Can anybody give an example of something being conscious and yet not aware at the same time? — Purple Pond

No, but for purposes of discussion, I think it's important to elaborate upon what "aware" means, and to recognise that from a clinical standpoint, "responsiveness" should probably also be included in a definition of consciousness.

Three types of human mind/body condition can be inferred from observation: consciousness, semi-consciousness, and non-consciousness. These conditions entail variations in awareness and responsiveness (fully aware and fully responsive, partially aware and partially responsive, unaware and unresponsive).

To be aware is to be perceptive, observant, and/or introspective. And to be responsive is to be receptive and/or reactive. The mind is variably aware, and the body is variably responsive.

I think you can be conscious but not aware in some states near sleep.Actually I have had the experience of being conscious of being asleep, very rarely - maybe once or twice. Also in meditation you can get into states where you're conscious but not conscious *of* anything, which almost fits that description.

In any case, I think 'being conscious' and 'being aware' are slightly different even if they overlap. I would think 'being conscious' means that your cognitive faculties are in order, that you know what is going on around you. A person who has just had a stroke may be aware in the sense that if you startle them they will show a startle reflex, but if you asked them who they are or what day of the week it is (standard diagnostics for stroke) then they may not be able to respond.

I think you can be conscious but not aware in some states near sleep.Actually I have had the experience of being conscious of being asleep, very rarely - maybe once or twice. Also in meditation you can get into states where you're conscious but not conscious *of* anything, which almost fits that description. — Wayfarer

I think these are good examples of semi-conscious activity (i.e., sleep, hypnagogia, trance). Other less obvious ones include daydream and flow.

It occurs to me that the expressions 'being aware of' and 'being conscious of' are clearly synonymous, whereas the noun 'awareness' and assumed distinctions from 'consciousness' seem popular in talk of psychology.

Both have an intentionalistic sense: you are (fully or partially) aware/conscious of something (i.e. awareness/consciousness is about something). Derivatively you might be able to be aware/conscious of the fact that you are aware or conscious of something (but not the awareness/consciousness itself, because the reference relation separates the awareness/consciousness from what it is of/about, and puts them on two different logical levels.

It occurs to me that the expressions 'being aware of' and 'being conscious of' are clearly synonymous, whereas the noun 'awareness' and assumed distinctions from 'consciousness' seem popular in talk of psychology. — jkop

It should be intuitively obvious that consciousness includes a mental component and a corporeal component. Cases in point: wakefulness, sleep, coma, etc.

This distinction serves as a basis for assessing disorders of consciousness (e.g., minimally conscious state, persistent vegetative state, chronic coma, etc.) and predicting life support outcomes, among other things.

I think you can be conscious but not aware in some states near sleep.Actually I have had the experience of being conscious of being asleep, very rarely - maybe once or twice. — Wayfarer

In other words, you were aware that you were asleep. How could you say that you're asleep if you didn't possess the knowledge that you were asleep, and how is it exactly that you acquire knowledge? How is it that you can say that you know anything? Awareness is simply information flow.

Also in meditation you can get into states where you're conscious but not conscious *of* anything, which almost fits that description. — Wayfarer

You're conscious/aware of meditating, no? How is it that you know that you're meditating?

In any case, I think 'being conscious' and 'being aware' are slightly different even if they overlap. I would think 'being conscious' means that your cognitive faculties are in order, that you know what is going on around you. A person who has just had a stroke may be aware in the sense that if you startle them they will show a startle reflex, but if you asked them who they are or what day of the week it is (standard diagnostics for stroke) then they may not be able to respond. — Wayfarer

You're simply talking about the different things we are aware of. We aren't aware of everything. Stroke patients would be aware of less, just like blind and deaf people.

Three types of human mind/body condition can be inferred from observation: consciousness, semi-consciousness, and non-consciousness. These conditions entail variations in awareness and responsiveness (fully aware and fully responsive, partially aware and partially responsive, unaware and unresponsive). — Galuchat

How do we know that those other parts aren't "conscious" in the sense that there is some form to the information being processed, and that there is some central executive "looking at" those forms and manipulating them for some meaning or purpose.

Consciousness seems to me to be some kind of information architecture. It is composed of all the various sensory impressions from our various sensory organs, and they all can appear at once. This seems to imply that the brain in a central nervous system is the central location where the information from the senses come together into a seemless model of the world, and it is this model that we reference in order to make any decision and perform any action.

Is a computer that uses face recognition by using an image of a face and then comparing the shape, angle and features of the face with what it has in it's memory so that it recognizes a face or doesn't, conscious/aware?

