What Pinter *doesn't* get into, in my opinion, is the sense in which h. sapiens transcends the biological, but as I said, that kind of subject is out of scope for the book. — Wayfarer

By transcends biological do you mean metacognitive capacities?

Its nature is indeterminate. And so it can't be said to exist, because what exists is determinate (i.e. it is 'this' or 'that'.) — Wayfarer

If you stipulate that the usage of "exist" should only apply to determinate beings, then of course you're going to be right that it should not be used to refer to indeterminate beings. We can imagine the existence of things that are not determinable to us, though. For example gods can be imagined to exist. Or indeterminate noumena: things in themselves that are the real existences in themselves of the objects familiar to us. In common usage 'being' and 'existence' are understood to be synonymous; just as being is not a being, existence is not an existent.

We cannot know something we can't remember. Socrates was correct. — Merkwurdichliebe

I think that's a different point.Socrates' claim is that (some?) knowledge is accessed via recollections of past lives.

That's not how we use the word 'know'. We use the word 'know' to refer to successful models of hidden states. I say something like "I know where the pub is", by which I mean that if I go to the place I believe the pub is, I will find it there. — Isaac

It has nothing to do with belief. If you know where the pub is, you know you will find it there, excluding possibilities such as that your memory is faulty or the pub has been demolished or moved. The word 'know' is used in many different ways. 'Know that', 'know how' and the knowing of familiarity. There is also 'knowing with': knowing via images, concepts or methodologies. Some knowings are bloodless and calculating, others rich and meaningful.

Yes. all language is by fiat. There's no book of what things 'really' mean. — Isaac

All language can be subjected to fiat. But the evolution of language is not by fiat, but by meaningful association and image.

Uh huh. And why can we not be familiar with hidden states? If we have good models of them, we can be very familiar with them. — Isaac

It's very simple: if we are familiar with them then they are not hidden.

Active inference describes, for example, what 'seeing' is. The intention is not that we say "Ah so we don't really 'see' things then", what 'see' means doesn't change, we're just describing what goes on in the process in more detail. — Isaac

Seeing is not a matter of inference; that is an inapt use of the term. An inference is a rational conjecture; there us no conjecture involved when I am looking at something; I simply see it. That said, of course sometimes we may think we see something that is not there or is something else, but that is caused by image association (what looks like a person turns out to be a tree, or what looks like a snake turns out to be a stick).

By transcends biological do you mean metacognitive capacities? — Tom Storm

Yes - humans know that they know. They ask how they know and what they know, and wonder who or what they are. 'Wisdom begins in wonder'. No coincidence that we're designated 'sapiens' on that account, sapience meaning 'wisdom' or 'sound judgement'. Although I think a better designation for modern humanity is homo faber- man who makes. There is no criteria for wisdom in today's public square, it's all simply a contest of ideas and the instrumentalisation of reason.

Pinter does broach something like a cosmic philosophy in the final chapter, Mind, Life and Universe. He mentions biosemiotics, although without using that term, and many recent discoveries in genetics. Then:

Could the universe not contain two tiers of reality, one material and the other experiential? If that were the case, then we would have to conclude that the cosmic function of life is to be the vehicle of experiential existence, and to be the repository of Gestalt multiplicity whose purpose is to bring into existence newly minted and highly complex organized structures. While the material aspect of the universe evolves in one way (by cooling down and dissipating information), the experiential aspect evolves in the direction of producing ever more intricate hierarchical productions. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 156).

After some discussion of the implications of quantum physics, the book ends with:

It would appear, from this, that reality is not limited to the physical. On a par with space and time—with matter and energy—the universe must include an organizing force which acts to create unified hierarchical structures. These are not composed of matter, but subsist on something nonmaterial that we interpret as mind. In order for physical science to advance to the next level, it is necessary to overcome a biological force that compels us to perceive the external world in the forms which our collective mind has created. Classical physics is an elegant description of the universe as it is laid out in our mental model of reality, and is a huge achievement. It may appear that it is impossible to go further, because that would be seeking what the philosopher Thomas Nagel called a view from nowhere. However, that is unwarranted pessimism. One might begin by examining the evidence for the existence in the universe of a nonmaterial mindlike effect that assigns form and structure to matter. The most obvious place to begin this search is in the phenomenon of life. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 160).

