Yes. Why wouldn't I be? — Isaac

Because you said before that people can see the wrong colours.

Because you said before that people can see the wrong colours. — Michael

People do, yes. 'Red' is not the term we use to describe the hidden state that causes birds to see what we would call red (if we had the same ocular equipment). It's the name we give to the hidden state which causes most humans in normal light conditions to respond in a predictable manner we call 'seeing red'. If a bird learned human speech and called those eggs 'red' he'd be wrong.

The 'dress', is black and blue. There's no debate about what colour the dress actually is.

People do, yes. 'Red' is not the term we use to describe the hidden state that causes birds to see what we would call red (if we had the same ocular equipment). It's the name we give to the hidden state which causes most humans in normal light conditions to respond in a predictable manner. If a bird learned human speech and called those eggs 'red' he'd be wrong. — Isaac

Hidden states are only half the picture. There’s also the non-hidden states, e.g the visible colour that is presented in experience and which, according to you, people can “get wrong”.

Direct and indirect realists want to know if we can trust these non-hidden states to show us the nature of the mind-independent world. Direct realists say that we can because these non-hidden states are the mind-independent nature, whereas indirect realists say that we can’t because these non-hidden states are only representative of and/or causally covariant with the mind-independent nature.

the visible colour that is presented in experience — Michael

No visible colour is presented in experience. It cannot happen (with what we currently know about the brain). Experience is a post hoc construction, no colour is presented to it, it infers colour from an abstraction out of the actual objects presented to it.

indirect realists say that we can’t because these non-hidden states are only representative of and/or causally covariant with the mind-independent nature. — Michael

Why does them being only representative or causally covariant mean we cannot trust them? We can be right.

No visible colour is presented in experience. — Isaac

Of course it is. Some people see the dress as black and blue, others as white and gold.

I honestly can’t be bothered to rehash the old arguments where you try to deny this very basic, empirical fact.

Some people see the dress as black and blue, others as white and gold. — Michael

How do you know?

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0010945215003226

So people, when asked, use the words 'black and blue', or 'white and gold'. They describe their personal folk psychology, meta theory of perception as 'seeing' those colours.

How does any of that show that colour actually is presented to experience?

How does any of that show that colour actually is presented to experience? — Isaac

I know from first-hand experience that colours are present in my experiences. I’m not just some thinking thing that engages in logical inferences.

Of course I can’t make such a claim about you or anyone else. Perhaps you all have blindsight or are p-zombies. But I tend to trust that other people have the same kind of experiences as me.

I know from first-hand experience that colours are present in my experiences. — Michael

So we've left the science behind, and anything that seems to you to be the case actually is the case?

Does it seem to you that your table is not actually solid, but rather made of probabilistic wave forms? You don't seem to have any trouble allowing the most bizarre conclusions of physics undo your most foundational beliefs about objects. Are your beliefs about your cognition so precious?

As I have said before, the world as seen isn’t the world as described by the Standard Model, and I’ll add isn’t the world as described by cognitive science either.

Phenomenological experience is its own domain, hence the hard problem of consciousness, and hence the epistemological problem of perception that direct and indirect realists are trying to solve.

I'm trying to understand why your line is where it is. Scientists tell you objects are made of waveforms. They don't seem to be, but you accept they are. Scientists tell you that parts of our brain infer models of external objects rather than see them directly. It doesn't seem that way, but you accept it's the case.

Scientists tell you your 'experience' is a post hoc construction made up of culturally medisted abstractions (such a folk-theories about perception), and you refuse to even consider it.

Scientists tell you objects are made of waveforms. They don't seem to be, but you accept they are. — Isaac

No I don’t. Waveforms are waveforms. Tables aren’t waveforms. I reject the philosophical position that reduces the everyday objects of perception to just being the mind-independent stuff “out there.”

No I don’t. Waveforms are waveforms. Tables aren’t waveforms. — Michael

Then why does it matter what the standard model tells us about how objects reflect light?

How does any of that show that colour actually is presented to experience? — Isaac

Maybe it’s not in yours, but color is certainly present in my experience of the world. You don’t have to believe iit if you wish to argue as p-zombie. But you might as well argue that I don’t exist. Makes no difference to my experience.

Then why does it matter what the standard model tells us about how objects reflect light? — Isaac

Because it shows that colours as-seen aren’t mind-independent. If it were the Standard Model or some other theory would find it. Instead, colour is a product of perception. The naive philosopher then mistakenly thinks of this colour as being mind-independent.

Maybe it’s not in yours, but color is certainly present in my experience of the world. — Marchesk

As I said to @Michael, if we're only talking about the way things seem to us to be, then there's no cause even for debate. It seems to me as if the apple actually is red.

Because it shows that colours as-seen aren’t mind-independent. If it were the Standard Model or some other theory would find it. Instead, colour is a product of perception. — Michael

Only according to the scientists. It doesn't seem that way to me, objects don't seem to me to be how the standard model describes them. So I suppose for the purposes of our current conversion, they aren't.

Only according to the scientists. It doesn't seem that way to me, objects don't seem to me to be how the standard model describes them. So I suppose for the purposes of our current conversion, they aren't. — Isaac

Exactly. Which is why the objects you see aren't mind-independent. That's the point I've been making since the start.

the objects you see aren't mind-independent. — Michael

They seem to me to be. So I suppose they are.

