I think the only viable understanding of truth (in the propositional not in the 'truth as aletheia' sense ) we have is that truth corresponds to, or is about actuality. (In the 'truth as aletheia' sense actuality is not a state of affairs but the living truth as it is revealed). — John

This is a common view, although it was rejected by philosophers post Frege. In spite of that, it persists as a common view. Some philosophers point out that it has intuitive appeal. Plus indirect realism is pretty much embedded in the average scientific outlook. This causes consternation because correspondence entails dualism of some kind.

One of the problems with a dualistic outlook is the challenge of explaining how the two supposed "realms" relate to one another. In other words... how does a truth-bearer correspond to a truth-maker? This is obviously intimately tied to the issue of how mind relates to the world.

An externalist approach to knowledge says that there is no need to work that question out. We just start by acknowledging that there are sentient beings who interact with their world. We note cases of "reliablity" in these interactions. That reliability is all there is to knowledge.

In many possible worlds frameworks, truth simpliciter is defined as truth with respect to a privileged world, sometimes designated w@, that is, the actual world. — The Great Whatever

That's a case of picturing truth as a property of statements, and it works well in managing necessary truths.

The question I have there is: necessary truths can't be false. So how does truth even come up in regard to them? I think it's cases like:

John believes that 4 is a prime number.

John is mistaken. It's necessarily true that 4 isn't prime. John's belief is false.

But if we persist in saying that "It's false that 4 is a prime number"... there's a subtle problem that arises having to do with the status of this false proposition, or really of any proposition. It's the unstated statement problem.

We can ditch that problem by declaring that we're speaking poetically when we talk about a proposition as existing in some abstract way... hanging in the void possibly unknown by any qualified knower. What we're saying is that if anyone believes that 4 is a prime number, their belief is wrong.

Eh... I gotta think about this some more.

correspondence entails dualism of some kind. — Mongrel

Correspondence, as I see it is a purely logical relation between what I say and what I experience or what I would experience. So if I say "it is raining" that assertion is understood to correspond to my experience of the rain. If I say "it is either raining or not right now at such and such a location in the Amazon" that is understood to correspond to what I would experience if I was in the Amazon right now.

I am not convinced that the disquotational account has dispensed with correspondence. I only care what philosophers "since Frege" have said if it is convincing. "'It is raining' is true iff it is raining", logically depends on a correspondence between "'It is raining"' and "it is raining" where the former is a statement of or about the latter actuality.

One of the problems with a dualistic outlook is the challenge of explaining how the two supposed "realms" relate to one another. In other words... how does a truth-bearer correspond to a truth-maker? This is obviously intimately tied to the issue of how mind relates to the world.

This is a metaphysical problem you are referring to here not an issue about logical correspondence. The question about what correspondence could be in some metaphysical dimension is a malformed question in my view; we simply don't know what we are asking when we ask that.

An externalist approach to knowledge says that there is no need to work that question out. We just start by acknowledging that there are sentient beings who interact with their world. We note cases of "reliablity" in these interactions. That reliability is all there is to knowledge.

The idea of "sentient beings interacting with their world " implies dualism equally as much as correspondence does in my view; that is it does so if it is taken as a metaphysical claim.

Gettier problem. Theories of knowledge are in flux at present. The problem is central to philosophy of mind. — Mongrel

Your epiphany was that truth was an object of knowledge, and my response was that your epiphany was what was already traditionally accepted.

If actuality is a dream, all the parts still have to interrelate — Mongrel

If actuality is a dream, all the parts still have to interrelate. — Mongrel

Unless I can dream up an example where they don't.

Correspondence, as I see it is a purely logical relation between what I say and what I experience or what I would experience. — John

Logical relations are between sentences. It doesn't make sense to say that some sentence is logically related to an experience (whether actual or counter-factual).

If there were no logical relation between your experiences and what you say about them, then you would not actually be saying anything about them, would you?

Although I agree with your correspondence theory of truth, as I understand it there are two other major theories, pragmatism and coherentism. Pragmatism argues that what is true is what is useful/pragmatic. Coherentism argues that what is true is what makes coherent sense, that is, a certain proposition under scrutiny holds truth if it is coherent with other propositions.

I find that neither two objections are sufficient for defeating correspondence theory; in fact I think both of them end up utilizing correspondence whether they realize it or not.

For a pragmatist, what is true is what is useful. However, this means that a person who believes in god and finds great value in their religion would be said to hold a true belief, which to many others would strike them as irrational. For pragmatism, truth is inherently relative, which is quite unsettling. Furthermore, what is useful is very often what actually is the case (correspondence), so it seems like pragmatism simply is a facet of correspondence theory.

For a coherentist, what is conceptually harmonized is what is true. But this is problematic; the coherentist theory of truth is actually a theory of justification. The related, justifying propositions are exactly what we use as evidence for some proposition.

