I have never come across a persuasive argument that external relations do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, and am persuaded, in particular, by F H Bradley's regress argument against external relations. — RussellA

Interesting post, a different direction. For exegetic purposes, Russell, and hence Wittgenstein, where reacting against Bradley. I think you may have hit on the core problem of the Tractatus, but coming at it, as it where, from behind. I suggest the solution is found, again, in Philosophical Investigations §201, that there is a way of understanding a rule that is not found in expressing or analysing the rule but in implementing it, in the doing, in the use.

But there is a lot of material between Bradley's argument and the Investigations.

2.0121 is worth looking at, too, especially in reply to @Fooloso4. In the Tractatus, objects are only understood in terms of their relations to each other; we talk about, and hence understand, objects only indirectly via their relations. Fooloso4 seems to disagree with this, but that runs against the text of the Tractatus.

4.01 A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it. — Tractatus

Sure, all that. It's not clear to me what you are saying, or even if you are agreeing or disagreeing with the suggestion I made.

Maybe I need more coffee.

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it, unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside! The honorable thing to do is put a lock on the door which will be noticed only by those who can open it, not by the rest.
— Wittgenstein Culture and Value

@Fooloso4. This sounds incredibly arrogant. :joke:

'R' is not the name of the relation between 'a' and 'b'. What that relation is is determined by 'a' and 'b'. — Fooloso4

Do you (agreeing with W) mean,

"R" is not the name of the relation between a and b. — Fooloso4

?

And then do you (agreeing with W) mean,

What that relation is is pictured by the relation between "a" and "b". — Fooloso4

? Although that doesn't fit with the following sentence, so do you (agreeing with W if you say so, not sure I follow) mean,

What that relation (between a and b) is is determined by a and b. Simple objects contain within themselves the possibilities of their combinations. — Fooloso4

?

This sounds incredibly arrogant. — Tate

The classic example is the fate of Socrates. As a result Plato and Aristotle had to be much more circumspect in order to protect themselves and their work, but also because philosophy posed a threat to the city. Certain things had to be hidden in their writings. For Descartes and Spinoza there was the example of what happened to Galileo. Descartes took as his own Ovid's motto: "He who lived well hid himself well". Spinoza's signet ring was engraved "caute". Wittgenstein witnessed how often his students misunderstood him. He thought it better to hide certain things to avoid misleading them. It was only those who are "like minded" who would have the key to unlock the rooms he kept hidden.

He used the term 'name' in a way that is different from the way we ordinarily use it. Names referred to the simple or elementary objects. What they are, he never said. The relation between these objects is not another object and do a relation is not a name. 'a' and 'b' are not names either but refer to any simple object. An elementary proposition is a picture of the relation between the objects. What that relation is is shown by the proposition.

2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.

2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.

He later abandoned this line of thought.

In the Tractatus, objects are only understood in terms of their relations to each other; we talk about, and hence understand, objects only indirectly via their relations. Fooloso4 seems to disagree with this, but that runs against the text of the Tractatus. — Banno

Yes, I disagree to the extent that if elementary objects are not identified, that is, known, we cannot say what their relations are. It is clear that they stand in relation to each other, but just what those relations are is left unsaid and cannot be said unless we know what the simple objects are.

This does run against the text of the Tractatus, but, as you know, Wittgenstein came to reject the text.

Sure, all that. It's not clear to me what you are saying, or even if you are agreeing or disagreeing with the suggestion I made. — Banno

What I disagreed with is:

... while for Wittgenstein the simples are states of affairs. — Banno

The simples are not states of affairs, they form states of affairs.

I suggest the solution is found, again, in Philosophical Investigations — Banno

Wittgenstein is the Elon Musk of philosophy, pushing the iterative process in order to go fast. Accepting setbacks and failures, but driven by the aspirational goal of discovering new and important philosophic insights.

I don't think relations "reside" somewhere. They're properties, aren't they? The apple's property of redness doesn't have a location. If the apple is red, that's a fact. It's a true proposition. It's an abstract object. Abstract objects are not residents of time and space. They don't move or age. — Tate

Relations are not of necessity properties
I can say "there is a relation between my pen and the Eiffel Tower", but this does not mean the relation between my pen and the Eiffel Tower is a property.

