The meaning of a word in a language is objective. We don't all have our own personal meanings, we couldn't talk if that were the case. — Isaac

:up:

Folks forget that objective is just unbiased.

Moral realists claim that moral facts are objective in the sense that the speed of light and the existence of Mercury are objective. — Michael

Is it not that certain statements about the speed of life are objective ?

Why need there be one? — Isaac

:up:

I am merely asking what you are referring to when you say ‘X is good’ or ‘Y is bad’. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Are looking for some Entity like goodness or badness ?

--It's raining.
--What is ? What is raining !?!?

Is it not that certain statements about the speed of life are objective ? — Pie

The realist will say that there is more to the world than just statements. There is the statement "the cat is on the mat" and there is the cat being on the mat. The latter is the case even if nobody talks about it and is what makes the former true.

Do they? — Isaac

At least as I have always understood it, with ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism being the two main types.

At least as I have always understood it, with ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism being the two main types. — Michael

Here's Routledge...

The realist, on this account, holds that moral statements are capable of truth, and indeed that some are true. If we say this, we can still distinguish between realism and objectivism in ethics. Realism is the claim that moral judgments are sometimes true; objectivism is the claim that the sort of truth they have is objective truth.

It goes on to cite Crispin Wright...

Crispin Wright (1992) has suggested that, if this is what is at issue between realism and noncognitivism, the matter will be quickly resolved in favour of realism. In his view, the mere fact that moral discourse is assertive, and that moral utterances are governed by norms of warranted assertibility, is enough to establish that we make no mistake in calling some true and others false.

"Punching old ladies is right" is an assertion which is amenable to being true in exactly the same way that "this is a game" is.

If I point to a bus and say "this is a game", what I've said is false, but it's false by no other criteria than that buses are not the sorts of things we use the word 'game' for.

The Routledge article also says:

Second, realists hold that moral facts are independent of any beliefs or thoughts we might have about them. What is right is not determined by what I or anybody else thinks is right. It is not even determined by what we all think is right, even if we could be got to agree. We cannot make actions right by agreeing that they are, any more than we can make bombs safe by agreeing that they are.

Traditionally, as I understand it at least, the moral realist's claim that murder is immoral isn't comparable to the claim that murder is illegal. They tend to make a more substantive claim than that. They think that murder has some (natural or non-natural) moral property that is then correctly (or incorrectly) described when we claim that murder is immoral.

But if you want to argue for a more minimal account of moral realism (that moral claims are truth-apt and some are true) then I suppose you're welcome to, although I don't suspect that's the kind that the OP is asking about. I suspect he’s asking about the meta-ethics that is comparable to mathematical realism, whereas yours is comparable to something like mathematical formalism, which is a type of mathematical antirealism.

I want to know what terms like ‘good’ ‘bad’ mean to a realist, if not being used in a stance dependent (relative to the desires of an agent or an established standard) construal.

Well, ‘is’ functions as a determiner in your example. Implying ontological status. Very interesting, but I want to understand the meanings of normative/moral terms first.

Why would you want to disqualify or ignore or circumvent established standards ? It's as if you want an example of a norm that's not a norm.

If it helps, I'm coming from the position that the role of philosopher is implicitly normative. "We rational ones..."

But that's not equivalent at all. I wouldn't point to the property that a tree has to be considered a tree. I'd just point to the tree. — Isaac

When you say the word ‘tree,’ presumably, what it is that your language is trying to do is to capture and transmit the conceptual information pertaining to the properties of a tree (long trunk made of bark, green leafs, etc) through corresponding signs, which are encoded with the conceptual information, across a medium we call language in order for a recipient to subsequently decode and form a mental image of the shared concept (the tree).

That understanding of language is far from being the only one, so such presumption, in my view anyway, might be unwarranted.

An alternative is inferentialism.

http://jarda.peregrin.cz/mybibl/PDFTxt/580.pdf

Inferentialism is the conviction that to be meaningful in the distinctively human way, or to have a 'conceptual content', is to be governed by a certain kind of inferential rules. The term was coined by Robert Brandom as a label for his theory of language; however, it is also naturally applicable (and is growing increasingly common) within the philosophy of logic.

The rationale for articulating inferentialism as a fully-fledged standpoint is to emphasize its distinctness from the more traditional representationalism.

Are you saying that my original question (what does it mean when realists use normative/moral terms?) is loaded?

