The systematic abuse of a terminology specially invented for that purpose.
P is true is just fancy talk for P. This is the 'redundancy' theory. — Pie
I think a large part of the problem is that we have different ideas of what philosophy is about. I hold to the ancient idea of philosophy as a way of life. This does not mean making, defending, and attacking arguments, although that is a part of it. — Fooloso4
It is requisite to reason’s lawgiving that it should need to presuppose only itself, because a rule is objectively and universally valid only when it holds without the contingent, subjective conditions that distinguish one rational being from another. — Kant
But truth, like most things, is not binary. — hypericin
Sentences have degrees of truth. Absolute truth is an edge case. — hypericin
Truth is just one property of P. It's semantic contents, its aesthetic appeal, the number of words, the language and dialect, are other properties of P.
P is the proposition, 'P is true' is a comment on P's property of truth. — hypericin
I think that they sometimes to, due to ambiguity primarily. But let us differentiate carefully here between imperfectly true statements (fuzzy logic, etc.) and the confidence we have in our beliefs. — Pie
But truth, like most things, is not binary. — hypericin
If truth can admit to degrees, which it does, then it must be a property. — hypericin
What distinction do you make between truth and values and do you consider it preferable (or even possible) for one's values to be mostly determined by true things? — Tom Storm
A thread on Davidson would be as absurd as a single thread on Wittgenstein. But it might be interesting to start a thread on one of his essays - say Truth and Meaning, since it sets out his early views. — Banno
Sure, in some contexts, propositional logic for instance, truth is binary.So... that's partially true? — Banno
Your argument, of course, applies to your own remarks, and so if it undermines everything, it undermines itself. — Banno
Of course. It could be false. — Luke
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/This much is agreed: “x makes it true that p” is a construction that signifies, if it signifies anything at all, a relation borne to a truth-bearer by something else, a truth-maker. But it isn’t generally agreed what that something else might be, or what truth-bearers are, or what the character might be of the relationship that holds, if it does, between them, or even whether such a relationship ever does hold. Indeed sometimes there’s barely enough agreement amongst the parties to the truth-maker dispute for them to be disagreeing about a common subject matter.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#DefIt seems obvious that for every true contingent proposition there must be something in the world (in the largest sense of “something”) which makes the proposition true. For consider any true contingent proposition and imagine that it is false. We must automatically imagine some difference in the world. (Armstrong 1973: 11)
For any truth, there must be something in the world whose existence entails that truth. — Truthmaker Slogan
By values I mean things like democracy, secularism, scientific evidence (e.g., medical treatment versus prayer), feminism, etc. — Tom Storm
As if in the T-sentence, 'p' (on the left) is a truth-bearer, and p (on the right) a truth-maker. What would that tell us? — Banno
So it cannot be the state of affairs that truth has degrees, because if it did, it would be impossible to state that truth had degrees? Sophomoric argument. — hypericin
Truthbearers look like an attempt to resuscitate substantive theories of truth by reintroducing some sort of ontological implication for true statements. It looks wrong. — Banno
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