So answer the questions and address the argument if you want this discussion to progress any further. — Janus
I'll put it another way: normative reasons are effective only if we believe them. Adaptive advantage gives us good reason to believe in them; namely that following them is generally adaptively advantageous.. — Janus
I don't know what you mean by that (and nor do you). — Bartricks
Address the OP. You haven't done that. If there are normative reasons, then we have reason to believe in them. — Bartricks
So, you think normative reasons are causes and causes are normative reasons?It means that it is a distinction without a real difference. — Janus
And what reason would that be? — Janus
So, you think normative reasons are causes and causes are normative reasons? — Bartricks
It would be an epistemic reason. There - that's a big word for you. You can misuse that one now. Have fun with it. — Bartricks
Answer the question: do normative reasons cause us to do things or not? — Janus
do you think that causes and normative reasons are one and the same — Bartricks
There are different kinds of causes for actions and normative reasons are one of them. Desires are another, and instincts are another. So that all reasons are causes does not entail that all causes are reasons, since there are other kinds of natural causes that do not pertain to human action and are thus not reasons for human action ( although they might be).. — Janus
or example, you have reason to think I know what I am talking about. You don't though. So that reason is not being causally effective. — Bartricks
show how an evolutionary explanation of our development needs to posit actual noramtive reasons. Not causes and not the belief in normative reasons. Actual normative reasons. — Bartricks
You need - without conflating normative reasons and causes - to show how an evolutionary explanation of our development needs to posit actual noramtive reasons. Not causes and not the belief in normative reasons. Actual normative reasons. — Bartricks
And I think you must show if our belief in normative reasons is actually evolving or not. — Daniel
If our belief in normative reasons is not evolving, you must show that it is not evolving. — Daniel
Here it is:
1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p.
And to that we add this premise:
2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things
From which it follows that:
3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things.
— Bartricks — Bartricks
So, that an evolutionary story appeals to causes does not establish that normative reasons have to be posited. — Bartricks
I've already acknowledged that not all causes, for example merely physical causes, are normative reasons. — Janus
I'm saying that causes of human and some "higher" social animals' behavior are, in the sense that behavior is constrained by what is acceptable to the group, normative. — Janus
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