So if it is implausible that God is in your mind (because that would mean you couldn't be wrong...etc), the we can know that god cannot be just in your mind. We can rule out that options and so 'know' that what is the case must be one of the remaining options. — Isaac

OK? And the solipsist is wrong he believes that God exists but God doesn't exist. What's the problem?

What's the problem? — Michael

I thought I'd explained that. If it is implausible that things only exist in our minds, then we can know that mind-independent objects exist. They must, we've just concluded it's implausible that they don't.

If the solipsist agrees it is implausible that they cannot be wrong, and we also conclude that the only way they can be wrong is if there are mind-independent objects, then they 'know' there are mind-independent objects... to the extent anyone knows anything...

If it is implausible that things only exist in our minds, then we can know that mind-independent objects exist. — Isaac

It is implausible that God exists in my mind, therefore I know that God exists independently of me.

Obviously this is wrong.

we also conclude that the only way they can be wrong is if there are mind-independent objects — Isaac

That doesn't follow. I don't need a mind-independent object to exist for me to be wrong when I claim that God exists.

It is implausible that God exists in my mind, therefore I know that God exists independently of me.

Obviously this is wrong. — Michael

No. It's implausible that if god exists he only exists in my mind therefore if god exists he must do so independently of me.

The only way out of mind-independent objects from there is that nothing exists.

No. It's implausible that if god exists he only exists in my mind therefore if god exists he must do so independently of me. — Isaac

Yes, but this doesn't entail that he knows that God exists.

So simply saying that if mind-independent objects and other minds exist then they do so independently of me doesn't entail that he knows that mind-independent objects and other minds exist.

I don't need a mind-independent object to exist for me to be wrong when I claim that God exists. — Michael

We're going round in circles. We've just demonstrated that. If god (should he exist) only exists in your mind, then it is impossible for you to be wrong about his existence because you know your own mind.

If you don't know your own mind, then you cannot prove the existence of the part of your mind you don't know (and so it falls under the same bus as the external world - assumed not to exist and so can't form part of a theory about how the world is). So all we're left with is that I know my own mind, and god (if he exists) is in it. Thus I cannot be wrong about god's existence. I simply examine my mind. If he's there, he exists. If he isn't he doesn't. Since I must know my own mind (to be sure it exists) I cannot be wrong about its contents.

I don't need a mind-independent object to exist for me to be wrong when I claim that God exists. — Michael

We're going round in circles. We've just demonstrated that. — Isaac

No we haven't. We've demonstrated that a mind-independent object (specifically God) needs to exist for me to be right when I claim that God exists.

What mind-independent object needs to exist for me to be wrong? Obviously not God otherwise I wouldn't be wrong. Perhaps a tree? Why must a tree exist for me to be wrong about God existing? Or must God's non-existence exist? That makes no sense at all.

What mind-independent object needs to exist for me to be wrong? — Michael

None. As I said, one way out is that nothing exists. I don't think solipsists make that claim though.

Barring that, you must know your own mind. that means you know both what's in it and what isn't Which means you know God isn't so you can't be wrong. If you say "god exists" you're just lying because you already know he's not in your mind - you know what is and isn't in your own mind.

As such, there must be mind-independent objects in order for you to be capable of being wrong about the existence of anything. Or... nothing actually exists.

None. As I said, one way out is that nothing exists. I don't think solipsists make that claim though.

Barring that, you must know your own mind. that means you know both what's in it and what isn't Which means you know God isn't so you can't be wrong. If you say "god exists" you're just lying because you already know he's not in your mind - you know what is and isn't in your own mind. — Isaac

Again, this makes no sense. The solipsist can claim that God exists, and that he is wrong if God doesn't exist. Nothing about this entails that the solipsist knows that God exists.

The solipsist can claim that God exists, and that he is wrong if God doesn't exist. — Michael

You're just restating your original claim, you're not addressing the argument.

1. We must know our own minds entirely - what is in them and what is not. If we don't then we cannot prove that part (the part we don't know about) actually exists. It must go exactly the same way as the external world, as it cannot be proven on exactly the same grounds.

