:ok: :roll:

Whatever the reason may be for our seeing the coffee get colder instead of hotter, it's not physics. It's pretty astonishing.

Whatever the reason may be for our seeing the coffee get colder instead of hotter, it's not physics. — Tate

So it's magic, huh? :sparkle: :lol:

Unsolved problem.

I don't fully get it but even I can tell something isn't right about the post — Darkneos

I think the problem starts with the first paragraph. It says

In a world stripped of concepts, there is no existence as existence is itself a concept. Therefore, a fundamental prerequisite for existence is the existence of concepts. Concepts however cannot exist without a conceiving entity. Therefore, existence requires consciousness

The concept of a chair is a concept. It does not follow that a chair is a concept. And in fact a chair is not a concept. We can do things with chairs that we cannot do with concepts. We can't sit on a concept, for example. That is a crucial difference between chairs and concepts.

The concept of existence is a concept. It does not follow that existence is a concept. We can say things about concepts that we may not be able to say about existence. For example, without conceivers there are no concepts. It does not follow that without conceivers there is no existence.

In a world stripped of concepts, there is no existence as existence is itself a concept. Therefore, a fundamental prerequisite for existence is the existence of concepts. Concepts however cannot exist without a conceiving entity. Therefore, existence requires consciousness.

I think this is true. There's an almost identical thread already on this topic, they should be merged. See this comment. I refer to a book I've just been reading on it, which you can find here.

The concept of a chair is a concept. It does not follow that a chair is a concept. And in fact a chair is not a concept. We can do things with chairs that we cannot do with concepts. We can't sit on a concept, for example. That is a crucial difference between chairs and concepts — Cuthbert

Perception is conceptually saturated. So doing things with chairs is informed by this tacit background intelligibility. We throw chairs, or sit on them , or move them around. These performances presuppose an interpretation of what we are doing.

We would never know that empirically for to observe for existence one has to be conscious.

Can we deduce the answer i.e. can we formulate an a priori argument to prove whether or not existence requires consciousness?

We can try something smaller: There are many deaths daily (google) but existence doesn't seem to be affected by these deaths in any way at all. They should, if existence depended on consciousness, oui (concomitant variation, vide Mill's Methods).

Then there's evolution: Consciousness is the new kid on the block and if existence depended on it, evolution would be false. There's strong evidence that evolution happened!

But what would we be sitting on if we had no concept of such things let alone the concept of a "thing".

@Darkneos. Wherever we would be sitting, it would not be on a concept. If we had no concepts we might still have somewhere to sit - as a hamster might sit somewhere, for example. Earthquakes can throw chairs around and they don't have the concept of a chair. The post you quoted has some interesting thoughts in it. I pointed out one of the things that is not quite in order. You suspected there was at least one. So there it is, for what it's worth.

It is possible that existence and consciousness are two sides of an infinitely thin plane.

Wherever we would be sitting, it would not be on a concept. If we had no concepts we might still have somewhere to sit - as a hamster might sit somewhere, for example. Earthquakes can throw chairs around and they don't have the concept of a chair. The post you quoted has some interesting thoughts in it. I pointed out one of the things that is not quite in order. You suspected there was at least one. So there it is, for what it's worth. — Cuthbert

To get to ‘what a thing is’ non-conceptually , we would have to remove all words that conceptually determine what it is that is being done or seen ( and not just words. Conceptually is richer than just linguistic expression). So we can’t use ‘sitting’, ‘throwing’, a spatial ‘somewhere’ or temporal ‘some thing’, words like ‘hamster’ and ‘earthquake’. So what is left?

We couldn't use the concept 'sitting' if we had no concepts. But we could sit if we had no concepts (hamster example). And we do have concepts. So what is left is (a) sitting and (b) concepts. And the difference between them. And the OP still contains the identified mistake. And it still contains some things of value, despite that mistake.

The concept of existence is a concept. It does not follow that existence is a concept. We can say things about concepts that we may not be able to say about existence. For example, without conceivers there are no concepts. It does not follow that without conceivers there is no existence. — Cuthbert

:fire: :up:

We couldn't use the concept 'sitting' if we had no concepts. But we could sit if we had no concepts (hamster example). And we do have concepts. So what is left is (a) sitting and (b) concepts. And the difference between them. And the OP still contains the identified mistake. And it still contains some things of value, despite that mistake. — Cuthbert

No, we can not use the word ‘sit’ to refer to a doing without concepts, or without some other organized framework of interrelationality ( sensori-motor schemas of movement and perception). All we can legitimately say is that we are always exposed to an outside that provides affordances and constraints relative to the direction of our functioning. Yes, there is an outside , but we cannot associate any intrinsic features with it , because what these features are is always relative to some other features , which are always in a state of reciprocal transformation, independent of our subjectivity. I dont agree with Quine that the relativist entanglement of fact and value finally reaches bedrock with physics.

