"Worldview?" Yes, subjective. Philosophy? Not subjective. (See below.)

Wtf – I can't think without using my brain, or without thinking, can you? Gibberish.

Maybe we wouldn't even be in this place communicating to each other, because there wouldn't be actually a reason for. — Alkis Piskas

So, we should not discuss mathematics or physics, because there are no fundamental disagreements? That philosophy also has the gristle of opinions – since Plato et al we've sought to keep trimming the fat of sophistry as much as possible – in no way reduces philosophy to nothing but opinions, prejudices, worldviews, dogmas, etc. It's "methods, tools" are not subjective, as you concede, which is my point; the difference is that science produces objective claims about nature whereas philosophy proposes objective "methods, tools" of which sciences can be paradigmatically composed and by which their observational and/or experimental results can be interpreted.

And correlation one can percieve between scientific and philosophical progress is pure contrivance — Merkwurdichliebe

Ok, here’s some contrivance for you:

The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, Francisco J. Varela Evan Thompson Eleanor Rosch

Conversations in Postmodern Hermeneutics, Shaun Gallagher, Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences

Critical Neuroscience, A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience,Edited by S. Choudhury and Jan Slaby

Heidegger and social cognition , Shaun Gallagher

Phenomenological Contributions to a Theory of Social Cognition, SHAUN GALLAGHER,Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences University of Central Florida

Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Shaun Gallagher

Neurophilosophy and neurophenomenology, Shaun GALLAGHER

Heidegger's attunement and the neuropsychology of emotion, MATTHEW RATCLIFFE

Phenomenology, Naturalism and the Sense of Reality, MATTHEW RATCLIFFE

What Are Cultural Studies of Scientific Knowledge? Joseph Rouse Wesleyan University

FROM REALISM OR ANTI-REALISM TO SCIENCE AS SOLIDARITY Joseph Rouse, Wesleyan University

Postmodernism and our understanding of science, Joseph Rouse

Heidegger on Science and Naturalism, Joseph Rouse

Merleau-Ponty and the Existential Conception of Science, Joseph Rouse

Mind in Life: BIOLOGY, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND THE SCIENCES OF MIND , Evan Thompson

Consciousness in the Neurosciences: A conversation of Sergio Benvenuto with Francisco Varela

The Tangled Dialectic of Body and Consciousness: A Metaphysical Counterpart of Radical Neurophenomenology:Michel Bitbol

And this from Evan Thompson’s book, Mind in Life:

“One common thread running through the following chapters is a re-liance on the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and developed in various directions by numerous others, most notably for my purposes by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Moran 2000; Sokolowski 2000; Spiegelberg 1994). 1 ( ) My aim, however, is not to repeat this tradition's analyses, as they are found in this or that author or text, but to present them anew in light of present-day con-cerns in the sciences of mind. Thus this book can be seen as con-tributing to the work of a new generation of phenomenologists who strive to "naturalize" phenomenology (Petitot et al. 1999). The project of naturalizing phenomenology can be understood in different ways, and my own way of thinking about it will emerge later in this book. The basic idea for the moment is that it is not enough for phenomenology simply to describe and philosophically analyze lived experience; phe-nomenology needs to be able to understand and interpret its investiga-tions in relation to those of biology and mind science.

Yet mind science has much to learn from the analyses of lived expe-rience accomplished by phenomenologists. Indeed, once science turns its attention to subjectivity and consciousness, to experience as it is lived, then it cannot do without phenomenology, which thus needs to be recognized and cultivated as an indispensable partner to the ex-perimental sciences of mind and life. As we will see, this scientific turn to phenomenology leads as much to a renewed understanding of na-ture, life, and mind as to a naturalization of phenomenology (Zahavi 2004b).”

