I am then arguing that not q. Not q here means I am arguing that our impressions of presentness are NOT systematically mistaken. — Bartricks

Where can I find that argument?

In the OP.

That “appearances enjoy default justification”? Then the world is flat, I suppose?

Look up 'default'. Also imagine how a huge ball would look if you were extremely tiny and on it. And finally, recognize that on Berkeley's view the world is not an extended thing, but an idea in the mind of another.

Doesn’t it appear that the Earth is flat, or that the sun goes around the Earth?

I did not claim that the external sensible world exists unpercieved, and nor does he.

Exactly, and that contradicts naive realism, i.e., the belief that the word does exist unperceived. That's my entire point. Take Berkley, he is advancing a novel argument about the way reality differs from people's naive conception of it. It's a fine argument. However, "if a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false." seems to apply to Berkley here, no?

Not 'all' minds. Our minds. That is, those minds whose sensations represent the world they are sensations of to have outness. It appears external. He concludes that it is.

I assume there is a typo confusing me here, but I can't figure out what it is or what you're trying to say.

Have you actually read the principles or are those cherry picked quotes from a website?
Because if you actually read him he's very clear about this. Those quotes are taken out of context. Willfully. Read him and see.

I've read the Principles many times. What makes you think that? I've quoted the entire paragraphs in question.

He doesn't think your desk disappears when you stop perceiving it. He does think it can't exist unpercieved.

>The desk can't exist when it is unperceived.
>You are alone in your office.
>You get up and leave, shutting the door.
>Your desk is no longer being perceived; it thus does not exist.

Quibble with the use of the word "disappeared" if you want, but the logic here is that the desk ceases to exist when no one is perceiving it.

Arguably, Berkley is saved from this conclusion through God's perception of all that is, but notably he does not invoke that solution when he anticipates the argument about things like "disappearing desks."

He says:

...it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. - In answer to all which, I refer the reader to What has been said in sect 3, 4, &c, [sections that go over how things do not exist except as sensations] all I desire he will consider whether be means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived.

Or to paraphrase: "a thing existing without being perceived is meaningless and incomprehensible, less so than that things might come into existence as they are perceived."

Look, if you just take materialism for granted and then interpret data in light of it, then you are not doing philosophy. — Bartricks

Was I doing that? Could you show where?
Just in general it would help if you integrated my response into your response to that. You seem to have restated your position, but I can't tell if it deals with my objection or not.

Philosophy is about following reason, not using reason to rationalize your prejudices. — Bartricks

Same reaction: did I do this? Where?

If a certain worldview - materialism- implies it is not present, then it follows that the evidence implies materialism is false. — Bartricks

Right, that evidence. Other evidence may support it. Your argument would mean that appearance trumps any evidence. But science, for example, studied appearances and kept studying them and found a delay. They found appearances - observations - that led to understandings of perception, how brains work and so on. These brought into question the presentness. And, in fact, they could argue that they need not have a materialist model. A decision on substance. They followed observations and found delays in the appearances.

All you are doing is rejecting the evidence on the grounds that it conflicts with materialism. — Bartricks

They are rejecting one interpretation of one kind of appearance because that is contradicted by a whole lot of other ones. Whatever the substance of reality. You would need to have an explanation within idealism, say, for why other appearances demonstrate a delay to dismiss their model.

Philosophy is about following reason, not using reason to rationalize your prejudices. — Bartricks

How much richer could an irony become?

You haven't answered my question - if there's a giant ball and you're tiny by comparison and are stood on a tiny bit of it, how would things look from there? Flat, yes? So there's no illusion.

Added to which you're assuming materialism in assuming that there's an extended ball out there in space.

If the earth does not appear to be the shape it actually is, then that counts against materialism, not immaterialism. It doesn't. There isn't a problem there. But if - if - materialism is true and the earth appears flat when it is round (which it doesn't!), then that would be further evidence of materialism's falsity.

Anyway, how about addressing the argument in the OP? With which premise do you disagree?

You haven't answered my question - if there's a giant ball and you're tiny by comparison and are stood on a tiny bit of it, how would things look from there? Flat, yes? So there's no illusion. — Bartricks

There’s no illusion that the world is flat? You have just accounted for the illusion that the world appears flat even though it’s a giant ball and isn’t flat.

Added to which you're assuming materialism in assuming that there's an extended ball out there in space. — Bartricks

And you don’t?

But if - if - materialism is true and the earth appears flat when it is round (which it doesn't!), then that would be further evidence of materialism's falsity. — Bartricks

So, basically, if science discovers that things are not as they appear, then that’s evidence of materialism’s falsity? According to what definition of materialism should things be as they appear?