I think that this 'organising force' is similar to what the Greeks called 'logos'. However what I don't think Pinter sees, is that (as Schopenhauer says), only in humans can this become the subject of knowledge, even if all other creatures are formed by it or from it.

For example gods can be imagined to exist. — Janus

This is where apophatic theology comes in, for example, Eriugena, Tillich, Whalon. God does not exist in the sense that individual beings do - but as our empirical culture can only conceive of what exists in those terms, then it can't be understood in terms of a different 'mode of being'.

Thank you.

This is where apophatic theology comes in, for example, Eiriugena, Tillich, , Whalon. S — Wayfarer

It's just a different way of talking, as I see it. In ordinary parlance to say that something does not exist is to say it is not real, but imaginary. We can ask if God is real or imaginary; would God exist if there were no humans? We don't have to ask such questions; we can just accept that we feel a presence we call God, or the divine, the sublime, the numinous, or whatever.

The same applies to familiar objects: we can ask if they are real or (collectively) imagined; would they exist without humans? How can we answer that, how could we know? Is the question even meaningful? Of course our familiar objects would not be familiar objects and wouldn't have names if there were no humans. We know that much.

This is simply not possible (where 'internal' applies to some self-organsing system). To recognise a system, a self organising one, there has to be an 'internal' and an 'external' otherwise you're just referring to 'everything', and a self organising system has to have a probability distribution function that is opposed to the Gaussian distribution, as this is just the definition of self-organising. — Isaac

I told you, systems theory is very flimsy, and I explained why. The exact separation, or boundary, between what is internal and what is external is impossible to establish, so that any proposed boundary is somewhat arbitrary, or sufficient for a specific purpose, but not a real boundary in any true or absolute sense.

So simply by the definition of a discrete system we've got, of necessity, an internal state, an external state, a Markov boundary, and two different probability functions on either side of that boundary. — Isaac

There is no such thing as a "discrete system" in nature. This is just a useful fiction. All natural things have other things overlapping them in space and time. The earth and sun overlap by gravity and radiation for example. My existence and my mother's existence overlap in space and time, as I come from her womb. And many other things overlap my existence.

The idea of discrete systems may be useful for some specific purposes, but not for describing living beings, or parts of living beings, because of the large degree of overlap. Von Bertalanffy described living beings as "open systems". An open system cannot be a discrete system because the environment is just as much a part of the definition ("open") as is the "system".

I think that's a different point.Socrates' claim is that (some?) knowledge is accessed via recollections of past lives. — Janus

That is the popular interpretation. But I've never seen any indication that is what he actually meant, at least not in the works of Plato. The more mundane interpretation is: to know something means you are capable of recollecting it...and I must admit, there are things I have fogotten that I no longer know about.

are you familiar with Kierkegaard's concept of repetition? It's a very interesting take on Socratic recollection.

are you familiar with Kierkegaard's concept of repetition? It's a very interesting take on Socratic recollection. — Merkwurdichliebe

No, I'm not familiar with i, but I'm interested. Can you suggest a work that presents it?

It has nothing to do with belief. — Janus

the evolution of language is not by fiat, but by meaningful association and image. — Janus

if we are familiar with them then they are not hidden. — Janus

An inference is a rational conjecture; there us no conjecture involved when I am looking at something — Janus

There is no such thing as a "discrete system" in nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

An open system cannot be a discrete system because the environment is just as much a part of the definition ("open") as is the "system". — Metaphysician Undercover

...

I've no interest at all in being lectured with a series of random assertions from nobodies off the internet. Provide arguments, cite sources, or at the very least show a little humility if you don't. I can't for the life of me think why you'd assume anyone would want to learn what some random people happen to 'reckon' about cognitive science and systems theory.