BTW, what other thread are you referring to besides "Is there an external material world?" ? — Alkis Piskas

dialectical-materialism is a recent one

Science and philosophy are completely separate. That is why universities usually have separate buildings for each. In your reasoning, there is no reason we cant say the same of advances in art and music or althetics - as rendering philosophy into more conventional language. — Merkwurdichliebe

Science and philosophy are completely separate because they have different buildings? Their textbooks are different colors, too. As for the arts and music , ever wonder why historical movements like Classical era, Renaissance, Enlightenment, Modernist and postmodernist includes the sciences, philosophy ,the arts, music and literature? Because all these cultural
modes of creativity are interdependent;reciprocally sharing, translating and reproducing what the others are producing via their one vocabulary.

And this from Evan Thompson’s book, Mind in Life:

“One common thread running through the following chapters is a re-liance on the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and developed in various directions by numerous others, most notably for my purposes by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Moran 2000; Sokolowski 2000; Spiegelberg 1994). 1 ( ) My aim, however, is not to repeat this tradition's analyses, as they are found in this or that author or text, but to present them anew in light of present-day con-cerns in the sciences of mind. Thus this book can be seen as con-tributing to the work of a new generation of phenomenologists who strive to "naturalize" phenomenology (Petitot et al. 1999). The project of naturalizing phenomenology can be understood in different ways, and my own way of thinking about it will emerge later in this book. The basic idea for the moment is that it is not enough for phenomenology simply to describe and philosophically analyze lived experience; phe-nomenology needs to be able to understand and interpret its investiga-tions in relation to those of biology and mind science.

Yet mind science has much to learn from the analyses of lived expe-rience accomplished by phenomenologists. Indeed, once science turns its attention to subjectivity and consciousness, to experience as it is lived, then it cannot do without phenomenology, which thus needs to be recognized and cultivated as an indispensable partner to the ex-perimental sciences of mind and life. As we will see, this scientific turn to phenomenology leads as much to a renewed understanding of na-ture, life, and mind as to a naturalization of phenomenology (Zahavi 2004b).”

Their textbooks are different colors, too. — Joshs

Yes, they are put in separate books for a reason, because they are separate disciplines. Just because a cutting edge scientists is philosophically minded, it does not make him a cutting edge philosopher

Because all these cultural
modes of creativity are interdependent;reciprocally sharing, translating and reproducing what the others are producing via their one vocabulary. — Joshs

But they do not all advance at the same rate. I would go so far as to argue that philosophy and art have declined over the past century, all while scientific advances have increased extensively. I see this reflected in the decadence of our generation, with this schizoid culture whose technology is far outrunning its wisdom.

What is this one vocabulary you speak of?

. I would go so far as to argue that philosophy and art have declined over the past century, all while scientific advances have increased extensively. — Merkwurdichliebe

I believe that the root of our disagreement is that you and I are not reading the same philosophers or scientists. Tell me what you think constitutes the last significant innovation in philosophy, and the most important recent advances in the sciences (not technology, but basic theoretical models like Relativity or Darwinian evolution).

Ok, here’s some contrivance for you: — Joshs

It's not surprising these are in the general area of cognitive sciences, a more or less scientific discipline that combines aspects of philosophy with subjects like artificial intelligence and linguistics. Although neuroscience is in this grouping, the models relating to it are not biologically compatible.

I'd rather see Max Tegmark's speculations mentioned. When you throw philosophy in with traditional science the primary question is one of competence: Does philosophy of science require a considerable depth of knowledge in that scientific discipline?

I would go so far as to argue that philosophy and art have declined over the past century, — Merkwurdichliebe

How has art declined in the past century? Can you give some examples?

