Feelings are different to thoughts. Feelings are not propositional, thoughts are propositional. — RussellA
the individual notes and combinations of notes in music express feelings not thoughts. — RussellA
Are feelings to thoughts as words are to proposition — bongo fury
So, yes? — bongo fury
So yes, as far as I know. — RussellA
(For you?) — bongo fury
the individual notesand combinations of notesin music express feelingsnot[while combinations of notes express] thoughts. — RussellA
That's the kind of reason I (and I claimed also W) counselled dispensing with mental entities. — bongo fury
But that line of thinking was leading me to expect, the individual notesand combinations of notesin music express feelingsnot[while combinations of notes express] thoughts. — bongo fury
In great music, as with great painting, the notes, or brush marks, combine into a single aesthetic experience, — RussellA
For in a printed proposition, for example, no essential difference is apparent between a propositional sign and a word.
(That is what made it possible for Frege to call a
proposition a composite name.) — 3.143
to say "music is language" is a metaphor. — RussellA
Meaning can only be expressed in a proposition, such as "the apple is on the table". — RussellA
Tactatus 4 "The thought is the significant proposition" — RussellA
4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.
3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.
PI 115. A. picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.
Wittgenstein was insisting that a proposition and what it describes must have the same ‘logical form’ Sraffa made a gesture, familiar to Neapolitans as meaning something like disgust or contempt, of brushing the underneath of his chin with an outward sweep of the finger-tips of one hand. And he asked: “What is the logical form of that?” [Malcolm N., (2001), Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, Oxford, Oxford University Press.]
4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.
3.03 Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.
If we dispense with mental entities then what is left?That's the kind of reason I (and I claimed also W) counselled dispensing with mental entities.
I was going along with it (entities included) out of interest, while I thought I could follow. Awareness too, and I'm out of here. — bongo fury
Depends on the claim. Maybe the issue is saying that you can claim any metaphysical position. Seems that you can only ponder or hypothesize metaphysical positions. A claim would change it from being metaphysical to scientific, no? Are scientific claims nonsense? Why?That metaphysical claims are nonsense. — Tate
Are scientific claims nonsense? — Harry Hindu
So does science. Science and Philosophy are about things. Is the idea of multiple universes and dark matter in the domain of philosophy or science? Are they mental entities as bongo put it, or something else?If they're about things in the world, they're fine. It's mainly philosophy that tries to comment on the world from a vantage point external to it. — Tate
If we dispense with mental entities then what is left? — Harry Hindu
sentence tokens — bongo fury
Curious that you want to downplay the relational/factual/structural aspect of the artwork and stress the whole, er, feeling — bongo fury
W is keen to use musical and pictorial structure to explain propositional structure — bongo fury
If it "doesn't latch onto the inner thing in terms of meaning", then why would the disconnect "eventually show up in our uses of the concept". Meaning is use. — Luke
My original response to your previous post, before I edited it, was going to be that you seem to be arguing that Wittgenstein's beetle is both necessary and unnecessary to language use. Wittgenstein tells us that it drops out of consideration as irrelevant; that it cancels out, whatever it is; that the box might even be empty; and that the thing in the box doesn't belong to the language-game at all. — Luke
It appears to me that Wittgenstein is saying that language takes its meaning entirely from behaviour, from use, and only from a third-person, external standpoint. Pain and other sensations do not refer directly to the private feelings but to the public expression of those feelings; to how you (and others) act when experiencing those sensations. Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke
And if that is the case - if language is entirely behavioural/external - then we cannot talk about sensations in terms of private subjective experiences or qualia or any of that. This is where we run up against the limits of language, and where Daniel Dennett is correct that qualia cannot possibly be private, ineffable, intrinsic and immediately apprehensible by consciousness. On the other hand, it seems as though we can talk about sensations and feelings directly in terms of the private subjective experiences and the sensations themselves, and not only in terms of their expression, because that is what we are doing now - or at least trying to do! In that case, Wittgenstein would be wrong about language or grammar being entirely behavioural/external. — Luke
Language, art, music, etc.
— bongo fury
My guess is that you would agree with this. — Sam26
So, as we get into the different shadings of red, and make detailed comparisons with other color samples, the idea that you're seeing yellow instead of red would seem to break down at some point. We would begin to recognize in our various uses that we're not seeing the same color or colors. If, on the other hand, there is no way to tell if you're seeing yellow instead of red, then the whole point is moot. Whatever's happening in the mind would fall away as as so much chaff, but I suspect this is incorrect. — Sam26
It seems to me that if you remove what's going on in the mind, then your left with nothing. I don't think Wittgenstein goes this far, even though his beetle in the box seems to remove the thing as having any great import. — Sam26
305. “But you surely can’t deny that, for example, in remembering,
an inner process takes place.” — What gives the impression that we
want to deny anything? When one says, “Still, an inner process does
take place here” — one wants to go on: “After all, you see it.” And it
is this inner process that one means by the word “remembering”. —
The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting
our face against the picture of an ‘inner process’. What we deny
is that the picture of an inner process gives us the correct idea of the
use of the word “remember”. Indeed, we’re saying that this picture, with
its ramifications, stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word
as it is. — Philosophical Investigations
If there is a limit, I suspect that it's not as limiting as he thinks it is. The fact that we can talk about some of these subjective experiences, as we're doing, seems to point at something problematic with Wittgenstein's limit. — Sam26
The Eiffel tower is in Paris, is 330m in height and is made of wrought iron. I can replace "I saw the 330m tall wrought-iron structure in Paris" by "I saw the Eiffel Tower". Is this what Wittgenstein is referring to ? — RussellA
An aesthetic is a unity between its parts, rather than just being an aggregation of parts loosely related. — RussellA
but did he say that music uses propositions, that propositions are used in music as well as language ? — RussellA
The gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world. — 4.014
For instance, how do we non-korean-speaking people know that Korean is a language? It just looks like scribbles and strange sounds being made by some people to us. How can you explain the difference in how different people interpret different scribbles and utterances if not by referring to mental entities? — Harry Hindu
The question is how are thoughts, which is one case, be about another entirely different case (not thoughts), like the movement of tectonic plates, if not by some form of causation (energy transfer, information transfer, etc.)? — Harry Hindu
6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.
6.41 For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
That metaphysical claims are nonsense. — Tate
5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it.
6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except
what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do
with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it.
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