I've no interest at all in being lectured with a series of random assertions from nobodies off the internet. Provide arguments, cite sources, or at the very least show a little humility if you don't. I can't for the life of me think why you'd assume anyone would want to learn what some random people happen to 'reckon' about cognitive science and systems theory. — Isaac

We're are all "nobodies" here; there are no authoritative sources for ideas about the evolution of language. As to whether it is logically correct to say that a hidden state could be familiar it just is not because it is a contradiction in terms, or whether it is reasonable to use a term such as 'inference' with a common usage in a way that is, by fiat, not consistent with that usage; it is not because it is tendentious and inconsistent. Also I have no interest in being lectured by another dry, opinionated academic who thinks that cognitive science and systems theory have any priority, beyond their own personal set of prejudices, in respect of philosophical questions.

only thing I've read is Kierkegaard's "Repetition - An Essay in Experimental Psychology".

he also says something interesting in Philosophical Crumbs:

we encounter the difficulty that Socrates draws attention to in the "Meno" as a ‘trick argument’, that it is impossible for a person to seek what he knows and equally impossible for him to seek what he does not know; because what he knows he cannot seek, because he knows it, and what he does not know he cannot seek, because he does not know what he should seek. Socrates ponders this difficulty and suggests as a solution that all learning and seeking are merely recollection, so that the ignorant person needs only to be reminded, in order by himself to recollect what he knows. The truth is thus not imparted to him, but was in him. Socrates develops this further in a way that concentrates the pathos of Greek thought, in that it becomes a proof for the immortality of the soul, though— and this is important — retrogressively, that is, a proof of the preexistence of the soul. This shows with what wonderful consistency Socrates was true to himself and realized artistically what he had understood. He was and remained a midwife; not because he ‘lacked the positive’,* but because he understood that this was the highest relationship one person could have to another. And in this he is eternally correct. Because even if there is ever given a divine point of departure, between one person and another this remains the true relationship, provided one reflects on the absolute and does not fool around with the contingent, but from the bottom of his heart renounces any understanding of the half-truth that seems to be man’s desire and the system’s secret. — Kierkegaard

We're are all "nobodies" here — Janus

I cited four papers written collectively by eleven experts in neuroscience, cognitive science and computational systems. I thought I was explaining those papers to some people interested in their conclusions.

I was clearly mistaken, so I apologise for wasting your time.

Back to the arguments...

Yes it does.

No it isn't.

Not necessarily.

Yes there is.

Great discussion. Can't wait to hear what you reckon next, do hurry.

I have no interest in being lectured by another dry, opinionated academic who thinks that cognitive science and systems theory have any priority, beyond their own set of prejudices, in respect of philosophical questions. — Janus

Then don't read my posts. You replied to me, not the other way round. You don't need to tell me you're not interested in my posts, just don't read them. Contrarily, you replied, with a load of random, unargued, uncited gainsaying. Doesn't sound uninterested, just sounds arrogant.

The matters you're discussing are either semantic (the use of the words 'hidden', 'inference', 'know'...) or scientific (the brain functions of language, perception, inference...) There's no shared, laymen, ground of rational thought because you presented no argument for your position, just declared a series of things to be the case.

If you don't like the technical terminology, fine, noted. It's hardly a topic for interesting discussion.

If it goes beyond a mere distaste for the chosen terminology, then make a case. The one thing we all share the same expertise in is rational thought. Make a case and we can discuss it.

1.Yes it does.

2.No it isn't.

3.Not necessarily.

4,Yes there is. — Isaac

I gave or at least implied arguments for all of these.

1, There is a clear distinction between knowledge and belief. If I know where the pub is that is different than believing the pub is at such and such a location, but am not sure. You are ironing over perfectly valid and useful distinctions by equating the two. Do you have an argument to justify doing that?

2, No one knows exactly how language evolved for obvious reasons. But I find it is more plausible to think it evolved in accordance with meaningful associations, in accordance with what people cared about, than in some merely arbitrary manner.

