Are you familiar with quantum bayesianism? — Wayfarer

Only very recently exposed to it. A colleague of mine knows I follow the work of Karl Friston and he forwarded me this preprint

https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.15242

It sounds like a really interesting approach, but my knowledge of Physics is too poor to judge how well it stacks up against the evidence from that quarter.

I've only read that Quanta interview I mentioned but it makes a lot of sense - knowledge of physics notwithstanding.

If one wants to argue (as some do) that there's no external world, — Isaac

It's not so much that there's no external world, but that the perception of what is external is itself a neural activity. That book I keep mentioning, Mind and the Natural Order, shows how we see everything in terms of a neurally-generated matrix of gestalts - meaningful wholes.

I don't know if 'idealism' is the right term for it. It might be closer to 'critical realism' because it doesn't question the existence of an external world, but says that how it occurs or appears to us, is a product of the brain - so in that sense internal to thought.

//ps// no, it's not 'critical realism'. My view is close to idealism but I don't understand that to mean that objects don't exist, but that they are lacking inherent or intrinsic reality.//

The best explanation for the consistency of my expectations and your expectations about the cup is that there's an external cup. — Isaac

I don't think that follows at all. Electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of ~650nm consistently triggers the experience of the colour red. The experience is nothing like the cause and it would be wrong to say that electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of ~650nm is "an external red".

I don't see why the same principle doesn't apply to the experience of a cup and whatever causes the experience. I would say that our current understanding of physics, e.g. the Standard Model, would show that it is a mistake to reduce the objects of perception to the external world causes of experience.

The external world is just a mess of wave-particles. The macroscopic world is a product of consciousness. It's naive to then project this macroscopic world onto the external world.

don't think that follows at all. Electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of ~650nm consistently triggers the experience of the colour red. — Michael

Things are not so simple. We see the object as red, we do not see the radiation as red. The object interacts with radiation which is everywhere around it, and emits 650nm, and this allows us to see it as red. I believe this is important to acknowledge, it is not really the radiation which triggers the experience, just like it is not the hammer which drives the nail. The radiation is a medium, and whatever it is, which is going on within the object, that is what is seen, just like the hammer is a medium, and the person swinging it is actually driving the nail.

Stand near a warm stove for example, and feel the radiant heat. What you are feeling, is the stove directly interacting with your body, despite the fact that this interaction is modeled by science as occurring through the means of some mysterious substance called "radiation". The problem is that we model the two distinct objects as distant from each other, separated by "space", and it is very counter-intuitive to think that these two objects could be directly interacting with each other, because there appears to be "space" between them. But in reality, we know that objects which appear to be separated by "space" actually do interact with each other directly, through gravity.

So the objects actually overlap each other, in space, and occupy the very same space as each other. Therefore we ought to recognize that this whole way of modeling objects as separated from each other by "space", and assuming a mysterious medium between them, "radiation", and saying that the radiation is what we sense, rather than sensing the object itself, directly, is fundamentally faulty.

We see the object as red, we do not see the radiation as red. — Metaphysician Undercover

And that's precisely why it is wrong to reduce the object of perception to the external world causes of the experience.

In terms of the external world there is just a bunch of photons and electrons and quarks and so on which interact in a variety of ways, and when electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of 650nm interacts with certain other particles it elicits the experience of seeing a red cup.

The red cup isn't any of that external world stuff. We might naively project the red cup we see onto the external world but that's a mistake.

My view is close to idealism but I don't understand that to mean that objects don't exist, but that they are lacking inherent or intrinsic reality. — Wayfarer

OK. I'm still unclear on what you mean by 'inherent or intrinsic reality'. Can you give an example of something which isn't inherently/intrinsically real and say what features deny it that status?

I asked thst way round because I'm already aware of things you think are inherently/intrinsically real (numbers, lass of logic) but I still can't see from those examples alone where you're drawing the line between real and not-real.

I would say that our current understanding of physics, e.g. the Standard Model, would show that it is a mistake to reduce the objects of perception to the external world causes of experience. — Michael

How so? Our current understanding of physics doesn't seem to be incompatible with the notion that some particular collection of those wave-particles are arranged in a stable, mind-independant manner to which we can apply the label 'red cup'.

You seem to be thinking that the fact that they could also be interpreted as some other arrangement means the arrangement we've chosen isn't real (in a mind-independant manner), but I don't see how that follows.

If I choose to see the duck-rabbit as a duck, the possibility of seeing it as a rabbit doesn't render the 'duck' arrangement of pixels unreal. The pixels are genuinely still arranged in the shape of a duck. They're just also arranged in the shape of a rabbit.