. Although neuroscience is in this grouping, the models relating to it are not biologically compatible. — jgill

I disagree. Phenomenologically informed enactivist models of neural functioning complement what Michael James Bennett calls “ a veritable sea change in the study of life. Over the past several decades evolutionary biology was shaken with a series of shockwaves that would culminate in what theorists today are starting to call an ‘Extended' and even ‘Postmodern' Evolutionary Synthesis in order to mark it off from the Modern Synthesis still dominant in the 1980s (Laland et al. 2015; Brucker and Bordenstein 2014). The hologenome theory of evolution – which posits that the organism and its micro-biome form a single, multifaceted unit of selection – signals perhaps better than any other theoretical development the advent of a new evolutionary synthesis. This is a synthesis founded in the increasingly important role afforded to symbiosis in explanations of the evolution of cells and species, from the endosymbiotic relationships responsible for the genesis of mitochondria from out of ancient bacterial alli-ances to the phylosymbiotic relationships between host species and their associated microbial communities constitutive of speciation as such (Brooks et al. 2017). One important consequence of these developments is a newfound appreciation for horizontal gene transfer and aparallel evolution in microorganisms, as well as cytoplasmic, environmental, behavioural and symbolic forms of transmission in almost everything else (Rosenberg and Zilber-Rosenberg 2016). These ‘new directions' work to disrupt and disperse two distinctions long taken to be self-evident and indispensable to evolutionary theory: between the organism and its genes, and between the organism and its environment. The critique and complication of each finds its positive complement in a new set of developments as well. Criticisms of genetic reductionism and the pan-adaptationist programme correspond to the elaboration of decentralised accounts of causality and transmission in Developmental Systems Theory and ‘Evo/Devo' (Oyama 2000); and criticisms of autonomous biological individuals, distinct genetic lineages and strictly vertical models of inheritance have developed alongside a newfound appreciation for the ubiquity of symbiosis, microbial alliances and horizontal gene transfer both as features of constituted organisms and as a source for variation and evolutionary discontinuities in the history of life as well (Gilbert et al. 2012).”

I should mention that one of the key figures in enactivist approaches to cogntivie science was Francisco Varela, who introduced the model of neurophenomenology:

“ Varela was trained as a biologist, mathematician and philosopher through the influence of different teachers, Humberto Maturana and Torsten Wiesel.

He wrote and edited a number of books and numerous journal articles in biology, neurology, cognitive science, mathematics, and philosophy. He founded, with others, the Integral Institute, a thinktank dedicated to the cross-fertilization of ideas and disciplines.

Varela supported embodied philosophy, viewing human cognition and consciousness in terms of the enactive structures in which they arise. These comprise the body (as a biological system and as personally experienced) and the physical world which it enacts.[5]

Varela's work popularized within the field of neuroscience the concept of neurophenomenology. This concept combined the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with "first-person science." Neurophenomenology requires observers to examine their own conscious experience using scientifically verifiable methods.

In the 1996 popular book The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems, physicist Fritjof Capra makes extensive reference to Varela and Maturana's theory of autopoiesis as part of a new, systems-based scientific approach for describing the interrelationships and interdependence of psychological, biological, physical, social, and cultural phenomena.[6] Written for a general audience, The Web of Life helped popularize the work of Varela and Maturana, as well as that of Ilya Prigogine and Gregory Bateson.[7]

Varela's 1991 book The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, co-authored with Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, is considered a classic in the field of cognitive science, offering pioneering phenomenological connections and introducing the Buddhism-informed enactivist and embodied cognition approach.[8] A revised edition of The Embodied Mind was published in 2017, featuring substantive introductions by the surviving authors, as well as a preface by Jon Kabat-Zinn.”

Does philosophy of science require a considerable depth of knowledge in that scientific discipline? — jgill

I suppose it depends on who is doing the philosophizing. I am very impressed with the work of Joseph Rouse. I can assure you his grasp of the physical and biological
sciences is quite substantial. I also like the work of Arthur Fine:

“Distinguished philosopher of science esteemed for work on the foundations of physics (particularly quantum mechanics) and for his studies of Einstein.”