2. If we know our own minds - what is in them and what isn't, and all that is the case is in our minds, then we cannot be wrong about anything being the case. all that is the case is in our minds and we know our own minds, so we know what is the case.

3. If the solipsist want to retain the ability to be wrong about what is the case then they must reject either 1 or 2.

Which point do you dispute?

3. If the solipsist want to retain the ability to be wrong about what is the case then they must reject either 1 or 2. — Isaac

The epistemological solipsist rejects the part that says "all that is the case is in our minds". They only say "all that can be known to exist is in our minds". I've made this clear several times now.

The epistemological solipsist rejects the part that says "all that is the case is in our minds". They only say "all that can be known to exist is in our minds". I've made this clear several times now. — Michael

Yes, which reverts to my point made earlier. If the epistemological solipsist were to entertain 2, then they cannot be wrong. They want to be able to be wrong. therefore they must reject 2.

They want to be able to be wrong. therefore they must reject 2. — Isaac

They do, that's why they're only an epistemological solipsist. I don't understand what you're trying to argue here.

They do, — Michael

2 says that all that is the case is in our minds. To reject 2 either some things which are the case are not in our minds (mind-independence), or nothing is the case (nothing exists).

You'd have to separate the mind into two halves - that which holds what is the case, and that which holds beliefs about the other half (which can then be wrong). — Isaac

:up:

This was basically the insight that inspired me to define the world (minimally) as that which a self can be wrong about. The concept of a self is hard to stabilize without such a non-self. A man trapped in a video who doesn't know what's around the next corner is in a world.

To reject 2 either some things which are the case are not in our minds (mind-independence), or nothing is the case (nothing exists. — Isaac

That's a false dichotomy. I've shown that with the example of God's existence. Under 2, whether or not God exists depends on my mind, which is false. But we don't then say that if God's existence depends on the existence of some mind-independent entity then God's non-existence depends on the existence of some mind-independent entity.

God's non-existence doesn't depend on the existence of anything.

If my mind is the only thing that exists then "God exists" is false. If my mind and God are the only things that exist then "God exists" is true. The solipsist doesn't know which of these two scenarios is the case.

That's a false dichotomy. I've shown that with the example of God's existence. Under 2, whether or not God exists depends on my mind, which is false. But we don't then say that if God's existence depends on the existence of some mind-independent entity then God's non-existence depends on the existence of some mind-independent entity. — Michael

Yeah. I went through that as well. You can answer that nothing exists. If you want to say that anything exists (and all that exists is on your mind) then you cannot be wrong.

The solipsist entertaining the notion that "all that exists is in my mind" cannot be wrong (in that scenario) about whether God exists. They would merely check the contents of their mind. If they find God, he exists, if they don't he doesn't.

The solipsist wants to retain being wrong, so they must reject that notion, therefore they do know it cannot be the case that "all that exists is in my mind", it must be one of the alternatives.

The only alternatives are that "something exists outside my mind", or "nothing exists"

The solipsist wants to retain being wrong, so they must reject that notion, therefore they do know it cannot be the case that "all that exists is in my mind", it must be one of the alternatives.

The only alternatives are that "something exists outside my mind", or "nothing exists" — Isaac

That's wrong. See here.

If my mind is the only thing that exists then "God exists" is false. If my mind and God are the only things that exist then "God exists" is true. The solipsist doesn't know which of these two scenarios is the case. — Michael

They do know, because if scenario 1 is the case then they cannot be wrong (we must know the contents of our own minds, as they conceive them) they find not being wrong about anything implausible, so they must reject 1. Therefore 2 is the case.

They do know, because if scenario 1 is the case then they cannot be wrong — Isaac

Of course they can. If scenario 1 is the case then God doesn't exist and so their claim that God exists is false.

expression which requires only a singular subjectivity, or communication, which requires a plurality of subjectivities, are only possible through a medium that is not subjective. — Mww

That non-subjective is the language we are sharing right now. Even our secret monologues occur in a public language.

Yeah, well....in Kant, autonomy does not relate to universality, but causality, so whoever said Kant said, or meant, that, has merely suited himself to his own ends. And as you say, we are entitled to interpret, but we do not have license from that entitlement, to subvert. — Mww

I'll grant the possibility that you are right about Kant, but your mere assertion is worth no more than mine or Brandom's. The key point for me is not the force of Kant's reputation but the force of reason itself, which lends Kant whatever value or authority he himself has as a philosopher.