I can say "the apple has the property red". A property needs relations, but a property is not of necessity a relation.

Properties cannot exist without relations existing, but relations can exist without properties existing.

In a mind-independent world, what are properties ?
A Realist about Universals believes that Universals can be present at various distinct locations in space at the same time while particulars are restricted to one location at a time. For example, a tomato and a strawberry are two particulars that exemplify the universal redness.

A concrete thing, such as a rock, exists inside time and space, is causal and is contingent (in that it may or may not exist). An abstract thing exists outside time and space, is not causal and is necessary (in that mathematical truths are necessary)

As regards a mind-independent world, if relations don't exist, then neither do Universals. As I have never come across a persuasive argument that external relations do exist, my belief is that Universals don't exist.

As regards a mind-independent world, as I have never come across a persuasive argument that it is possible for things to exist outside of time and space, my belief is that Abstracts don't exist.

Terminology
In the mind is the proposition "the apple is red" and the thought that the apple is red. In the world is the (believed) fact that the apple is red.

The proposition "the apple is red" both represents and corresponds with the thought that the apple is red, but is not isomorphic.

The thought in the mind that the apple is red corresponds to, is isomorphic with and represents the (believed) fact in the world that the apple is red.

2.18 What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of reality.
Logical form includes representation, correspondence and isomorphism.

The expression ("The apple is red" is true iff the apple is red) is about knowledge in the mind, not (believed) facts in the world.
Light hits an apple, most of the light is absorbed, and light of a wavelength of 700nm is reflected back to the observer. We perceive light of a wavelength of 700nm as red.

We say the apple has the property of redness, but what we mean is that the apple reflects red light. If we looked at the reflection of a person in a mirror, we would not say that the mirror is that person. Similarly, if we looked at the reflection of red light from an apple, we should not say that the apple is red. When we say the apple is red or the apple has the property redness, the expressions "the apple is red" and "the apple has the property of redness" are metaphors.

In the expression "The apple is red" is true iff the apple is red, the clause the apple is red does not exist as a (believed) fact in the world but only as a thought in the mind, in that the (believed) fact in the world is that the apple reflects light of 700nm. The expression links the proposition "the apple is red" with the thought that the apple is red, both only existing in the mind. The expression does not link the proposition "the apple is red" with the (believed) fact in the world that the apple reflects light of 700nm.

IE, the expression does not link the mind with a mind-independent world, but does link one part of the mind to another part of the mind, propositions to thoughts.

Did he (Wittgenstein) specify or imply mind independence? — Tate

From 6.3 onwards he discusses Newtonian mechanics and physical laws, and includes in 6.373: "The world is independent of my will."

From 6.3 onwards he discusses Newtonian mechanics and physical laws, — RussellA

I don't think Newton is necessarily incompatible with some types of idealism.

The world is independent of my will." — RussellA

If the world is an abstract object, it would be independent of my will and mind, but still not a physical thing.

He used the term 'name' in a way that is different from the way we ordinarily use it. — Fooloso4

Ok. And you prefer single inverted commas, but the reader infers, from your use of the word "term", that you use these single marks as quote marks. We aren't sure why you decline to clarify with doubles, when invited, but never mind.

Names referred to the simple or elementary objects. — Fooloso4

If you mean, names were for W those symbols that referred to simple or elementary objects, that doesn't sound any different to ordinary usage of "name" in logic.

What they are, he never said. — Fooloso4

Also standard. Interesting, of course, if W is keen to be asked the further question.

The relation between these objects is not another object and so a relation is not a name. — Fooloso4

Do you mean,

The relation between these objects is not another object and so a relation cannot be named (referred to by a name). — Fooloso4

? Or,

The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so such a relation cannot be a name? — Fooloso4

? Or both?

'a' and 'b' are not names either but refer to any simple object. — Fooloso4

Do you mean,

"a" and "b" are not names either but refer to — Fooloso4

... any two particular names, according to context?

Or do you mean, "a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation?

Or something else?