“Having studied physics, philosophy, and mathematics, Fine graduated from the University of Chicago in 1958 with a Bachelor of Science in mathematics. He then, in 1960, earned a Master of Science in mathematics from the Illinois Institute of Technology with a thesis supervised by Karl Menger,[1]

Fine earned his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1963 under the direction of Henry Mehlberg.[2] Before moving to the University of Washington, Fine taught for many years at Northwestern University and, before that, at Cornell University and the University of Illinois at Chicago. He is a past president of the American Philosophical Association and the Philosophy of Science Association and has for many years been on the editorial board of the journal Philosophy of Science, one of the leading publications in the field.In 2014, Fine was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences.”

I also recommend Michel Bitbol:

“ His research interests are mainly focused on the influence of quantum physics on philosophy. He first worked on Erwin Schrödinger's metaphysics and philosophy of physics.[3]

Using theorems demonstrated by Jean-Louis Destouches, Paulette Destouches-Février, and R.I.G. Hughes, he pointed out that the structure of quantum mechanics may be derived to a large extent from the assumption that microscopic phenomena cannot be dissociated from their experimental context.[4] His views on quantum mechanics converge with ideas developed by Julian Schwinger[5] and Asher Peres,[6] according to whom quantum mechanics is a "symbolism of atomic measurements", rather than a description of atomic objects. He also defends ideas close to Anton Zeilinger's, by claiming that quantum laws do not express the nature of physical objects, but only the bounds of experimental information.

Along with this view, quantum mechanics is no longer considered as a physical theory in the ordinary sense, but rather as a background framework for physical theories, since it goes back to the most elementary conditions which allow us to formulate any physical theory whatsoever. Some reviewers suggested half-seriously to call this view of physics "Kantum physics". Indeed, Michel Bitbol often refers to the philosophy of I. Kant, according to whom one can understand the contents of knowledge only by analyzing the (sensorial, instrumental, and rational) conditions of possibility of such knowledge.[7]

He was granted an award by the French "Académie des sciences morales et politiques" in 1997, for his work in the philosophy of quantum mechanics.

Later on, he concentrated on the philosophy of mind and consciousness,[8] defending a strongly anti-reductionist[9] and neo-Wittgensteinian view.[10] He collaborated with Francisco Varela on this subject.”

Science is advancing. This is very obvious. But is philosophy? — Alkis Piskas

I think that the perception of philosophical "advance" (whatever that might mean) is being colored by this belief. If advancement is understood to mean "be like the sciences" and philosophy is understood to mean "whatever it is, it's not science" then we shouldn't be surprised that we don't feel like philosophical advancement hasn't happened. That's just how we set up how to use our words.

Science is advancing. This is very obvious. But is philosophy? — Alkis Piskas

Paraphrase:
"My empirical knowledge is increasing, but is my understanding and wisdom increasing?"

I believe that the root of our disagreement is that you and I are not reading the same philosophers or scientists. Tell me what you think constitutes the last significant innovation in philosophy, and the most important recent advances in the sciences (not technology, but basic theoretical models like Relativity or Darwinian evolution). — Joshs

I doubt many users on TPF are reading the same material as you and I.

Lets not jump ahead. You have been avoiding the issue I raised earlier.

Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, Wittgenstein — Joshs

Name f̶i̶v̶e̶ one contribution from any of those philosophers that have significantly advanced philosophy.

If your position is remotely correct, you should easily be able to name at least one significant contribution made by eight world class philosophers.

If your position is remotely correct, you should easily be able to name at least one significant contribution made by eight world class philosophers. — Merkwurdichliebe

I thought I did.

this from Evan Thompson’s book, Mind in Life:

“One common thread running through the following chapters is a re-liance on the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and developed in various directions by numerous others, most notably for my purposes by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Moran 2000; Sokolowski 2000; Spiegelberg 1994). 1 ( ) My aim, however, is not to repeat this tradition's analyses, as they are found in this or that author or text, but to present them anew in light of present-day con-cerns in the sciences of mind. Thus this book can be seen as con-tributing to the work of a new generation of phenomenologists who strive to "naturalize" phenomenology (Petitot et al. 1999). The project of naturalizing phenomenology can be understood in different ways, and my own way of thinking about it will emerge later in this book. The basic idea for the moment is that it is not enough for phenomenology simply to describe and philosophically analyze lived experience; phe-nomenology needs to be able to understand and interpret its investiga-tions in relation to those of biology and mind science.