So there's my two cents. If I got any of this wrong, someone correct me.

If that's the implication. Because it is a fact that a logical relation is "an interpropositional relation in which a proposition is related to another, in reasoning, as a premise to a conclusion or as an antecedent to a consequent."¹

So either we can't talk about things or talking about things doesn't require a logical relation between sentences and experiences. I think it obvious that we can talk about things. Therefore talking about things doesn't require a logical relation between sentences and experiences.

¹http://www-01.sil.org/linguistics/glossaryoflinguisticterms/WhatIsALogicalRelation.htm

You are using a narrow definition of logic as propositional or predicate logic; so apparently we are talking about different things.

In any case the point stands, that if what you say about your experiences does not correspond, somehow, to your experiences then you cannot be saying anything about them. The question that raises is: in what way could what you say about your experiences correspond to your experiences other than in a logical/conceptual way?

For anybody who's interested:

Correspondence theory didn't fall out of favor because somebody thought disquotationalism was a better idea. It was because of a brick shit-house of an argument that it doesn't make sense (by way of Frege.)

I wrote Frege's argument out twice on the old forum. I'm not writing it again. See Scott Soames if you're interested.

Unfortunately, Nagase didn't join us over here.

Damn.

Thanks for all your comments! I think I may have fuel to keep going with my scheme. Does it matter if it makes sense to anyone else? In the final analysis... probably not.

The first thing that pops to mind, at least, is that in saying "Truth is actuality" you're just reifying truth -- treating the concept of truth as if it were a thing. Now, maybe it is an object, as you say -- but you'd have to qualify that somehow, I think. Clearly truth is not like my desk, or my cup, or a myriad other objects. If truth is an object then it would seem that it is closer to numbers, as long as they are objects too.

Then there would be the question -- is it true that truth is actuality? How would you deal with that?

I don't know if these are problems. Just thoughts of mine.

Thanks for all your comments! I think I may have fuel to keep going with my scheme. Does it matter if it makes sense to anyone else? In the final analysis... probably not. — Mongrel

The one extra thing I'd add is that Habermas isn't much read by us Anglo-Americans, and so far I only know his stuff mostly second-hand, but he does have a different way of approaching these things, which would fall into the 'pragmatic' rather than correspondence or coherentist camps. Worth adding to the reading. For him it's a question of the linguistic community 'validating' talk among themselves, as far as I grasp it at one remove.

For him it's a question of the linguistic community 'validating' talk among themselves, as far as I grasp it at one remove. — mcdoodle

I'll look for Habermas. Sounds interesting.

What did you come up with on the Heidegger front?

Don't know if this help...

... I find truth (or certainty) to be a 'process' rather than an 'actuality'. It is a dynamic process subject to adaptation of actuality of status via the accumulation of information/experience.

I find this to be more deductive and empirical than intuitive.

Meow!

GREG

I hope someone in this thread will explain the importance of truth. As a latecomer to philosophy, I still haven't grasped why it matters so centrally. But I feel like the village idiot sometimes in looking for ways of saying this, ('In what way is language about truth-conditions?') because it seems so obvious to so many people that it's central. — mcdoodle

To suggest that the truth doesn't matter is itself a truth claim. Hence, it clearly does matter, otherwise, the person making such a claim would never make it in the first place.

What did you come up with on the Heidegger front? — Mongrel

I'm not going to pop up with anything pronto on that front. I'm attending a course of lectures starting tomorrow, so it may be March before I even have a semblance or appearance of knowing what H is talking about!

The first thing that pops to mind, at least, is that in saying "Truth is actuality" you're just reifying truth -- treating the concept of truth as if it were a thing. Now, maybe it is an object, as you say -- but you'd have to qualify that somehow, I think. Clearly truth is not like my desk, or my cup, or a myriad other objects. If truth is an object then it would seem that it is closer to numbers, as long as they are objects too.

Then there would be the question -- is it true that truth is actuality? How would you deal with that?

I don't know if these are problems. Just thoughts of mine. — Moliere

Could you explain how I'm reifying it?

My thinking is that it's a word. I'm defining it. This is AP heresy because of Frege's proof that it's unanalyzable. That proof starts with the assumption that truth is a property of statements or propositions.

"True" does appear in language as a property of statements. But I think it's easy enough to translate these usages to "truth" as an object of knowledge. The truth is what we want to know.

Most often, it's that we want to know what is, as opposed to what could be. In short: actuality.

Mathematical truth is something I handle with tongs. I'm not a mathematician, and I've concluded that Banno is right. Math is a game. Truth in math works pretty much the way truth works in a game.

To suggest that the truth doesn't matter is itself a truth claim. Hence, it clearly does matter, otherwise, the person making such a claim would never make it in the first place. — Thorongil

I think Yaha was thinking that I've dug myself a ditch for no reason. Not very charitable of him.