3.I've said I think it is necessarily the case that it is contradictory to say that we are familiar with what is hidden from us. Perhaps you could explain why you think it could make sense to say that isn't so. Who is the one who has failed to present an argument?

4. I know from self-reflection that making an inference is different than looking at something, and I gave examples of mistaking what I thought I saw due to pattern association, a matter of recognition not of inference, to support my contention. An inference is a process of logical deduction, how would you know such a process is going on unless you were conscious of it?

Also Johannes Climacus

Consciousness, then, is the relation, a relation whose form is contradiction. But how does consciousness discover the contradiction? If that fallacy discussed above could remain, that ideality and reality in all naivete communicated with one another, consciousness would never emerge, for consciousness emerges precisely through the collision, just as it presupposes the collision. Immediately there is no collision, but mediately it is present. As soon as the question of a repetition arises, the collision is present, for only a repetition of what has been before is conceivable.
In reality as such, there is no repetition. This is not because everything is different, not at all. If everything in the world were completely identical, in reality there would be no repetition, because reality is only in the moment. If the world, instead of being beauty, were nothing but equally large unvariegated boulders, there would still be no repetition. Throughout all eternity, in every moment, I would see a boulder, but there would be no question as to whether it was the same one I had seen before. In ideality alone there is no repetition, for the idea is and remains the same, and as such it cannot be repeated. When ideality and reality touch each other, then repetition occurs. When, for example, I see something in the moment, ideality enters in and will explain that it is a repetition. Here is the contradiction, for that which is, is also in another mode. That the external is, that I see, but in the same instant I bring it into relation with something that also is, something that is the same and that also will explain that the other is the same. Here is a redoubling; here it is a matter of repetition. Ideality and reality therefore collide-in what medium? In time? That is indeed an impossibility. In eternity? That is indeed an impossibility. In what, then? In consciousness-there is the contradiction. The question is not disinterested, as if one asked whether all existence is not an image of the idea and to that extent whether visible existence is not, in a certain volatilized sense, a repetItIon. Here the question is more specifically one of a repetition in consciousness, consequently of recollection. Recollection involves the same contradiction. — Kierkegaard

And Repetition:

WHEN the Eleatics* denied motion, Diogenes, as everyone knows, came forward in protest, actually came forward, because he did not say a word, but simply walked back and forth a few times, with which gesture he believed he had sufficiently refuted the Eleatic position. When I had been preoccupied for some time, at least when I had the opportunity, with the problem of whether repetition was possible and what it meant, whether a thing wins or loses by being repeated, it suddenly occurred to me: you can go to Berlin, since you were there once before, you could in this way learn whether repetition was possible and what it meant. I had come to a standstill in my attempts to resolve this problem at home. Say what you will, this problem is going to play an important role in modern philosophy because repetition is a decisive expression for what ‘recollection’ was for the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowledge is recollection, thus will modern philosophy teach that life itself is a repetition. The only modern philosopher who has had the least intimation of this is Leibniz.* Repetition and recollection are the same movement, just in opposite directions, because what is recollected has already been and is thus repeated backwards, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forwards. — Kierkegaard

Funny, I had much the same conversation with Janus a week back.

I've been ducking in and out, so I haven't followed the whole conversation, but it seems to me that two distinct ideas are being conflated and confused within this thread.

On the one side we have the supposes think-in-itself, that which is supposedly behind our perceptions and hence supposed to be forever beyond our comprehension. It's "hidden"

On the other is the state of a neural network passed from one iteration to the next, or something like that.

Is that roughly right?

There is a difference between pointing to potential errors in common sense made by us individuals when we're 'riffing' our own ideas and pointing out such mistakes in an entire established body of scientific work in constant review by dozens, if not hundreds, of experts. The likelihood of them all having drifted off the rails of common sense, and you alone having spotted it are miniscule. A little more humility is warranted in the latter claim that might well be totally unnecessary in the former.

