You aren't forced onto a sports team though. How is this not a violation if you were? Even if it was seen as a benefit if you joined the team. Not only is it a violation of the individual by overlooking the very agent who this is affecting, but it is exactly the kind of aggressive paternalistic assumption I am talking about where another gets to decide for an individual what the conditions are for them (whether for a cause or otherwise). — schopenhauer1

Yup, giving birth to someone is to force that someone to play a/the game (of life). To that extent it (life) is an imposition.

Nevertheless, I can't shake off the feeling that not giving birth to someone who could've enjoyed life to the fullest (suppose his/her parents are super-rich) is also a privation. This too is an imposition of sorts.

Another point I want your views on is there's a likeness between antinatalism and abortion and we all know the latter has been equated to murder. Is antinatalism murder? At the very least it is a kind of preemptive euthanasia.

Anti-"antinatalism" does not entail pro-natalism. The "moral" arguments in favor of "antinatalism" proffered thus far have been neither valid nor persuasive.

Is antinatalism murder? — Agent Smith

Is exorcism murder? :halo:

At the very least it is a kind of preemptive euthanasia.

Like suicide is a kind of retroactive abortion ... :sweat:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/722428 :eyes:

Nevertheless, I can't shake off the feeling that not giving birth to someone who could've enjoyed life to the fullest (suppose his/her parents are super-rich) is also a privation. This too is an imposition of sorts. — Agent Smith

On what person is this imposing? A person could be born that likes a bike you could have bought them. Do you mourn that person who is not there to like the bike you bought? That would be odd indeed. Even if you did mourn it.. That is YOUR problem as an already existing person.. not the person who doesn't exist who didn't need the bike in the first place. Nor do you need to create that circumstance JUST BECAUSE you have some notion that it is necessary for them to experience liking the bike. Unfortunately, the case is you create a person who has a range of choices, harms, and unforeseen circumstances that you imposed on them, not just X positive experiences that that person would have liked had they lived out some utopia. All major assumptions for others.

Is antinatalism murder? — Agent Smith

No. How would it be?

At the very least it is a kind of preemptive euthanasia. — Agent Smith

Not really. Euthanasia entails someone exists and is already being harmed. It just leads to poor framing of it to mislead.

:lol:



Look at it from the angle of potential - once you recommend antinatalism for reasons such as the possibility of suffering, you'll also have to advise natalism for children who'll be happy. It's only fair to do so.

If you insist that with respect to antinatalism no one exists to be deprived of joy and hence my objection fails to pass muster, I'd be forced to respond likewise - no one exists to benefit from not being born into a life of pain. You can't have your cake and eat it too is what I mean. Be consistent and antinatalism has no leg go stsnd on, oui monsieur?

If existence can be imposed, so can nonexistence. A little gedanken experiment is in order. Imagine you know for certain that a child about to be bern will live an enchanted life, perfectly happy in every possible way. Would you not do your utmost to ensure the birth of this child? This demonstrates, in my humble opinion, that antinatalism too can be immoral.

If you insist that with respect to antinatalism no one exists to be deprived of joy and hence my objection fails to pass muster, I'd be forced to respond likewise - no one exists to benefit from not being born into a life of pain. You can't have your cake and eat it too is what I mean. Be consistent and antinatalism has no leg go stsnd on, oui monsieur? — Agent Smith

Go back to my response again and not just put out the same old non-identity argument which I have objected to many a time. You talked about someone not enjoying X. I explained the faulty reasoning for such thinking on mourning the bike that is missed by no one. As for your (separate red herring) non-identity argument (unrelated to that other point but seemingly thrown in there as yet another chance at this discussion), the collateral damage of imposition only goes one way- birth. The missed goods don't cause collateral damage (to that person that is supposed to miss out). It doesn't matter what you even judge the state of affairs as, no collateral damage took place. No "good" took place either, but think of that missed bike mourned by only you. Birth guarantees the collateral damage, no birth has no collateral damage. It only has you thinking about a missed opportunity.

Also, this is about impositions made on others behalf, not harms not had by non-existent people, oui? So is this sneaking in another argument into this particular one to pry open room for a red herring debate on the non-identity argument, or is it not understanding this particular claim which does not rely on non-existent people enjoying or not enjoying something?

Imagine you know for certain that a child about to be bern will live an enchanted life, perfectly happy in every possible way. Would you not do your utmost to ensure the birth of this child? This demonstrates, in my humble opinion, that antinatalism too can be immoral. — Agent Smith

In this universe do people live such a life, ever? If you bring in probabilities of some 1 trillionth chance we're done. I've stated many times that if life was someone's individualized utopia, then it's no longer an imposition.

I get where you're coming from - we already exchanged a few posts on the matter of the nonexistence-existence asymmetry.

To pick up where we left off, I agree I would do everything possible to prevent a mother from birthing a child who is going to end up in a boiling lava pit.

