You don't make a case for "science as metaphysics" – besides, the phrase seems incoherent insofar as the latter consists of categorical statements (ideas) and the former hypothetical propositions (explanations). :chin:

And modeling only highlights the role of consciousness in creating the scientific view of reality, a paradox that emerged rather conspicuously in the observational phase of quantum physics. — Pantagruel

The role of measurement, perhaps.

You don't make a case for "science as metaphysics" – besides, the phrase seems incoherent insofar as the latter consists of categorical statements (ideas) and the former hypothetical propositions (explanations). :chin: — 180 Proof

This seems a gross oversimplification that does justice to neither.

The role of measurement, perhaps. — jgill

Can you amplify this?

The role of measurement, perhaps. — jgill

Can you amplify this? — Pantagruel

An experiment is performed. A machine registers the outcome. This is when the "collapse" occurs. An hour later a scientist reads the measurement - his reading doesn't mystically create an answer. Mathematically, a superposition means a variety of possible answers arising from a solution of an equation. One is correct.

If I am wrong a physicist on TPF can correct me. :smile:

I admit, I am wrong at times!

An experiment is performed. A machine registers the outcome. This is when the "collapse" occurs. An hour later a scientist reads the measurement - his reading doesn't mystically create an answer. — jgill

Inasmuch as the machine was created and deployed by human intention, I don't think this successfully detaches the observer from the event, do you? It's definitely interesting.

I don't think this successfully detaches the observer from the event, do you? — Pantagruel

There's your philosophical wiggle room! Have at it. :cool:

Also, in a sense the machine becomes part of a model/simulation consisting of the measurable and the potential measurements....

Could be. I just look at the math of the thing, which doesn't seem like Magick.

Math is intriguing.
Did you know that quite recently, scientists were able to create an entirely new phase state of matter that resists quantum decoherence by bombarding atoms in a quantum computer with a laser pulse sequence based on Fibonnaci numbers? Now that is math for you, try explaining that!
New phase of matter

Now that is math for you, try explaining that! — Pantagruel

Haven't a clue. It's Greek to me.

Haven't a clue. It's Greek to me. — jgill

Maybe it's Magick.

This seems a gross oversimplification that does justice to neither. — Pantagruel

Maybe; but is also true.

An hour later a scientist reads the measurement - his reading doesn't mystically create an answer. — jgill

:100:

The relationship between metaphysical research programs and scientific theories is pretty complex, I'll give you that.

This looks interesting, but it's pretty lengthy. I've only skimmed it.

Criticism and the methodology of Scientific Research Programs

More on point

[The metaphysics of science is] the philosophical study of the general metaphysical notions that are applied in all our scientific disciplines....This modal suggestion, that the metaphysics of science is an investigation of the metaphysical preconditions of science, has rather a Kantian flavour. But arguably, the idea that certain metaphysical phenomena are necessary for science was present in ancient thinking, as we will now see.

What is the metaphysics of science, Mumford & Tigby

If metaphysics (qua ontology) is the science of being, then it must have universal relevance. Frankly, there are a lot of terminological niceties in philosophy that give rise to a great variety of competing interpretations. The fact that this is so means that anyone who argues vehemently from some terminological standpoint (such as propositional logic) is really only appealing to lack of consensus as an authority.

How is the metaverse science? It's technology and a dubious one at that, if you have in mind Zuckerberg's version of it.

I perceive a tendency to conflate technology with science - it has some similarities, for example, much new tech would not be possible without scientific breakthroughs, but it does not follow that the technology itself is science, I don't think.

Science has no metaphysics. It is neutral in this regard. We choose, if we so wish, to add metaphysics to science. Everyone has a metaphysics after all, even if they dislike it.

Metaphysics only interprets physics, therefore it is not "science". :yawn:

Metaphysics only interprets physics, therefore it is not "science".