How so? Our current understanding of physics doesn't seem to be incompatible with the notion that some particular collection of those wave-particles are arranged in a stable, mind-independant manner to which we can apply the label 'red cup'. — Isaac

I think that it would be like saying that there's a person on the TV, when really it's just a bunch of pixels on the screen being lit up a certain way. It might be a useful fiction to talk that way, but in terms of the underlying (meta-)physics it would be wrong.

I think that it would be like saying that there's a person on the TV, when really it's just a bunch of pixels on the screen being lit up a certain way. — Michael

Well no, because 'a person' is a label we have for an object which has properties like being made of cells, being autonomous etc. Properties which the pixels on the screen clearly lack.

This is not true of the wave particle arrangement which is our 'red cup'. Those wave particles have exactly the properties we expect of red cups. They reflect the right wavelengths, they hold liquids (other wave particles we call 'liquids'). There's no made up properties.

Those wave particles have exactly the properties we expect of red cups. They reflect the right wavelengths, they hold liquids (other wave particles we call 'liquids'). There's no made up properties. — Isaac

Wave-particles holding wave-particles? That's a category error and is the exact kind of naive projection that I mentioned earlier.

The external world is just a mass of wave-particles all interacting with each other. This then causes us to see a red cup filled with water.

Wave-particles holding wave-particles? That's a category error — Michael

How so? Can some wave particles not be considered 'inside' others?

The external world is just a mass of wave-particles all interacting with each other. This then causes us to see a red cup filled with water. — Michael

Why?

Why do those wave particles there cause us to see a red cup filled with water, and not, say, a bus, or a circus clown?

They have some specific properties which cause us to see red cups filled with water.

What is in error in labelling those wave particles with those particular properties a 'red cup'?

We can say that's what a red cup is. It's a particular collection of wave particles which have the property of causing humans to 'see' a red cup.

Why do those wave particles there cause us to see a red cup filled with water, and not, say, a bus, or a circus clown?

They have some properties which cause us to see red cups filled with water.

What is in error in labelling those wave particles with those particular properties a 'red cup'? — Isaac

I saw this image recently:



Under an "ordinary" explanation I would say that we see the things we do because that's just how our eyes and brain respond to stimulation, and organisms with very different eyes and brains will see things differently, as the picture above shows. Presumably there's some kind of deterministic explanation as to why particular kinds of eyes and brains respond the way they do to stimulation, and that there's some kind of deterministic explanation as to why particular kinds of brain activity elicit particular kinds of conscious experience, but that's all beyond my understanding.

Although, of course, any such talk of "eyes" and "brains" is more of the same kind of useful fiction as talking about "red cups". Rather there are two sets of wave-particle collections, and when one set interacts with a certain kind of light the "human vision" experience above is elicited, and when the other set interacts with that same kind of light the "bird vision" experience above is elicited.

when one set interacts with a certain kind of light the "human vision" experience above is elicited, and when the other set interacts with that same kind of light the "bird vision" experience above is elicited. — Michael

Yes, but where's the error in labelling the set which (when they interact with a certain kind of light) cause the "human vision" experience of a red cup, a 'red cup'?

Why are we wrong to apply the label 'red cup' to those particular wave particles with those particular properties?

I don't see how the fact that they elicit different properties in birds makes our labelling process incorrect. We're just not labelling them by the effect they have on birds. There's nothing wrong with that. I don't see why our labelling practices should accommodate the effect the object of our labelling has on birds.

Yes, but where's the error in labelling the set which (when they interact with a certain kind of light) cause the "human vision" experience of a red cup, a 'red cup'? — Isaac

Taking colour as an example, the colour that I see isn't the colour that the bird sees, even though the external world objects are the same. The colour that I see and the colour that the bird sees aren't part of the external world; they're part of our respective conscious experiences.

Deciding to then label the external world objects as "having" the colour that we see is a naive projection.

But if you want to say that something is red if it causes most humans to see red then we have two different meanings for "red" (red as the colour in the experience and red as reflecting light at a certain wavelength) leaving us susceptible to equivocation. And the same for if you want to say that something is a cup if it causes most humans to see a cup. But if that were the case then when you say that there is an external world red cup you're just saying that there's some external world stuff that causes most humans to see a red cup. If that's all you want to say then fine, although it doesn't say much and can be accepted by the indirect realist/transcendental idealist.

I saw this image recently: — Michael

In a Cartesian theatre?

In a Cartesian theatre? — bongo fury

No, in my bedroom on my computer. I don't go to the theatre.

The colour that I see and the colour that the bird sees aren't part of the external world — Michael

Why not?

Why can it not be that 'red' just is a category of wave particles which cause humans, in normal light conditions with normal eyesight to have the response we call 'seeing red'. What's wrong with categorising collections of external world particles by the effect they tend to have on humans?

Why not?

Why can it not be that 'red' just is a category of wave particles which cause humans, in normal light conditions with normal eyesight to have the response we call 'seeing red'. What's wrong with categorising collections of external world particles by the effect they tend to have on humans? — Isaac

Because of what I said next in that comment.

