I think someone, maybe Alvin Plantinga, has argued that if God is possible then he must exist--that his existence in some possible world would be necessary in that world, and that if he's necessary in that possible world then he's necessary in all of them, and therefore he exists. It was something like that. — Srap Tasmaner

Very interesting. I will stay away from it because its complexity makes it hard to convince.

"Everything that begins to exist requires a cause for its existence" is just a variation on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which I don't think we are obligated to accept as a dogma. — SophistiCat

I think this is logically provable: Once again, let's start with the self-evident principle that 'nothing can come from nothing'. Therefore the event 'a thing begins to exist' must come from something. And a thing cannot cause itself into existence, because to cause something, one must first exist, which is self-contradictory. Therefore everything that begins to exist requires an external cause for its existence.

That's fine. I too have trouble coming up with clear examples to illustrate general statements. But then let's provisionally accept that the statement 'no effect has a property not possessed by its cause' is not patently false, until either a clear exception arises, or a flaw is found in the reasoning of the original argument here.

In any case, your conclusion (that the cause must possess all properties of its effects) obviously does not follow. — SophistiCat

But conservation of properties does not follow from this. — SophistiCat

I tried to prove this here. Where do you see a flaw in the reasoning?

let's provisionally accept that the statement 'no effect has a property not possessed by its cause' is not patently false, until either a clear exception arises, or a flaw is found in the reasoning of the original argument here. — Samuel Lacrampe

I'm still in the "patently false" camp.

Maybe you could give me an example of an object causing another to exist, so I know what you mean.

Using the law of noncontradiction, either a thing has a cause or not. This is true regardless if the thing is observable or not, because the law of noncontradiction is an absolute. — Samuel Lacrampe

The law of contradiction would say, roughly, that nothing is both caused and uncaused. You're using the law of the excluded middle. I know it might seem like they're the same thing but they're not.

I think we would get too far into the weeds going through this here, but here's a quote from Michael Dummett that should give you some idea what I have in mind:

Unless we have a means which would in principle decide the truth-value of a given statement, we do not have for it a notion of truth and falsity which would entitle us to say that it must be true or false.

So you should at least be aware that there are philosophers who have qualms about drawing "logical" conclusions about matters we can in principle know nothing about.

Maybe you could give me an example of an object causing another to exist, so I know what you mean. — Srap Tasmaner

Nevermind, I've got it.

I just caused that sentence to exist. It has the property of being composed of words; I am not composed of words.

I summon Hume's principle that there are no innate ideas, that all conceptions must come from experience; and thus anything that we can conceive must exist at some point. This does not mean that just because I can imagine a unicorn, that unicorns exist, but that the basic components of the unicorn (colours, shapes, sounds, ...) must exist. — Samuel Lacrampe

I have been unable to find a source for the clause beginning "thus." I don't think Hume says anything like this, and it clearly does not follow from the summary of Hume's view of the imagination that you've presented. If you want to keep relying on this idea, you'll need to argue for it without Hume's help.

I think this is logically provable: Once again, let's start with the self-evident principle that 'nothing can come from nothing'. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, let's not. I keep telling you that I don't regard the PSR, in any of its forms, as a necessary truth, something that any possible world must conform to. You just go from one form of it to another, firmly convinced that I must subscribe to at least one such principle. I am telling you that I do not. That's not to say that I believe that things happen for no reason. I just don't think that they are obligated to happen for a reason by some a priori principle. (And, as points out, you can push the principle to absurdity if you apply it to the world as a whole or to the putative first event, but I don't think you are doing this, yet.)

I tried to prove this here. Where do you see a flaw in the reasoning? — Samuel Lacrampe

Unfortunately, you can't link to specific posts this way. I think I have read all that you wrote concerning the principle of conservation of properties (as I call it) in this thread, but I don't see where you have given a sound argument for it. You just say, in effect, that it follows from some principle of sufficient reason, but I honestly cannot see how.

And it is such an odd principle! You might find one or two examples that work, more-or-less (considering that causation talk is generally pretty loose and there is no universally accepted account of causation). But isn't it obvious that in general there is no such conservation of properties? Indeed, it often isn't even clear just what might be conserved and in what way. But if you want clear counterexamples, phase transitions work particularly well. A boiling pot, for instance: neither the fire under the pot nor the water prior to the onset of boiling have the property of boiling. For that matter, the fire that brings the water to a boil does not have the property of being at 100C.