How do we know that those other parts aren't "conscious" in the sense that there is some form to the information being processed, and that there is some central executive "looking at" those forms and manipulating them for some meaning or purpose. — Harry Hindu

Great question. I can't answer it beyond saying that non-conscious activity could be the source of automatic thoughts and the primitive reflexes. It may also process forgotten memories. I would very much be interested in any current research on non-consciousness.

Consciousness seems to me to be some kind of information architecture. It is composed of all the various sensory impressions from our various sensory organs, and they all can appear at once. This seems to imply that the brain in a central nervous system is the central location where the information from the senses come together into a seemless model of the world, and it is this model that we reference in order to make any decision and perform any action. — Harry Hindu

I agree. Well said.

Is a computer that uses face recognition by using an image of a face and then comparing the shape, angle and features of the face with what it has in it's memory so that it recognizes a face or doesn't, conscious/aware? — Harry Hindu

Another great question. Automated facial recognition is probably a current technology. If a computer can simulate perception, observation and introspection, it satisfies my definition of awareness. At some point it becomes necessary to formulate general, inorganic, organic, and human definitions of consciousness.

I believe Block argues that something like this is possible and makes the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, though I don't recall the specifics (nor how or if he distinguishes between consciousness and awareness). He claims, I think, that one can be phenomenally conscious without having access to the phenomena; in other words, one can be conscious of the phenomena of experience without being aware of it, due to lack of access. If I recall correctly, I think he motivates such a view by appealing to certain scientific findings having to do with blindsight and other perceptual pathologies.

While not utterly ridiculous, I find this view pretty implausible; it seems to me that consciousness and awareness are too intimately connected for there to be one without the other (assuming that what we are talking about when talking about "consciousness" and "awareness" are two separate phenomena). When consciously experiencing the world, we seem to always be aware that we are doing so.

One might object in the following way: suppose you are sitting in a coffee shop and there is some drilling going on outside. The sound of the drilling eventually fades into the background noise forming the backdrop of your awareness, before falling from awareness entirely. When reminded of the ongoing construction work some time later, you notice again not only the sound of the drilling, but that you were in fact conscious of the sound all along -- you merely weren't aware of it, as your focus was taken up with other activities. The phenomena that is the sound of the drilling is there in your stream of consciousness all along without your being aware of its being so. We thus have consciousness without awareness.

I am not convinced by this example. When the drilling sound fades from our awareness, it fades from our conscious experience. When we are not aware of it, we are not conscious of it. When we are made aware of it, it is introduced (or reintroduced) to our consciousness. Whether or not consciousness and awareness are in fact distinct phenomena (and, if they are, what this distinction consists in) doesn't seem to make much a difference.

Cases of blindsight might be treated analogously. Persons with blindsight seem to react to things in their visual field that they are not aware of -- they claim to see or be aware of nothing, and are judged to be blind (in relevant parts of the visual field). In other words, they seem to be conscious of something in their visual field that they utterly unaware of. In my view, they are also not conscious of that something, either; what is likely occurring is some sort of entirely unconscious response, probably the effect of unconscious processing in some neural system that isn't compromised. It is that system that unconsciously responds to something lying outside of one's conscious awareness.

Another plausible explanation is that the possibility of their being consciousness (awareness) without awareness (consciousness) seems absurd because of the way consciousness tends to be characterized or defined, in that it seems to be often (and, perhaps, unintentionally) lumped together or identified with awareness when in fact it is not; perhaps the two are utterly distinct (though highly correlated). Because this thought just occurred to me, however, I haven't had the time to flesh it out and consider it in detail.

When consciously experiencing the world, we seem to always be aware that we are doing so. — JulianMau

I don't think so. I may be aware of my experiences when I have them, but I am not also
aware of the fact that I am having experiences. That sort of awareness requires an extra act of introspection which IMO we don't always exercise at every moment in our lives. So, for example, I may be having a red visual experience, but that does not necessarily mean that I have the thought that I am having a red visual experience.

Consciousness seems to me to be some kind of information architecture. It is composed of all the various sensory impressions from our various sensory organs, and they all can appear at once. This seems to imply that the brain in a central nervous system is the central location where the information from the senses come together into a seemless model of the world, and it is this model that we reference in order to make any decision and perform any action. — Harry Hindu

Statements are compositions of words, and beliefs about the world are models of the world, but consciousness...? I don't think consciousness is a composition, nor a model, of anything but a capacity to identify and use objects and their compositions (including representations and models of them).

It should be intuitively obvious that consciousness includes a mental component and a corporeal component. Cases in point: wakefulness, sleep, coma, etc. — Galuchat

How is it obvious? What's an example of evidence for the idea that consciousness is a composition?