There is a clear distinction between knowledge and belief. — Janus

No one is ignoring that distinction. The terminology simply uses belief as any state of cognition which informs an action. Knowledge would be a specific type of belief which is supported by success in using it as a policy. As per above, this is the way 'belief' and 'knowledge' are used by a vast body of experts in the field. I'm sure there's an equally vast body of experts who use the terms differently. Their reasoning for doing so might be interesting to discuss, but the chances of either group having just 'got it wrong' by missing some obvious matter of common sense is tiny, so we oughtn't start there if we're to have such a discussion.

No one knows exactly how language evolved for obvious reasons. But I find it is more plausible to think it evolved in accordance with meaningful associations, in accordance with what people cared about, than in some merely arbitrary manner. — Janus

That you find something plausible is not an argument. People do know quite a lot about language, from linguistic science, vto the neuro-anatomy of language centers. We can study, for example, people who have trouble making verbal associations and see what differences there are in their language cortices which might explain that. What language processing remains in such patients tells us a lot about how language works. We can do more than just 'reckon' stuff.

I've said I think it is necessarily the case that it is contradictory to say that we are familiar with what is hidden from us. Perhaps you could explain why you think it could make sense to say that isn't so. Who is the one who has failed to present an argument? — Janus

It's not something amenable to argument. It's the technical terminology. It's a) too late, and b) completely unnecessary to change it now. If you don't think it makes sense, that's on you. Others are clearly fine with it. I don't think your opinion on the preferred use of technical terminology is a particularly ripe topic for discussion.

I know from self-reflection that making an inference is different than looking at something, and I gave examples of mistaking what I thought I saw due to pattern association, a matter of recognition not of inference, to support my contention. An inference is a process of logical deduction, how would you know such a process is going on unless you were conscious of it? — Janus

Again, 'inference' is the term used to describe a particular type of cognitive process. If you don't like the terminology, fine, but the entire field of cognitive science seems fine with it, so I'm not sure that a particularly interesting point of discussion either and, again, too late to change it now anyway.

On the one side we have the supposes think-in-itself, that which is supposedly behind our perceptions and hence supposed to be forever beyond our comprehension. It's "hidden"

On the other is the state of a neural network passed from one iteration to the next, or something like that.

Is that roughly right? — Banno

Yes.

's last post seems to sum it up for me. Perception is a staged process, one iteration to the next, as you say, and there seems to be a feeling among some that one stage somewhere in the middle must be the 'real' object of perception (rather than the external hidden state, we all seem to actually refer to). I've yet to really understand why they might feel that way.

Not a part of this discussion, but the issues raised in https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13247/phenomenalism, may shed some light on the motivation. Some seem to think that the connection between what we might call our current model of an external state and our 'experience' is somehow more direct than the connection between the external state and our current model. I was trying, in that thread, to point out that it is no more 'direct', it has no unique status in the process.

Unless we are going to say that the object of our perception is whatever is currently held in the working memory (at any given millisecond) then we have to accept that there are at least some data nodes between our response (us talking about, acting on, labelling, 'experiencing') and the object of that response. Once we've accepted that there are intervening data nodes, the search for the 'real' object becomes pointless. It might as well be the thing we've all been referring to it as for the last few hundred thousand years...the external object.

Nothing. 'Seeing' is a process of inference. Nothing is seen directly. Everything that is seen is seen indirectly. It's not a direct process, it has stages. — Isaac

So when you say this, you are pointing out the "thing" is part of the hidden state passed from iteration to iteration, and folk instead take you to be setting forth the philosophical notion of indirect realism?