Philosophy, and in particular metaphysics, has been killed off again and again, day after day, the deed done by a variety of assassins: eighteenth-century empiricists, Hegel, Marx, positivists of every hue, Wittgenstein, and so on. But behold, after all these massacres the poor thing rises from the grave, oblivious to the fact that it is supposed to be dead, and starts walking. Where it is going it admittedly does not know, and nor does anyone else, but that is a different question. - Leszek Kołakowski, "Our Merry Apocalypse," Is God Happy? :death: :yikes:

And the point is ...?

That metaphysics could be seen as a destructive threat for positivism... (?)
I am lost, sorry...

Everyone has a metaphysics after all, even if they dislike it. — Manuel

Yes, as does science, implicitly. That is the gist.

If it does, which I don't think is clear at all, then I'd argue that the metaphysics of science is bound to be argued for one's own personal metaphysical preferences: it can be defended as materialism, verifications, rationalistic idealism, transcendental idealism, eliminitavist, dualist, and so on.

I've come to believe that the term metaphysics itself is the problem.

Inasmuch as metaphysics purports to examine the nature of being, and being necessarily exists, then the subject-matter of metaphysics is incontestably real. In which case metaphysics is not different in kind from science, but only degree. Metaphysics must be an attempt to conceptualize the nature of reality insofar as that is not yet well-captured by science. Which certainly covers a lot of ground. However the notion of metaphysics as somehow distinct or separate from physics is misleading, a strawman.

Are 'metaphysical statements' experimentally testable? Does any 'metaphysical system' entail predictions about matters of fact? If not, then metaphysics isn't modern science.

Fair assessment. How do you respond to the claim that science is founded on a metaphysical position - that reality can be understood? Or do you view science as being less totalising than this claim and more tentative in its approach?

↪Pantagruel Are 'metaphysical statements' experimentally testable? Does any 'metaphysical system' entail predictions about matters of fact? If not, then metaphysics isn't modern science. — 180 Proof

Modern science is a methodology, whose primary result is knowledge. Obviously, knowledge predates modern science. Science has carved out a domain, but it is far from being universal. Indeed, modern science operates by way of abstractions and approximations, which is why its products are 'facts' whose accuracy is fundamentally limited by the physical constraints of instruments, and 'theories' which are only ever a 'currently best description' of something. So the question is really, is it legitimate to pursue knowledge in domains where science, for various reasons, is unable to operate? Where events transpire either too quickly or too slowly to be effectively observed and analyzed, for example. In fact, as I've mentioned elsewhere, the trend is precisely to expand science beyond such limits by means of modeling, a method which has been assimilated by science. At the end of a day, a scientific theory is a model. But so could a metaphysical theory be construed.

So, yes, metaphysics isn't modern science, because it attempts to go beyond some of the limits of modern science. Of which there are many. Certainly the metaphysics of consciousness springs to mind.

How do you respond to the claim that science is founded on a metaphysical position - that reality can be understood? — Tom Storm

I think "science is founded on" pragmatic, or working, assumptions like that one. Such a "metaphysical position", however, may be a categorical generalization that has been subsequently deduced from scientific practices and findings.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/739670

Or do you view science as being less totalising than this claim and more tentative in its approach?

Yes, IME, the results of science are only provisional (fallibilistic) and eliminable, not proven.

So, yes, metaphysics isn't modern science, because it attempts to go beyond some of the limits of modern science. — Pantagruel

Maybe "metaphysics" only makes explicit (i.e. problematizes) "the limits" – presuppositions – "of modern science" ...

Nice. Thank you.

Modern science is a methodology, whose primary result is knowledge. — Pantagruel

I’ve found this précis to be quite accurate:

Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century with two fundamental ideas: planned experiments (Francis Bacon) and the mathematical representation of relations among phenomena (Galileo). This basic experimental-mathematical epistemology evolved until, in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a stringent form involving (1) a mathematical theory constituting scientific knowledge, (2) a formal operational correspondence between the theory and quantitative empirical measurements, and (3) predictions of future measurements based on the theory. The “truth” (validity) of the theory is judged based on the concordance between the predictions and the observations. While the epistemological details are subtle and require expertise relating to experimental protocol, mathematical modeling, and statistical analysis, the general notion of scientific knowledge is expressed in these three requirements.