When you say the word ‘tree,’ presumably, what it is that your language is trying to do is to capture and transmit the conceptual information pertaining to the properties of a tree (long trunk made of bark, green leafs, etc) through corresponding signs, which are encoded with the conceptual information, across a medium we call language in order for a recipient to subsequently decode and form a mental image of the shared concept (the tree). — Cartesian trigger-puppets

If I'm a passenger in a rally car and I yell 'tree', I sincerely hope there's no decoding of concepts going on.

I mean for the driver to swerve.

Do you not understand my question, or are you being evasive? This conversation keeps getting off track.

Do you not understand my question, or are you being evasive? This conversation keeps getting off track. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I do. Do you not understand my answer?

Are you saying that my original question (what does it mean when realists use normative/moral terms?) is loaded? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

You're asking "what does it 'mean'?" and then claiming that discussion of how words 'mean' something is 'off track'. If you have a particular direct reference theory of meaning that you want to use when looking at the question "what does it mean...?" then you'll need to make that clear, otherwise the answer is going to hinge entirely on different interpretations of how any word means anything.

Are you saying that my original question (what does it mean when realists use normative/moral terms?) is loaded? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Well, probably every question is. But what is implicitly assumed (and what commitments are made ) as the philosopher puts his philosophy hat on ? Perhaps we are both interested in wtf certain philosophers even mean by their keywords in the first place.

'Real' is as slippery as they come perhaps.

Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.

If this is what you mean, then I'm a moral realist. If someone says 'murder is wrong,' they don't just mean that they don't like it. In fact, they might like it very much, knowing that it's wrong, perhaps because it's wrong.

To me this is a point about language, how the concept 'wrong' (typically) functions.

I do. Do you not understand my answer? — Isaac

Could you reproduce my question?

If this is what you mean, then I'm a moral realist. If someone says 'murder is wrong,' they don't just mean that they don't like it. In fact, they might like it very much, knowing that it's wrong, perhaps because it's wrong.

To me this is a point about language, how the concept 'wrong' (typically) functions — Pie

What concept is it that ‘wrong’ refers to? I have the concept for my view (to desires or standards: like the desire for pleasure or the standard rules of chess), however I do not have any idea what concept it is that you are referring to. Language functions to share concepts.

So you want an Entity ?

If God says its wrong, does that work ? If not, why not ?

Who wrote the logic textbooks ? And why should we trust them ?

I just want to know what it you mean by it.

God said it’s wrong is stance dependent. It depends upon the desires if God in that case. In order to accept that I would need you to provide a meaning for God as well because, like ‘stance independent wrongs,’ I don’t think have your concept of God.

If you have a different concept for a term we are using in a statement, then I need you to convey your meaning so that I can assess whether or not the statement is true, false, propositional, vacuous, or just meaningless mouth sounds.

I endorsed the idea that "ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."

I think I can assume and assert that the widespread proscription of murder is a genuine/objective/real feature of the world.

I'm an atheist. I'm just trying to fish out your presuppositions.

I just want to know what it you mean by it. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

This dictionary definition is not a bad start, especially the bold part. "Not in conformity with fact or truth; incorrect or erroneous. Contrary to conscience, morality, or law. Unfair; unjust. "

What do you make of this ? Does it relate ?

Autonomy is self-government, self-determination. I think the Kantian conception of
autonomy can be summarized like this: one is self-determining when one’s thinking and
acting are determined by reasons that one recognizes as such. We can think of
“autonomy” as labelling a capacity, the capacity to appreciate the force of reasons and
respond to it. But determining oneself is actually exercising that capacity. That is what it
is to be in control of one’s own life.

Why should I bother to be autonomous ? Is the force of reason a private matter ?

Note: Im not asking for a definition, but your meaning. That definition uses synonyms and is therefore tautologous, so yeah, I of course accept it, but it is rendered repetitive and has no force or additional meaning.

Note: Im not asking for a definition, but your meaning. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Would you mind explaining what you mean by 'meaning' first ? Please, though, no dictionary definition. Just your meaning.

I suspect I was right w/ my original atoms-and-void comment. You want an Impossible Object to make things Actually Wrong ? Or....you would like to think the moral realist needs one ? I see moral realism as at least potentially trivial. There are norms. Surprise surprise.

I suspect the outlandish theses are on the other side, lurking as secret premises. "Norms aren't really norms unless ... X "

The reals go round and round.

You seem to use ‘tautology’ synonymously with ‘necessary’ byw. If that was you earlier. Im working and only have moments to respond, sorry.