But without existence as a concept how would it still exist?

Sorry I'm just trying to wrap my head around your point.

The concept of existence is a concept. It does not follow that existence is a concept. — Cuthbert

I think it is. Anything that we deem to exist, does so by virtue of its identity - it is something (or some being) which 'stands apart' - which is what 'exist' means. This doesn't mean that absent the observer, the universe is non-existent, as non-existence is also a concept. You can imagine a universe devoid of observers, but even there the imagination provides a framework. You can't imagine a universe from no perspective.

@Darkneos did mention somewhere that this is 're-hashed Buddhist philosophy'. Whilst that is rather a condescending expression, there is some truth in it. Buddhist Madhyamaka philosophy says that nothing possesses 'own-being' (svabhava) or intrinsic existence (reference.) This is the well-known 'doctrine of śūnyatā ('emptiness') associated with Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Ask @Cuthbert.

But without existence as a concept how would it still exist?

Sorry I'm just trying to wrap my head around your point. — Darkneos

Existence is a concept whose meaning is opposed to absence. Ultimately, the absence of anything is a void.

A world that contains nothing, is a void. How can this be when a world that contains nothing, does not have the concept of a void?

It's because we're talking about that world from the comfort of our world, where there is an abundance of concepts.

In the same way, I can imagine a world that contains no conscious entities.

I can imagine a world that contains no conscious entities. — Tate

Right. Now try not imagining anything whatever. That would be closer to the mark.

Now try not imagining anything whatever. That would be closer to the mark. — Wayfarer

Closer to what mark?

Closer to what you're proposing. Yes, you can imagine an empty universe, but that is still an imaginative act on your part. The subject is still implicit there, as the subject who is imagining. So you can't imagine a world with no subject.

Closer to what you're proposing. Yes, you can imagine an empty universe, but that is still an imaginative act on your part. The subject is still implicit there, as the subject who is imagining. So you can't imagine a world with no subject. — Wayfarer

Think possible worlds. There are possible worlds that don't contain me. I have no problem imagining them.

Likewise, there are possible worlds that contain no conscious entities.

There are possible worlds that don't contain me. — Tate

That's not the point. It's not necessarily about you in particular. The subject is implicit in every such imagined world.

If the universe had intention to create humans it sure took a long time. — Jackson

I'm thinking it was for aliens in the Andromeda galaxy 10 billion years ago.

That's not the point. It's not necessarily about you in particular. The subject is implicit in every such imagined world. — Wayfarer

No, the subject is in this world, imagining things. The object of imagination, in this case, is a world that contains no conscious entities.

No, we can not use the word ‘sit’ to refer to a doing without concepts, or without some other organized framework of interrelationality ( sensori-motor schemas of movement and perception). — Joshs

Correct. We cannot refer to anything without concepts. And also, hamsters can sit. And they have no concepts. That is because sitting is one thing; and referring is another.

(I have no idea why I chose hamsters. They are not even well know for their ability to sit. I think they might just be able to lie down. If anyone comes here to claim that hamsters cannot sit, I'm fine with that. It someone claims that the reason they cannot sit is because they lack the concept of sitting then I might pop up again. Possibly.)

Yes, you are right. We cannot use the word 'sit' to refer to anything without concepts and some framework that is organised enough to generate meanings. And also I am right. Pot plants can sit on window-sills and can use no words at all. Both, and.

So, without further heating, a hot cup of coffee does not become a cold cup of coffee? — 180 Proof

Further heating of the coffee cup still leads to increased entropy. The point is entropy is why the coffee cools in the first place. Energy doesn’t like to be close to itself it prefers to spread out evenly and as far from itself as possible

To heat the cup of coffee further - you still require all the processes to make the fuel, or electricity, the appliance for heating it, and the heat itself which 80% or more is lost to heating the air or environment that isn’t the coffee. In simple terms more work is always put in than that which is gotten out of the system.

In any aspect of that process more energy is lost than that needed to heat the coffee. Therefore entropy always rises.

A philosophical understanding is possible if we try to conceive it as provisional, limited, conditioned, imperfect, rather than ultimate. — Angelo Cannata

Isn’t scientific understanding also provisional, limited, conditioned, imperfect and ofc not ultimate?

On the contrary, this is exactly what science is and what makes it different from philosophy.
When, for example, science says that the earth is a planet turning around the sun, this means that a lot of experiments and evidence make us possible to synthesize their result with these words. But nothing in science prevents that tomorrow something different may be discovered. Science doesn’t establish any limit to what future discoveries might reveal, even about things that today seem 100% sure and certain.

Philosophy, instead, or, at least, a certain kind of philosophy, looks for things that should be guaranteed for ever, indipendently from new discoveries. I disagree with this kind of philosophy, but this is what some philosopher have been looking for.