Anyway, how about addressing the argument in the OP? With which premise do you disagree? — Bartricks

I’ve already told you. You’ve provided no argument that things are exactly how they appear to be. Saying that this is the “default justification” is not an argument. If it was, then you should agree that the world is flat, just as it appears to be.

However, "if a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false." seems to apply to Berkley here, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. How?

The sensible world appears to exist outside of our minds, yes?

He concludes that it does. Not that it doesn't. That it does - it does exist outside of our mind. It has, as he put it, 'outness'.

But it can't exist unperceived, as it is self-evident to reason that a percept can't exist absent any perceiver.

Thus, the external sensible world exists as the sensations of another mind.

Now, that does not conflict with any appearance. What it conflicts with is a widespread belief - belief, note, not appearance - that the world is an extended realm that exists extra-mentally.

I assume there is a typo confusing me here, but I can't figure out what it is or what you're trying to say. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There's absolutely no justification for not being able to figure it out.

The sensible world exists outside of your mind.

And mine.

And everyone else's bar one mind - the mind that it exists in.

So, you seem unable to distinguish between two distinct claims: that the sensible world cannot exist unperceived and that the sensible world exists as 'your' percepts.

I've read the Principles many times. What makes you think that? I've quoted the entire paragraphs in question. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yeah, I don't believe you. I think you've read paragraphs that have been taken out of context. If you'd read him you'd know he never argues that the sensible world exists in 'our' minds. It exists in another mind. Read paragraphs 6 and 29-33 (and plenty of others, but those are just some)

>The desk can't exist when it is unperceived.
>You are alone in your office.
>You get up and leave, shutting the door.
>Your desk is no longer being perceived; it thus does not exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's not a quote from him. That's you misunderstanding him.

When he talks about the desk, the point he is making is about the nature of sensations, not the location of the sensations constitutive of sensible desks of our experience.

Again, it's clear that you haven't read him, just paragraphs taken out of context.

He says:

...it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. - In answer to all which, I refer the reader to What has been said in sect 3, 4, &c, [sections that go over how things do not exist except as sensations] all I desire he will consider whether be means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived.

Or to paraphrase: "a thing existing without being perceived is meaningless and incomprehensible, less so than that things might come into existence as they are perceived." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, you haven't read him. You're just reading quotes taken out of context. He's referring you back to the early paragraphs - 3,4 and c. Paragraphs you should have read by the time you read the one you're quoting, and thus should already understand taht he's not arguing the desk exists in your mind, but rather that the desk can't exist unperceived.

Like I say, you haven't read him.

Was I doing that? Could you show where? — Bylaw

Certainly. Here:

I am not sure how you got to materialism is false. I get that there is an illusion of presentness. But that doesn't make materialism false. It would mean that there is an illusion about part of experience. Materialism could still be correct in the main. And in fact could simply contain this as one of the facets of materialism. — Bylaw

You are simply assuming that materialism is true and then concluding that the appearance of presentness is illusion.

That's to assume a worldview and then interpret the data in light of it.

It's no different from, say, assuming that God exists and then concluding that the existence of evil is an illusion because God would not permit any.

It's not a case. It's just you imposing a worldview on the data. It's not following evidence. It's interpreting evidence in light of one's worldview.

It's not philosophy. It's what you did. And it's not philosophy. It's not how Berkeley argues. Berkeley's idealist worldview is in his conclusion, not his premises.

Right, that evidence. Other evidence may support it. Your argument would mean that appearance trumps any evidence. — Bylaw

Appearances ARE the evidence. Jesus!

There’s no illusion that the world is flat? You have just accounted for the illusion that the world appears flat even though it’s a giant ball and isn’t flat. — Luke

You're too confused for words. I'm not going to explain again.

So, basically, if science discovers that things are not as they appear, then that’s evidence of materialism’s falsity? According to what definition of materialism should things be as they appear? — Luke

Read the OP.

Appearances are default evidence in support of what they represent to be the case.

So, if event x appears to be present, that's default evidence that it is present.

If a certain theory about the world implies that x is not present, but past, then we have default evidence that the theory in question is false.

Surprise me - understand what I just said.

I’ve already told you. You’ve provided no argument that things are exactly how they appear to be. Saying that this is the “default justification” is not an argument. If it was, then you should agree that the world is flat, just as it appears to be. — Luke

OP.

I don't think you know an argument from your elbow given you think if someone says "if p, then q" they are defending p!

