Two questions about the ontological existence of relations in a mind-independent world — RussellA

For the purposes of the Tractatus, the states of affairs, the facts, constituted the world, while relations form a picture of the world. That this or that relation is in the world is displayed, shown.

Recall that the notion of a mind-independent world is not found in the Tractatus.

Hence relations do not cause changes to the facts. Relations are in the picture of the world, not in the facts. The relations form the picture of the facts.

When he says pain in not "a Something" ,I take this to mean it is not a thing or object existing in the world that is represented in thought or propositions. — Fooloso4

Doesn't this contradict what you said earlier, that the sensation of pain "enters the picture"?

PI 1 These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands ...

If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.


But the remaining kinds of words do not take care of themselves when this picture holds us captive. — Fooloso4

Are you saying that "pain" is or is not a noun? You appeared earlier to be saying that "pain" is a noun - a thing or object existing in the world, which does "enter the picture" of propositions. You now appear to be saying instead that "pain" is one of "the remaining kinds of words".

The purpose of the statement: "I am in pain" is not to convey the thought that I am in pain. — Fooloso4

Right, the statement "I am in pain" is not an expression of a thought or a description of pain, but is an expression of pain; a pain-behaviour. As he notes at 244, making statements such as "I am in pain" are a substitute/replacement for more primitive, natural expressions of pain, such as crying.

But if the word "pain" is used (in this way) as an expression of pain, then this indicates that the word "pain" refers to the expression; to the pain-behaviour. If the meaning of the word is how the word is used, and if the word "pain" is used (in this way) as an expression of pain, then the word "pain" (when used in this way) means the expression of pain.

Analogously, the word "red" doesn't refer to a colour that any individual sees, but to the relevant behaviours associated with correct use(s) of the word "red". It is these relevant/correct behaviours that we learn when we learn the language. The sensation is "not a Something, but not a Nothing either"; "if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant."

Good luck with that. It's like trying to be clear on what the authors of the Bible are saying. I'm not really rejecting anything Witt is talking about. — Harry Hindu

Many scholars recognize the value of hermeneutics.

I'm taking issue with his improper use of language. — Harry Hindu

You mistake what you take the terms 'accident' and 'necessity' to mean for what the terms mean in their various uses.

For what reason? — Harry Hindu

You assume there must be some reason why things happen as they do. Wittgenstein rejected this assumption. So do I. The issue is not as settled as you assume. This is not the thread to discuss it but see, for example: Sean Carroll:s On Determinism

Logical necessity is just as much a part of the world as any other causal relation. — Harry Hindu

Once again you want to stipulate the meaning of terms. Logical necessity has a very specific meaning in the Tractatus, and what it says is not what you claim.

Yet all you did was infer that you'd either submit your posts or not based on what conditions existed prior to submitting your post or not. — Harry Hindu

The conditions may be there but those conditions might support both A and B or A and N, all of which may be possible under those conditions.

Witt disproves his own assertions by writing his books for others to read. — Harry Hindu

Nonsense! That is not what he asserts. Read the book. Then we can discuss it.




.

Relations are in the picture of the world, not in the facts. — Banno

For Wittgenstein, is there a mind-independent world ?
I follow that " the notion of a mind-independent world is not found in the Tractatus", yet he does refer to things we would expect to be in a mind-independent world, for example:
4.014 The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world...............(like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story.........)
6.3432 We must not forget that the description of the world by mechanics is always quite general
6.373 The world is independent of my will

Although Wittgenstein may not refer to a mind-independent world, I read that the existence of a mind-independent world is assumed.

Does the "world" in the Tractatus exist in the mind or is it mind-independent ?
3 The logical picture of the facts is the thought

In a mind-independent world, there are two possibilities as regards the existence of relations.

Possibility One: If relations don't exist, then facts don't exist. Therefore, as the logical picture in the mind cannot be a logical picture of facts in the world ( although it can be a representation of facts in the world), it can only be a logical picture of facts in the mind. In this case, the "world" must be read as existing in the mind.

Possibility Two: If relations do exist, then facts exist. Therefore, the picture in the mind can be a logical picture of facts in the world. It can also be a logical picture of facts in the mind. In this case, the "world" may be read as either existing in the mind or existing as mind-independent.

IE, one's reading of whether the "world" in the Tractatus exists in the mind or is mind-independent depends on one's opinion as to the existence or not of relations in a mind-independent world.

