Because you said before that people can see the wrong colours. — Michael
People do, yes. 'Red' is not the term we use to describe the hidden state that causes birds to see what we would call red (if we had the same ocular equipment). It's the name we give to the hidden state which causes most humans in normal light conditions to respond in a predictable manner. If a bird learned human speech and called those eggs 'red' he'd be wrong. — Isaac
the visible colour that is presented in experience — Michael
indirect realists say that we can’t because these non-hidden states are only representative of and/or causally covariant with the mind-independent nature. — Michael
How does any of that show that colour actually is presented to experience? — Isaac
I know from first-hand experience that colours are present in my experiences. — Michael
Scientists tell you objects are made of waveforms. They don't seem to be, but you accept they are. — Isaac
How does any of that show that colour actually is presented to experience? — Isaac
Then why does it matter what the standard model tells us about how objects reflect light? — Isaac
Because it shows that colours as-seen aren’t mind-independent. If it were the Standard Model or some other theory would find it. Instead, colour is a product of perception. — Michael
Only according to the scientists. It doesn't seem that way to me, objects don't seem to me to be how the standard model describes them. So I suppose for the purposes of our current conversion, they aren't. — Isaac
Note that ‘red’ is a fictive cause of the data, not a sufficient statistic — it does not exist other than as the support of a probability distribution. It is this belief we associate with qualia. Imagine now that you have access to the sufficient statistics inducing qualia from multiple patches of retinotopically mapped colours and hues. You then hierarchically optimize the next level of sufficient statistics to find the best hypothesis that explains the sufficient statistics at the retinotopically mapped level — and you select a belief that they are caused by a red rose. Again, the rose does not in itself exist other than to support a probability distribution associated with sufficient statistics — say neural activity. The key thing here is that the hypotheses underpinning (supporting) beliefs are specified by a generative model. This model furnishes a virtual reality that is used to explain sensory impressions through the act of inference.
I'm pointing out how even the theory you're supporting doesn't make the metaphysical claims you're trying to make. — Michael
For example, we do not 'see' an internal model. That appears to be impossible. — Isaac
Does the world when not being seen resemble how it looks to us? We need to answer these questions to solve the epistemological problem of perception. All this other talk is a red herring — Michael
Maybe it would be better to dissolve the epistemological problem of perception by dissolving the alleged gap between perceiver and world and along with it representational realism. — Joshs
Is this done by playing with language, by conceptional framing, or by looking the other way? :razz: — Tom Storm
They would instead share with their anti-realist opponents the need to defend their conceptions of scientific understanding with the recognition that these conceptions conflict with what the sciences have to say about our own conceptual capacities — Joshs
There is no gap between how the world appears to us and how it “really” is for realists to overcome, — Joshs
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.