You can share an understanding and not know that you share an understanding. And at least on the non-solipsist's end he must admit to a known shared understanding. So it would be hypocritical of the non-solipsist to demand of the solipsist what he won't demand of himself. — Michael

What hypocrisy? I don't see why the non-solipsist would not "demand it of himself", or admit to a known shared understanding of the word "exist". But if the solipsist admits to it, then...see my previous post.

The 'we' is 'deeper' or more 'primordial' than the (linguistic) 'I.' — Pie

Yet, it was an “I” from which that notion of primordial is given. If the other way around, how come “we” is at the top of the second column of pronouns, while “I” is at the top of the first?

If the (linguistic) “I”, what qualifies the “we”? What is a linguistic “I” anyway?

What hypocrisy? I don't see why the non-solipsist would not "demand it of himself", or admit to a known shared understanding of the word "exist". But if the solipsist admits to it, then...see my previous post. — Luke

The non-solipsist says "it is possible to know that other minds and mind-independent objects exist".
The solipsist replies with "it is impossible to know that other minds and mind-independent objects exist".
The non-solipsist then says "but what does it mean to exist"?

Why is the non-solipsist asking that? Presumably he knows, or has some notion of, what it means to exist which is why he claims that it is possible to know that other minds and mind-independent objects exist.

Anyway, all I have been trying to do here is explain that the claim "it is impossible to know that other minds and mind-independent objects exist" is different to the claim "no proposition is truth-apt". The solipsist claims the former, not the latter, contrary to @Pie's misrepresentation.

Yet, it was an “I” from which that notion of primordial is given. — Mww

This is a deep issue, so I don't pretend to have some final theory. That said, as a start, I think it's incoherent to deny that concepts are public, for how or why should I trust that I understand what you 'intend' 'behind' the concepts 'privately'?

Language is tribal software. I don't deny that the individual organism is necessary as a host for this software. It's dance we do together. The 'I' is (roughly) a token used for scorekeeping.

Anyway, all I have been trying to do here is explain that the claim "it is impossible to know that other minds and mind-independent objects exist" is different to the claim "no proposition is truth-apt". The solipsist claims the former, not the latter, contrary to Pie's misrepresentation. — Michael

I grant that we can both interpret terms so that either of us is right.

I've tried to argue that epistemological solipsism is 'toothless' if understood in a way that makes it (more) coherent. It's either a claim about knowledge as a pubic, self-transcending concept (a feature of the external world it pretends to doubt), or it's just about (paradoxical) private concepts.

The notion of "other minds" requires a degree of inference that comes after self-recognition. To understand that other people have minds you must first understand that you have a mind. — Michael

I doubt that in turn. To the degree that this is an empirical question, I defer to more serious students. But my prejudice is that differentiation is learned.

A typical example of this is a teenager finally getting around to questioning tribal norms. Another is just the philosopher who builds on and even turns against the common sense that makes him intelligible to his fellows in the first place...such as a reasonable theory of sense organs and sensations being extended to doubting the existence of those very organs, promoting meanwhile those sensations to the given and indubitable itself.

Central to the solpisism subissue here is that of whether concepts are public or private. I claim it's incoherent to say they are not public.

"Concepts are private !"
"What's that you say ? I can only guess that you mean that the telephones on Neptune are made with real butter. "

Central to the solpisism subissue here is that of whether concepts are public or private. I claim it's incoherent to say they are not public. — Pie

If that were the case then we wouldn't have to ask people what they mean. We wouldn't have to ask them to clarify their position. There wouldn't be misunderstanding. Why did you ask me what it means to exist if existence is a public concept?

Why did you ask me what it means to exist if existence is a public concept? — Michael

How did you ask me why I asked you what it means to exist if existence isn't a public concept?

There wouldn't be misunderstanding. — Michael

If no one is wrong, no one is right. There wouldn't be misunderstanding. Just screeching primates who could no longer coordinate their doings in the world.