Logic is the transcendent condition for both objects and their representation. In so far as the facts of the world include our representations, the world is not independent of the mind.

But see the shift from the world to my world in his discussion of solipsism, the will, and the "metaphysical ''I".

Although:

6.373 The world is independent of my will — RussellA

when he says:

6.431 So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.

he is referring to my world, the world as it is for me, the world of the metaphysical I.

As to the exercise of the will:

6.43 If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.

I'll join Anscombe in suggesting that thinking in terms of idealism and empiricism is an impediment to understanding the Tractatus.

IE, one's reading of whether the "world" in the Tractatus exists in the mind or is mind-independent depends on one's opinion as to the existence or not of relations in a mind-independent world. — RussellA

But, as I explained before, relations are part of the picture, not of the world. The world consists of facts. It therefore does not consist of relations.

But, as I explained before, relations are part of the picture, not of the world. The world consists of facts. It therefore does not consist of relations. — Banno

I don't think this is correct.

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.

The way in which the objects combine is the relation one stands to another.

2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.

A fact is not just a collection of objects but objects standing in a determine relation to one another.

I don't think this is correct. — Fooloso4

Well I disagree.

A fact is not just a collection of objects but objects standing in a determine relation to one another. — Fooloso4

Yep. The picture shows these relations. that's the point.

2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.

Look at the context, at the mis-view @RussellA expresses.

What exactly are relations ? Can they be individuals ? — RussellA

Admittedly, I haven’t been paying close attention, but are you assuming that if external relations exist then they must be individuals? Isn’t that a category error?

The picture shows these relations. that's the point. — Banno

Yes, the picture shows the relation. My point is that there is a relation that is pictured, that is, the relation are not just part of the picture. The possibility for objects to be in relation is a necessary condition for facts.

Look at the context, at the mis-view RussellA expresses. — Banno

Sorry, I jumped in in response to the quoted statement. I too admit I have not been paying close attention to the exchange.

the relation are not just part of the picture. — Fooloso4

Sure, the relation shows the state of affairs, and in that way steps beyond what is said.

The remark being replied to is:

IE, one's reading of whether the "world" in the Tractatus exists in the mind or is mind-independent depends on one's opinion as to the existence or not of relations in a mind-independent world. — RussellA

The purpose here is to move beyond seeing the Tractatus in terms of idealism and empiricism. The world is all that is the case. The picture is of the world, and hence in an important sense distinct from it. Thinking of the world as either mind-dependent or mind-independent will not allow one to see that the picture shows the world.

Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world, it is not a part of the world in the way RussellA is asking...

That being said, I also do not wish to rule out antirealist readings of the Tractatus.

Does this help?

2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.

2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture. — Tractatus

But, as I explained before, relations are part of the picture, not of the world. The world consists of facts. It therefore does not consist of relations. — Banno

The picture is of the world, and hence in an important sense distinct from it. — Banno

Only in a warped sense. "Distict" and "of" are relations, so it seems that relations are primary and the world and pictures are part of a relation. If pictures only show relations, then what are you showing when you use the scribble, "facts", if not that facts are relations too? The attraction to Witt's ideas are similar to the attraction to the Bible or Koran's ideas - in that they show that humans are distinct from nature, hence in an important sense "special".

Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world, — Banno

Do you mean

Insofar as some true proposition "aRb" (and/or some spatial relation within its sign) pictures a fact,

?

Just trying to follow.

Sure, the relation shows the state of affairs, — Banno

Yes. Fact = state of affairs = relation.

A proposition, for W, is any such entity (by whatever of those names) which is used in a language to (if true) show (be a diagram of) another.

Sure, the relation shows the state of affairs,
— Banno

Yes. Fact = state of affairs = relation. — bongo fury

and is it a fact that the relation shows the state of affairs, and as such is part of the world and not distinct from it?

I originally included these when writing my post but decided to eliminate them before posting because I wanted to stress the fact that these relations exist between things and not just the picture.

2.031 and 2.15 both refer to "determinate relations".

You mistake what you take the terms 'accident' and 'necessity' to mean for what the terms mean in their various uses. — Fooloso4

All I've been doing is trying to follow your interpretation of Witt. You have been unable to make a sensible case of your own interpretation. It's not how I take the terms, but how most people take the terms:

accident
ăk′sĭ-dənt, -dĕnt″
noun
An unexpected and undesirable event, especially one resulting in damage or harm.
An unforeseen event that is not the result of intention or has no apparent cause.
An instance of involuntary urination or defecation.

necessary
nĕs′ĭ-sĕr″ē
adjective
Needed or required: synonym: indispensable.
Unavoidably determined by prior conditions or circumstances; inevitable.
Logically inevitable.