However, in the same vein as it were, would you prevent a child being born in heaven? No, you wouldn't, oui? In other word, if you're consistent and you should be, a possible person whose birth you prevented is, for certain, deprived of the happiness s/he would've experienced.

View it from the perspective of potential for enjoyment/suffering.

Poverty is hardship, but it does not necessarily entail suffering. Breaking your leg is hardship, but it does not necessarily entail suffering. — baker

You'll need to elaborate on that, though honestly what we call it may not be all that relevant.

What gives us the idea we have a right to make such a decision for someone else in the first place? — Tzeentch

Self-confidence, a "lust for life". — baker

Why would self-confidence suffice in the case of procreation, when it clearly does not suffice anywhere else in life?

To go back to the sky-diving example, if I push someone out of a plane being extremely confident that they'll enjoy it, but instead they crash into the ground, does my self-confidence make any difference as to the nature of what just happened?

However, in the same vein as it were, would you prevent a child being born in heaven? No, you wouldn't, oui? — Agent Smith

I've already answered this..

I've stated many times that if life was someone's individualized utopia, then it's no longer an imposition. — schopenhauer1

Since life does not offer a personalized utopia, it is creating major impositions onto someone else, so being that this existence is not that (and it's not even a debate that this existence is not that), it is an imposition.

This does bring up an analysis of the word "imposition". There are two ways it is used, and I think both are relevant here.

A) Imposition- foisting one's will onto another.
B) Imposition- creating a burden for another.

Both of these definitions can apply here. In the case of the utopia example, the absence of B makes the the case a bit murkier, but this existence never has a case where there is not B, it it wouldn't matter. In my argument I had three things here:

1) The range of choices are limited to the physical-cultural arrangements of this existence and circumstances of time and place. This was assumed to be an appropriate set of choices for another.

2) Known harms are assumed to be enough for others to endure.

3) Unknown harms are simply had by a person through collateral damage of being born. The parent knows there are unknowns but they can't say what they are.

2 and 3 are certainly a violation of B.

1 may seem to not be a violation of B, but besides just the fact one is imposing one's own will (A), the fact that the choices are limited to what existence currently has to offer, B is still relevant too in that the choices may not be wanted if otherwise one could choose so. A and B are violated in all three parts of the argument.

Well, if you've answered my question and you're still arguing for antinatalism, something's wrong. At the very least, I expect you to rethink your treatment of the nonexistence-existence asymmetry. Can you accommodate my objections and make the appropriate changes, please? Muchas gracias in advance.

Since life does not offer a personalized utopia, it is creating major impositions onto someone else, — schopenhauer1

Like the old Academic Skeptic's canard "since knowledge is never certain, there cannot be knowledge", to wit: if existing is not painless, then existing should not be reproduced (or prolonged). Let the perfect be the enemy of the good, huh? That'll show 'em ... :sweat:

since knowledge is never certain, there cannot be knowledge — 180 Proof

:fire:

Most interesting. — Ms. Marple

May the nonexistent god bless your nonexistent soul! :smile:

Since you haven’t addressed my arguments, no.

Red herring observation. Why should the conclusion be this imposition? You haven’t connected that. It’s just moral fiat. Do it cause you think so.

Oh yeah, riiiiiiiiight, "imposed" on an inexistent person? Look out, Frodo! :rofl:

Since you haven’t addressed my arguments, no. — schopenhauer1

Let's back up a little to the point where we seem to be on the same page. I would, like you would, do everything in my power to prevent the birth of a child in a lava pit.

My counter-question is will you, isn't it immoral, to stop the birth of a child in heaven?

If the potential for suffering matters (lava pit birth), the potential for happiness does too (heavenly birth). It is only fair that this is so.

If the potential for suffering matters (lava pit birth), the potential for happiness does it (heavenly birth). It is only fair that this is so. — Agent Smith

The asymmetry between harm and benefits. In this existence, it isn't a heaven, it comes with harms. Harms = Impositions (point B specifically.. the burdening of someone and A, foisting one's idea of what those burdens should be onto someone). A heaven, if it is so, would not have at the least B. So there is a category error between comparing heaven to this existence, which obviously isn't so..

What you end up doing is trying to make this statistics. It's not about probabilities but the rule of avoiding imposing unnecessary impositions on others. Or maybe more categorically-speaking, questioning the right to impose, or assume the harms, set of choices, etc. that others must encounter.

Suppose we do exist prior to birth as a human. What then? Would you not be depriving someone of joy by not letting him/her go to a fun-filled party ? Did Cinderella not cry in sorrow when her stepmom and stepsisters forbade her from attending the prince's ball?

Let's now look at the asymmetry due nonexistence:

Birthing a child is to impose one's will on a child even if it's well-thought-out.

Not birthing a child, on the other hand, isn't an imposition for only the living can be so (mis)treated.

Can you spot the error? Possible persons vs. Nonexistent persons! The T1000 in Terminator 1, had it succeeded in killing Sarah Connor, wouldn't have committed any crime against John Connor, the leader of the resistance, because John hadn't been conceived yet!

