What do normative/moral terms mean on a realist construal?

Cartesian trigger-puppets

Normative/moral terms are meaningless to me from a realist construal. Not to use ‘meaningless‘ as a rhetorical pejorative, but rather in good faith as in a non-cognitive sense. I am unable to form a concept from the purported meanings of moral realist terms, and they likewise are unable to successfully convey their purported meanings to me. I can only make sense of normative/moral terms from an anti realist construal. To better explain, consider the following example sentences with normative/moral terms italicized.

1. The heart is functioning properly
2. Shoplifting is wrong

Now, by ‘anti realist,’ I simply mean that I interpret such terms to be stance-dependent (to be referring to the desires of an agent or regarding an established standard). In other words, sentence 1 seems to be saying that the heart is doing what it ought to be doing with regard to a medical standard; whereas sentence 2 seems to be saying that the act of stealing goes against the desires of the sentence’s author.

The problem is: to say that the heart is functioning properly or that the act of stealing is wrong, but in a stance-independent way (not referring to a subjects desires or an established standard), seems to me to be positing some kind of spooky metaphysics into the dialectic. What else is there besides desires and standards? Intuition? Reciprocal altruism? These are inconsistent, arbitrary and unreliable. Without a successfully conveyed meaning of these terms, not only am i not able to grant that the sentence is true—I am not able to grant that the sentence is even propositional. To me, its like saying “Stealing is blah-blah-blah” and without understanding the meaning of the terms the sentence could be false, non propositional or vacuous. Imagine analogously if I were to say “This stone is big” but instead of using the adjective ‘big’ in a relational way (an object is big only relative to another object), I instead claim that the stone actually has non-relational bigness. Would that make sense to you? You would likely wonder what it is that I am referring to, and fail to form a conception.

If any moral realist here wants to help out by conveying their meanings and interpretations of such terms, I would be interested to hear you. Also, one last thing. Oftentimes while in this discussion amongst more uncharitable moral realists, attempts are often made at exposing a reductio on my position. I will be asked such questions as: “Was the holocaust good?” in effort to show an absurdity in my position by my responding “For the Nazi, yes”—however, and please remember, that under my interpretation, to say that ‘something is good’ is just to say that ‘it corresponds with some agents desires’. Therefore, to say that ‘the holocaust was good for the Nazi’ is simply to say that ‘the holocaust corresponds with the desires of the Nazi’—it becomes a tautology.

180 Proof

For my filthy lucre ...

Norms are procedural, not representational; they either (mostly) work or they don't, which is a fact (J. Searle ~ institutional facts). The traditional construal of "moral realism" is incoherent insofar as it's premised on the category error of conflating the procedural with the representational. And "error theory" likewise is incoherent for running with this "moral realist" premise claiming it is false and thereby concluding from this that moral statements are categorically false or meaningless. Logical Positivism by another name. The consequences of using norms – practices – are real (i.e. have inescapable impacts on matters of fact). Norms are practices, not just pictures (Witty).

YMMV.

Cartesian trigger-puppets

↪180 Proof

Thats all quite interesting. Im not committing to a particular metaethical view. I only mention normative and moral terms to refer to the terms used in the example sentences. Im not saying that the statements are indeed true, false or meaningless — Im withholding judgment until I actually understand what the realist is referring to, if not a stance-dependent construal as I am.

I am merely asking what you are referring to when you say ‘X is good’ or ‘Y is bad’.

Banno

↪180 Proof

Yep. Perhaps the direction of fit for realism is changing the words to fit the world, but for ethics it's changing the world to fit the words.

Cartesian trigger-puppets

↪180 Proof

For example, would you say that the holocaust was bad? If yes, are you saying that it was bad because the things that happened there go against your desires? Or, the desires of those afflicted? Was it bad independent from any desires?

Cartesian trigger-puppets

I just don’t understand how we can assess the truth value of a sentence when there is a term that we do not understand… The words we use must succeed in transferring our concepts to one another in order for us to continue tracking the conversation.

Isaac

What else is there besides desires and standards? Intuition? Reciprocal altruism? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Language?

Shoplifting is wrong because it's the sort of thing we use the word 'wrong' for.

Banno

I just don’t understand how we can assess the truth value of a sentence when there is a term that we do not understand… — Cartesian trigger-puppets

"2+2=4 or Spoigle is a blothik" is true.

Pie

"2+2=4 or Spoigle is a blothik" is true. — Banno

:up:

Pie

↪Cartesian trigger-puppets

I could be getting you wrong but....What norms compel you to found your norms in terms of atoms and void ?

Cartesian trigger-puppets

↪Isaac

Language? — Isaac

What is it our language is attempting to capture? Whats the referent?

Shoplifting is wrong because it's the sort of thing we use the word 'wrong' for. — Isaac

That answer is a tautology (essentially): Shoplifting is wrong because we use the word ‘wrong’ to describe ‘wrong acts’ and shoplifting is one of those ‘wrong acts.’

Isaac

What is it out language is attempting to capture? Whats the referent? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Why need there be one?

we use the word ‘wrong’ to describe ‘wrong acts’ and shoplifting is one of those ‘wrong acts.’ — Cartesian trigger-puppets

We don't use the word 'wrong' to describe wrong acts. We use the word 'wrong' to describe some acts and not others. You're assuming there's some strict property we're identifying by that use but you've given no reason why you think there is. Why can we not use the word vaguely, or contextually, or without the other person completely understanding what we mean?

Cartesian trigger-puppets

↪Pie

atoms and void? Democritus? Yeah, i don’t understand.