It is you that are taking the terms to mean something other than their various uses, so it is incumbent upon you and Witt to lay out the way you're using the terms when not using them the way most people use them.

Many scholars recognize the value of hermeneutics. — Fooloso4

Then you should be finding value in many different interpretations. Once you start declaring some interpretation right or wrong, you prove my point that what makes some interpretation necessarily right or wrong is what is the case prior to interpreting it. You keep making the same mistake and when I point it out, you ignore it.

For what reason?
— Harry Hindu

You assume there must be some reason why things happen as they do. Wittgenstein rejected this assumption. So do I. The issue is not as settled as you assume. This is not the thread to discuss it but see, for example: Sean Carroll:s On Determinism — Fooloso4

No. I was asking for what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do. The reason why I accept the idea that there are reasons things happen as they do is by experience, like right now, when I'm typing this post my fingers are tapping the keyboard and scribbles appear on the screen. Look at all the letters on this screen and each one was typed prior to it appearing on the screen. That is a lot of potential for accidents, yet we all are able to type each letter in the correct sequence to form a word, sentence and paragraph without much of a problem. If what you are saying is the case, then one would expect that this page would be filled with blank posts, random scribbles, etc. but it isn't. Why?

Once again you want to stipulate the meaning of terms. Logical necessity has a very specific meaning in the Tractatus, and what it says is not what you claim. — Fooloso4

It is you and Witt that want to stipulate the meaning of terms too. The problem appears to be that we don't want to agree on the usage of the terms, so there ends up being no communication. I cannot picture your meaning if we are not agreeing on their usage. That is what I've been trying to do - just to find out where we differ in our usage and what you are actually saying if you don't mean "accident" and "necessity" in the same way most people do. You are free to use other words if they capture the meaning of what you are trying to convey. Use them.

The conditions may be there but those conditions might support both A and B or A and N, all of which may be possible under those conditions. — Fooloso4

Using the term, "possible" just shows that you are confusing what is the case with our ignorance of what is the case. How would you know what is possible if not by referring to what the prior conditions are?

Nonsense! That is not what he asserts. Read the book. Then we can discuss it. — Fooloso4

I have and it makes as much sense as the Bible does. It is open to personal interpretation, so anyone's interpretations is just as good as anyone else's. I prefer a good science book on language. Steve Pinker is a much better read than Witt.

I originally included these when writing my post but decided to eliminate them before posting because I wanted to stress the fact that these relations exist between things and not just the picture.

2.031 and 2.15 both refer to "determinate relations". — Fooloso4

Sure, I just thought that 2.15 (and 2.151) might better demonstrate that Wittgenstein held relations to be a part of both the picture and the world; otherwise, they could not share a pictorial form.

2.17 What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way that it does, is its pictorial form. — Tractatus

Hence relations do not cause changes to the facts. Relations are in the picture of the world, not in the facts. The relations form the picture of the facts. — Banno

So humans and their relations do not change the world as a result of those relations? Then I guess racism is not something that can change the facts of discrimination, nor could the relations Trump showed ever have changed the outcome of the election so there was never any reason to worry or waste time and taxpayer dollars with a committee to investigate what Trump showed and how it might cause a change in the facts.

If facts are not relations then how did anyone come to understand that the world is composed of facts, or even what a fact is, if we can only show relations with pictures and words?

and is it a fact that the relation shows the state of affairs, and as such is part of the world and not distinct from it? — Harry Hindu

I don't know exactly which other squabble you're alluding to, but bear in mind that when someone opposes "world" to "language" they often mean the less encopassing "fact" and "proposition" respectively.

I don't know exactly which other squabble you're alluding to, but bear in mind that when someone opposes "world" to "language" they often mean the less encopassing "fact" and "proposition" respectively. — bongo fury

This doesn't explain the nature of the opposition or distinction. What does it even mean to say that the world is the totality of facts and not of things, if not that the world is a relation of facts? If facts don't stand in relation to other facts, then each fact would be separate from the world and not be part of the totality that is the world in the same way that the world is distinct from language. Language use requires a medium and that medium is the world.

