — Fooloso4

Cool. My father went to Temple.

Oh shit, I was right!

My father went to Temple. — Jackson

I was much older than the other grad students. Maybe your father's age.

I was much older than the other grad students. Maybe your father's age. — Fooloso4

He died long ago.

[ The conclusion about ethics in the Tract ] was not a matter of certainty, but of propositions having a sense, a meaning; they represent some state of affairs in the world. Ethics/aesthetics do not represent what is the case. Ethics/aesthetics are not a matter of certainty but of personal experience. — Fooloso4

The picture of "representation" of the world, or what is the case, is what is taken apart in the PI as the product off the requirement for a crystalline purity (to give us the certainty we desire). It is representationalism that creates the idea of objective/subjective (personal "experience"), of fact/value.

No. Just the opposite [Witt did not want ethics to be reducible to logic]. He said that ethics/aesthetics are transcendental. They stand outside the relations of things in the world, outside logical relations. — Fooloso4

You are not allowing a distinction between what he says and the reasons he says it. He says the things about ethics in the Tract because of the requirement he has for us (him) in that work in order to be said to say anything. In the PI he dissects why he wanted (we want) that requirement by first looking at the varied "logical relations" that each thing has, even ethics.

he is using [transcendental] in Kantian sense of the condition for the possibility of experience — Fooloso4

I too think that the " 'possibilities' of phenomena" (#90) is analogous to Kantian "conditions", but Kant's, as in the Tractatus, were a pre-requisite, a threshold (logical) necessity (as with his imperative)--set out by us (unknowingly even) beforehand. But in the PI, he comes with an open mind, investigating first for the varied conditions we use to judge a thing to be what it is (categorically Kant would say, e.g., to follow a rule, or not)--he calls these conditions: criteria.

The conditions for such possibilities are, however, no longer regarded as a priori. — Fooloso4

As he shows in the PI, these criteria (the logical form of a thing) are already there, in our language, which holds our culture, which is the history of all the ways we are in the world. "We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena." (#90., emphasis added)

By the logic of our language he means a priori logical form. But logical form cannot be represented, there can be no propositions about logic form. — Fooloso4

The logical form of a thing (its grammar) is captured in the statements we make about a thing (not "represented"). We need not do a study to come to the criteria for an apology, understanding, thinking, pointing, following a rule; it is not a matter for science to find out. Our ordinary criteria are not "hidden", but open to plain view, if we but allow them to come to us rather than blinding ourselves with the criteria of purity.

Ethics/aesthetics are not a matter of certainty but of personal experience — Fooloso4

To clarify, I am not saying Witt is denying personal experience in the PI; just that the only options are not so black-and-white as my experience or scientific certainty (to pit my individual values against abstract morality). Sure, there is the ineffable, the inexpressible, but that is the outer edges of all the ways in which we can express things. The idea that our experience is "hidden" within us is to avoid my responsibility to make myself known, your responsibility to respond to my moral claim on you (say, being in pain) without having certainty.

The picture of "representation" of the world, or what is the case, is what is taken apart in the PI as the product off the requirement for a crystalline purity (to give us the certainty we desire). It is representationalism that creates the idea of objective/subjective (personal "experience"), of fact/value. — Antony Nickles

The ways in which we picture the world is a prominent feature of both the Tractatus and PI. In the later work, however, he rejects the notion that logic is the a priori transcendental condition that makes representation possible.

That there are facts but they do no determine how we see the world is something he did not reject.

You are not allowing a distinction between what he says and the reasons he says it. He says the things about ethics in the Tract because of the requirement he has for us (him) in that work in order to be said to say anything. — Antony Nickles

It is not because of his concept of logic that he says what he does about ethics. It is the result of his relationship to the world, of his experience of what is important and meaningful. He distinguishes between this sense of meaningful and Sinn or meaning as referent.

As he shows in the PI, these criteria (the logical form of a thing) are already there, in our language, which holds our culture, which is the history of all the ways we are in the world. — Antony Nickles

Culture and history are not the whole of what he is getting at. Again, the importance of the "possibility of phenomena" and new ways of seeing things. "Logic as grammar" means that it is an activity. Language changes as a form of life changes.