If that were the case then we wouldn't have to ask people what they mean. — Michael

Concepts need not be perfectly definite. Roughly speaking, they are patterns in what we do. We perform concepts. Away from practical life, such performances are less rote. It's not so clear which inferences ought to be licensed in terms of them. Tentative, exploratory uses compete for wider assimilation.

It's as if you are saying there is no law unless the law is so perfectly unambiguous and final that it does not require continuing interpretation and adjustment.

Why did you ask me why I asked you what it means to exist if existence isn't a public concept? — Pie

I asked you because the inner workings of your mind are private and I need to you publicly express them.

So why did you ask me?

If no one is wrong, no one is right. There wouldn't be misunderstanding. Just screeching primates who could no longer coordinate their doings in the world.

Concepts need not be perfectly definite. Roughly speaking, they are patterns in what we do. We perform concepts. Away from practical life, performances are less rote. Tentative, exploratory uses compete for wider assimilation. — Pie

I don't quite know what you mean here (quite nicely proving my point).

What I'm trying to get at is this: let's say that you and I agree to meet up at the gym. I then have to cancel. We then never realize that we misunderstood which gym we were to meet up at; I thought the one on the east side of town, you thought the one on the west.

There's stuff that goes on in our head that is never made public.

I asked you because the inner workings of your mind are private and I need to you publicly express them. — Michael

The 'important' part of my mind, as I see it, is the thinking, linguistic part. 'My' version of green doesn't matter, but my use of 'green' does. Even my secret use of 'green' in private inferences is manifest eventually in public assertions and the way I react to others' talk.

What is it that makes an individual valuable and interesting to the tribe ?

Let's say that you and I agree to meet up at the gym. I then have to cancel. We then never realize that we misunderstood which gym we were to meet up at; I thought the one on the east side of town, your on the west.

There's stuff that goes on in our head that is never made public. — Michael

I don't object to the ordinary version of privacy. But note that both of us can be explained in terms of unexpressed beliefs attributed to us. Our driving or not to the gym is explained by our beliefs. They are in the same explanatory nexus. (We could also explain beliefs by sense organs being exposed to photons.) Private meanings (metaphysically private meanings, hidden from public concepts) do not make sense for this role...or any role, except as a mystified X marks the not, for there can be nothing to say about them.)

The 'important' part of my mind, as I see it, is the thinking, linguistic part. — Pie

So whether or not someone is lying or being honest isn't important? It doesn't matter what they think or feel, only what they say and do? That seems quite psychopathic if I'm being honest. I don't just want my partner to "go through the motions" of a loving relationship.

'My' version of green doesn't matter, but my use of 'green' does. Even my secret use of 'green' in private inferences is manifest eventually in public assertions the way I react to others' talk. — Pie

Doesn't matter to what? To the practicalities of everyday life? Sure. But the philosophical questions regarding perception and ethics and epistemology and realism and so on can still be worth discussing, and likely have true and false answers.

At the moment your position amounts to saying that solipsism might be true but doesn't affect how I (or we) live.

I don't know what you mean here. — Michael

What happens if we drop the assumption that concepts are something immaterial ? And along with that the whole material/immaterial distinction ? We can grant a sort of continuum. We don't have to pretend to forget ordinary uses of 'material' or 'mental.' But, as philosophers, we can try to consider the evolution of this distinction as an historical contingency, as a metaphor that became so dominant in a conversation that questioning it was literally unintelligible at first, except by a few weirdos. I take Wittgenstein, Hegel, Derrida, and others to have questioned it, shown its flaws.

So whether or not someone is lying or being honest isn't important? It doesn't matter what they think or feel, only what they say and do? — Michael

Of course it matters. We can both speak with the vulgar and think with the wise.

Note please that what people think is still linguistic.

Perhaps 'feeling is first,' but justification is going to involve reports or ascription of feelings, typically used as the premises or conclusions of inferences. 'John's mad because Sally lost the car keys again.'

