"For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist." — charles ferraro
is an impersonal "thought-in-general" the ontological precondition for the existence of the "I," — charles ferraro
But, perhaps, the most fundamental question of all is whether the occurrence of my "thinking" and of my "existing" is vulnerable, or invulnerable, to the possibility of complete cessation? — charles ferraro
"is an impersonal "thought-in-general" the ontological precondition for the existence of the "I,"
— charles ferraro — charles ferraro
Do you mean, is his soul the thinking thing? Dues Ex Machina? Descartes thought so, yes! He located the soul in the pineal gland! — counterpunch
But, perhaps, the most fundamental question of all is whether the occurrence of my "thinking" and of my "existing" is vulnerable, or invulnerable, to the possibility of complete cessation? — charles ferraro
For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist. — Descartes
...a more adequate and more complete version of the truth would be expressed by the phrase: "Cogito contingenter, ergo Sum contingenter." The: When and while I am thinking contingently (in the first person, present tense mode), I must be existing contingently." — charles ferraro
In conclusion, because of their contingent natures, the true significance of Descartes' Cogito and even of his indubitably certain Sum, is their inherent existential tenuousness and triviality — charles ferraro
Clearly, Descartes considered his personal thinking, his Cogito, to be an inherently contingent occurrence because it was always open and vulnerable to the possibility of complete cessation. — charles ferraro
Without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am and that I know and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, “What if you are deceived?” For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? For it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know. And when I love these two things, I add to them a certain third thing, namely, my love, which is of equal moment. For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; though even if these were false, it would still be true that I loved false things. — St Augustine, City of God
What you say sounds correct to me. — Bartricks
Thanks Bartricks! You understood my point. — charles ferraro
What I have argued for, WHILE ALWAYS SIMULTANEOUSLY SUBSCRIBING TO THE INDUBITABLY CERTAIN INTUITIVE TRUTH OF THE COGITO SUM... — charles ferraro
. . . the true significance of Descartes' Cogito and even of his indubitably certain Sum, is their inherent existential tenuousness and triviality. — charles ferraro
Thanks Wayfarer — charles ferraro
Of course. Whatever philosophy Descartes devised, it's always is reference to RCC doctrine. The moment one divorces Descartes' thoughts from the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, is the moment when they're rendered trivial.In conclusion, because of their contingent natures, the true significance of Descartes' Cogito and even of his indubitably certain Sum, is their inherent existential tenuousness and triviality. — charles ferraro
Traditionally, a necessary being had its originating cause situated within itself, but a contingent being had its originating cause situated outside itself in another, higher being. — charles ferraro
So any knowledge based upon it would be indubitably certain, but also be equally as contingent. — charles ferraro
In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is.
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