I wasn't digging a ditch. I expressed something that occurred to me while studying theories of knowledge on the way to understanding Chalmers' book: "Constructng the World."

Don't know if this help...

... I find truth (or certainty) to be a 'process' rather than an 'actuality'. It is a dynamic process subject to adaptation of actuality of status via the accumulation of information/experience.

I find this to be more deductive and empirical than intuitive. — Mayor of Simpleton

As my lately adopted mense on issues of mental health, I pay close attention to what you say.

But I wasn't saying that truth is empirical or intuitive. It's the way things are, whether we observe it or intuit it. The truth may be beyond our grasp. What this means, though, is that truth is the way things are.... that which actually is.

Banno would sniff at non-propositional truth.

But he's not on this forum, so we can proceed without his council.

I'm not going to pop up with anything pronto on that front. I'm attending a course of lectures starting tomorrow, so it may be March before I even have a semblance or appearance of knowing what H is talking about! — mcdoodle

Interesting. I got interested in AP for wanting to know how their answers to questions would vary from H's. So.... I would love to hear from you after you've digested some of H's ideas.

I've long wanted to do a group reading of the OWA. Maybe you'd be interested after your sojourn?

As my lately adopted mense on issues of mental health, I pay close attention to what you say. — Mongrel

That sort of makes me feel, well... hell... I don't even pay close attention to what I say... that kind of freaked me out. That must be a good thing.... I hope.

But I wasn't saying that truth is empirical or intuitive. It's the way things are, whether we observe it or intuit it. The truth may be beyond our grasp. What this means, though, is that truth is the way things are.... that which actually is. — Mongrel

I get ya...

... I sort of thin that truth, that is truth is all possible context, is beyond our grasp, as there is always some sort of context or information that we don't have to take into consideration, as well as the influx of new context and information after the fact of fielding a notion of truth that will in some way or another influence that notion and make adaptations/revisions in that notion... my silly idea that there are no fixed points in value attributon, except for stubborness.... perhaps it says more about the (relative) state of our being than the (relative/absolute) state of what is truth itself happens to be in?

Let me know if that makes any sense. (I'm not too sure it did.)

Banno would sniff at non-propositional truth.

But he's not on this forum, so we can proceed without his council. — Mongrel

Indeed...

... Banno has a way of reducing my statements of racing thoughts into a short sound bite. A master of brevity... a talent I wish I could employ as well, but I fear will never be mine.

Meow!

GREG

I think Yaha was thinking that I've dug myself a ditch for no reason. — Mongrel

I'm confused. The bit you quoted from Thorongil was directed at mcdoodle, not me.

Not very charitable of him.

I don't know where charity comes into it. If you want to use the word "truth" to refer to a sentence that successfully describes something about the world then you can, and if you want to use the word "truth" to refer to the thing about the world which sentences try to describe then you can. As long as you make it clear to your interlocutor which you're doing it really doesn't matter. You could even drop the word "truth" and just talk either about sentences that successfully describe something about the world or about the things about the world that sentences try to describe.

Sorry. I missed that Throngil was talking to mcdoodle.

Could you explain how I'm reifying it?

My thinking is that it's a word. I'm defining it. This is AP heresy because of Frege's proof that it's unanalyzable. That proof starts with the assumption that truth is a property of statements or propositions.

"True" does appear in language as a property of statements. But I think it's easy enough to translate these usages to "truth" as an object of knowledge. The truth is what we want to know.

Most often, it's that we want to know what is, as opposed to what could be. In short: actuality.

Mathematical truth is something I handle with tongs. I'm not a mathematician, and I've concluded that Banno is right. Math is a game. Truth in math works pretty much the way truth works in a game. — Mongrel

The reason I thought you were reifying truth is because actuality is thing-like . . . or at least contains things in it. So my thinking was that if truth is actuality, then the lamp on my desk and the desk and my phone, and so forth, are all parts of truth, because they are also parts of actuality. Though stating it like this makes me think that the whole is different from the parts, so perhaps not. But even so, then it would seem that truth is part of reality, where I would say that reality or actuality are metaphysical questions, and truth is a concept. There's no truth "out there", so to speak, or behind the veil of appearances.

But I think when you say "truth is what we want to know" that this isn't necessarily the case, either. Like I said, it was just the first thought that popped into my head.

The reason I thought you were reifying truth is because actuality is thing-like . . . or at least contains things in it. So my thinking was that if truth is actuality, then the lamp on my desk and the desk and my phone, and so forth, are all parts of truth, because they are also parts of actuality. — Moliere

A world contains things. We reside in the actual world, as opposed to the one in which Christianity never came into being, for example

There's something interesting that happens when we consider actuality in the light of probability. In a sense, the actual world is the only possible world.