Again, 'inference' is the term used to describe a particular type of cognitive process. If you don't like the terminology, fine, but the entire field of cognitive science seems fine with it, so I'm not sure that a particularly interesting point of discussion either and, again, too late to change it now anyway. — Isaac

All of your replies are based on the accepted usages within cognitive science. But this is not a cognitive science thread, and I would not presume to post in a cognitive science thread. I think if you want to bring cognitive science into the discussion you need to be able to explain in terms understandable to the reasonably philosophically educated layperson what relevance it has to philosophical questions which seem, at least on the face of it, to be outside its scope,

So the thread topic concerns whether or not there is an "external world". We already know that from a general scientific perspective, of course there is an external world, because it just is various aspects of what is understood to be the world external to our bodies and/or the world which is "external" in the sense of being the perceived object of conscious awareness, which is being studied by the various scientific disciplines. So, in that sense science is predicated upon there being an external world.

So when you say this, you are pointing out the "thing" is part of the hidden state passed from iteration to iteration, and folk instead take you to be setting forth the philosophical notion of indirect realism? — Banno

Possibly. I've never gotten clear how indirect realism is using the term 'indirect' (nor, for that matter how direct realism is using the term 'direct'). One of the things I thought might come out of this discussion.

But yes, for my part, I'm simply pointing out that cognitive science shows us that 'seeing' is an iterative process and as such nothing is without intervening nodes. The mere presence of an intervening 'modelling' stage shouldn't mean that what we 'see' is the model because there's loads of intervening stages between the model and the experience too. There's just loads of iterative stages full stop. So looking for a 'direct' object-subject link (where 'direct' means no intervening stages) is a fool's errand. We'd end up in a place I don't think anyone wants to be where the object of our perception is an ephemeral, constantly changing snippet of a model sliced and diced for whatever we're engaged in that very millisecond.

Interesting passages, thanks. I need a bit more time than I have right now to read them closely and respond.

Possibly. I've never gotten clear how indirect realism is using the term 'indirect' (nor, for that matter how direct realism is using the term 'direct'). One of the things I thought might come out of this discussion. — Isaac

It's always seemed to me that they are arrived at on account of looking at the situation form different perspectives. So, the scientific understanding of visual perception tells us it is a multi-stage process, which means we don't see things "directly". But from the experiential point of view, we just see things immediately, directly. Which view is correct? In the senses relative to their proper contexts, both are, so there would seem to be no point arguing over whether indirect or direct realism is true is any absolute sense.

I think if you want to bring cognitive science into the discussion you need to be able to explain in terms understandable to the reasonably philosophically educated layperson what relevance it has to philosophical questions which seem, at least on the face of it, to be outside its scope, — Janus

I have been trying to do so, but clearly with less success than I'd hoped. Is there something specific about my attempts that have failed for you, or just in general?

So the thread topic concerns whether or not there is an "external world". We already know that from a general scientific perspective, of course there is an external world, because it just is various aspects of what is understood to be the world external to our bodies and/or the world which is "external" in the sense of being the perceived object of conscious awareness, which is being studied by the various scientific disciplines. So, in that sense science is predicated upon there being an external world. — Janus

The argument given for an external world doesn't rely on science as such, it's a logical construct... I'll repeat it here.

Any system is logically defined by having a boundary, otherwise it's just everything and we're not talking about something. That boundary can be fuzzy, ephemeral, leaky, or tight and clear, but it must be there just in order to talk about something, it must be this as opposed to that.

A self-organising system (such as ourselves) must, again by definition, work against the gradient of a Gaussian probability distribution, it must avoid dispersal by random forces if it is to maintain itself as system (no science yet, just maths). That is, that it must perform a gradient climbing equation (in information system terms), it has to otherwise it would disperse to a random distribution.

One step back. The declaration of an internal state and an external state (necessary simply by declaring the object of our thought to be this and not that) Requires that there is what we call a Markov boundary between the internal and the external states. This is (again no ontology yet) simply a statistical feature of there being internal and external states, there simply must exist in any network those nodes which connect to the external states and the internal states. These are the Markov boundary (and anything within them is inside the Markov blanket).

Back to probabilities. Anything inside the Markov blanket is carrying out this gradient climbing equation relative to outside the Markov blanket otherwise it would disperse according to a Gaussian distribution. In order to carry out this equation, it must maximise the terms of a marginal likelihood function (or minimise free-energy as it's sometimes expressed - two sides of the same function).

