Its nature is indeterminate. And so it can't be said to exist, because what exists is determinate (i.e. it is 'this' or 'that'.) — Wayfarer
We cannot know something we can't remember. Socrates was correct. — Merkwurdichliebe
That's not how we use the word 'know'. We use the word 'know' to refer to successful models of hidden states. I say something like "I know where the pub is", by which I mean that if I go to the place I believe the pub is, I will find it there. — Isaac
Yes. all language is by fiat. There's no book of what things 'really' mean. — Isaac
Uh huh. And why can we not be familiar with hidden states? If we have good models of them, we can be very familiar with them. — Isaac
Active inference describes, for example, what 'seeing' is. The intention is not that we say "Ah so we don't really 'see' things then", what 'see' means doesn't change, we're just describing what goes on in the process in more detail. — Isaac
By transcends biological do you mean metacognitive capacities? — Tom Storm
Could the universe not contain two tiers of reality, one material and the other experiential? If that were the case, then we would have to conclude that the cosmic function of life is to be the vehicle of experiential existence, and to be the repository of Gestalt multiplicity whose purpose is to bring into existence newly minted and highly complex organized structures. While the material aspect of the universe evolves in one way (by cooling down and dissipating information), the experiential aspect evolves in the direction of producing ever more intricate hierarchical productions. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 156).
It would appear, from this, that reality is not limited to the physical. On a par with space and time—with matter and energy—the universe must include an organizing force which acts to create unified hierarchical structures. These are not composed of matter, but subsist on something nonmaterial that we interpret as mind. In order for physical science to advance to the next level, it is necessary to overcome a biological force that compels us to perceive the external world in the forms which our collective mind has created. Classical physics is an elegant description of the universe as it is laid out in our mental model of reality, and is a huge achievement. It may appear that it is impossible to go further, because that would be seeking what the philosopher Thomas Nagel called a view from nowhere. However, that is unwarranted pessimism. One might begin by examining the evidence for the existence in the universe of a nonmaterial mindlike effect that assigns form and structure to matter. The most obvious place to begin this search is in the phenomenon of life. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 160).
For example gods can be imagined to exist. — Janus
This is where apophatic theology comes in, for example, Eiriugena, Tillich, , Whalon. S — Wayfarer
This is simply not possible (where 'internal' applies to some self-organsing system). To recognise a system, a self organising one, there has to be an 'internal' and an 'external' otherwise you're just referring to 'everything', and a self organising system has to have a probability distribution function that is opposed to the Gaussian distribution, as this is just the definition of self-organising. — Isaac
So simply by the definition of a discrete system we've got, of necessity, an internal state, an external state, a Markov boundary, and two different probability functions on either side of that boundary. — Isaac
I think that's a different point.Socrates' claim is that (some?) knowledge is accessed via recollections of past lives. — Janus
are you familiar with Kierkegaard's concept of repetition? It's a very interesting take on Socratic recollection. — Merkwurdichliebe
It has nothing to do with belief. — Janus
the evolution of language is not by fiat, but by meaningful association and image. — Janus
if we are familiar with them then they are not hidden. — Janus
An inference is a rational conjecture; there us no conjecture involved when I am looking at something — Janus
There is no such thing as a "discrete system" in nature. — Metaphysician Undercover
An open system cannot be a discrete system because the environment is just as much a part of the definition ("open") as is the "system". — Metaphysician Undercover
I've no interest at all in being lectured with a series of random assertions from nobodies off the internet. Provide arguments, cite sources, or at the very least show a little humility if you don't. I can't for the life of me think why you'd assume anyone would want to learn what some random people happen to 'reckon' about cognitive science and systems theory. — Isaac
we encounter the difficulty that Socrates draws attention to in the "Meno" as a ‘trick argument’, that it is impossible for a person to seek what he knows and equally impossible for him to seek what he does not know; because what he knows he cannot seek, because he knows it, and what he does not know he cannot seek, because he does not know what he should seek. Socrates ponders this difficulty and suggests as a solution that all learning and seeking are merely recollection, so that the ignorant person needs only to be reminded, in order by himself to recollect what he knows. The truth is thus not imparted to him, but was in him. Socrates develops this further in a way that concentrates the pathos of Greek thought, in that it becomes a proof for the immortality of the soul, though— and this is important — retrogressively, that is, a proof of the preexistence of the soul. This shows with what wonderful consistency Socrates was true to himself and realized artistically what he had understood. He was and remained a midwife; not because he ‘lacked the positive’,* but because he understood that this was the highest relationship one person could have to another. And in this he is eternally correct. Because even if there is ever given a divine point of departure, between one person and another this remains the true relationship, provided one reflects on the absolute and does not fool around with the contingent, but from the bottom of his heart renounces any understanding of the half-truth that seems to be man’s desire and the system’s secret. — Kierkegaard
We're are all "nobodies" here — Janus
I have no interest in being lectured by another dry, opinionated academic who thinks that cognitive science and systems theory have any priority, beyond their own set of prejudices, in respect of philosophical questions. — Janus
1.Yes it does.
2.No it isn't.
3.Not necessarily.
4,Yes there is. — Isaac
Consciousness, then, is the relation, a relation whose form is contradiction. But how does consciousness discover the contradiction? If that fallacy discussed above could remain, that ideality and reality in all naivete communicated with one another, consciousness would never emerge, for consciousness emerges precisely through the collision, just as it presupposes the collision. Immediately there is no collision, but mediately it is present. As soon as the question of a repetition arises, the collision is present, for only a repetition of what has been before is conceivable.
