but I can will only one of these options at a time. I cannot will to stand up and sit down simultaneously — Thorongil
http://www.jkrishnamurti.org/krishnamurti-teachings/view-text.php?tid=591&chid=4910&w=freedomSurely there are several kinds of freedom. There is political freedom; there is the freedom which knowledge gives when you know how to do things, the know-how; the freedom of a wealthy man who can go round the world; the freedom of capacity, to be able to write, to express oneself, to think clearly. Then there is the freedom from something: freedom from oppression, freedom from envy, freedom from tradition, from ambition, and so on. And then there is the freedom which is gained, we hope, at the end - at the end of the discipline, at the end of acquiring virtue, at the end of effort - the ultimate freedom we hope to get through doing certain things. So, the freedom that capacity gives, the freedom from something and the freedom we are supposed to gain at the end of a virtuous life - those are types of freedom we all know. Now are not those various freedoms merely reactions? When you say, ''I want to be free from anger,'' that is merely a reaction; it is not freedom from anger. And the freedom which you think that you will get at the end of a virtuous life by struggle, by discipline - that is also a reaction to what has been. Please, sirs, follow this carefully because I am going to say something somewhat difficult in the sense that you are not accustomed to it. There is a sense of freedom which is not from anything, which has no cause, but which is a state of being free. You see, the freedom that we know is always brought about by will, is it not? I will be free, I will learn a technique, I will become a specialist, I will study, and that will give me freedom. So we use will as a means of achieving freedom, do we not? I do not want to be poor and therefore I exercise my capacity, my will, everything to get rich. Or, I am vain and I exercise will not to be vain. So we think we shall get freedom through the exercise of will. But will does not bring freedom, on the contrary, as I will show you.
What is will? I will be, I must be, I must not be, I am going to struggle to become something, I am going to learn - all these are forms of exercising will. Now what is this will and how is it formed? Obviously, through desire. Our many desires, with their frustrations, compulsions, and fulfillments form, as it were, the threads of a cord, a rope. That is will, is it not? Your many contradictory desires together become a very strong and powerful rope with which you try to climb to success, to freedom. Now will desire give freedom, or is the very desire for freedom the denial of it? Please watch yourselves, sirs, watch your own desires, your own ambition, your own will. And if one has no will and is merely being driven, that also is a part of will - being driven is also part of that will, the will to resist and go with it - all that is part of will. Through that weight of desire, through that rope, we hope to climb to God, to bliss, or whatever it is.
So I am asking you whether your will is a liberating factor. Is freedom come by through will? Or, is freedom something entirely different, which has nothing to do with reaction, which cannot be achieved through capacity, through thought, experience, discipline, or constant conformity? That is what all the books say, do they not? Conform to the pattern and you will be free in the end; do all these things, obey, and ultimately there will be freedom. To me all that is sheer nonsense because freedom is at the beginning, not at the end, as I will show you. — J. Krishnamurti
I find that when people use the phrase "free will," they really mean "free choice." — Thorongil
I cannot will to stand up and sit down simultaneously. As Schopenhauer says, "man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills." — Thorongil
Uncoerced choice.How do you define free will? — Sineview
With regard to choice: the absence of coercion, human nature in general, genetic predisposition in particular, and environmental circumstances.What are the parameters of human freedom? — Sineview
Choice is actualised through subsequent intention, planning, volition, and action.Can we make only internal choices, or can we actualize our internal choices in the external world? — Sineview
Conflicting volitions are a common experience, you can't physically stand and sit at the same time but it's perfectly possible to be internally conflicted as to which you prefer. — Sivad
So, exactly how does one make a choice? Does it just pop out of nowhere, like a daisy? — TimeLine
I think you may have confused what Schopenhauer meant here, that the will is independent, a thing in-itself. Our perception of the external world is merely a representation of this will, but what this representation may be perceived as does not necessarily represent reality as it is, as our instinctual drives can propel us to act independent of reason for instance. — TimeLine
but it is not entirely absent and suddenly replaced with 'choice' which basically contradicts what Schopenhauer was attempting to convey — TimeLine
I find that when people use the phrase "free will," they really mean "free choice." Humans possess the latter, but not the former, and the lack of this clarification tends to muddle a lot of contemporary philosophical debate on the topic. In other words, I am free to choose whether to stand up or to sit down so long as no one and no thing forces me to do one or the other, but I can will only one of these options at a time. I cannot will to stand up and sit down simultaneously. As Schopenhauer says, "man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills." Nor can he will that he wills. Willing is concomitant with simply being alive and existing.
In this way, "free will" is a nonsensical phrase, akin to "free thought" or "free digestion." So long as one lives, one wills, thinks, digests, etc. Freedom, at least generically, only applies to the absence of compulsion in determining what to decide. — Thorongil
I hold that free will requires the ability to do otherwise. In other words, I hold that the free agent has a power of volition that enables them to will different options in an undetermined and nonrandom way. While I am sympathetic to the compatibilist pursuits as good philosophers (questioning unreflective assumptions about freedom and responsibility) and are sympathetic towards their interests (feelings of freedom and moral responsibility that are deeply human and practically unavoidable), I ultimately remain unconvinced by their efforts. I do not find an unfettered will (a will unrestrained or overridden by direct external causes) to be sufficient to have moral responsibility.