Yet mind science has much to learn from the analyses of lived expe-rience accomplished by phenomenologists. Indeed, once science turns its attention to subjectivity and consciousness, to experience as it is lived, then it cannot do without phenomenology, which thus needs to be recognized and cultivated as an indispensable partner to the ex-perimental sciences of mind and life. As we will see, this scientific turn to phenomenology leads as much to a renewed understanding of na-ture, life, and mind as to a naturalization of phenomenology (Zahavi 2004b).”

Science is advancing. This is very obvious. But is philosophy?
— Alkis Piskas

Paraphrase:
"My empirical knowledge is increasing, but is my understanding and wisdom increasing?" — Yohan

I like that. :up:

My own peculiar paraphrase:

"Theoretical models are increasing in explanatory power, but are reasonable criteria of judgment and/or conceptual problematics increasing in parsimony?"

Indeed, once science turns its attention to subjectivity and consciousness, to experience as it is lived, then it cannot do without phenomenology, which thus needs to be recognized and cultivated as an indispensable partner to the experimental sciences of mind and life — Joshs

I'm a little skeptical of a "science of mind".

Phenomenologists reject the concept of objective research.

(Wiki)

However, this thread has made me aware of a new kind of mathematics supporting cognitive science,
Denotational Mathematics, created by a gentleman named Wang. It seems so peripheral that it doesn't even have a Wikipedia page (24,000 math topics do). It could be classified as a form of abstract alegbra, which has become a kind of jumbled mess IMO.

“Having studied physics, philosophy, and mathematics, [Arthur] Fine graduated from the University of Chicago in 1958 with a Bachelor of Science in mathematics. — Joshs

I was there at that time. I missed knowing Fine, but I did go climbing with Mihály Csíkszentmihályi, who later wrote extensively about a subject I discussed occasionally with him: "flow" in human activities. In particular, in gymnastics and climbing.

I just observed that the topic "Is there an external material world?" at the moment of writing this has reached 33 pages and is very close to 1000 responses! — Alkis Piskas

It's a perfectly valid philosophical concern, the fact that it strikes the man in the street as obvious or pointless notwithstanding. Besides, if talking about it is pointless, then talking about talking about it is even more so.

Besides, if talking about it is pointless, then talking about talking about it is even more so. — Wayfarer

If talking about it is a waste of time, then talking about talking about it won't be a waste of time if it cures you of the habit of talking about it. :wink:

Been here ten years, hasn't worked yet :yikes:

I feel you brother...me neither.

I was there at that time. I missed knowing Fine, but I did go climbing with Mihály Csíkszentmihályi, who later wrote extensively about a subject I discussed occasionally with him: "flow" in human activities. In particular, in gymnastics and climbing. — jgill

Did you ever cross paths with Eugene Gendlin, who arrived at U. of C. in 1963?

It is said truth, reality, and the absolute has always existed. Before us, after us, with or without us, eternal and unchanged. Philosophy is merely consciousness attempting to speak the language of eternity. If such a language could be spoken - in the scope of a lengthy speech - the combined works of every intellect and scientist who ever lived would amount to little more than an unintelligible grunt.

Like any language, some are more proficient at it than others.

Thank you :blush:

Tell me what you think constitutes the last significant innovation in philosophy, and the most important recent advances in the sciences (not technology, but basic theoretical models like Relativity or Darwinian evolution). — Joshs

Nietzsche's dionysian is the last great philosophical contribution.
More recently, the human genome project was pretty significant.