Science is neither rationalism nor empiricism. It includes both in a particular way. In demanding quantitative predictions of future experience, science requires formulation of mathematical models whose relations can be tested against future observations. Prediction is a product of reason, but reason grounded in the empirical. Hans Reichenbach summarizes the connection: “Observation informs us about the past and the present, reason foretells the future.”

The demand for quantitative prediction places a burden on the scientist. Mathematical theories must be formulated and be precisely tied to empirical measurements. Of course, it would be much easier to construct rational theories to explain nature without empirical validation or to perform experiments and process data without a rigorous theoretical framework. On their own, either process may be difficult and require substantial ingenuity. The theories can involve deep mathematics, and the data may be obtained by amazing technologies and processed by massive computer algorithms. Both contribute to scientific knowledge, indeed, are necessary for knowledge concerning complex systems such as those encountered in biology. However, each on its own does not constitute a scientific theory. In a famous aphorism, Immanuel Kant stated, “Concepts without percepts are blind; percepts without concepts are empty.” — Edward Dougherty

Further to that, scientific method embodies a great many axioms, at least some of which are metaphysical, which, however, are not visible to science itself, as they’re not considered to be amongst the objects of scientific analysis. This is explored by philosophers of science like Michael Polanyi. According to Polanyi, science operates within a set of boundary conditions that define the limits of scientific inquiry. These boundary conditions refer to the assumptions, tacit knowledge, and frameworks that shape scientific investigations. They represent the underlying principles and presuppositions upon which scientific knowledge is built.

Polanyi argued that these boundary conditions are not explicitly derived from scientific evidence or observation alone. Instead, they are influenced by personal and tacit knowledge, which includes subjective experiences, intuitions, and individual perspectives, and are often tacitly, but enormously, influential in what are considered to be valid questions for scientific research. In arriving at these, scientists rely on their personal judgments, commitments, and values when formulating hypotheses, designing experiments, and interpreting results.

Furthermore, Polanyi emphasized that the boundary conditions of science are not fixed or static but can evolve over time. As scientific knowledge progresses, new discoveries, theories, and paradigms emerge, challenging existing boundary conditions and expanding the frontiers of scientific inquiry.

I've come to believe that the term metaphysics itself is the problem.

Inasmuch as metaphysics purports to examine the nature of being, and being necessarily exists, then the subject-matter of metaphysics is incontestably real. In which case metaphysics is not different in kind from science, but only degree. Metaphysics must be an attempt to conceptualize the nature of reality insofar as that is not yet well-captured by science. Which certainly covers a lot of ground. However the notion of metaphysics as somehow distinct or separate from physics is misleading, a strawman. — Pantagruel

I think that's right and that's what I've more or less concluded after looking at the topic rather carefully for 4 years and still to this day. I also agree that metaphysics is "real" and is related to the nature of being.

I do not think it follows that metaphysics must be connected to physics, but it is helpful to the framework if what you conclude from a system of metaphysics does not contradict physics, otherwise your system is bad.

Two further comments:

1) I believe that we have restricted the scope of or knowledge to such a degree, that what was thought to be "capturable" by human thought turned out to be less than we expected: Descartes, Leibniz, etc. We know much less that they aimed for.

2) Yes, there is merit in the idea that it can be thought of as an attempt to conceptualize reality "ahead of physics", in a way. Which is why I believe the notion of "things in itself", for instance, or maybe idea of the ground of the given in experience are ideal candidates for modern metaphysics, more so the former idea.

The problem is that it seems to me we can only speak on these things on an "as if" basis, or negatively, as it were, saying what it can't be. Going beyond this would be going beyond what we can know in principle.

So, mostly agree, with minor reservations.