Chalmers starts his book, Constructing the World, by contemplating Laplace's Demon. He reviews the main objections to it and refines the idea to dispense with those objections. If you're interested, we could sort through that. What is a world really? I think we're basically examining the way we think when we talk about worlds.

But to answer your question, the meaning of "actual" is bound up with our ability to imagine, to hypothesize, to create fiction, and to lie. Obviously, truth and actuality are associated in meaning in a fundamental way.

My guess is that the most common use of "true" has to do with deception. Consider the requirements of a good lie. It has to be believable. It has to be a possible world. What is the truth in these cases? The actual world.

What this thread lacks is a clear explanation for why philosophical examinations of truth tend to center around the idea of truth as a property of statements. It's a good question.

But even so, then it would seem that truth is part of reality, where I would say that reality or actuality are metaphysical questions, and truth is a concept. There's no truth "out there", so to speak, or behind the veil of appearances. — Moliere

Reality and actuality are also concepts... both closely related to the concept of truth.

My point would be that when you want to know the truth about your lamp, you aren't saying you'd like to become acquainted with a useful speech act.

Interesting. I got interested in AP for wanting to know how their answers to questions would vary from H's. So.... I would love to hear from you after you've digested some of H's ideas.

I've long wanted to do a group reading of the OWA. Maybe you'd be interested after your sojourn? — Mongrel

I would. I'll be reading that in mid-Feb if all goes according to plan.

To suggest that the truth doesn't matter is itself a truth claim. Hence, it clearly does matter, otherwise, the person making such a claim would never make it in the first place. — Thorongil

I can't say I agree with that. Someone who says that the aesthetic doesn't matter isn't making an aesthetic claim, they're claiming that aesthetics lacks importance in a schema involving various other things which presumably are more important.

But indeed it feels like the way analytic approaches keep talking about truth; it seems like a residue that will never evaporate :)

My guess is that the most common use of "true" has to do with deception. Consider the requirements of a good lie. It has to be believable. It has to be a possible world. What is the truth in these cases? The actual world. — Mongrel

The plausible is not the true. I feel much conversation hinges on plausibility not truth. And the pleasure of fiction seduces us by being plausible...ok, so what if...? - and then...?

Now, my Heidegger reading has already reached 'Higher than actuality stands possibility.' For me actuallity flits by and then is irretrievable, ah, memories, evidence, ghosts, what am I to believe? All we can do is make up dialogues and narratives about it. The possible is great fun, and rebounds back on the actual. Rub on a lamp of Moliere's and a genie appears to grant a wish, tell a marvellous story. So they say over in 'fiction'. Or over there in 'science', it turns out we can use lamps for wifi - who'd have thought there was even such a possibility until some geek imagined it?

When someone says "I'm seeking the truth" or "We fear we'll never know the truth about what happened to Bill..", what's meant by "truth" is actuality: of all the things that could be, what actually is.

This is pretty intuitive, but I think it would generally be dismissed as an example of the flexibility of language. Truth as a property of statements is supposed to be the meat and potatoes of philosophy. I think this preoccupation with truth as a property results in the adoption of weird externalist approaches where, for example, scientific knowledge arises simply from noting reliability.

Imagine that truth as actuality is closer to the heart of the matter. The truth of statements is the oddity of language use and the conundrums that arise there are the result of missing the use of metaphor.

I'm looking for challenges to this view... to help me think it through. What am I missing? — Mongrel

It seems like truth and actuality are conceptually distinct. Statements that describe non-actual states of affairs can be true (e.g. "Harry Potter is married to Ginny Weasley"), and things can be actual without being true (e.g. I would not describe the actual tree in my back yard as being "true"). Seems like a category error to equate the two.

The plausible is not the true. I feel much conversation hinges on plausibility not truth. And the pleasure of fiction seduces us by being plausible...ok, so what if...? - and then...? — mcdoodle

I wasn't building an edifice here. I just meant to suggest that thinking of truth as a property of statements is a recipe for confusion. The fact that "the truth" often stands in contrast to a state of affairs that conceivably could be indicates that truth is actuality.

Now, my Heidegger reading has already reached 'Higher than actuality stands possibility.' For me actuallity flits by and then is irretrievable, ah, memories, evidence, ghosts, what am I to believe? All we can do is make up dialogues and narratives about it. The possible is great fun, and rebounds back on the actual. Rub on a lamp of Moliere's and a genie appears to grant a wish, tell a marvellous story. So they say over in 'fiction'. Or over there in 'science', it turns out we can use lamps for wifi - who'd have thought there was even such a possibility until some geek imagined it? — mcdoodle

The motto of the IEEE used to be something like: 'Engineering: Bringing Ideas into Reality.'

On the one hand, you're right. Possibility is an engine of the mind. Any case of determining actuality is a little grave because it's a question answered.

On the other hand, you say actuality is something we make up stories about. If that true, it is actual.