Not at all. See above. Seeing is the process of updating predictions about external states. Two people can have different predictions about the same state. Seeing differently does not necessitate seeing different things. — Isaac

Seeing is what is meant when we say "person A sees a red dress" and "person B sees a blue dress."

To take your approach, the grammar is clear; they're seeing different things.

They're just doing it differently so getting different results. — Isaac

Doing what differently? Seeing? What does it mean to see differently other than to see different things?

Th neural net is not making a model that you then see with your mind. It is your mind seeing. — Banno

No the neural net is not the same as your mind seeing, because "seeing" obviously requires the activity of the eyes as well, the rods and cones for example. Otherwise seeing and dreaming might be the same thing. But REM is a different type of eye involvement. And we do know what other features are required as well, (the role of memory in seeing?). So the activity of the neural net cannot be said to be "your mind seeing". The "neural net" is a model which people have constructed and some might claim it to represent "your mind seeing", but it is a deficient model.

Spot on. — Isaac

Spot off, as explained above.

No, they are not built to represent a thing. It's simply not what they do. — Isaac

Banno loves Wikipedia, so:

The central connectionist principle is that mental phenomena can be described by interconnected networks of simple and often uniform units. The form of the connections and the units can vary from model to model. For example, units in the network could represent neurons and the connections could represent synapses, as in the human brain. — Wikipedia, Connectionism

That's explicit. representative models. I wouldn't exclude the possibility that Wikipedia is wrong though.

What does it mean to see differently other than to see different things? — Michael

Seeing is a process. Like riding a bike. Two people can ride a bike differently. They're not necessarily riding different bikes. They're riding the same bike (one after the other), but doing so differently.

For example, units in the network could represent neurons and the connections could represent synapses, as in the human brain. — Wikipedia, Connectionism

This is talking about how neural network models might represent neurons, not how the physical instantiation of those models represent the external world.

This is the problem. You're saying that seeing₁ hidden state X causes person A to see₂ a red dress and person B to see₂ a blue dress. Two different sense of "seeing".

Or to tie this back into what I was saying before about the two different sense of "red": you're saying that seeing₁ a red₁ hidden state causes person A to see₂ a red₂ dress and person B to see₂ a blue₂ dress.

You're saying that seeing1 hidden state X causes person A to see2 a red dress and person B to see2 a blue dress. Two different sense of "seeing". — Michael

No. I'm saying that second use is incorrect. Seeing a hidden state does not cause seeing a blue dress. We do not 'see' mental representations, we respond to outputs from Bayesian models as part of the process of seeing external hidden states.

we respond to outputs from Bayesian models as part of the process of seeing external hidden states. — Isaac

That "response" is seeing a red dress or seeing a blue dress.

That "response" is seeing a red dress or seeing a blue dress. — Michael

I don't see how. 'Seeing' involves light entering the retina. The response can't be 'seeing' it can only be part of 'seeing'.

I don't see how. 'Seeing' involves light entering the retina. — Isaac

Because there are two different senses of "seeing" (and "hearing") as I have said. There's the seeing in the sense of light entering the retina and hearing in the sense of sound entering the eardrum, and there's seeing in the sense of the visual awareness (seeing a red dress) and hearing in the sense of auditory awareness (hearing music).

The latter kind of seeing and hearing is separate from the former kind, and the latter can happen without the former (e.g. when we dream or hallucinate).

The latter kind of seeing and hearing is separate from the former kind, and the latter can happen without the former (e.g. when we dream or hallucinate). — Michael

And I'll add, the former can happen without the latter, e.g. when someone has blindsight.

We do not 'see' mental representations, — Isaac

That makes sense. The content of experience includes a visual field that changes as you turn your head and glance around. This visual field with accompanying sound and sensations of aroma and heat or cold, taste and so on is believed by biologists to be constructed from sense data and various contributions from the brain itself.

I think the homunculus keeps creeping into your outlook because the content of experience implies an experiencer. Following the same mode that if we see the car, not a perception of a car, if we experience, a subject is experiencing it.

You'll have to get picky choozy about how you deploy arguments from ordinary language use to avoid the dreaded "subject."

The latter kind of seeing and hearing is separate from the former kind, and the latter can happen without the former (e.g. when we dream or hallucinate). — Michael

Can you see the red dress in your photos with your eyes shut? Or are you imagining the red dress when you have your eyes shut and seeing it when you have your eyes open?

There's a reason we have the word 'hallucinating'. It is to distinguish the activity from actual seeing.

Notwithstanding that. We are talking (when we talk about perception) not of hallucinating, nor of dreaming, nor of imagining, but of seeing. If there are multiple senses of the word, then in the case of the dresses you posted photos of, we are discussing that latter sense.

We are talking (when we talk about perception) not of hallucinating, nor of dreaming, nor of imagining, but of seeing. If there are multiple senses of the word, then in the case of the dresses you posted photos of, we are discussing that latter sense. — Isaac

People with schizophrenia hear voices. We see things when we dream. This is a perfectly ordinary and appropriate way to speak.