Relations are not of necessity properties
I can say "there is a relation between my pen and the Eiffel Tower", but this does not mean the relation between my pen and the Eiffel Tower is a property. — RussellA

A relation is an attribution to multiple objects. A property is attributed to one object. Relations and properties are kindred things, but not exactly the same. A property can be a "limiting case" of a relation per the SEP article on properties. In other words, if your pen is to the left of the Eiffel Tower, this is a property of your pen. It implies a property of the Eiffel Tower (that it's to the right of your pen) and what we're doing is working within a relation.

Relations, like properties, are constituents of propositions. The ontology should just follow whatever you think of propositions. Do you agree?

If the world is an abstract object, it would be independent of my will and mind, but still not a physical thing. — Tate

Wittgenstein wrote 6.373 The world is independent of my will.

It is said that an abstract object such as a number exists outside of time and space and is not a physical thing, whereas a concrete object such as a tree exists in time and space and is a physical thing.

Realism
Within Realism, the world may be independent of my will and mind-independent.

Idealism
There are different types of Idealism.

For example, in Berkeley Idealism, there is a world of time, space and trees, not physical, and which only exists in the mind, and continues to exist even when not observed as exists in the mind of god.

Berkeley's world is not an abstract world. Berkeley rejected the concept of an abstract. While he admits that he can abstract, for instance, the smell of a rose without thinking of the rose itself, Berkeley wants to maintain that it is impossible to conceive "any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it".

Within Berkeley's Idealism the world may be independent of my will yet not mind-independent.

Was Wittgenstein an Idealist or a Realist
IE, within both Realism and Idealism, the world can be independent of my will. It depends on Wittgenstein's approach to Idealism and Realism.

For example, there is an article elaborating on Wittgenstein’s anti-sceptical ideas, and based on On Certainty argues for his refutation of Idealism.

Yet there is another article that argues Wittgenstein was neither a Realist nor an Antirealist.

It seems that Wittgenstein conceived philosophy to be an activity rather than a belief.

It seems that Wittgenstein conceived philosophy to be an activity rather than a belief. — RussellA

There are different sorts of anti-realism. Ontological anti-realists reject the debate regarding idealism and physicalism as valuable or resolvable. Maybe we would classify Wittgenstein as an ontological anti-realist.

Ok. And you prefer single inverted commas, but the reader infers, from your use of the word "term", that you use these single marks as quote marks. We aren't sure why you decline to clarify with doubles, when invited, but never mind. — bongo fury

Single quote marks are also sometimes used in academic writing, though this isn’t considered a rule. Specialist terms that are unique to a subject are often enclosed in single quotation marks in both U.S. and British English. This is very common in specific disciplines, particularly philosophy or theology.

https://grammar.yourdictionary.com/punctuation/rules-for-using-single-quotation-marks.html

If you mean, names were for W those symbols that referred to simple or elementary objects, that doesn't sound any different to ordinary usage of "name" in logic. — bongo fury

In general, logic uses proper names. Wittgenstein specifies how he is using the term in the Tractatus:

2.02 Objects are simple.

3.22 In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.

3.26 A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.

The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so a relation cannot be a name? — Fooloso4

Do you mean,

The relation between these objects is not another object and so a relation cannot be named (referred to by a name).
— Fooloso4

? Or,

The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so a relation cannot be a name?
— Fooloso4 — bongo fury

The parenthetical remark does not appear in what is quoted. Square brackets [ ] should be used. They should also be used when adding words to a quote: [sign] objects. Wittgenstein distinguishes between a sign and an object. There are no "sign objects".

3.221 Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives.

A relation cannot be named because a relation is not a object. A relation can, however, be given a sign 'R'.

Do you mean,

"a" and "b" are not names either but refer to
— Fooloso4

... any two particular names, according to context?

Or do you mean, "a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation?

Or something else? — bongo fury

The full sentence is:

'a' and 'b' are not names either but refer to any simple object. — Fooloso4

'a' and 'b' are variables.

Single quote marks are also sometimes used in academic writing, though this isn’t considered a rule. — Fooloso4

Sure, but also they can be 'scare' quotes:

Specialist terms that are unique to a subject are often enclosed in single quotation marks in both U.S. and British English. — Fooloso4

So in a thread about distinguishing word from object, requests for clarification might be expected.

Square brackets [ ] should be used. — Fooloso4

Haha, fair do's.

