Yes, you are right and I see your point. But I was referring to the type of language implemented. If you check logic premises they tend to be pretty hard to follow. This is why I wonder if it is more difficult to me to reach "truth" because I can't follow the logic rules. — javi2541997
I'm a bit confused right now. The notion of a definition includes a word which can be any damn thing you want (arbitrary) although etymology-based ones tend to make sense and are more easily recalled + what the definiens lists are, conventionally, essential features (not arbitrary) of that element/set the word is assigned to. I think I'm making a noob mistake; sorry, I'm new to the game (of philosophy). — Agent Smith
“John is a bachelor” is true iff John is a bachelor
“John is a bachelor” is true iff John is an unmarried man
This shows us the meaning of “bachelor”. — Michael
One must be wary of "etymology-based" definitions. The definition employed by the logician will significantly restrict the word's usage in comparison to the common usage. However, the word still has all that baggage within the reader's mind, habitual associations. The dishonest logician (sophist) will employ that baggage (equivocation) to produce the appearance of valid conclusions which are really invalid. The conclusions are invalid because they require making associations outside of what is stipulated by the significantly restricted definition. — Metaphysician Undercover
Any name in the Object Language can be designated any set of names in the Metalanguage. — RussellA
a language strong enough to talk about its own sentences, because directly it will be able to generate a sentence of the form
This sentence is false — Banno
So yes, the T-sentences are not a theory of truth, at least in that they do not tell us which sentences are true and which false, but which sentences have the same truth value. — Banno
We need to be careful not to conflate 'language' with 'theory', or with 'a theory and an axiomatization' or 'a logic' or 'logistic system'. These are related but different notions. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Tarski himself used an analytic proposition "snow is white" — RussellA
Adding white to snow is a synthetic addition to my more modern understanding because on a dark night snow could be black instead. — magritte
Tarski in "snow is white" is using "is" to mean "has the property", in which case "snow is white" is analytic.
To say "snow is black on a dark night" is a synthetic proposition, as it can be expanded to "snow which has the property of being white appears black on a dark night" — RussellA
So yes, the T-sentences are not a theory of truth, at least in that they do not tell us which sentences are true and which false, but which sentences have the same truth value. — Banno
So yes, the T-sentences are not a theory of truth, at least in that they do not tell us which sentences are true and which false, but which sentences have the same truth value.
— Banno
A one-to-one translation from object language to another language then gets us nowhere, truth value remains unaffected, and a truth maker ϕ is still to be sought. What else could constitute a truth maker for any proposition of an object language? — magritte
We have material adequacy:
For any sentence p, p is true if and only if ϕ
and we tie meaning down by sticking to one sentence, so that the meaning cannot be ambiguous. We name the sentence on one side, and use it on the other.
"p" is true if and only if p
...and hey, presto, we have a definition of truth. — Banno
To my understanding, 1) Tarski's T-Schema "p" is true IFF p is not a Theory of Truth, but establishes the conditions necessary for a Theory of Truth for synthetic propositions. — RussellA
Snow is black shocks because it is contradictory to white and thus supposedly logically impossible. — magritte
It seems unlikely that the fundamental nature of snow changes with the light. — RussellA
white is not a property but just the most commonly seen appearance of snow...Unfortunately this leads away from the OP topic which presumes truth for T-sentences. — magritte
The analytic.synthetic distinction makes not difference to the T-sentence; in works for both.............Your use of "designation" is nothing like Tarski's. It's closer to Austin's discussion of performative utterances — Banno
To my understanding, whether a proposition is analytic or synthetic makes a difference to the T-Sentence, because the truth of an analytic proposition is determined by a Performative Utterance, which is not the case for a synthetic proposition. — RussellA
"Snow is white" is not analytic...Keep working on it. — Banno
The problem is one of logic. — RussellA
In what fundamental way is "snow is white" different to "seven plus five is twelve". — RussellA
The Revision Theory — Banno
That in another possible world snow is green, but 7+5 is 12 in all possible worlds................And is not obviously related to T-sentences. — Banno
For Tarski, the right hand side is a Metalanguage, which is not the world. — RussellA
Relations don't exist. Individuals, {a,b,c...} are what exist.Yes, if relations ontologically exist in the world. No, if relations don't ontologically exist in the world. — RussellA
the domain of the metalanguage — Banno
Relations don't exist. — Banno
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