What is a fact? Saying that a fact is what is the case or a state of affairs isn't saying anything about the nature of what a fact is. What is the case, and what is the state of affairs if not events, or relations between things?

It seems to be a vague use of terms. It's more meaningful to think of the world as the totality of information with information being the relation between causes and their effects. So the world is the totality of causes and their effects and their relation is a fact.

All I've been doing is trying to follow your interpretation of Witt. — Harry Hindu

You want to participate in a discussion of Wittgenstein but refuse to read what he said. Read him and see if my interpretation follows from what he said, and then you might have a better chance of following my interpretation.

It's not how I take the terms, but how most people take the terms — Harry Hindu

Common usage also includes:

2. an event that happensby chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.
b :lack of intention or necessity : chance

Once you start declaring some interpretation right or wrong, you prove my point that what makes some interpretation necessarily right or wrong is what is the case prior to interpreting it. — Harry Hindu

What is the case prior to interpreting a text, is the text itself. The irony is that you have declared my interpretation wrong without even looking at the text itself. In addition, you declare Wittgenstein wrong based on claims of what he said that you pulled out of who knows where.

I was asking for what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do. — Harry Hindu

See Aristotle on chance. See Ecclesiastes and Job on the expectation of reasons why.

That is a lot of potential for accidents ... — Harry Hindu

Yes, Wite-Out was a much used product. It is still sold but not used as much since we can easily fix typos with a word processor.

How would you know what is possible if not by referring to what the prior conditions are? — Harry Hindu

The prior conditions are, according to the Tractatus, transcendental.



.

Sure, I just thought that 2.15 (and 2.151) might better demonstrate that Wittgenstein held relations to be a part of both the picture and the world; otherwise, they could not share a pictorial form. — Luke

Yes, both. He has other fish to fry with the saying/showing distinction, but it is not clear to me where Banno stands when he says:

Sure, the relation shows the state of affairs, and in that way steps beyond what is said. — Banno

are you assuming that if external relations exist then they must be individuals? — Luke

An external relation is a relation that is external to the terms or things it relates, and is not grounded in its relata. For example a cherry and a strawberry are 3m apart. Some philosophers believe that if external relations did exist they would be ontological additions. An internal relation is grounded in its relata. For example, a cherry and a strawberry may both be the same shade of red. Some philosophers believe that internal relations are not ontological additions because they can be reduced to intrinsic properties.

As regards FH Bradley, what he calls "real" relations are grounded in their relata, and are what would be called in modern usage internal relations, and therefore not ontological additions. Those relations not grounded in their relata, and are what would be called in modern usage external relations would be ontological additions. It is these external relations that Bradley argues cannot exist, as their existence would lead to an infinite regress, in that this external relation would need another relation to relate it to its relata.

Therefore, if relations grounded in their relata are internal relations, and not ontological additions, then relations not grounded in their relata are external relations, are individuals, and would be ontological additions.

You want to participate in a discussion of Wittgenstein but refuse to read what he said. Read him and see if my interpretation follows from what he said, and then you might have a better chance of following my interpretation. — Fooloso4

No. I have read what he said, as well as what you are saying. I am then going on to ask questions about what both you and he said and you are unable to be consistent with your explanation, or refuse to address the points I am making. I have even asked you twice (now is my third) what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do, and you haven't answered. When you are inconsistent and intellectually dishonest then that is my reason to not trust your interpretation. These are not "gotcha" questions. These are questions that I am asking to better understand your interpretation. Contradictions and hypocrisy leads to more confusion, not a better understanding of what Witt, or you said.

Common usage also includes:

2. an event that happensby chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.
b :lack of intention or necessity : chance — Fooloso4

How is that any different than how I've been using it, or the definition I provided here:

An unforeseen event that is not the result of intention or has no apparent cause. — Harry Hindu

I have pointed out several times now that in trying to show that we cannot predict some outcome, you provide different reasons as to why there would be a different outcome, thereby defeating your own argument. If we understand this particular definition the same way, then we would both realize that there would not be a reason for anything - that reasons would be meaningless. The problem is that I don't think you are thinking about the implications of what you and Witt are saying. You just say them and expect others to sit in awe of what you said. It seems that you have emotionally invested yourself in the things Witt has said, and that Witt (and by association you) can never be wrong about anything.