The position I propose to defend is weak naturalism. Conforming broadly to the standard of scientific inquiry known as methodological naturalism, it can be distinguished from the stronger position of philosophical naturalism, which claims categorically that the natural world is all there is. I'm also contending that naturalism is more probable than supernaturalism.

Weak naturalism: as far as we know, the natural world is all there is. I defend the claim that naturalism is more probable than supernaturalism... — Hugh Harris

My position, from a non-religious point of view, is that supernaturalism is much more probabilistic than either form of naturalism. I base this on my studies of near death experiences, which is based on the consistent testimonial evidence of NDEs across a wide variety of religious and non-religious cultures; across a wide variety of age groups; and occurring across a wide variety of experiences that can bring on an NDE. I haven't seen any argument from a naturalistic point of view that can explain these experiences away. The testimonial evidence, I would contend, which is based on literally millions of accounts of these experiences is very difficult to dismiss, i.e., based on the numbers, variety, and consistency of the testimony.

From a scientific point of view one may be able to dismiss the testimonial evidence, but that is only because of the nature of the scientific method. I would contend that testimonial evidence is a valid way of obtaining knowledge, viz., being justified that a certain conclusion is probably true. Testimonial evidence can be weak, but it can also be very strong if you have a large enough sampling across a wide variety of people, and as long as it remains relatively consistent.

My conclusion from NDEs is that there is life after the death of our bodies, i.e., that consciousness survives the body and is not dependent on the brain.

- If something can exist, then it can be conceived of, because we can conceive all logical possibilities.
- If something can be conceived of, then it must exist. (as defended by Hume)
∴ If something can exist, then it must exist. — Samuel Lacrampe

Already had a go at this, and I would like to add that I also have a problem with both these premises.

The first premise is, at best, a rather optimistic statement about our cognitive faculties. But, even if it happens to be true, I wouldn't take it as a metaphysical first principle: the world has no obligation to be comprehensible to the human intellect. And if you take it definitionally (possibility is conceivability) then you are trivializing your conclusion.

The second premise is obviously false and doesn't follow even from the simplistic "blank state" account of cognition that you attribute to Hume.

Sure, Harry Hindu, well, you could just hand me a dictionary/encyclopedia, those have plenty good definitions.
But, there are no running elephants in dictionaries, for example. You might, however, show evidence of a stampede or whatever, and that's "real" in this sense at least:

x is real ⇔ x exists irrespective of anyone's definitions — jorndoe

(may or may not be a worthwhile thesis, don't know).

On the other hand, dictionaries excel at context-building, e.g. may state where elephants live or something. You won't find flying pink elephants in dictionaries either, by the way, but that didn't stop me from just mentioning them. :)

Anyway, I've just noticed there are some relations among ...

Invention Discovery
Definition Evidence
Quiddity Existence

... when it comes to epistemic claims.
Definitions are fine; my depreciation is just when some such x is defined only (possibly invented). — jorndoe

I could hand you a dictionary/encyclopedia, but wouldn't you prefer to experience x for yourself? Why is a dictionary full of pictures better than one without? It's because words are simply scribbles that refer to x. Words are an indirect way, but better than nothing (like when you don't know the language of the person you are trying to share x with so you resort to showing pictures of x), of showing x. Even pictures only get you part of the way - something that words can then be used to supplement (but even then still don't get you all the way there to everything that entails x). To truly know x, requires an experience of x over time.

How would you define flying pink elephants to someone who has never seen the color pink? You might define, "pink" as "faded red", but then what if they've never seen "red"? How would you define flying pink elephants to someone who is congenitally blind? If you were to ask someone to draw a picture of x as you define it, you would find that you'd have to be extremely detailed in your definition and it also requires that the one drawing understand your terms as you are intending.

If it wasn't obvious, I'm a realist, so of course I can agree that our definitions of x exist independently of x. Definitions of x are made of words, while x is made of colors, shapes, sounds, etc. One can also say that words themselves are made of shapes and colors or sounds, which is why we can see and hear them. But in order to understand that there are more to the shapes, colors, and sounds of words than just them being words, requires that you understand associations where words refer to x in order to communicate (the primary use of words) the features and qualities of x for someone who has never experienced x. This is why it would be redundant to define x for you when you're standing right next to me looking at x yourself.