Can you give an example of something which isn't inherently/intrinsically real and say what features deny it that status? — Isaac

I would argue with Putnam , who is a semantic relativist , that the world has no intrinsic properties or attributes. What is real is internal to accounts of the world.

“…the metaphysical assumption that there is a fundamental dichotomy between "intrinsic" properties of things and "relational" properties of things makes no sense.”( The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy). This would seem to rule out Wayfarer’s mathematical objects.

if that were the case then when you say that there is an external world red cup you're just saying that there's some external world stuff that causes most humans to see a red cup. — Michael

Yes. And that's what a cup is.

I would argue with Putnam , who is a semantic relativist , that the world has no intrinsic properties — Joshs

Does that imply homogeneity of the external world? If so, then what causes the heterogeneity we experience?

Yes. And that's what a cup is. — Isaac

Seems like you’re falling victim to the exact equivocation I warned against.

Seems like you’re falling victim to the exact equivocation I warned against. — Michael

Here...?

if you want to say that something is red if it causes most humans to see red then we have two different meanings for "red" (red as the colour in the experience and red as reflecting light at a certain wavelength) leaving us susceptible to equivocation. — Michael

I don't see it. I don't know of anyone who seriously talks about the redness of their experiences. Post boxes are red, roses are red, traffic lights are red. Experiences aren't coloured, they're mental events.

What I'm claiming is that when we partake in our naming practices, what we're naming are hidden states. We name them by a complex, interactive and collaborative process of agreement as to the best model of the effects those states have on us (humans). The process might be fiendishly complicated, but it doesn't change the 'what' we're naming...which is a hidden state.

A 'cup' is a hidden state which we generally agree causes us to model it as something to drink out of. That's just what a 'cup' is.

It can't be an internal model I'm referring to...

I can be wrong about whether the thing I'm naming is a cup. I couldn't possibly be wrong if what I'm naming is my internal model of that hidden state.

When I say "put that cup away" I'm expecting that instruction to effect the external hidden state. I'm expecting to later model that state as being one with a cup previously on a table now away in a cupboard. I'm not expecting my instructee to act upon my model. I'm expecting him to act on the external hidden state.

The fact that we can only infer hidden states doesn't prevent us from naming them because we can come to an agreement about what it is we infer from them.

My view is close to idealism but I don't understand that to mean that objects don't exist, but that they are lacking inherent or intrinsic reality.// — Wayfarer

Isn't this also close to indirect realism?

I would argue with Putnam , who is a semantic relativist , that the world has no intrinsic properties
— Joshs

Does that imply homogeneity of the external world? If so, then what causes the heterogeneity we experience? — Isaac

I think the opposite is the case. There are no intrinsic properties because the heterogeneity the world produces is not based on static facts of the matter but continually changing patterns of relationship.

There are no intrinsic properties because the heterogeneity the world produces is not based on static facts of the matter but continually changing patterns of relationship. — Joshs

How can there be any pattern of relationship (continually changing or not) without intrinsic properties? If the hidden states are absent of any properties at all then there'd be no pattern. All would be one homogeneous mass.

Patterns (even ephemeral ones) require variation and variation requires properties over which there can be variance.

How can there be any pattern of relationship (continually changing or not) without intrinsic properties? If the hidden states are absent of any properties at all then there'd be no pattern. All would be one homogeneous mass.

Patterns (even ephemeral ones) require variation and variation requires properties over which there can be variance. — Isaac

Patterns emerge and are reinforced or altered in actual
contexts of interaction, rather than in rules or properties that supposedly exist before or outside of actual contexts. What is at issue for an organism with regard to any aspect of its behavior must re-establish itself in actual material interactions.

I don't see it. I don't know of anyone who seriously talks about the redness of their experiences. Post boxes are red, roses are red, traffic lights are red. Experiences aren't coloured, they're mental events. — Isaac

Do you remember the dress that some people see as black and blue and others as white and gold? Same stimulus, different colours experienced.

Your account of colour would make this, and things like Locke's inverted spectrum hypothesis, incomprehensible.

If there's no bird, but just a collection of wave/particles responding to another collection of wave/particles and imagining it's a bird. then how do we know how bird's see things?

Patterns emerge and are reinforced or altered in actual
contexts of interaction, rather than in rules or properties that supposedly exist before or outside of actual contexts. — Joshs

That doesn't rule out a material or energetic context in which patterns emerge prior to there being humans and other animals to interpret those patterns as perceived by them.

Do you remember the dress that some people see as black and blue and others as white and gold? Same stimulus, different colours experienced.

Your account of colour would make this, and things like Locke's inverted spectrum hypothesis, incomprehensible. — Michael

Why? Same stimulus, different people; why would you think that incomprehensible?