And when we dream, there are colours and sounds. These colours and sounds aren't some hidden external state; they're properties of the experience.

The colours that we see and the sounds that we hear when we're awake are the same kind of colours that we see and sounds that we hear when we dream. The only difference is that when we're awake the experience is triggered by external stimulation and when we dream the experience is triggered by "random" brain activity.

The only difference is that when we're awake the experience is triggered by external stimulation and when we dream the experience is triggered by "random" brain activity. — Michael

This isn't true. There are numerous differences in the neurological process of dreaming or imagining other than the source of the causal trigger, but aside from that, we're talking about seeing in terms of the process triggered by light entering the retina. That process does not involve a separate sub-process where we 'see' a mental representation of an object. Object recognition is done by s series of cortices in sequence through the ventral stream exiting the occipital cortex, it takes place after modeling things like colour and edge in the visual regions. We do not 'see' a representation of an object internally by any definition of 'see'. We can say that much pretty categorically since the order of processing is unequivocal.

we're talking about seeing in terms of the process triggered by light entering the retina — Isaac

I'm not. I'm talking about the experience of seeing a red dress or hearing voices. I referenced it before, but see blindsight. Their body is stimulated by and responds to external stimulation but there's no visual percept. They don't see. And the features of that visual percept (e.g. colours and shapes) are not properties of the external stimulation but properties of that visual percept.

the features of that visual percept (e.g. colours and shapes) are not properties of the external stimulation but properties of that visual percept. — Michael

No, they're not. That's not how blindsight works. people with blindsight have non-striate stimulation from neighbouring cortices within the occipital cortex. They do not see any visual percept at all. No 'dress' of any description (mental representation or otherwise) is processed through the occipital cortex. The data the occipital cortex processes is output from neighbouring neural clusters, after which the ventral stream cortical hierarchies might identity a dress.

They do not see any visual percept at all. — Isaac

I know they don't, that's the point. Their body is stimulated by and responds to external stimulation but they don't see. Therefore seeing has nothing to do with being stimulated by and responding to external stimulation (except in the trivial sense that stimulation is often what causes those of us who don't have blindsight (and who aren't blind) to see).

We see when there is a visual percept, and the features of this visual percept (e.g. colour and shape) are not properties of whatever the external cause of the sensation is.

When hidden state X causes person A to see a red dress and person B to see a blue dress, person A and person B have different visual percepts, and the words "red" and "blue" refer to some property of their respective percepts, not to some property of hidden state X.

If, in your example, the hidden state is red, not blue, then what does the word "blue" refer to when we say that person B sees a blue dress? Some quality of his inner experience.

Therefore seeing has nothing to do with being stimulated by and responding to external stimulation (except in the trivial sense that stimulation is often what causes those of us who don't have blindsight (and who aren't blind) to see). — Michael

That's not a trivial sense. It's the sense in which 99.9999% of the population see. I can't understand how you could justify calling that a trivial sense.

We only use the term 'see', often still in inverted commas, to describe things like blindsight for lack of a better term, or because of the similarity to seeing proper. It's bizarre to take this very niche and ephemeral use and say that's what we mean by 'see', and not the use it's put to 99.9999% of the time.

We see when there is a visual percept, and the features of this visual percept (e.g. colour and shape) are not properties of whatever the external cause of the sensation is. — Michael

Where is this visual percept with properties such as colour and shape. Whereabouts in the brain is it stored?

the words "red" and "blue" refer to some property of their respective percepts, not to some property of hidden state X. — Michael

So where is your evidence for data traveling from the inferior temporal cortex where object recognition takes place to the BA7 or V4 regions which process colour? Such data would need to flow in order for us to 'see' the colour of the percept.

Where is this visual percept with properties such as colour and shape. Whereabouts in the brain is it stored? — Isaac

I don't think consciousness is "stored in the brain". Consciousness is a product of brain activity, perhaps as some emergent phenomena. The hard problem of consciousness hasn't been resolved yet.

So where is your evidence for data traveling from the inferior temporal cortex where object recognition takes place to the BA7 or V4 regions which process colour? — Isaac

I don't know much about the mechanics of the brain, but that's irrelevant to this particular issue. This is a matter of what words mean. If the hidden state is "red" (as you say) but it causes person B to "wrongly" see a blue dress then the "blue" in "see a blue dress" doesn't refer to any property of the red hidden state. So what does it refer to? If seeing a blue dress is a response to stimulation then the word "blue" in this context refers to some feature of the response, not the stimulus.

the words "red" and "blue" refer to some property of their respective percepts, not to some property of hidden state X. — Michael

If this was the case we'd have no explanation for why exposure to coloured non-objects (colour swatches) triggers activity in the inferior middle temporal region (associated with word recognition - among other things) which is not triggered by exposure to coloured objects.