Another relation you might notice is how most of our terms are visual terms, which is related to how we think the world is. We often refer to our visual experiences as how the world really is. This is because our sense of vision provides us with the most detail, or information, of x. So it is no surprise that most of our words are visual in nature and refer to visual experiences, or trigger visuals in our mind when we hear or see them. We don't just see words and words are the only thing in our minds that we see. Words seem to be the catalyst for triggering in our minds what it is that the words refer to.

If something can exist, then it must exist.

I wonder if the universe were infinite, then wouldn't what is actually possible have to become actual at some point?

I think some philosophers have said something similar in the past; but this seems absurd to me. Here is an example: I have never been to China. It is possible for me to go there. But say that I die in my sleep tonight. Then this possibility will never be actualized, even with infinite amount of time, past or future.

Unless we have a means which would in principle decide the truth-value of a given statement, we do not have for it a notion of truth and falsity which would entitle us to say that it must be true or false.

This sounds like a self-contradiction: Do you (or Michael Dummett) have a means which would in principle decide the truth-value of that very statement? If not, then according to that statement, we do not have for it a notion of truth and falsity which would entitle us to say that it must be true or false.

So you should at least be aware that there are philosophers who have qualms about drawing "logical" conclusions about matters we can in principle know nothing about. — Srap Tasmaner

While I take your statement in consideration, I do not base truth on philosophers and their authority, but rather on philosophy. I trust you do the same.

No probs. I was just paraphrasing. Here is the link. Additionally, I can summarize the argument on how he got to that conclusion, if requested.

Hume claims that
(1) any complex thing we can imagine is built up out of simple things, and
(2) any simple thing we can imagine is directly derived from our experience, as a faint copy, in fact.

If you accept these claims, you will reason thus:
(1) if I imagine something complex, then what I imagine has simple components;
(2) the simple components of what I imagine must be derived from my experience.

Hume doesn't suggest that the gold mountain we imagine must be real, only that we must have experience of gold and mountains.

Ok, but if the universe is truly infinite, then all sorts of weird shit is possible and we apparently we don't know if it is finite or infinite.

https://phys.org/news/2015-03-universe-finite-infinite.html

Interesting article. So what it says is that if I died tonight, another "me" could still go to China, thus making that possibility actualized somewhere in this infinite universe. But I would like to refute that there are other "me" out there. The reason I am an individual is because my attributes are unique. Not all of them are unique (probably most of them are not) but the entire configuration is. There may be another being that looks identical to me, but at least we do not share the same position (x,y,z) attributes, thereby making that being "not me".

I just caused that sentence to exist. It has the property of being composed of words; I am not composed of words. — Srap Tasmaner

Still an incorrect causal relationship. The words have a physical property (say pixels on the screen), and a meaning. The meaning of the words is caused by you directly, and they are also a property of you because you can think (i.e. you meant what you wrote). You are not composed of pixels, but the direct cause of the pixels is the computer, which has the ability to create these pixels.

A boiling pot, for instance: neither the fire under the pot nor the water prior to the onset of boiling have the property of boiling. — SophistiCat

The fire emits the energy received by the water to boil, and the "boiling" effect is just the combination of the energy (caused by the fire) and the potential of water molecules to boil (not caused by the fire). And we know the energy received cannot be more than the energy emitted, due to the first law of thermodynamics.

For that matter, the fire that brings the water to a boil does not have the property of being at 100C. — SophistiCat

Indeed. The fire has a property of being greater than 100C, which agrees with my point that the cause(s) may be greater or equal to the effect.

The first premise is, at best, a rather optimistic statement about our cognitive faculties. But, even if it happens to be true, I wouldn't take it as a metaphysical first principle: the world has no obligation to be comprehensible to the human intellect. And if you take it definitionally (possibility is conceivability) then you are trivializing your conclusion. — SophistiCat

Yep. I stand corrected. Upon further thinking, I too don't actually believe that all that exists can be conceived. Thanks for finding the flaw in that reasoning.

Corollary: God (should he exist) should be defined as "that which nothing greater can exist", and not merely as "that which nothing greater can be conceived". The latter implies maximum possibility, where as the former implies that we could conceive such a being, which is incorrect from a christian standpoint.

I agree. That is why I said earlier:

This does not mean that just because I can imagine a unicorn, that unicorns exist, but that the basic components of the unicorn (colours, shapes, sounds, ...) must exist. — Samuel Lacrampe

Does it make my reasoning invalid?