And I'll refer back to Friston:

Note that ‘red’ is a fictive cause of the data, not a sufficient statistic — it does not exist other than as the support of a probability distribution. It is this belief we associate with qualia. Imagine now that you have access to the sufficient statistics inducing qualia from multiple patches of retinotopically mapped colours and hues. You then hierarchically optimize the next level of sufficient statistics to find the best hypothesis that explains the sufficient statistics at the retinotopically mapped level — and you select a belief that they are caused by a red rose. Again, the rose does not in itself exist other than to support a probability distribution associated with sufficient statistics — say neural activity. The key thing here is that the hypotheses underpinning (supporting) beliefs are specified by a generative model. This model furnishes a virtual reality that is used to explain sensory impressions through the act of inference.

Of course, he talks about things like "red" and "a rose" as being a "fictive" that is used as some sort of instrumentalist tool to make sense of sensory impressions, whereas I would refer to such things as being sense-data (and he indeed mentions qualia). Either way, it's not the mind-independent causal thing.

And I'll refer back to Friston: — Michael

So now we're believing the scientists again. Can we come to some kind of decision on this, I'm struggling to keep up.

So now we're believing the scientists again. — Isaac

I'm not believing him. I'm pointing out how even the theory you're supporting doesn't make the metaphysical claims you're making.

I'm pointing out how even the theory you're supporting doesn't make the metaphysical claims you're trying to make. — Michael

Friston's theory is about how we see. We're discussing what we see. I'm using aspects of his model to constrain the possibilities of the answer to that question. For example, we do not 'see' an internal model. That appears (according to the science) to be impossible.

For example, we do not 'see' an internal model. That appears to be impossible. — Isaac

This is where you're getting lost in the irrelevance of English grammar. All that matters is whether or not the world when not being seen resembles how it looks to us. Are the mind-independent features of the world present in the phenomenological character of experience? We need to answer these questions to solve the epistemological problem of perception. All this other talk is a red herring.

Does the world when not being seen resemble how it looks to us? We need to answer these questions to solve the epistemological problem of perception. All this other talk is a red herring — Michael

Maybe it would be better to dissolve the epistemological problem of perception by dissolving the alleged gap between perceiver and world and along with it representational realism.

Joseph Rouse argues:

“This account blocks both realism and anti-realism by showing how the contentfulness of scientific claims about the world is worked out as part of ongoing interaction with our developmental and selective environment. Scientific claims and the conditions for their intelligibility are part of that environment, and only acquire meaning and justification as part of our ongoing efforts to articulate that environment conceptually from within. There is no gap between how the world appears to us and how it “really” is for realists to overcome, or for anti-realists to remain safely on the side of those appearances. Scientific understanding instead develops hard-won, partial articulations of the world. Within those conceptually articulated domains we can differentiate locally between what our theories and models say about the world, and whether what they say is correct or in need of some form of revision. Both conceptual understanding and its assessment nevertheless presuppose the kind of access to the world that antirealists deny and realists seek to secure.
​In the wake of these arguments, we should stop asking the questions to which realism or anti-realism would pose answers. Unless they can develop an adequate critical response to these arguments, realists must abandon any commitment to philosophical naturalism. They would instead share with their anti-realist opponents the need to defend their conceptions of scientific understanding with the recognition that these conceptions conflict with what the sciences have to say about our own conceptual capacities.”

Maybe it would be better to dissolve the epistemological problem of perception by dissolving the alleged gap between perceiver and world and along with it representational realism. — Joshs

Is this done by playing with language, by conceptional framing, or by looking the other way? :razz:

Is this done by playing with language, by conceptional framing, or by looking the other way? :razz: — Tom Storm

Joseph Rouse argues:

“This account blocks both realism and anti-realism by showing how the contentfulness of scientific claims about the world is worked out as part of ongoing interaction with our developmental and selective environment. Scientific claims and the conditions for their intelligibility are part of that environment, and only acquire meaning and justification as part of our ongoing efforts to articulate that environment conceptually from within. There is no gap between how the world appears to us and how it “really” is for realists to overcome, or for anti-realists to remain safely on the side of those appearances. Scientific understanding instead develops hard-won, partial articulations of the world. Within those conceptually articulated domains we can differentiate locally between what our theories and models say about the world, and whether what they say is correct or in need of some form of revision. Both conceptual understanding and its assessment nevertheless presuppose the kind of access to the world that antirealists deny and realists seek to secure.
​In the wake of these arguments, we should stop asking the questions to which realism or anti-realism would pose answers. Unless they can develop an adequate critical response to these arguments, realists must abandon any commitment to philosophical naturalism. They would instead share with their anti-realist opponents the need to defend their conceptions of scientific understanding with the recognition that these conceptions conflict with what the sciences have to say about our own conceptual capacities

They would instead share with their anti-realist opponents the need to defend their conceptions of scientific understanding with the recognition that these conceptions conflict with what the sciences have to say about our own conceptual capacities — Joshs

I guess much of the debate here has been getting stuck in this bog.

Is this from Rouse's paper, 'Beyond Realism and Antirealism ---At Last?'

These are tantalizing incomplete snippets - I wish I had time to read more.

There is no gap between how the world appears to us and how it “really” is for realists to overcome, — Joshs

That's demonstrably false, since there's tons of counterexamples where appearance didn't match reality. Arguably, philosophy got its start noting those differences. Ancient skeptics base many of their arguments on appearances varying. But certainly science has shown many times where appearance and reality differ.