Thus — Bartricks
Oh. My. God. How many times?
I am arguing that reasons exist.
Are you a goldfish? — Bartricks
Unless it is merely their intuition that senses it is false. — Bylaw
No, I'm not a goldfish! :snicker: — Agent Smith
Any argument - any case - that ends by concluding that we do not have any reason to believe anything is self-undermining. For arguments are just attempts to show us what we have reason to believe.
We can safely dismiss such arguments, then. They are, in effect, arguments against arguments. Only a fool or a scoundrel makes an argument against arguments. — Bartricks
Now for the puzzle: when it comes to our faculty of reason the evolutionary explanation seems to be a debunking one, not a vindicatory one. We seem able to explain why we developed a faculty that produces in us the belief that we have reason to believe things without having to suppose that there are actually any reasons to believe things in reality. So we can explain the development of the faculty without having to suppose the reality of what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of.
Yet that now means that we've undermined our own case, as any case for anything depends on there being actual reasons to believe things (not the mere belief in such things). — Bartricks
The puzzle arises becasue we can give an evolutionary account of the development of our faculty of reason without having to posit any actual reasons. And thus such an account debunks our impressions and beliefs that we have reasons to do and believe things. Yet we have to presuppose that there really are reasons to believe things. So the atheist who believes they have reason to believe in evolution by natural selection has an incoherent set of beliefs. They believe there is reason to believe in evolution by natural selection, yet if evolution by natural selection alone (unassisted by God, that is) is true, then there are no reasons to believe anything. — Bartricks
1. If the correct explanation of why a person believes x does not involve positing x, then that person's belief in x is debunked.
2. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our development is true, then the correct explanation of why any person believes there are reasons to believe things does not involve positing any reasons to believe things.
3. Therefore, if a purely evolutionary explanation of our development is true, then a person's belief in reasons to believe things is debunked. — Bartricks
OMG. I think there ARE reasons to do things. I could not have been clearer. I said only an idiot or a scoundrel thinks they do not exist.
They exist.
The PROBLEM - for you, not me - is that an evolutionary explanation of how we have acquired our belief in them will discredit them.
So guess what? That means that an exclusive evolutionary explanation is FALSE. It does not mean that evolution by natural selection is false. It means that it can't be the whole story. — Bartricks
I'm not attacking Reason. I think there are reasons to do things. You can't make a case against them without presupposing them. So if you don't believe in reasons, you're stuck. You can't defend your disbelief, for the instant you do that you'll be appealing to the very things you think do not exist. And so all you can do is assert: all you can do is declare that you disbelieve in things that appear to exist both to you and everyone else who possesses a faculty of reason. — Bartricks
Note, I think reasons to do things exist. I am not arguing that they do not exist. I think they exist. I think a purely evolutionary explanation of us is demonstrably false. Demonstrably, because if true it implies there are no reasons to do things. But there are, so it is false. — Bartricks
1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p.
And to that we add this premise:
2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things
From which it follows that:
3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things.
Note, that conclusion does not assert that there are no reasons to do and believe things or that our belief in such things has actually been debunked. It says 'if'.
This premise is also true:
4. There are reasons to do and believe things and the correct explanation of our belief in reasons to do and believe things does invoke the actual existence of such things.
From which it follows:
5. Therefore, a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is incorrect. — Bartricks
Er, no. I am saying that there are reasons to do and believe things. — Bartricks
Oh. My. God. How many times?
I am arguing that reasons exist.
Are you a goldfish? — Bartricks
Evolutionarily speaking, there doesn't havta be real reasons for believing/doing something even though you believe there are.
What follows? — Agent Smith
1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p.
And to that we add this premise:
2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things
From which it follows that:
3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things. — Bartricks
You claim that the belief that there are real reasons to believe or do something is debunked. It's, to put it bluntly, just convenient/useful/healthy to believe that there are real reasons to believe or do something even though there are none. — Agent Smith
If so, any argument you make, which quite naturally requires you to furnish reasons (duh!), is going to fall flat on its face owing to the fact that according to you there are no real reasons. — Agent Smith
If a purely evolutionary story of our development is true, then there are no actual reasons to do anything.
That means that any faculty of reason we have developed is not capable of detecting any actual reasons - for there are none - and will instead be a faculty that generates the hallucination of reasons. — Bartricks
OK, right. I don't think I conflate them.Our faculty of reason.
Reasons to do things — Bartricks
Can you give me a couple of other examples. If someone is motivated to torture John, it seems to me he has a reason. It may not be what most people call a good reason (when looked at in total) but there would be a reason. He is mad at John and wants John to feel bad. OK, perhaps you grant that but point to the psychopath. He just does it for the hell of it. But then the psychopath gets pleasure from torturing John. John is a human and the psychopath gets pleasure out of torturing humans. That is a reason. We just don't like that reason.Our motivations are often the basis upon which we have a reason to do something, but the reason to do something and the motivation are distinct. For example, if I am motivated to torture John, that is not equivalent to me having reason to torture John. What we are motivated to do we can sometimes have no reason to do, and thus the two are not the same. — Bartricks
I took this as reasoning, as in reaching conclusions via logic and probably verbal thought. The second seemed to be 'the why we do things.'Our faculty of reason.
Reasons to do things — Bartricks
We are not motivated enough to do it perhaps. But if we have reasoned that we should do X, but don't do X other motivations are stronger. I mean, if we believe we should do X (either version of should, the moral or the practical) then we have some motivation to do it.But a reason-to-do something is not a motivation, for we can have reason to do that which we are not motivated to do and we can have a motivation to do that which we have no reason to do. — Bartricks
3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things. — Bartricks
I don't know what you mean. 3 is a conclusion and so to reject it you need to reject either 1 or 2 — Bartricks
How long were you pulling the push door before someone rescued you? Two days, wasn't it? — Bartricks
3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things. — Bartricks
I don't know what you mean. 3 is a conclusion and so to reject it you need to reject either 1 or 2 — Bartricks
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