In reality as such, there is no repetition. This is not because everything is different, not at all. If everything in the world were completely identical, in reality there would be no repetition, because reality is only in the moment. If the world, instead of being beauty, were nothing but equally large unvariegated boulders, there would still be no repetition. Throughout all eternity, in every moment, I would see a boulder, but there would be no question as to whether it was the same one I had seen before. In ideality alone there is no repetition, for the idea is and remains the same, and as such it cannot be repeated. When ideality and reality touch each other, then repetition occurs. When, for example, I see something in the moment, ideality enters in and will explain that it is a repetition. Here is the contradiction, for that which is, is also in another mode. That the external is, that I see, but in the same instant I bring it into relation with something that also is, something that is the same and that also will explain that the other is the same. Here is a redoubling; here it is a matter of repetition. Ideality and reality therefore collide-in what medium? In time? That is indeed an impossibility. In eternity? That is indeed an impossibility. In what, then? In consciousness-there is the contradiction. The question is not disinterested, as if one asked whether all existence is not an image of the idea and to that extent whether visible existence is not, in a certain volatilized sense, a repetItIon. Here the question is more specifically one of a repetition in consciousness, consequently of recollection. Recollection involves the same contradiction. — Kierkegaard
WHEN the Eleatics* denied motion, Diogenes, as everyone knows, came forward in protest, actually came forward, because he did not say a word, but simply walked back and forth a few times, with which gesture he believed he had sufficiently refuted the Eleatic position. When I had been preoccupied for some time, at least when I had the opportunity, with the problem of whether repetition was possible and what it meant, whether a thing wins or loses by being repeated, it suddenly occurred to me: you can go to Berlin, since you were there once before, you could in this way learn whether repetition was possible and what it meant. I had come to a standstill in my attempts to resolve this problem at home. Say what you will, this problem is going to play an important role in modern philosophy because repetition is a decisive expression for what ‘recollection’ was for the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowledge is recollection, thus will modern philosophy teach that life itself is a repetition. The only modern philosopher who has had the least intimation of this is Leibniz.* Repetition and recollection are the same movement, just in opposite directions, because what is recollected has already been and is thus repeated backwards, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forwards. — Kierkegaard
There is a clear distinction between knowledge and belief. — Janus
No one knows exactly how language evolved for obvious reasons. But I find it is more plausible to think it evolved in accordance with meaningful associations, in accordance with what people cared about, than in some merely arbitrary manner. — Janus
I've said I think it is necessarily the case that it is contradictory to say that we are familiar with what is hidden from us. Perhaps you could explain why you think it could make sense to say that isn't so. Who is the one who has failed to present an argument? — Janus
I know from self-reflection that making an inference is different than looking at something, and I gave examples of mistaking what I thought I saw due to pattern association, a matter of recognition not of inference, to support my contention. An inference is a process of logical deduction, how would you know such a process is going on unless you were conscious of it? — Janus
On the one side we have the supposes think-in-itself, that which is supposedly behind our perceptions and hence supposed to be forever beyond our comprehension. It's "hidden"
On the other is the state of a neural network passed from one iteration to the next, or something like that.
Is that roughly right? — Banno
Nothing. 'Seeing' is a process of inference. Nothing is seen directly. Everything that is seen is seen indirectly. It's not a direct process, it has stages. — Isaac
Again, 'inference' is the term used to describe a particular type of cognitive process. If you don't like the terminology, fine, but the entire field of cognitive science seems fine with it, so I'm not sure that a particularly interesting point of discussion either and, again, too late to change it now anyway. — Isaac
So when you say this, you are pointing out the "thing" is part of the hidden state passed from iteration to iteration, and folk instead take you to be setting forth the philosophical notion of indirect realism? — Banno
Possibly. I've never gotten clear how indirect realism is using the term 'indirect' (nor, for that matter how direct realism is using the term 'direct'). One of the things I thought might come out of this discussion. — Isaac
I think if you want to bring cognitive science into the discussion you need to be able to explain in terms understandable to the reasonably philosophically educated layperson what relevance it has to philosophical questions which seem, at least on the face of it, to be outside its scope, — Janus
So the thread topic concerns whether or not there is an "external world". We already know that from a general scientific perspective, of course there is an external world, because it just is various aspects of what is understood to be the world external to our bodies and/or the world which is "external" in the sense of being the perceived object of conscious awareness, which is being studied by the various scientific disciplines. So, in that sense science is predicated upon there being an external world. — Janus
from the experiential point of view, we just see things immediately, directly. Which view is correct? In the senses relative to their proper contexts, both are, so there would seem to be no point arguing over whether indirect or direct realism is true is any absolute sense. — Janus
Possibly, but then do you not also experience some of the optical illusions, weird filtering, and changes of perspective that the multi-stage scientific model gives an explanation for. Do these experiences not need accounting for in any phenomenological description? — Isaac
Possibly. I've never gotten clear how indirect realism is using the term 'indirect' (nor, for that matter how direct realism is using the term 'direct'). One of the things I thought might come out of this discussion. — Isaac
I'm not entirely sure what you are referring to. By "optical illusions" do you mean things like sticks appearing bent when they are part in and part out of water? — Janus
I'll need to think some more on this and undergo some digestion before replying. So, when I have more time... — Janus
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