And modeling only highlights the role of consciousness in creating the scientific view of reality, a paradox that emerged rather conspicuously in the observational phase of quantum physics. — Pantagruel
You don't make a case for "science as metaphysics" – besides, the phrase seems incoherent insofar as the latter consists of categorical statements (ideas) and the former hypothetical propositions (explanations). :chin: — 180 Proof
The role of measurement, perhaps. — jgill
Can you amplify this? — Pantagruel
An experiment is performed. A machine registers the outcome. This is when the "collapse" occurs. An hour later a scientist reads the measurement - his reading doesn't mystically create an answer. — jgill
I don't think this successfully detaches the observer from the event, do you? — Pantagruel
Now that is math for you, try explaining that! — Pantagruel
Maybe; but is also true.This seems a gross oversimplification that does justice to neither. — Pantagruel
:100:An hour later a scientist reads the measurement - his reading doesn't mystically create an answer. — jgill
Metaphysics only interprets physics, therefore it is not "science".
Everyone has a metaphysics after all, even if they dislike it. — Manuel
↪Pantagruel Are 'metaphysical statements' experimentally testable? Does any 'metaphysical system' entail predictions about matters of fact? If not, then metaphysics isn't modern science. — 180 Proof
I think "science is founded on" pragmatic, or working, assumptions like that one. Such a "metaphysical position", however, may be a categorical generalization that has been subsequently deduced from scientific practices and findings.How do you respond to the claim that science is founded on a metaphysical position - that reality can be understood? — Tom Storm
Yes, IME, the results of science are only provisional (fallibilistic) and eliminable, not proven.Or do you view science as being less totalising than this claim and more tentative in its approach?
Maybe "metaphysics" only makes explicit (i.e. problematizes) "the limits" – presuppositions – "of modern science" ...So, yes, metaphysics isn't modern science, because it attempts to go beyond some of the limits of modern science. — Pantagruel
Modern science is a methodology, whose primary result is knowledge. — Pantagruel
Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century with two fundamental ideas: planned experiments (Francis Bacon) and the mathematical representation of relations among phenomena (Galileo). This basic experimental-mathematical epistemology evolved until, in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a stringent form involving (1) a mathematical theory constituting scientific knowledge, (2) a formal operational correspondence between the theory and quantitative empirical measurements, and (3) predictions of future measurements based on the theory. The “truth” (validity) of the theory is judged based on the concordance between the predictions and the observations. While the epistemological details are subtle and require expertise relating to experimental protocol, mathematical modeling, and statistical analysis, the general notion of scientific knowledge is expressed in these three requirements.
Science is neither rationalism nor empiricism. It includes both in a particular way. In demanding quantitative predictions of future experience, science requires formulation of mathematical models whose relations can be tested against future observations. Prediction is a product of reason, but reason grounded in the empirical. Hans Reichenbach summarizes the connection: “Observation informs us about the past and the present, reason foretells the future.”
The demand for quantitative prediction places a burden on the scientist. Mathematical theories must be formulated and be precisely tied to empirical measurements. Of course, it would be much easier to construct rational theories to explain nature without empirical validation or to perform experiments and process data without a rigorous theoretical framework. On their own, either process may be difficult and require substantial ingenuity. The theories can involve deep mathematics, and the data may be obtained by amazing technologies and processed by massive computer algorithms. Both contribute to scientific knowledge, indeed, are necessary for knowledge concerning complex systems such as those encountered in biology. However, each on its own does not constitute a scientific theory. In a famous aphorism, Immanuel Kant stated, “Concepts without percepts are blind; percepts without concepts are empty.” — Edward Dougherty
I've come to believe that the term metaphysics itself is the problem.
Inasmuch as metaphysics purports to examine the nature of being, and being necessarily exists, then the subject-matter of metaphysics is incontestably real. In which case metaphysics is not different in kind from science, but only degree. Metaphysics must be an attempt to conceptualize the nature of reality insofar as that is not yet well-captured by science. Which certainly covers a lot of ground. However the notion of metaphysics as somehow distinct or separate from physics is misleading, a strawman. — Pantagruel
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