Yes. What you got from Hume, as summarized here, doesn't support the conclusion you draw, namely that everything we can conceive of must exist. (Hume didn't draw this further conclusion either, for what that's worth.)

@Sam26, haven't you ever wondered why these NDE experiences tend to be visual (with the eyes safely situated in the body), and audio (with the eardrums safely back in the body), remembered (with the brain back in the body), etc?
Some common characteristica are known from other reports, like "sensing a presence", when being subject to generated magnetic fields, fluctuating similarly to brain scans.
Individual self-comprehension has always been troublesome.
Jumping to the conclusion that "supernaturalism is much more probabilistic than" something a bit more "down to Earth", as it were, seems a stretch; I'm guessing what we might call the "natural" world is significantly richer than our thinking.
I suppose several independent, credible, well-justified reports of somehow "seeing" something that the experiencer couldn't possibly otherwise have known (or inferred/guessed), would lend more merit to the hypothesis.
How about putting together an organization of spies using OOBEs? :D

If something can exist, then it must exist — Srap Tasmaner

Seems vaguely like modal realism?

I wonder if the universe were infinite, then wouldn't what is actually possible have to become actual at some point? — Cavacava

Well, it would have to be infinite in all possible aspects, at least, wouldn't it?
Even then, I'm not quite convinced; infinitudes aren't that easy to reason about.

I'm a realist — Harry Hindu

I tend towards realism (or anti-idealism) as well; alternatives just don't stack up.
But of course the conundrums you brought up still apply. Who doesn't like a good mystery? (Y)

Anyway, my comment was just an attempt to point out a potential problem with some propositions.
Say, there's not much doubt that the Sun exists, and we may then come up with sufficient definitions thereof (converging on quiddity). Such definitions can be found in dictionaries and whatnot.
If, on the other hand, we only have definitions to go by, then things become more questionable, which was what I meant by defining quiddity (like flying pink elephants perhaps).
Come to think on it, Hume may actually have agreed.
If the potential problem holds up, then it would go towards naturalism of some sort.

I wonder if the universe were infinite, then wouldn't what is actually possible have to become actual at some point? — Cavacava

Depends on what kind of possibility you have in mind. Nomological possibility combined with infinite probabilistic resources results in all possibilities being "almost surely" realized. But a planet made of cheese, for example, is not any more likely with an infinite universe than with a finite one, even though such a thing is conceivable.

I tend towards realism (or anti-idealism) as well; alternatives just don't stack up.
But of course the conundrums you brought up still apply. Who doesn't like a good mystery? (Y) — jorndoe

There have been scientists that say the opposite, that the brain despises mysteries, hence our natural tendency to solve them, or to figure things out. It seems to me that the only ones that like mysteries are the ones that don't want their beliefs, which they've made an emotional investment in, to be explained away.

The knowledge argument seems to be fallacious to me. Why would we need to know how something is experienced in order to know that something? The color of bananas informs us of the state of the banana (that it's ripe or rotten). If I knew the banana was ripe, then why do I need to also know how others see the banana? The knowledge argument doesn't take into account how our experiences inform us of some state-of-affairs in the world. Knowing a banana is ripe is the same as seeing a banana is yellow. How else would you know the banana is ripe? Your knowledge of the banana must take some form, which could be colors, or something else, as long as there's a relationship between the state-of-affairs and the way some entity is informed of that state-of-affairs.

Anyway, my comment was just an attempt to point out a potential problem with some propositions.
Say, there's not much doubt that the Sun exists, and we may then come up with sufficient definitions thereof (converging on quiddity). Such definitions can be found in dictionaries and whatnot.
If, on the other hand, we only have definitions to go by, then things become more questionable, which was what I meant by defining quiddity (like flying pink elephants perhaps).
Come to think on it, Hume may actually have agreed.
If the potential problem holds up, then it would go towards naturalism of some sort. — jorndoe

But we don't seem to ever only have definitions to go by. The words, "flying pink elephants" refer to some mental image. Even if I had an flying pink Asian elephant in my mind when I say it, which then triggers a flying pink African elephant in your mind, we'd still both be thinking of flying pink elephants, that is unless I stated specifically, that it was an Asian elephant. This is why it is important that we get our definitions right so that we can be on the same page when talking about something.