Cartesian trigger-puppets

We don't use the word 'wrong' to describe wrong acts. We use the word 'wrong' to describe some acts and not others. You're assuming there's some strict property we're identifying by that use but you've given no reason why you think there is. Why can we not use the word vaguely, or contextually, or without the other person completely understanding what we mean? — Isaac

I just rearranged your statement so to make it clear that it was tautological. That is not my view.

Isaac

I just rearranged your statement so to make it clear that it was tautological. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

It's not tautologous. We use the word 'wrong' to describe certain behaviours, shoplifting is one of them. There's nothing tautologous about that claim.

Pie

↪Cartesian trigger-puppets

TLDR : Justifying or asking others to justify norms-in-general is absurd.

Cartesian trigger-puppets

↪Pie

Im not justifying norms. Im asking what moral or normative terms mean on a realist construal.

Michael

Language?

Shoplifting is wrong because it's the sort of thing we use the word 'wrong' for. — Isaac

This wouldn’t be moral realism though.

Isaac

This wouldn’t be moral realism though. — Michael

Are languages not real?

I'm using this definition of moral realism, by the way...

Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

It is a fact that shoplifting is one of the behaviours we use words like immoral in connection with. Therefore the moral claim "shoplifting is not moral" reports a fact, the fact that shoplifting is not one the behaviours we use the word 'moral' in connection with.

Michael

↪Isaac

Moral realists claim that there are objective moral facts. Your account makes for morality to be a linguistic convention which would be a kind of moral relativism.

Isaac

Im asking what moral or normative terms mean on a realist construal. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

If you ask "what does 'tree' mean" would you expect an answer other than just to point to a tree and say "It's one of those"? why would you expect the answer to "what does 'moral' mean" to be any different than to point to moral acts and say "it's one of those"?

Isaac

Moral realists claim that there are objective moral fact. — Michael

The meaning of a word in a language is objective. We don't all have our own personal meanings, we couldn't talk if that were the case.

Cartesian trigger-puppets

Shoplifting is wrong because it's the sort of thing we use the word 'wrong' for. — Isaac

This is not a tautology?

Im asking what is the meaning (metaethics) of good or bad (right or wrong). You respond with a tautological argument. Look, your believes are:

We use the word ‘wrong’ to describe things like shoplifting.

Shoplifting is wrong.

You answer a tangential question “Why is shoplifting wrong?” (Which is the same as asking “Why do we use the word ‘wrong’ to describe things like shoplifting.”) by answering, essentially, “Because shoplifting is wrong.” It is wrong because it is wrong. Tautology.

Michael

The meaning of a word in a language is objective. We don't all have our own personal meanings, we couldn't talk if that were the case. — Isaac

That has no bearing on what moral realists mean.

Isaac

Shoplifting is wrong because it's the sort of thing we use the word 'wrong' for. — Isaac

This is not a tautology? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

No. It could be otherwise. It could be that shoplifting is wrong because God said so, regardless of whether entire language communities use the word 'right' in connection with it. Since it could be otherwise, the claim is not tautologous.

You answer a tangential question “Why is shoplifting wrong?” (Which is the same as asking “Why do we use the word ‘wrong’ to describe things like shoplifting.”) by answering, essentially, “Because shoplifting is wrong.” — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Read again what I've written. Nowhere have I answered the question "why is shoplifting wrong?" by saying "because it's wrong". I've said it's wrong because it's one of the behaviours we use the word 'wrong' in connection with.

This could not be the case. It could be the case that it's wrong for some other reason. Hence the claim is not tautologous.

It's like Wittgenstein's 'game'. Why do we call some things 'games'? There's no single reason other than "because they are members of a group of things we use the word 'game' in connection with"

Isaac

That has no bearing on what moral realists mean. — Michael

You said moral realists believe morality relates to objective facts. Being part of a group of behaviours associated with a particular word is an objective fact. If you mean to claim some additional criteria for moral realism, then state it.

Cartesian trigger-puppets

If you ask "what does 'tree' mean" would you expect an answer other than just to point to a tree and say "It's one of those"? why would you expect the answer to "what does 'moral' mean" to be any different than to point to moral acts and say "it's one of those"? — Isaac

Either it is subjective (mind dependent) or objective (mind independent) like your tree. On a realist construal, moral good and bad are things of the world—they are a thing or property of the world. Again, like your tree. So, yeah, point to the property something has to have to be considered ‘wrong’.

Isaac

On a realist construal, moral good and bad are things of the world—they are a thing or property of the world. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

How is language not part of the world? An entire community of real people really use the word 'wrong' in association with the behaviour shoplifting. That's a fact about the world. It's objective. It's not the case only if I think it is, and I can be wrong about it.

Isaac

point to the property something has to have to be considered ‘wrong’. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

But that's not equivalent at all. I wouldn't point to the property that a tree has to be considered a tree. I'd just point to the tree.

Michael

You said moral realists believe morality relates to objective facts. Being part of a group of behaviours associated with a particular word is an objective fact. If you mean to claim some additional criteria for moral realism, then state it. — Isaac

Moral realists claim that moral facts are objective in the sense that the speed of light and the existence of Mercury are objective. They don't claim that they are objective in the sense that the legality of marrying a 16 year old is objective. This latter kind of "objectivity" would count as a type of relativism. In your example, the morality of an action is relative to and determined by the linguistic practices of a language community.

Isaac

Moral realists claim that moral facts are objective in the sense that the speed of light and the existence of Mercury are objective. — Michael

Do they?

Moral realism is not a particular substantive moral view nor does it carry a distinctive metaphysical commitment over and above the commitment that comes with thinking moral claims can be true or false and some are true. — SEP Article

What do normative/moral terms mean on a realist construal?

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