That seems quite psychopathic if I'm being honest. I don't just want my partner to "go through the motions" of a loving relationship. — Michael

You should of course infer then that you misunderstand me. Read charitably, friend. Please.

Doesn't matter to what? To the practicalities of everyday life? Sure. But the philosophical questions regarding perception and ethics and epistemology and realism and so on can still be worth discussing, and likely have true and false answers.

At the moment your position amounts to saying that solipsism might be true but doesn't affect how I (or we) live. — Michael

No, sir, that's not at all the point. I like philosophy. Practicality be damned ! But getting to the truth about these concepts requires considering their origin in practical life. We need bread and government before the priests have the leisure to talk about talk about talk.

Of course it matters, in the ordinary lingo. We can both speak with the vulgar and think with the wise.
Note please that what people think is still linguistic.

Perhaps 'feeling is first,' but justification is going to involve reports or ascription of feelings, typically used as the premises or conclusions of inferences. 'John's mad because Sally lost the car keys again.' — Pie

The point is that the thinking, feeling part is private. Such thoughts and feelings might be expressed, but the private thoughts and feelings nonetheless exist and are prior to the public expression.

And given the concept of lying, we cannot know that someone's public expressions are an accurate representation of their private thoughts and feelings. We often assume it, and might even often be correct, but skepticism is warranted all the same. From the understanding that we cannot know what someone's private thoughts and feelings are there can then be the understanding that we cannot know that someone has private thoughts and feelings. They might just be a philosophical zombie, engaging in the same public behaviour and making the same public expressions as a thinking, feeling person.

Such thoughts and feelings might be expressed, but the private thoughts and feelings nonetheless exist and are prior to the public expression. — Michael

This is just the ghost story that Ryle mostly demolishes...the idea that the self is hidden behind everything it does. To be sure, we sometimes 'talk to ourselves.' No one denies this. But recall that it was an accomplishment once to read silently. We come at the end of a long development, and we are tempted to put the result at the beginning.

Your view (implicitly) takes lying as prototypical rather than anomalous, features the "seems" operator as if it came before simple assertion. I think Sellars has shown that this doesn't work, that 'seems that P' depends on the grammar of the simpler assertion 'P.'

From the understanding that we cannot know what someone's private thoughts and feelings are there can then be the understanding that we cannot know that someone has private thoughts and feelings. They might just be a philosophical zombie, engaging in the same public behaviour and making the same public expressions as a thinking, feeling person. — Michael

:up:

Recall that I said earlier that the P-zombie is the shadow cast by the ghost story. What, sir, is this mysterious X that separates the convincing P-zombie from the genuine article?

"There is a there there," I swear I swear I swear. "I know it but I cannot say." We are reduced to a minimal mysticism, a negative theology of Being.

I think it's incoherent to deny that concepts are public...... — Pie

The use of them is public, as a means to an end. The origin of them cannot be public, iff they are the product of an individual intelligence.

That named things are given to us as a matter of course, from the day we individually began learning what things are, obscures the fact that, originally, nothing already named was ever given to anybody.

The implications were obvious to the ancients, merely uncomfortable for the post-moderns, who would prefer to be told this thing is a basketball, rather than think about how it came to be one.
————

how or why should I trust that I understand what you 'intend' 'behind' the concepts 'privately'? — Pie

You first need to grasp the categorical error of conjoining what you understand, with what I intend, upon which is found trust has nothing to do with it. You understand, or you do not, regardless of what I intend, which reduces to similarities in experience, and nothing more, insofar as the mechanisms of our respective intelligences are sufficiently similar, if not exactly identical, to each other.
————

Concepts need not be perfectly definite. — Pie

Yes, they do, otherwise, logical systems, and therefore human knowledge, is impossible. How the concept is represented.....the name assigned to it......may be contingent, but that which is named, is perfectly definite. If this were not the case, then a square circle could be an object of experience.
————

The 'important' part of my mind, as I see it, is the thinking, linguistic part. — Pie

There is no thinking linguistic part; there is the thinking part, and the linguistic part, from which arises the old adage, “think before you speak”, or, “for that which you don’t know you cannot speak”.
————

We’re so inescapably surrounded by people, that we’ve forgotten ourselves.

