ne can give an exegesis of the picture the text presents without raising the question of whether it is true or false, but if the exegesis includes the question of the truth of what is presented then it is not beside the point. — Fooloso4
they are "shown" by their relations to each other. So it's no surprise that examples are not listed... — Banno
The idea in the Early Wittgenstein is that we recognise elementary objects when we see them. — Banno
Well, the standard reading, after Anscombe, would maintain that elementary objects can't properly be said to even exist - they are "shown" by their relations to each other. — Banno
This turned to the idea that we choose whatever elementary objects we wish to treat as simples, in accord with what we are doing. — Banno
See PI §48 — Banno
I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even “itself” or “that” or “each” or “alone” or “this” or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be expressed by reason;they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. (201e - 202b)
The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables ... (202e)
Then does someone who says that the broom is in the corner really mean: the broomstick is there, and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed in the brush?—If we were to ask anyone if he meant this he would probably say that he had not thought specially of the broomstick or specially of the brush at all. And that would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick nor of the brush in particular.
Fuck no.So refer to Kant's transcendentalism? — schopenhauer1
We can get to the meaning of words by using them. — Banno
Wittgenstein wasn't a realist, then. — Tate
5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits
of my world.
5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
...
We cannot think what we cannot think; so
what we cannot think we cannot say either.
5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.
5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world:
rather, it is a limit of the world.
5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.
5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
Ok, I wanted to make sure I was playing by the rules of this language game.Why shouldn't we do both, with care? If Wittgenstein agrees with us that there are problems with the Tractatus, let's acknowledge that. — Banno
We do not get to the meaning of a word by setting out its definition using other words, because we would then never step outside that circularity. We can get to the meaning of words by using them.
Explaining a rule suffers a similar circularity. We can state the rule in ever more detail, finding ourselves in a circle or a regress. But there is a way of understanding a rule that is seen in implementing it, not in analysing it.
This is only superficially "starting in the middle". — Banno
Whether or not a proposition is true is determined by comparing it with reality. But:
5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits
of my world. — Fooloso4
Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
I am my world. (The microcosm.)
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world:
rather, it is a limit of the world.
5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.
5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
Relations, like properties, are constituents of propositions. The ontology should just follow whatever you think of propositions. Do you agree? — Tate
How does this work then? I compare a proposition to the state of a world that is limited by my language.
This actually sounds like empirical idealism. — Tate
The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight — Wittgenstein Culture and Value 47
How would logic pervade the world? Because it pervades language, it pervades the world? — Tate
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
This is heavily idealistic, isn't it? — Tate
The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
5.641 What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul,
with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world— not a part of it.
The proposition "The cat is on the mat" is true if the cat is on the mat. The limits of my language play no role here. The problem Wittgenstein is pointing to does not occur in the world, but only at the limits of the world. — Fooloso4
Note that he calls it "pure realism" — Fooloso4
There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world, matters of ethics and aesthetics. — Fooloso4
The subject does not belong to the world:
rather, it is a limit of the world.
What problem? — Tate
How does this work then? I compare a proposition to the state of a world that is limited by my language. — Tate
There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world, matters of ethics and aesthetics.
— Fooloso4
Not according to the quote you provided:
The subject does not belong to the world:
rather, it is a limit of the world. — Tate
The question is, is there an external world, and if there is, do these objects exist in it. Assuming there is an external world, an important question would be, do relations exist within it. Because, if relations don't exist in the external world, then neither do properties, and neither do objects s — RussellA
As regards Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the word "world" can be read as being either inside or outside the mind of the observer. — RussellA
Subsist means to have timeless or abstract existence, as a number, relation, etc. To say that relations exist outside of time and space is no more an explanation that saying that they have magical powers. — RussellA
That doesn't comply with the quote you gave though. — Tate
Plus for some reason you have brought up the T schema. — Tate
Whether or not a proposition is true is determined by comparing it with reality. — Fooloso4
The Tractatus falls apart if the world is not objects and their relations. — schopenhauer1
The Tractatus is wrong if it fails to prove the very foundation it stands on. It never even set out to do that. It's more that he never proves himself right, as he skips the foundation, assumes it, and goes from there. And if you're going to rebut with the wholeSo your argument is, if the Tractatus is wrong, then it is wrong. — Banno
he was demonstrating his own values whereby philosophy cannot speak of things that can't be pictured.. — schopenhauer1
But BECAUSE it is the very basis for which the picture theory "hangs" (get what I did there).. it MUST be discussed otherwise, Witty garners himself right by way of never having to prove anything outside of what he himself is claiming. How convenient that works.. "I make a claim, but it would be 'nonsense' to refute its very basis". Again, real convenient. — schopenhauer1
Names cannot be specified? What do you mean about that? He specified that atomic facts are objects.As for your points 1-3, you are making exactly the point made in the tractatus, that names cannot be specified, that words and explanations must come to an end, that the ladder must be thrown away.
You are agreeing with Wittgenstein. — Banno
As for your points 1-3, you are making exactly the point made in the tractatus, that names cannot be specified, that words and explanations must come to an end, that the ladder must be thrown away. — Banno
Can you advise a good secondary resource? — Tate
The use of the word "subject" and the way he uses the word "world" sounds like he's riffing on Schopenhauer, especially of the third book of WWR. — Tate
Nevertheless, number don't age, and are still independent of any particular mind. — Tate
the Tractatus, I don't believe that Wittgenstein's meaning of the term "world" is made explicit and remains ambiguous. The "world" may be read as something existing outside the mind, but I read it as something existing inside the mind — RussellA
At first glance it looks like W is justifying correspondence theory by saying the world is linguistic in form. — Tate
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