Methodology plays a major factor. The scientific method is much stricter than any methodology philosophy has to offer, and for that reason its progress is more apparent. Moreover, philosophy challenges its own methods and becomes mired in its own complexities, often leading to mind twisting paradoxes, whereas science takes its method and moves forward, achieving concrete results.

Even if science can integrate phenolenalism into naturalism and give birth to a new scientific paradigm that yeilds revolutionary new discoveries in the natural world, the deep philosophical problems of phenomenology will continue to remain unresolved. Hence, progress in philosophy is not correlated with advances in science.

If your position is remotely correct, you should easily be able to name at least one significant contribution made by eight world class philosophers. — Merkwurdichliebe

In case that quote by Thompson’s wasn't enough, I will organize contributions by contemporary philosophers in the form of a developmental hierarchy, beginning with the least advanced and ending with the most advanced thinkers. You focused on the past 100 years. Only one of the names on this list, Nietzsche, is disqualified.

Quine
Sellars
Putnam
Sartre
Wittgenstein
Kuhn
Rorty
Gergen
Nietzsche
Foucault
Deleuze
Husserl
Heidegger
Merleau-Ponty
Derrida

Let’s begin with Quine, Sellars and Putnam. They dissolved the fact-value distinction by showing how all statements of fact about any aspect of the empirical
world presuppose a valuative account within which they are intelligible. This has important implications for the understanding of the relation between our concepts and the world. Based on this. Putnam argues that all concepts are relative, and there is no fact of the matter that has intrinsic existence independent of all accounts.

Kuhn , Rorty and Gergen take us into the postmodern realm, not only arguing for conceptual relativism , but ethical and valuative relativism. Phenomenologists like Sartre showed psychologists how to integrate cognition and emotion, which under positivism, behaviorism
and cognitivism had been treated separately , with emotions treated as secondary phenomena in relation to cognition. Phenomenology also contributed to self-organizing approaches within the biological sciences, and to embodied cognitive models of perception.
There is much more to be said here , but this is a starting point.

In sum, ideas from the last 100 of philosophical work have made possible entirely new approaches within psychology and to some extent biology.

The scientific method is much stricter than any methodology philosophy has to offer, and for that reason its progress is more apparent. Moreover, philosophy challenges its own methods and becomes mired in its own complexities, often leading to mind twisting paradoxes, whereas science takes its method and moves forward, achieving concrete results. — Merkwurdichliebe

This is an old view of what science and philosophy do, harking back to Kant. Popper’s falsificationist philosophy of science is a representation of this modernist idea of scientific progress. With Putnam , Kuhn and Rorty we see a shift in thinking away from Kant toward a conceptual relativism that forms the basis of newer work in psychology. You are reading Nietzsche
as a modernist, but these days he tends to be read as a postmodernist.

In sum, ideas from the last 100 of philosophical work have made possible entirely new approaches within psychology and to some extent biology. — Joshs

I can agree that those are significant contributions of philosophical thought to science. But they did little to move philosophy forward like the Dionysian. To a much lesser degree, I would give Wittgenstein some credit for making a significant contribution with the tractatatus. But it was nowhere near as big as Nietzsche's. It's too bad Wittgenstein abandoned that line of thought, he was onto something big.

How has art declined in the past century? Can you give some examples? — Jackson

Popart and dadaism are two that come to mind.

The idea behind subjectivity-objectivity is bias and how to obviate/avoid it lest we distort the truth/fact and fool ourselves and others in the process.

Philosophy makes a big deal of objectivity and for the right reasons - we want the truth, we want to get to the facts, we want to know reality, not someone's opinion or fantasy.

Did you ever cross paths with Eugene Gendlin, who arrived at U. of C. in 1963? — Joshs

Afraid I was gone by then. But reading about him I can see a connection with what Mihály made his life's work. Was there a common school of thought there about that time? Incidentally, about that time the physics department started teaching all the math courses for its majors. Must have been a bit of ill will between physics and math departments.

OK.
(Subjects like these are too heavy for me; can't digest them. :smile:)