But I didn't like the second-sense, finding it pretty much the same as the first sense. No, U would not be a member of itself, but it would be a member of something that includes other <need a noun here>'s which also distinguish themselves from whatever background we might identify. I think it presumptuous to select a noun there with the distinction left undefined. I tried 'structure', but not sure if other members that stand out are necessarily structures. — noAxioms
Agree with pretty much all of this, but since these quantum worlds are part the one structure (our spacetime), they're really another part of the same universe, just like another planet, sufficiently distant to be completely out of our empirical reach. The existence of alternate worlds is using 'existence' the way we do with tulips: another part of U. This is opposed to the typical language usage of the word which implies part of the world that to which we have access.OK, per hypothesis, there would be a (Many-Worlds) quantum world where a real Harry Potter exists as well as the Harry Potter fictional stories in our quantum world. Similarly, there would be fictional stories in Harry's world that just so happens to describe our world.
In this case it would be true to say (justification aside) that Harry Potter existed somewhere in the universe, though not in our quantum world. We would just need to be careful to keep our claims about the real Harry Potter in the other world distinct from claims about the fictional Harry Potter in our world. Similarly for Harry's claims about us. — Andrew M
It seems I misinterpreted your meaning of U. You define it (tentatively) as everything that exists in the sort of way I am seeking, not as 'our universe' which is just the chunk of spacetime to which I have access and includes "all the stuff I see and can imply from it".So what's the next move? How could you define U in a way that does some work? — Srap Tasmaner
Yes, I can name any number of sets, but I don't think my naming a set is what makes the universe exist.Yeah, I don't understand the significance of being a member of some set. If some means any, then anything you can name is a member of any number of sets. If it is some particular set, then the burden of definition is shifted to defining that set.
— SophistiCat
That last bit was where I was headed. Would have been clearer if I had said "a special set, let's call it U." That's what noAxioms seemed to want to do, and I was just helping him along, as it turns out, mistakenly. — Srap Tasmaner
Hard to. The set of possible structures, which seems strange without a set of rules about why one might not be possible. The set of structures resulting from consistent application of rules. Closer maybe, but a set of rules can be arbitrarily complex and thus technically rule out almost nothing.I think, therefore I'm possible. Ewww, but maybe...
— noAxioms
Can you explain this more? — schopenhauer1
In the end, I don't think there is a set of existing things. I think 'existence' is misapplied. The cosmological argument questions the how of the existence of the universe, or more naively, how it was 'caused', but the universe seems not to be in need of either causation or existence. There is no set, and I exist in the universe despite the lack of meaning to the concept of the existence of the universe. — noAxioms
Sounds pretty clean to me.This problem goes back to the first philosopher, Anaximander actually. He thought all was undefined or Boundless. Essentially, it was the idea that all was potential with no actuality to it (no form). — schopenhauer1
This presumes that it does 'go from undefined to defined', which seems contradictory since it would imply states and time are defined before anything is defined. Isn't potential enough?Of course, how it goes from boundless to boundaries or undefined to defined from the very start, is anyone's guess.
OK, I seem to be one post behind all the time.You are in a universe where contingent and determined forces play out perhaps from an original apeiron of boundless and indefinite possibilities which was broken in an original asymmetry which allowed for yet more asymmetries into the universe or multiverse we reside. — schopenhauer1
Well, it's that background I'm seeking I think. I'm not so sure about a necessary lack of one. — noAxioms
Actuality is a property of a temporal tulip object. The universe cannot be actual in this way. — noAxioms
It seems I misinterpreted your meaning of U. You define it (tentatively) as everything that exists in the sort of way I am seeking, not as 'our universe' which is just the chunk of spacetime to which I have access and includes "all the stuff I see and can imply from it".
Taking your definition of U, your statement above is just restating the problem in my OP. — noAxioms
Our universe is presumed to 'exist', and not just by being a member of itself. I'm asking what that means. I'm questioning that it means anything at all.