When's your next album coming out, Alanis?

Whether that external sensible world is independent of all minds is not something one can see. How would you 'see' that? — Bartricks

You can't 'see' presentness either. So being able to 'see' that which is assumed doesn't seem to distinguish the two propositions.

Philosophy is about following reason, not using reason to rationalize your prejudices.
— Bartricks

How much richer could an irony become? — Janus

:clap: :lol:

Appearances are default evidence in support of what they represent to be the case.

So, if event x appears to be present, that's default evidence that it is present.

If a certain theory about the world implies that x is not present, but past, then we have default evidence that the theory in question is false.

Surprise me - understand what I just said. — Bartricks

I don't believe that what appears to be the case is evidence that it is actually the case. Otherwise, it follows that the Earth is flat, that the Sun revolves around the Earth, that optical illusions are not illusions, and a host of other things that are known to be untrue, simply because that is how they appear to be. The "evidence" of appearances supports both an inaccurate theory (if the appearances are non-veridical) and an accurate theory (one which better accounts for those non-veridical appearances). Which of these is the "default evidence"?

Would you allow for any alternative evidence to outweigh the "default evidence" of appearances?

Anyway, how about addressing the argument in the OP? With which premise do you disagree?
— Bartricks

I’ve already told you. You’ve provided no argument that things are exactly how they appear to be. Saying that this is the “default justification” is not an argument. If it was, then you should agree that the world is flat, just as it appears to be.
— Luke

OP.

I don't think you know an argument from your elbow given you think if someone says "if p, then q" they are defending p! — Bartricks

I was disagreeing with your second premise, not-q: that our impressions/sensations are not inaccurate and that things are exactly how they appear to be.

I have not only read Berkeley, but sat through lectures on him and read secondary sources on the Principles. My reading of paragraph 45 is fairly common.

You're also confusing what I'm saying. "Things do not exist outside their being perceived by minds," is most definitely Berkeley's point. I'm not sure why you're getting hung up on external versus internal here. I mentioned "external" (and independent) objects, because that's what naive realism posits as existing.

Perhaps look up the principal of charity? Perhaps consider that your interpretation of Berkeley might not be everyone's, and that anyone who disagrees with you is not necessarily misunderstanding. I also really don't get your objections in light of how Principals is written. It's quite obvious that Berkeley knows he is saying something that is unintuitive.

I think what might make more sense for your argument is to simply drop the claim that being unintuitive/violating appearances is a black mark against a theory. After all, that same standard says that the world being round, germs causing disease, the periodic table, and the theory that squares A and B in the image below are the same color, are all bad theories simply because they clash with immediate intuition and sensation.

We have a sensation of presentness. Do keep up.

We have a sensation of presentness. Do keep up. — Bartricks

We have a sensation of externality. We have a sensation of materialness. We have a sensation of mind-independance. We have a sensation of persistence...

By what means are you determining that your belief that events are happening in the present is a 'sensation', but my belief that objects are mind independent is not?

Do they have little labels on them that only you can read?

You haven't read him. And you seem incapable of understanding that the claim that percepts do not exist unpercieved is not equivalent to the claim that the precepts constitutive of the sensible world exist in our minds. They exist in another mind. Not yours, not mine.
Now you haven't read him because all you are doing is quoting big standard out of context paragraphs gleaned from websites written by ignoramuses, yes? Now read 29 to 33

A sensation of materialness? Er no.
What the F do you mean? Do you have an Issac sense? What is a sense of materialness? Do explain

What is a sense of materialness? Do explain — Bartricks

It's the sense I have that, for example, the chair I'm sat on is made of solid material.

Fine. I'm not going to quibble. And can sensations exist outside minds?

And can sensations exist outside minds? — Bartricks

Possibly. I think it's moot. It wouldn't be incoherent to say that a computer sensor is receiving a 'sensation'. It's called a 'sensor' after all.

Is a sensation a mental state?

Is a sensation a mental state? — Bartricks

I've just answered that question. No. I don't think a sensation need be a mental state. I think a computer's response to a sensor could reasonably be called a sensation.

Are your sensations mental states?

Pssst. The answer is yes. And then Berkeley beats you.

Are your sensations mental states? — Bartricks

No. Why are you asking these questions? A sensation is the response from a sensor. My sensations might be electrical stimuli in my retinal ganglia, or in my somatic nerve endings or some such. We might also use the word to refer to the 'sensation' thst there's someone behind me, for example. Without context I can't answer questions about what a word means. Words mean different things in different contexts.

I have sensations which are mental events. If that answers your question.