Suppose we do exist prior to birth as a human. What then? Would you not be depriving someone of joy by not letting him/her go to a fun-filled party ? — Agent Smith

While this supposition is obviously a bit of a stretch, I would say the following:

1). Just like the procreator has no right to decide for another they should play the game of life, neither does a person (who in this hypothetical exists prior to birth) have a right to demand it.

2). Life is not always a fun-filled party.

3). Since this ties into the earlier discussion, it's worth pointing out that even in this hypothetical, not procreating would not be depriving anyone of anything. The hypothetical person desires, and as a result of his desire suffers a lack. We don't create that lack.

An acorn, if nurtured, will grow into a oak tree [yes potential].

A stone, no matter what you do, will remain a stone [no potential].

That's why we treat acorns and stones differently.

Ok, sure.

But now turn that into something we can work with. Otherwise I'm left to guess what you think the implications are.

But now turn that into something we can work with. Otherwise I'm left to guess what you think the implications are. — Tzeentch

That is ground we've already covered mon ami!

For example, once certain people decided that the way to end their suffering was to kill all the Jews. And for at least some time, it worked. Per your formula, that _wasn't_ maladaptive.
— baker
Of course it was, and still is, maladaptive. They were mistaken and consequently acted on that mistake. — 180 Proof

Why was that maladaptive? Why were they mistaken?

Substantiate.

Poverty is hardship, but it does not necessarily entail suffering. Breaking your leg is hardship, but it does not necessarily entail suffering.
— baker

You'll need to elaborate on that, though honestly what we call it may not be all that relevant. — Tzeentch

Hardship and suffering are two different concepts.
Hardship (pain) are the external and bodily circumstances that a person is subject to: poverty, a broken leg.
Suffering is a possible (but not necessary) response to these cirumstances.


Or, as another poster put it:

Insofar as an existing person maladaptively interprets / relates to her environment, she suffers. — 180 Proof

What gives us the idea we have a right to make such a decision for someone else in the first place?
— Tzeentch

Self-confidence, a "lust for life".
— baker

Why would self-confidence suffice in the case of procreation, when it clearly does not suffice anywhere else in life?

I answered your question. Self-confidence, a "lust for life" are what gives a person the idea they have a right to procreate, ie. make such a decision for someone else in the first place.

To go back to the sky-diving example, if I push someone out of a plane being extremely confident that they'll enjoy it, but instead they crash into the ground, does my self-confidence make any difference as to the nature of what just happened?

No. But if you wouldn't be thusly confident, you wouldn't push that person out of the plane.

Self-confidence, a "lust for life" are what gives a person the idea they have a right to procreate, ie. make such a decision for someone else in the first place. — baker

A very literal answer to my question, but ok.

Does it suffice?

If we can justify making a major imposition on someone else based on self-confidence, then that would open the door for a whole slew of behaviors that most would consider immoral.

What if I push someone off a building because I was extremely confident they were suicidal and wanted to make an end to their life?

I'm still trying to articulate this more clearly, but I'd like to ask you, can you define what it is that makes not imposing harms from scratch (for someone else) more ethically relevant than not causing benefits from scratch (for someone else)?

I've explained it thus that for a potential person to exist (the procreative question whereby the effect is another life), not creating a life that has benefits for that person is not experienced by that person. However, creating a person that will be harmed/limited to a set of choices that they might not like, is going to be experienced. It is this that is relevant, despite the good that might come about.

Why is it that if someone already existed and I forced them to play my game of limitations and harms with some good, THAT would be roundly rejected, but if I created someone from scratch (let's say snapped my fingers) THAT is considered fine and dandy? What makes that difference? I think people are misconstruing the idea that a person GETS to experience in the FIRST PLACE as some sort of untold condition of goodness.. But I don't see that as relevant. Thoughts?

Anti-"antinatalism" does not entail pro-natalism. The "moral" arguments in favor of "antinatalism" proffered thus far have been neither valid nor persuasive. — 180 Proof

An argument can only be persuasive to someone, to a person. It cannot be objectively, suprapersonally persuasive.

The point is the choices are limited, the harms are known (and some unknown), and that there are immense assumptions being made for imposing them onto other people. — schopenhauer1

So what are you going to do about that?

So what are you going to do about that? — baker

Talk about it.

Why is it that if someone already existed and I forced them to play my game of limitations and harms with some good, THAT would be roundly rejected, but if I created someone from scratch (let's say snapped my fingers) THAT is considered fine and dandy? What makes that difference? I think people are misconstruing the idea that a person GETS to experience in the FIRST PLACE as some sort of untold condition of goodness.. But I don't see that as relevant. Thoughts? — schopenhauer1

As another poster suggested earlier in this discussion (in this or another thread), the actual issue is that existence itself is problematic.

Antinatalists (at least the variety one usually encounters in secular Western settings) don't go far enough in their criticism of procreation. It is existence itself they should be criticial of, not merely procreation.

Talk about it. — schopenhauer1

And talking about it accomplishes what?