[...] If determinism is true, then we could not have done anything different than what we have done, are currently doing, and will do in the future. In a counterfactual sense, things could have been different if the parameters had been different, but that is irrelevant to the actual state of affairs. — Chany
Aristotle's concept of choice (liberum arbitrium) is the mediation between reason and the passions.
It was Christianity, specifically Paul who discovered 'free will' as a faculty wherein I struggle with myself. In Romans he says "I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate" (7:15) The emphasis on God's laws changes from the blind obedience of Thou shalt, to the love of God' and his laws in freely willing of their fulfillment, and one's own guilt when his laws are nilled. — Cavacava
With regard to choice: the absence of coercion, human nature in general, genetic predisposition in particular, and environmental circumstances. — Galuchat
Since you bring up reason and passions... Say that our reason and our passions are inherent to our design, and in that way, determined. Yet we have the ability to deliberate between them and choose our preferred. Does this undermine self-determination/free choice? In other words, we have the choice between n options, but the options presented to us are externally determined.
Yes. To my thinking, hypothetical ability -- that is, our choice would be different if circumstances had been different -- does nothing to satisfy our ability to do otherwise. 'Otherwise' pertains to an alternative, which by nature depends upon the "first" option (the option that will be chosen, if determinism). But under compatibilism, all that's changed is the first option, which the agent is still compelled to choose. — Sineview
That tension is a conflict of the will, and will often fails, we end up doing things we will not to do or not doing things we we will to do. That's why we talk about strength of will or weakness of will, willpower etc. I don't see why the will can't be in conflict?Yes, and that inner conflict is best described as the tension between rival choices, not between rival wills. You only have one will. — Thorongil
Incorrect.You're saying that human nature and genetic predispositions qualify as coercion, correct? — Sineview
Coercion is the use of physical force, threat or intimidation without regard for a person's desires or volition in order to obtain compliance. Using this definition, I suspect that, absent oppressive living conditions, choice coercion is more exception rather than rule.Are uncoerced choices possible, then? — Sineview
Correct. In this, it's important to note the difference between coercion and influence.Human nature and genetic predisposition would seem inescapable and fully influencing of our choices, since they affect the mechanisms by which one chooses. — Sineview
Perception, and then thought based on perception, furnishes the material which make up the different options available to choose from. — Thorongil
Then perhaps you should read more Schopenhauer. What one does is what one wills. Willing to move my hand to the left is moving my hand to the left. There is no willing in the absence of doing.Not sure the correlation between sitting and standing to this (again, :-} ); our characters are shaped by this will and yes, there are limitations to free-will, but it is not entirely absent and suddenly replaced with 'choice' which basically contradicts what Schopenhauer was attempting to convey. The freedom we assume - the 'choice' - is actually illusory. — TimeLine
Neither do I :-}And, please, I have no time to waste on a series of superfluous straw-mans — TimeLine
The only freedom that the will has lies in the choices it makes.our characters are shaped by this will and yes, there are limitations to free-will, but it is not entirely absent and suddenly replaced with 'choice' which basically contradicts what Schopenhauer was attempting to convey. — TimeLine
So, the influence of human nature in general, and genetic predisposition in particular place limitations (constraints) on a person's choices. They are parameters of human freedom with reference to choice.
This is why free will, defined as the ability to do otherwise, is an illusion. — Galuchat
And, please, I have no time to waste on a series of superfluous straw-mans — TimeLine
Neither do I :-} — Agustino
Wait, will stops one from being blind? I think Schopenhauer just turned in his grave. — TimeLine
Intellect is what gives eyes to the will and makes it see - stops it from being blind, and hence makes it able to choose based on the material the intellect furnishes. — Agustino
I think you may have confused what Schopenhauer meant here, that the will is independent, a thing in-itself. Our perception of the external world is merely a representation of this will, but what this representation may be perceived as does not necessarily represent reality as it is, as our instinctual drives can propel us to act independent of reason for instance. — TimeLine
Absolute nonsense. First, YOUR WILL isn't thing-in-itself. Second, Will (impersonal) can be thing-in-itself with reference to the phenomenon, but not absolutely. That's why S. leaves the thing-in-itself as unknown in Vol II.I think you may have confused what Schopenhauer meant here, that the will is independent, a thing in-itself. Our perception of the external world is merely a representation of this will, but what this representation may be perceived as does not necessarily represent reality as it is, as our instinctual drives can propel us to act independent of reason for instance. — TimeLine
First, YOUR WILL isn't thing-in-itself. Second, Will (impersonal) can be thing-in-itself with reference to the phenomenon, but not absolutely. That's why S. leaves the thing-in-itself as unknown in Vol II. — Agustino
I'm quite familiar with Schopenhauer. — Agustino
I don't see what anything I've written about has to do with genius. — Agustino
Yes I am familiar with Book III of WWR, what about it? The point I was driving has nothing to do with it. Furthermore it has absolutely 0 to do with S's discussion of genius.Are you unfamiliar with his aesthetics? I'll ignore your little cheap diversion for now. — TimeLine
Yes I am familiar with Book III of WWR, what about it? The point I was driving has nothing to do with it. Furthermore it has absolutely 0 to do with S's discussion of genius. — Agustino
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