Kinda of a tricky question. I think conscious awareness suggests a manner of being conscious, and not separate or identical brain states. We are always conscious, but we are not always aware of it in the same manner. Even in a deep sleep our body keeps us going, it is aware of itself and makes all the necessary adjustments to keep us going, which I think is also a form of consciousness.

If we understand consciousness as "intentionality," that is: "being conscious 'of'" an object, then clearly we are conscious of a lot more than we're aware.

For example, I have been "conscious of" a loud ticking sound outside for a long time now, but didn't realize it until just now. Likewise, if a large buzzing sound continued for some time and then suddenly stopped, I didn't "just now become conscious of it," even though I didn't realize it was there until it stopped.

We don't find only one intentional object amongst a field of vague sense data, but an entire horizon of intentional objects, some of which we aren't attentively focused on.

For example, I have been "conscious of" a loud ticking sound outside for a long time now, but didn't realize it until just now. Likewise, if a large buzzing sound continued for some time and then suddenly stopped, I didn't "just now become conscious of it," even though I didn't realize it was there until it stopped. — Colin B

You're conscious/aware of meditating, no? — Harry Hindu

In classical Buddhist literature, there is a classificatory system of the eight stages of jhana (meditative absorption). The four higher stages are described in terms of 'neither perception nor non-perception' i.e. awareness of external factors is diminished or attenuated but there is awareness of what are described as 'formless' (arupa) states. (I should add, I have never undergone such an experience.)

Similarly in the yoga sutras there are descriptions of states such as 'nirvikalpa samadhi' which means something like 'contentless consciousness' (nir- is a negative particle, 'vikalpa' is a 'discriminative thought formation'. Although with a name like 'Harry Hindu', perhaps you know that already. ;-) )

Nirvikalpa samādhi, on the other hand, absorption without self-consciousness, is a mergence of the mental activity (cittavṛtti) in the Self, to such a degree, or in such a way, that the distinction (vikalpa) of knower, act of knowing, and object known becomes dissolved — as waves vanish in water, and as foam vanishes into the sea.

(From Wikipedia)

There are scientific attempts to study such states through fMRI:



However as an essential characteristic of such states is their first-person nature, it is likely that their real nature will remain out of reach for the natural sciences.

f we understand consciousness as "intentionality," that is: "being conscious 'of'" an object, then clearly we are conscious of a lot more than we're aware. — Colin B

Right. Consciousness is a hierarchical matrix, with discursive awareness being the topmost level, but discursive awareness is underpinned by many activities which are subliminal, subconscious and/or unconscious. We're obviously not directly aware of those factors as they are prior to what we are conscious of, i.e. they form the actual basis of conscious awareness, rather than being objects of consciousness, as such.

Consciousness is a hierarchical matrix, with discursive awareness being the topmost level, but discursive awareness is underpinned by many activities which are subliminal, subconscious and/or unconscious. — Wayfarer

I agree. The terms conscious, semi-conscious, and non-conscious are convenient for classifying types (or aspects) of mental activity, and provide a convenient framework for discussion, but they are not mutually exclusive categories.

If you define consciousness as the sum total of an individual's current mental activity (the Spotlight Model subscribed by most cognitive theories), it can be measured on a continuum between fully aware/responsive, partially aware/responsive, and unaware/unresponsive. Then the operation of any particular activity (e.g., attention) may be described as varying between a controlled (conscious) and automatic (semi-conscious) process.

By extension, inference could be measured on a continuum between induction/deduction/abduction (controlled processing) and the application of heuristics (automatic processing).

The activation of processing type (controlled and/or automatic) depends on the exigencies of a situation. Immediate decision-making requires semi-conscious, automatic processing. Delayed decision-making permits conscious, controlled processing. Both are employed in daydreaming (creative thinking), with or without meta-awareness.

However as an essential characteristic of such states is their first-person nature, it is likely that their real nature will remain out of reach for the natural sciences. — Wayfarer

That's another aspect of consciousness that many refer to - that first person nature, or the subjectivity. But doesn't that also seem to be an integral part of being aware? What is aware, and of what? Doesn't being aware entail some kind of exchange of information, which is what gives us the feeling of "aboutness"? Some people call this "intentionality" but I think that term should be reserved solely for attentional aspect of consciousness where certain parts are amplified or suppressed based on the present goal.

Subjectivity is simply a unique information architecture, or model, of some part of the world relative to some location in the world. That location that everything is located relative to in space-time is the "self". If there were no content then I can see how one would lose the sense of "self". You'd lose that relativeness, or subjectivity. But something we've learned is that if deprived of content for too long, the mind fills it with it's own content. People undergoing sensory deprivation tend to hallucinate.