Not if it is a true belief. — Banno
See the word "actually"? It sneaks in a misplaced modal quantifier. — Banno
When we admit to the possibility of being wrong we're not saying "I'm actually right, but in some possible world I'm wrong". We're saying "I might actually be wrong." That's fallibilism
3. Kp (premise)
4. ¬□p (premise)
5. Kp ∧ ◇¬p (from 3 and 4) — Michael
3. p (premise)
4. ¬□p (premise)
5. p ∧ ◇¬p (from 3 and 4)
And what I say is true even if I am not wrong. — Michael
5. Kp ∧ ◇¬p (from 3 and 4) — Michael
We then conclude that I could be wrong even if I know everything (and assuming that some p is not necessarily true): — Michael
I'm not just saying that. I'm saying that she might not be 30 in the actual world. When we admit to the possibility of being wrong we're not saying "I'm actually right, but in some possible world I'm wrong". We're saying "I might actually be wrong." That's fallibilism. — Michael
1. I believe that aliens exist but I don't know that aliens exist.
2. I claim that I might actually be wrong.
3. My claim that I might actually be wrong is true even if aliens happen to exist and I'm not wrong — Michael
1. I believe that aliens exist but I don't know that aliens exist.
2. I claim that I might actually be wrong.
3. My claim that I might actually be wrong is true even if aliens happen to exist and I'm not wrong.
This world might ... be one of the ones in which aliens don't exist, even if it is one of the ones in which aliens exist. — Srap Tasmaner
The problem here is that we still have subjunctives, because we're layering the epistemic issue on top of the, let's say, metaphysical one. — Srap Tasmaner
All the possible worlds are already there; the question for you, the epistemic question, is which one you're in. — Srap Tasmaner
is the below true?
This world might be one of the ones in which aliens don't exist — Michael
If that's a way of saying, I don't know which sort of world I'm in, sure. — Srap Tasmaner
Do you think there is credence in the proposal that there WILL BE a time in the future when a human, a transhuman or a non-human system will be declared as omnimathematical and have some accompanying proof from first principles based on modal logic? — universeness
Except you seem also to want to say that your true belief "might be" false. — Srap Tasmaner
The words "omniscience" and "God" are not in my vocabulary normally. — jgill
1. I believe that aliens exist
2. I might be wrong
One of these is true:
3. Aliens exist
4. Aliens do not exist — Michael
Again, these two are true:
1. I believe that aliens exist
2. I might be wrong
One of these is true:
3. Aliens exist
4. Aliens do not exist — Michael
These premises are not independent. The truth-value of (2) depends on which of (3) and (4) is true. If aliens exist, you cannot be wrong to think they do; if they don't, you cannot be wrong to think they don't. — Srap Tasmaner
Then this adds to my skepticism regarding a modal logic path towards it. — universeness
I think that's the converse of what I was at least trying to say. — Srap Tasmaner
"I believe this but I might be wrong" — Michael
I believe this but I might be wrong — Michael
as just saying that one is not certain of one's beliefs. — Banno
To avoid the conclusion you must be an infallibilist and claim that knowledge requires certainty. In which case if I am certain that aliens exist then "I might be wrong" is false, and so I can't have knowledge that might be wrong.
I think a mistake that some fallibilists here are making is that they switch to infallibilism. They say that we don't require certainty to have knowledge but then imply that if we have knowledge then we're certain.
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