Are you familiar with quantum bayesianism? — Wayfarer
If one wants to argue (as some do) that there's no external world, — Isaac
The best explanation for the consistency of my expectations and your expectations about the cup is that there's an external cup. — Isaac
don't think that follows at all. Electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of ~650nm consistently triggers the experience of the colour red. — Michael
We see the object as red, we do not see the radiation as red. — Metaphysician Undercover
My view is close to idealism but I don't understand that to mean that objects don't exist, but that they are lacking inherent or intrinsic reality. — Wayfarer
I would say that our current understanding of physics, e.g. the Standard Model, would show that it is a mistake to reduce the objects of perception to the external world causes of experience. — Michael
How so? Our current understanding of physics doesn't seem to be incompatible with the notion that some particular collection of those wave-particles are arranged in a stable, mind-independant manner to which we can apply the label 'red cup'. — Isaac
I think that it would be like saying that there's a person on the TV, when really it's just a bunch of pixels on the screen being lit up a certain way. — Michael
Those wave particles have exactly the properties we expect of red cups. They reflect the right wavelengths, they hold liquids (other wave particles we call 'liquids'). There's no made up properties. — Isaac
Wave-particles holding wave-particles? That's a category error — Michael
The external world is just a mass of wave-particles all interacting with each other. This then causes us to see a red cup filled with water. — Michael
Why do those wave particles there cause us to see a red cup filled with water, and not, say, a bus, or a circus clown?
They have some properties which cause us to see red cups filled with water.
What is in error in labelling those wave particles with those particular properties a 'red cup'? — Isaac
when one set interacts with a certain kind of light the "human vision" experience above is elicited, and when the other set interacts with that same kind of light the "bird vision" experience above is elicited. — Michael
Yes, but where's the error in labelling the set which (when they interact with a certain kind of light) cause the "human vision" experience of a red cup, a 'red cup'? — Isaac
In a Cartesian theatre? — bongo fury
The colour that I see and the colour that the bird sees aren't part of the external world — Michael
Why not?
Why can it not be that 'red' just is a category of wave particles which cause humans, in normal light conditions with normal eyesight to have the response we call 'seeing red'. What's wrong with categorising collections of external world particles by the effect they tend to have on humans? — Isaac
Can you give an example of something which isn't inherently/intrinsically real and say what features deny it that status? — Isaac
Seems like you’re falling victim to the exact equivocation I warned against. — Michael
if you want to say that something is red if it causes most humans to see red then we have two different meanings for "red" (red as the colour in the experience and red as reflecting light at a certain wavelength) leaving us susceptible to equivocation. — Michael
I would argue with Putnam , who is a semantic relativist , that the world has no intrinsic properties
— Joshs
Does that imply homogeneity of the external world? If so, then what causes the heterogeneity we experience? — Isaac
There are no intrinsic properties because the heterogeneity the world produces is not based on static facts of the matter but continually changing patterns of relationship. — Joshs
How can there be any pattern of relationship (continually changing or not) without intrinsic properties? If the hidden states are absent of any properties at all then there'd be no pattern. All would be one homogeneous mass.
Patterns (even ephemeral ones) require variation and variation requires properties over which there can be variance. — Isaac
I don't see it. I don't know of anyone who seriously talks about the redness of their experiences. Post boxes are red, roses are red, traffic lights are red. Experiences aren't coloured, they're mental events. — Isaac
Patterns emerge and are reinforced or altered in actual
contexts of interaction, rather than in rules or properties that supposedly exist before or outside of actual contexts. — Joshs
Do you remember the dress that some people see as black and blue and others as white and gold? Same stimulus, different colours experienced.
Your account of colour would make this, and things like Locke's inverted spectrum hypothesis, incomprehensible. — Michael
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