Not at all. See above. Seeing is the process of updating predictions about external states. Two people can have different predictions about the same state. Seeing differently does not necessitate seeing different things. — Isaac
They're just doing it differently so getting different results. — Isaac
Th neural net is not making a model that you then see with your mind. It is your mind seeing. — Banno
Spot on. — Isaac
No, they are not built to represent a thing. It's simply not what they do. — Isaac
The central connectionist principle is that mental phenomena can be described by interconnected networks of simple and often uniform units. The form of the connections and the units can vary from model to model. For example, units in the network could represent neurons and the connections could represent synapses, as in the human brain. — Wikipedia, Connectionism
What does it mean to see differently other than to see different things? — Michael
For example, units in the network could represent neurons and the connections could represent synapses, as in the human brain. — Wikipedia, Connectionism
You're saying that seeing1 hidden state X causes person A to see2 a red dress and person B to see2 a blue dress. Two different sense of "seeing". — Michael
I don't see how. 'Seeing' involves light entering the retina. — Isaac
We do not 'see' mental representations, — Isaac
The latter kind of seeing and hearing is separate from the former kind, and the latter can happen without the former (e.g. when we dream or hallucinate). — Michael
We are talking (when we talk about perception) not of hallucinating, nor of dreaming, nor of imagining, but of seeing. If there are multiple senses of the word, then in the case of the dresses you posted photos of, we are discussing that latter sense. — Isaac
The only difference is that when we're awake the experience is triggered by external stimulation and when we dream the experience is triggered by "random" brain activity. — Michael
we're talking about seeing in terms of the process triggered by light entering the retina — Isaac
the features of that visual percept (e.g. colours and shapes) are not properties of the external stimulation but properties of that visual percept. — Michael
They do not see any visual percept at all. — Isaac
Therefore seeing has nothing to do with being stimulated by and responding to external stimulation (except in the trivial sense that stimulation is often what causes those of us who don't have blindsight (and who aren't blind) to see). — Michael
We see when there is a visual percept, and the features of this visual percept (e.g. colour and shape) are not properties of whatever the external cause of the sensation is. — Michael
the words "red" and "blue" refer to some property of their respective percepts, not to some property of hidden state X. — Michael
Where is this visual percept with properties such as colour and shape. Whereabouts in the brain is it stored? — Isaac
So where is your evidence for data traveling from the inferior temporal cortex where object recognition takes place to the BA7 or V4 regions which process colour? — Isaac
the words "red" and "blue" refer to some property of their respective percepts, not to some property of hidden state X. — Michael
If the hidden state is "red" (as you say) but it causes person B to (wrongly) see a blue dress then the "blue" in "see a blue dress" doesn't refer to any property of the red hidden state. — Michael
We've been through this. If I mistakenly call the person in the doorway Jack when his name's really Jim, I'm still referring to the person in the doorway. I'm just doing so badly. — Isaac
What does it mean to see differently other than to see different things? — Michael
Shall we go through https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Quining-Qualia-Dennett/b00cba53a3744402b5c52accea35bff6074a38a9 again? — Isaac
Maybe experiences are qualia, maybe they're brain activity, maybe they're something else. — Michael
Where is this visual percept with properties such as colour and shape. Whereabouts in the brain is it stored? — Isaac
Shall we go through https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Quining-Qualia-Dennett/b00cba53a3744402b5c52accea35bff6074a38a9 again? — Isaac
Well, they'd have to be either qualia or some brain activity which no one, despite decades of research, has ever seen... Hence, qualia. — Isaac
So, as far as current knowledge of cognition goes, we do not 'see' a black and blue dress internally. — Isaac
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