So any self-organising system (one which does not disperse randomly) must, by definition contain within it's informational architecture, a Bayesian model of the external world which, in minimising the surprise function of, it carries out this gradient climbing function and so avoids dispersal to Gaussian distribution (from which we could not possibly distinguish it as system (no this and that just homogeneous stuff).

I should be clear, I'm repeating here, to the best of my ability, how it was explained to me. This isn't my theory, it's that of active inference in general. The papers I cited earlier contain the details, but they can be a little impenetrable as presented. I've found the above explanation useful.

We can then go on to look at the sort of biological instantiation of this informational architecture, but there we really are just doing neuroscience and outside the scope of this forum.

from the experiential point of view, we just see things immediately, directly. Which view is correct? In the senses relative to their proper contexts, both are, so there would seem to be no point arguing over whether indirect or direct realism is true is any absolute sense. — Janus

Possibly, but then do you not also experience some of the optical illusions, weird filtering, and changes of perspective that the multi-stage scientific model gives an explanation for. Do these experiences not need accounting for in any phenomenological description?

Possibly, but then do you not also experience some of the optical illusions, weird filtering, and changes of perspective that the multi-stage scientific model gives an explanation for. Do these experiences not need accounting for in any phenomenological description? — Isaac

I'm not entirely sure what you are referring to. By "optical illusions" do you mean things like sticks appearing bent when they are part in and part out of water? If so, then I would say that we just directly see the stick as bent. It doesn't seem to be a problem for direct realism that the stick is not really bent; that can easily be established by taking the stick out of the water or feeling along its length; we don't need science to tell us it's not really bent, but we do need science to tell us exactly why it appears that way. Although, that said, the hunter gatherer might have said it appears that way because it is partially submerged. the scientific understanding of refraction, tying it in with other refractive phenomena, is just a further, more generalized explanation.

Thanks. I'll need to think some more on this and undergo some digestion before replying. So, when I have more time...

Possibly. I've never gotten clear how indirect realism is using the term 'indirect' (nor, for that matter how direct realism is using the term 'direct'). One of the things I thought might come out of this discussion. — Isaac

The article I (and you) referenced above offered an analogy to explain this. The spider is directly aware of the vibrations and indirectly aware of the fly.

In terms of human sight, as I explained before, the same external cause causes one person to see a red dress and one person to see a blue dress. There is a qualitative difference to their experiences, which is why we don't say that they both see a red dress or both see a blue dress. The words "red" and "blue" in this context refer to some quality of their respective experiences (and perhaps also to some property of the external cause, but a failure to recognise the reference to some quality of the experience will lead to equivocation). The qualities of these experiences are equivalent to the vibrations in the spider analogy, and the property of the external cause – emitting or reflecting light at a particular wavelength – is equivalent to the fly.

And in terms of the epistemological problem of perception, the indirect realist will say that how the world looks and how the word feels doesn't tell us anything meaningful about what the external world is "like" (other than the trivial fact that it is such that it causes us to see this or feel that), whereas for the direct realist the external world is "like" we see and feel things to be (although some direct realists will only say this about so-called "primary" qualities like shape, not about so-called "secondary" qualities like colour).

I'm not entirely sure what you are referring to. By "optical illusions" do you mean things like sticks appearing bent when they are part in and part out of water? — Janus

Yes, plus a range of others. Something like...

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lilac_chaser

...or the Gorilla experiment I described earlier (not seeing a 'gorilla' walk on stage right in front of you because it's unexpected and your focus is elsewhere)...

These are harder to just do a kind of 'feel the stick' check on, yet the latter type particularly (filtered sensory processing) affects our phenomenal experience massively. We're quite regularly seeing things which don't match our other senses (and vice versa). I think we've always needed a narrative to explain that. The simple idea that we just directly see what's there doesn't seem to be sufficient here.

I'll need to think some more on this and undergo some digestion before replying. So, when I have more time... — Janus

Cool.