Once you start declaring some interpretation right or wrong, you prove my point that what makes some interpretation necessarily right or wrong is what is the case prior to interpreting it.
— Harry Hindu

What is the case prior to interpreting a text, is the text itself. The irony is that you have declared my interpretation wrong without even looking at the text itself. In addition, you declare Wittgenstein wrong based on claims of what he said that you pulled out of who knows where. — Fooloso4

I pulled it out of the dictionary.

I haven't declared anything wrong - just incoherent.

For you to read some text, the text has to already be available, no? - meaning someone had to write it down, right?

That is a lot of potential for accidents ...
— Harry Hindu

Yes, Wite-Out was a much used product. It is still sold but not used as much since we can easily fix typos with a word processor. — Fooloso4

You're still missing (or ignoring) the point and committing the same error that undermines your own argument. Here you have just provided reasons as to why we use White-Out, why it's not used as much now, etc. Not to mention that you ignore all the times we don't need to use White-Out, or the backspace key on the keyboard. My point was that every case was an accident, then there would be no consistency between typing a letter on the keyboard and seeing the letter you typed. The fact that the right letter appears on the screen MOST (99%) of the time poses a problem to your position.

When you are inconsistent and intellectually dishonest then that is my reason to not trust your interpretation. — Harry Hindu

You accuse me of being intellectually dishonest and yet expect me to help you understand what you clearly do not.

How is that any different than how I've been using it — Harry Hindu

Here is what you said, emphasis added:

The accidental only makes sense in light of the determined or predicted. Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. Accidents only come about when something was predicted to happen but didn't. If you dont make a prediction then there can be no accidents. — Harry Hindu

I am not going to point out the ways in which this differs from what you say now.

I have even asked you twice (now is my third) what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do, and you haven't answered. — Harry Hindu

And in return I asked you why you think they do. I know of no argument that would settle the matter. Reason alone is not decisive in deciding what side we favor.

Let me ask you a few related questions:

Do you think that things could have turned out differently?
Is there some necessity that things can only turn out as they do?
Can the same conditions support different outcomes?

Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world,
— Banno

Do you mean

Insofar as some true proposition "aRb" (and/or some spatial relation within its sign) pictures a fact,
— Banno

? — bongo fury

No.

Sure, the relation shows the state of affairs,
— Banno

Yes. Fact = state of affairs = relation.

A proposition, for W, is any such entity (by whatever of those names) which is used in a language to (if true) show (be a diagram of) another. — bongo fury

Facts and states of affairs are much the same. Relations, not so much. Nor are "proposition" and "relation" interchangeable. Further, propositional signs are distinct from propositions (3.12)

Have a look a 3.1 and thereafter. What you call a "scribble" may be what Wittgenstein calls a "propositional sign".

If facts are not relations then how did anyone come to understand that the world is composed of facts, or even what a fact is, if we can only show relations with pictures and words? — Harry Hindu

Harry, despite this sentence being marks on a screen, you are aware that it is addressed to you. How is that?

It is these external relations that Bradley argues cannot exist, as their existence would lead to an infinite regress, in that this external relation would need another relation to relate it to its relata. — RussellA

I'm unclear on your point with regards to the Tractatus. Why are you raising the issue of Bradley and external relations? Is it for historical interest; to demonstrate Wittgenstein's agreement with Bradley?

The problem being that as relation C is independent of its relata A and B, a further relation D needs to be shown relating relation C with relata A and B, leading to the conclusion that relations independent of their relata are not possible. — RussellA

I don't see how C can be independent (external) of A or B when it is the relation between A and B; what relates A to B.

I believe this is addressed by Wittgenstein at 3.1432. The right way to think of a relation is that "a stands to b in a certain relation" (my emphasis).

I don't see Wittgenstein as arguing for external relations. I take this to be the point of his remarks at (e.g.) 4.122, 4.125 and 4.1251.

No. — Banno

What, then? How are we to parse,

Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world, — Banno

? Is "aRb" being used or mentioned (in your sentence)?

Nor are "proposition" and "relation" interchangeable. — Banno

Hence,

A proposition, for W, is any such [relation] which... — bongo fury

Further, propositional signs are distinct from propositions (3.12) — Banno

3.12 — And a proposition is a propositional
sign in its projective relation to the world.

I.e. in the isomorphism shown between the fact and a certain relation in the sign.

How are we to parse,

Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world,
— Banno — bongo fury

How to parse it? How do we put it into words?