There are no "sign objects" — Fooloso4

But there are sign-objects by other names, e.g. "the picture's elements", "a propositional sign [...] composed of spatial objects", "elements of the propositional sign", "simple signs", etc.

'a' and 'b' are variables. — Fooloso4

I expect this could be a right reading. But I'd like to know whether this means, for you or for W, that

"a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation?

Or something else? — bongo fury

I expect this could be a right reading. But I'd like to know whether this means, for you or for W, that

"a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation? — bongo fury

As I understand it, as they are used here those symbols denote any two elemental objects. There may be conventions that I am not aware of, but I assume 'x' and 'y' or something else could have been used instea.

My turn to ask a question: do bongos infuriate you or do you play the bongos furiously or something else?

I wish... I had a pair of bongos.

As I understand it, as they are used here those symbols denote any two elemental objects. — Fooloso4

Any two, or any two that are related in the fashion specified (by "R")?

OK, that was ill-expressed on my part. Perhaps my question will be clearer if I set out my change in thinking over the course of this thread.

What I am after is the difference between the logical atomism of Russell and the logical atomism of Wittgenstein.

Again, I had understood the for Russell, at least in Principles of Mathematics, the indivisibles were certain individuals and properties. These were given names and predicates, and then a logical edifice built on those.

I had understood that for Wittgenstein, the basic logical unit was the relation, aRb, and that a and b could be understood only in terms of their relations, and so rather than building from a and b and their predicates, Wittgenstein built the logical edifice from aRb.

However, on consideration, the theory of descriptions in On Denoting is much closer to Wittgenstein's system. Also, Moore and Russell's objected to Bradley's argument that the notion of relations between individuals led to a vicious regression () on the grounds that Bradley had assumed that all propositions were of subject-predicate form - Bradley was making use of Aristotelian logic rather than the new-fangled logic of Frege.

Hence my understanding of Russell's position was wrong; Russell's view must be much closer to Wittgenstein's than I had supposed.

So the difference between the logical atomism of Russell and the logical atomism of Wittgenstein is not as I had supposed, but in the way they understand the relations that are for both of them, central to the construction of the logical edifice.

So thank you for your part in forcing me to reconsider Russell's views. But now I have to reconcile this rejection of idealism with Kripke's undermining of the theory of descriptions. This might explain how Kripke could entertain antirealism.

It may be worth pointing out again that this is an exercise in exegesis, since it seems to me that Davidson's use of T-sentences shows that a true proposition is a fact. They have the very same truth conditions - what more could you want? And also that the later Wittgenstein showed how Bradley's regress argument fails because relations can be shown as well as expressed. This is a course explanation, but I think the detail will hold up. The end result is that the difference between idealism and realism consists in the selection between a bi-valued and a many-valued grammar, and hence the dissipation of that particular bifurcation in ontology.

What fun!

int main() {
std::cout << "Hello World!";
return 0;
}

...just what those relations are is left unsaid and cannot be said unless we know what the simple objects are. — Fooloso4

This is your view, and not exegetic. Ok.

Speaking exegetically, the theory of descriptions and the Tractatus both hold that the elementary objects are "identified" by their relations, and hence knowing what the simple object is consists in knowing their relations.

Are we now on the same page here?

Meh.

I have not read enough Kripke or Davidson to say anything that would not demonstrate my ignorance.

An example.

On the table is a cup with on. handle. The realist and the idealist agree that "the cup has one handle" is true.

In the cupboard is another cup. The realist says "The cup has one handle" is true. The idealist says "the cup has one handle" does not have a truth value.

The difference between these two is their choice of grammar.

This is your view, and not exegetic. — Banno

How do you explain the absence of even a single example of an elementary object or name or proposition? Or did he identify any elementary objects or their relations?

That seems to be beside the point.

That seems to be beside the point. — Banno

It depends on what one from an exegesis. Some may regard the fact that elementary objects, names, and propositions are assumed a priori is satisfactory for understanding the text, but others might think the inability to identify them a significant problem that calls the truth and meaning of the text into question. After all, he does say:

2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224 It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225 There are no pictures that are true a priori.

One can give an exegesis of the picture the text presents without raising the question of whether it is true or false, but if the exegesis includes the question of the truth of what is presented then it is not beside the point.