Seems like pretty good reasoning at first glance, an argument for a lack of distinction.How would you address this reasoning?: The background to the sum of all existents either exists or does not. If it exists in some way, it is contained within the sum of all existents. If it doesn’t exist in some way, then there is no background to the sum of all existents. Both conclusions result in there not being a background to the sum of all existents, aka to existence. — javra
I would say space and time are bounded by the big bang, avoiding the 'before the big bang' reference you use above, a conflicting implication of a time before time. Similarly space, which cannot be a prerequiste. Choose your model. Empty space existing until stuff bangs into it, or space and time being bounded. The two models don't mix kindly. The former requires creation: a cause of sorts. Inflation theory fits the bill at least for a cause, if not the preexisting space and time. The inflation concept of time does not map to the time measured by clocks here, and the theory does not posit space into which stuff exploded.Actuality is a property of a temporal tulip object. The universe cannot be actual in this way.
— noAxioms
I think the following supports this quoted conclusion:
Looking at things from a solely physical perspective, the Big Bang is inferred to have resulted from a volume-less gravitational singularity (both space and time began with the Big Bang, so, before the Big Bang there was no space: the gravitational singularity is then volume-less, or space-less [as well as timeless; a different issue though] … hence neither incredibly small nor incredibly big, for both these are contingent upon the existence of space). The more mainstream of modern physics—excluding suppositions such as those of QM MW and M-theory—infers the "Boundless" in the physical form (if it can be termed “form”) of a gravitational singularity. There’s lots of evidence for the Big Bang, and all this evidence points to a volume-less state of being that preceded it (in which all the energy of the universe was contained).
The singularity qualifies as an event, and events exist sort of in the way the tulip does (the tulip is multiple events, grouped together by language). The universe is not just that one event.This volume-less gravitational singularity, then, does not exist in the manner that a tulip does. Yet, assuming it to be objectively real, it nevertheless is (or was), thereby physically existing in a manner other than the physical existence of a tulip.
Funny, since I cannot conceive of one with a location in space that is the center. Such a picture would mean there's an edge to it with the fastest moving stuff, and if you were there, you'd see stars only on one side, making it pretty easy to point to said center. If spacetime is modeled in 4D, the center is in that 4th direction, which is arbitrary, but they all point to the same place. I guess we just view the geometry differently.I’m far less confident in upholding what I’ve heard from documentaries about the known universe of today (sorry, I don’t recall which documentaries): that the universe is inferred to have no center and no circumference.
Didn't quite understand this part. If you're saying that our universe doesn't have a location in relation to other universes, they I'd agree. For the record, I don't use the word 'universe' as 'all there is'. It is quite context dependent, and, and for the purpose of this discussion, it means all there is in this grand ball of quantum-mechanical structure, bounded by a bang on one end. Otherwise the question of the existence of other-universes is meaningless, being a question of if there is another all-there-is. A more confined definition of universe would be 'all that matters', which is a more idealistic notion since it implies all that matters to us. This perhaps excludes the past which cannot be affected, the future which cannot be sensed, things that are currently not-here, which is inaccessible in both ways, and places simply beyond our reach even over time, for whatever reason.Nevertheless, were this to be objectively real, the same roundabout issue of existence would apply to the physical universe as it is today: there is distance from one tulip to another, or from one galaxy to another, but there is no distance regarding the whole. If so the universe (as everything that is) physically exists in a manner other than that in which any physical item exists as a part of the universe.
The antinatalist must be pretty happy. There are billions of non-actualized potential people for every actualized one. — noAxioms
Well, I am not willing to accept this, so hardly tautological. Even Descartes went only so far as something like "thinking, therefore existence" without immediately being so bold as to fit an "I" into that picture. But I'm questioning what it means to exist, so such axioms cannot be held if they rely on what I'm trying to define.'I think, therefore I'm possible' is a tautology.
1. I think, therefore I am. — Owen
Maybe they're the same thing.Possibility exists and therefore actuality can exist. — schopenhauer1
Kind of followed by my understanding of the last line of Owen's post. So perhaps I misunderstood. I'm trying to get a clarification. Maybe the four-leggedness is not true of unicorns because they would first need to exist to have the four legs, but then the reasoning is circular and meaningless.If you can prove unicorns exist by saying they have four legs, you know you've done something wrong. — Srap Tasmaner
Kind of followed by my understanding of the last line of Owen's post. So perhaps I misunderstood. I'm trying to get a clarification. — noAxioms
Maybe the four-leggedness is not true of unicorns because they would first need to exist to have the four legs, but then the reasoning is circular and meaningless. — noAxioms
I am trying to nail down what we're claiming if we claim something exists or not. — noAxioms
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