Solipsists don't make such a claim though. Epistemological solipsists only say that we can't know that there are other minds and ontological solipsists say that "there are other minds" is false.

This was my point in the other thread - since this thread seem to be talking about the same thing.

What, sir, is this mysterious X that separates the convincing P-zombie from the genuine article? — Pie

The private thoughts and feelings and perceptual sensations that might go unexpressed, or that can be contrary to the expression (i.e in the case of lying).

Again consider the example of a genuine loving relationship compared to a convincing act.

The use of them is public, as a means to an end. The origin of them cannot be public, iff they are the product of an individual intelligence. — Mww

But I dispute very much that they are the product of an individual intelligence. Even the idea of an individual intelligence is problematic. I don't mean that a man can't write poetry in the woods. I mean that language is tribal software that an individual keeps with him.

The implications were obvious to the ancients, merely uncomfortable for the post-moderns, who would prefer to be told this thing is a basketball, rather than think about how it came to be one. — Mww

A strange claim ! The pomo cool kids love genealogies. Also, FWIW, much of my thinking in this thread was inspired by the self-contradiction I found in pomo. "Communication is impossible." "There is no truth." Blah blah self-subversion.

Yes, they do, otherwise, logical systems, and therefore human knowledge, is impossible. How the concept is represented.....the name assigned to it......may be contingent, but that which is named, is perfectly definite. — Mww

I consider this an extravagant claim. P, else squares are circular ! I'm no stranger to pure math, and I'll grant that, in this tiny corner of human life, we have relatively exact concepts. But that's because we've invented a beautiful formal game, a realm atypically subject to precise law, a generalization of chess.

Please Pie - My final time, and I'm shocked no one gets this. Explain the existence of other minds without begging the conclusion. Tell me in a way that doesn't presuppose other minds in the premise. Without using words like social, you and me, communication which all imply other minds, which you still haven't proven in the first place.

I'm begging you!

There is no thinking linguistic part; there is the thinking part, and the linguistic part, from which arises the old adage, “think before you speak”, or, “for that which you don’t know you cannot speak”. — Mww

As I see it, and I don't intend rudeness, you merely assert the old, 'theological' tale of Forms. I don't claim that thoughts and language are strictly equivalent. We can postulate nonlinguistic thoughts as we can postulate neutrinos...and see whether the theory is useful. But 'self-evident' non-linguistic thoughts sounds like mysticism. We might as well claim to hear the voice of God directly...or witness the flicker of an Inner Light.

Without using, social, you and me, communication which all imply other minds, which you still haven't proven in the first place. — GLEN willows

The concept of 'proof' already drags in a world of folks who share a language in which they can make claims which might be wrong.

Don't expect us to prove you aren't dreaming. That's a different issue. People are known to dream. I vaguely remember asking myself in a dream once whether I was dreaming.

Again consider the example of a genuine loving relationship compared to a convincing act. — Michael

I totally get that, but that's a tangent, an exception. By your account, I can't know that my wife loves me. For her 'true' self is 'behind' all the nice things she does. Is it not better to say that we are constituted by all we do and say ? That the self is what the body does and says and the way its tracked by a community for honesty, decency, creativity, productivity ? What is objectivity? Why reason toward consensus at all ? Defer to the better reason ? Is philosophy not anti-self inasmuch as the self is the stubborn, selfish, superstitious child with no regard for the good of the tribe?

The concept of 'proof' already drags in a world of folks who share a language in which they can make claims which might be wrong.

You did it again. Obviously your belief is that no solipsistic one-mind existence could ever contain the illusion of a language, communication and conversations. I think we've hit the nub of it. You see I do think it's possible for it ALL to be an illusion, and you haven't proven it impossible.