That said, I will defend the association of Kant with autonomy and not mere causality.

Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding [= reason] without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. Sapere aude! [Dare to be wise!] Have courage to make use of your own understanding [= reason]! is thus the motto of enlightenment.

It is requisite to reason’s lawgiving that it should need to presuppose only itself, because a rule is objectively and universally valid only when it holds without the contingent, subjective conditions that distinguish one rational being from another.
...
Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. For there is nothing so important because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons [i.e. does not recognize any person as bearing more authority than any other—GW]. On this freedom rests the very existence of reason, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back. (A738f/B766f, translation slightly modified)
...
To make use of one’s own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into a universal principle for the use of reason.

[N]ot even the slightest degree of wisdom can be poured into a man by others; rather he must bring it forth from himself. The precept for reaching it contains three leading maxims: (1) Think for oneself, (2) Think into the place of the other [person] (in communication with human beings), (3) Always think consistently with oneself. — Kant

Notice that the coherence norm is foregrounded in that last quote.

And here's a scholar summarizing:

We saw above (§1.4) that Kant characterizes reason in terms of a self-reflexive procedure. Reason is autonomous and submits to no external authority; it gains authority from submitting itself to critique; and critique involves rejecting any mode of thinking or acting that cannot be adopted by all. In less abstract terms, the self-scrutiny of reason is scrutiny by all those who demand justification for any particular mode of thought or action. Such a view does not assume that we are necessarily bound to our interests and inclinations (as the instrumental account does). It does not ask us to rely on what others do accept (as the communitarian account does). It does not involve the fantasy that we already know or intuit what everyone should accept (as the perfectionist account does). It proposes, instead, a vision of human beings who are able to step back from their particular inclinations, habits and intuitions, and who are willing to use this ability to seek terms that all can accept—to construct an intersubjective order of co-existence, communication and cooperation on terms that all can accept.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/#ReaArbEmpTru

Of course they can. If scenario 1 is the case then God doesn't exist and so their claim that God exists is false. — Michael

Their claim that God doesn't exist is lie, not false. They must know their own mind, so they must know whether God is in it or not.

No need. I just presented an opportunity for you to ask yourself a question. Shouldn’t be any more difficult, or use any other faculties, than asking yourself what would be nice to have for dinner. — Mww

Are you really asking me how I'd apply a concept ? And that's supposed to prove some kind of Platonism ? No one is denying the existence or the application of concepts. The issue is how best to think of them. Functional equivalence classes in an inferential context is one approach. For instance, the words 'and' and 'und' are used pretty much the same way in English and German. Let me be clear that I'm not denying the existence in some sense of abstractions. But I don't commit myself to platonism because I have concepts like 'function' and 'equivalence class.' As I mentioned earlier, these concepts can be understood to be co-performed (in the inferences we allow, etc.)

This notion of yours that concepts depend on there being multiple thinking things or mind-independent objects is very wrong. — Michael

Wrong in terms of what ? Your own opinion ? Or something that exceeds and compels us both ? If the latter, you support my point that philosophers as such embrace an externality.

Their claim that God doesn't exist is lie, not false. They must know their own mind, so they must know whether God is in it or not. — Isaac

They claim that if God exists then he is external to their mind, and they claim that God exists. If he does then they're right, if he doesn't then they're wrong, and they don't know which. It's very simple.

Wrong in terms of what ? Your own opinion ? Or something that exceeds us both ? If the latter, you support my point that philosophers as such embrace an externality. — Pie

See here. It's as simple as I can make it.

I think we are stuck on this particular issue for now, but I have enjoyed the battle so far, and I hope to break a lance on some other issue at some point.

They claim that if God exists then he is external to their mind, and they claim that God exists — Michael

Right, but being wrong about that entails being wrong about solipsism.

I'm arguing that they cannot be wrong about claims assuming "all that exists is my mind" (or some variation of that).

If they can't be wrong assuming "all that exists is my mind" (or some variation of that), and they want to retain the possibility of being wrong, they must reject the assumption.