One has green as a property of some mental representation, the other as a property of the hidden state.
The former is without warrant. — Isaac
Then you still have to explain what you mean by one person seeing something as red and another person seeing that same thing as blue. Does each person have different hidden states? — Michael
Same hidden state causes one person to respond in the way we call 'seeing blue' and another person to respond in the way we call 'seeing red'. — Isaac
Because it seems to me that when we say that one person sees something as red and another as blue that the words "red" and "blue" are referring to the particular qualities of their individual experiences. That's colour as everyone ordinarily understands it. — Michael
Responding in the way called "seeing blue" is just seeing blue — Michael
We have experiences, and we use words to refer to properties of these experiences. Colour, texture, pleasure, pain, and so on. — Michael
it's wrong to deny that in normal conversation they refer to something else; something that isn't hidden but instead is immediately apparent. — Michael
Blue being the name given to the property we're seeing. The property of the external hidden state. — Isaac
But we clearly aren't referring to the properties of the experience. When I say "the post box is red" I'm clearly referring to the post box. The grammar could not be more clear. — Isaac
But people see different things despite the same external hidden state, e.g some a white and gold dress and some a black and blue dress. Therefore it’s not the external hidden state they see. — Michael
the postbox isn’t an external hidden state either. — Michael
I didn’t realise that English grammar dictates/reveals the (meta-)physics of perception. — Michael
Why? Why must the property of the external state we're labelling as 'green' be such that it causes the same response in all people at all times? — Isaac
Then when I say "I'll meet you by the postbox" I'm expecting you to get into my mind and wait next to my mental representation? — Isaac
I'm saying that if two people are seeing different things (one a black and blue dress, the other a white and gold dress) then they are not seeing the external state — Michael
And "meeting someone by the postbox" isn't an external hidden state. — Michael
Why not? I don't understand why you're invoking this rule that a hidden state has to have the same effect on all people at all times. Where does that rule come from? — Isaac
Me <-- <- Me seeing the Cup is "my" occurrence/process \ \ Cup <- just the one cup / / You <- <- You seeing the Cup is "your" occurrence/process
Maybe there are actually two cups, one for you and one for me, and we communicate telepathically about our individual scenes. — Tate
Point is: watch out for question begging. — Tate
Maybe it can, but in this scenario it isn't. Neither person A nor person B sees a white and gold and black and blue dress. Person A only sees a white and gold dress. Person B only sees a black and blue dress. — Michael
Maybe there are actually two cups, one for you and one for me, and we communicate telepathically about our individual scenes.
— Tate
:D (you're just dreaming that you're reading posts on a forum) — jorndoe
Point is: watch out for question begging.
— Tate
There are no proofs here. Just switching to other (descriptive) verbiage. — jorndoe
Right. But how does that make it that the dress must be one or the other? — Isaac
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