The conventional explanation is that we respond to amorphous swatches by reaching for the right colour word, but we respond to coloured objects by deciding how the colour helps us identify what the object is.

By your hypothesis, the colour is a property of the percept, so we'd have to identify the object first. So how do you explain the lowered ventral stream activity in exposure to coloured swatches?

If the hidden state is "red" (as you say) but it causes person B to (wrongly) see a blue dress then the "blue" in "see a blue dress" doesn't refer to any property of the red hidden state. — Michael

We've been through this. If I mistakenly call the person in the doorway Jack when his name's really Jim, I'm still referring to the person in the doorway. I'm just doing so badly.

The 'blue' in person B's blue dress still refers to the colour of the hidden state. It just does so less well than 'red'. It's a policy which less effectively minimises the surprise function.

We've been through this. If I mistakenly call the person in the doorway Jack when his name's really Jim, I'm still referring to the person in the doorway. I'm just doing so badly. — Isaac

It's not about what he says, it's about what he sees. He sees a blue dress. If there is no hidden blue state then him seeing something blue has nothing to do with there being some hidden blue state.

If there is no hidden blue state then him seeing something blue has nothing to do with there being some hidden blue state. — Michael

No. There's a hidden red state, which he's less effectively taking a policy of treating as blue.

There's a hidden red state, which he's less effectively taking a policy of treating as blue. — Isaac

He sees blue.

I honestly think you might be a p-zombie.

I honestly think you might be a p-zombie. — Michael

Ah, we've reached that point have we?

Shall we go through https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Quining-Qualia-Dennett/b00cba53a3744402b5c52accea35bff6074a38a9 again?

What does it mean to see differently other than to see different things? — Michael

It means to classify the same things differently.

To see different things is to carve it all differently.

Shall we go through https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Quining-Qualia-Dennett/b00cba53a3744402b5c52accea35bff6074a38a9 again? — Isaac

I don't think what I'm saying depends on "qualia". All it depends on is the fact that when you see the dress as black and blue and I see it as white and gold there are differences in our experiences, not in the external stimulus, and that these differences are described using the words "black and blue" in the case of your experience and "white and gold" in the case of my experience. Therefore, these terms in this context refer to the nature of our experiences, not to the nature of the stimulus which is the same for both us. Maybe experiences are qualia, maybe they're brain activity, maybe they're something else.

You might also want to use colour words to refer to some property of the external stimulus, but then that's a case of the word "red" meaning one thing in one context (the nature of the experience) and one thing in another context (that it emits or reflects light at a wavelength of 650nm), with the word we use to refer to the external property determined by the word we use to describe the effect it has on (most of) us.

Maybe experiences are qualia, maybe they're brain activity, maybe they're something else. — Michael

Well, they'd have to be either qualia or some brain activity which no one, despite decades of research, has ever seen... Hence, qualia.

We know with quite some certainty what regions of the brain produce colour data. We know quite well what regions of the brain are involved in object recognition. We know quite well in what order those two regions are networked. So, as far as current knowledge of cognition goes, we do not 'see' a black and blue dress internally. We conclude that the retinal stimulus is from black and blue light, then afterwards, we determine that the object producing the black and blue light is a dress. There is no brain activity which could possibly correspond to the internal 'seeing' of a black and blue dress. The parts of the brain dealing with colour simply don't model stimuli from the parts of the brain dealing with object recognition*, they model stimuli from the retina.

* there are backward acting suppressive links which act to reduce data noise and refine priors.

** they can also be stimulated by the hippocampus in rehearsal for long term memory storage. I'm trying to simplify a very complex topic, but some bright spark is bound to pick up on the gaps.

Where is this visual percept with properties such as colour and shape. Whereabouts in the brain is it stored? — Isaac

I don't know, but color and shape are part of the visual experience. The difficulty of squaring that with the correlating brain function is the well known hard problem.

Shall we go through https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Quining-Qualia-Dennett/b00cba53a3744402b5c52accea35bff6074a38a9 again? — Isaac

That's already been done, and no consensus was reached. Same with professional philosophers. Not everyone find's Dennett's arguments convincing. I think Keith Frankish has a better approach (illusionism), although the implication is that we are in fact p-zombies, which is an extremely difficult bullet to bite. Because after-all, I do experience seeing colors and hear sounds. Also dreaming, remembering and visualizing them.

Well, they'd have to be either qualia or some brain activity which no one, despite decades of research, has ever seen... Hence, qualia. — Isaac

Yes, because of the objective/subjective split with describing the world that Nagel's paper on "What it's like to be a Bat" laid out. Or Locke's primary and secondary colors. You're mistaking the map of neuroscience with the actual territory of whatever a conscious brain is.

So, as far as current knowledge of cognition goes, we do not 'see' a black and blue dress internally. — Isaac

Yet, we have one of those two visual experiences, whatever the brain activity is leading up to it the experience.