Evidence/observations that Putin wants to enroll Ukraine in Russia, as far as feasible at least, has been mentioned prior.
The NATO thing applies to all of Ukraine;
various statements (propaganda style) like calling Ukraine not a real country, should never have been given self-governance, history this history that (there's a bit of irony here), suppression-oppression-repression (if not assassination) of other voices in Russia along with calls for nationalism, whatever;
Yanukovych was ousted in a bad way, granted, yet the parliament voted to fire him, and democratic elections followed, putting Ukraine on a trajectory of more openness and democratic transparency with international observers, despite all the foreign meddling in different directions - all construed as nothing but a wicked coup d'état by the Putinistas;
officials demanding Ukraine just give up, and that the "special operation" has been expanded;
yep, the initial Feb move on Kyiv, too;
diplomatic "hesitance" and semi-concern, perhaps even pseudo-efforts (apparently being dictated by Kremlin war strategists - albeit conjecture, it's consistent);
too little bona fides indications;
actions taken in Ukraine, the interrupted Kherson pseudo-vote, militarily, against civilians, what-have-you.
As of typing, I can't be bothered to round up more.

Something that stands out is the disregard for, even forgetting, Ukrainian self-governance.
They're the ones being bombed, killed, while flooded (past and present) with propaganda/meddling in different directions.

Personally, I think that if the Ukrainians size the initiative, the Russian front can only take so much; it will collapse at some point under various stress factors, including poor morale, logistical difficulties and relentless attacks. What one needs to take into account is that the Ukrainians have been building up their capabilities while the Russians have eroded theirs. Now the balance is tilting. That means "fear is changing camp."

Crimea is another kettle of fish but it has vulnerabilities, e.g. that bridge linking it to Russia.

Europe facing the energy crisis



Gargalo (Portugal), courtesy of Cartooning for Peace

On the SCO summit’s first day, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov made Putin wait for him before issuing a joint statement – even though Kyrgyzstan hosts a Russian military base, and at least one million of its citizens work as labour migrants in Russia. — Al Jazeera

Not just the president of Kyrgyzstan, but the leaders of Turkey, India and Azerbaijan also made Putin wait for them.

And Erdogan has done this to Putin before.



Remember how Putin made everyone wait for him?



How the times have changed!

It may seem a bit childish to gloat like that, but in politics optics matter, and this is an apt illustration of the point made in the article.

It may seem a bit childish to gloat like that, but in politics optics matter, and this is an apt illustration of the point made in the article. — SophistiCat

The term "paper tiger" has appeared in a number of articles. It seems Putin has screwed up, probably irreversibly.

I think the US has helped China fill the power vacuum, though.

As long as ordnance and equipment continues flowing into Ukraine, Ukraine will not stop until all of the Donbas is reclaimed. Ukrainians are mad and extremely motivated. Actually, even if supplies stopped coming into Ukraine from the West, Russia would be hard pressed to get them to accept any kind of compromise.

As it stands right now, Kharkiv and several thousand square kilometers to the east of the city have been recaptured. Russia is suffering serious personnel shortages. The Russian soldiers previously stationed in that region were inadequately fortified and entrenched. In the south we have Kherson pinned from the north and west, and Russia’s supply lines into the Kherson and some of the surrounding cities in the oblast have been severely compromised. There are still a LOT of Russian soldiers left in Kherson, so the going is slow. We have to work very carefully.

From my experience fighting the Russian invasion force is like fighting children. Most of their troops are inexperienced, unmotivated, poorly provisioned, and suffering from low morale. The main thing that makes things difficult is the inordinate amount of artillery that Russia possesses (easily the most in the world, more than the United States), and the fact that Russia was able to essentially sneak a large part of its army into Ukraine with very little resistance under the guise of doing military exercises and other things.

Ukraine is going to incur heavy casualties in the coming months, but the difference between Russia and Ukraine is that the former lacked the personnel to adequately defend newly gained territory, whereas the later does not. Also, the motivation of the Ukrainian soldiers cannot be underestimated, and the poor morale of Russian soldiers cannot be dismissed. They are very salient factors in this war, especially now that winter is coming.

Russia will be unable to maintain its current pace of artillery fire for more than one year. This is extremely important because its Russia’s artillery (as well as air support, missiles & rockets) that have been largely keeping Ukrainian armies at bay. Meanwhile Ukraine is picking up steam with more and more long range weaponry.

Most likely Kherson will be taken and we will recapture more territory in the north and east. We are reaching a point where Russian forces are more compacted and dug in, so its best to focus on digging in now to fortify the lands we have recaptured, while more of our forces can “catch up” behind us.

Putin’s escalation plan of infrastructure destruction has now begun in earnest.

Will Ukraine be armed with enough air defence to protect its civilian power grid? Or does the Russian “trash everything you are claiming to liberate” mentality just proceed to its next logical step?

Unclear if the Ukrainians can cut off a Kherson supply route.

We have to work very carefully.

From my experience fighting the Russian invasion force is like fighting children. — Wolfman

:chin:

What I'm missing again from your reply: even if all of that is true (which I don't think any of us are in a position to say with certainty one way or the other), should they? Is it worth the deaths and destruction? Surely there's more to morality than beating the Russians at all costs?

boethius means winning as a surrender, much the same way the Dutch and French surrendered to the Germans and the Germans surrendered to the Allies and the Russians. Winning like that is nigh impossible. I think that's a bit of a semantic trick though. — Benkei

Yes, in the context of "we will not negotiate!" then winning is the surrender of the opposing side.

Then there's winning meaning reclaiming the above and Crimea. That's exceedingly difficult and to me it's pretty obvious that that should not be attempted from a cost-benefit analysis (costs in human lives). At least as things stand now and appear to continue for the foreseeable future. — Benkei

Winning meaning reclaiming Donetsk and Luhansk and the southern occupied territories is already much more difficult. Not impossible but I think that also depends on what of the stories are true. Did the Russians merely tactically retreat form Kharkiv or was it an actual gain? Are the Russians having problems with their supply lines or are these news items exagerrated? Is Western material support sufficient or not? I can't tell and I don't think anyone on this site can accurately gage it. Along with those uncertainties, the question also becomes one of whether the costs (eg. Ukrainian deaths first and foremost but also Russian deaths which are mostly men like you and me forced to fight). My personal feeling about that, is that territory is much less important than people. But then I've never been a nationalistic or patriotic type so I might misunderstand the psyche of Ukrainians in that respect. — Benkei

None of these scenarios are "winning the war". This is the key point that Zelenskyites refuse to address.

Take back Donbas, take back Crimea ... the war would still be on.

Not only would the human and material cost be very high to retake all Donbas and even higher Crimea, Russia can re-enter Ukraine at any point along the 2000 km border with Ukraine at any time (and, presumably also the 1000 km border with Belarus).

The "front line" discussed today is only a small part of the actual front line that stretches some 4000-5000 km.

Even if the the above scenarios were to play out, there would still be a state of war with a lot of border to defend.

Winning meaning locking up Russian forces in a stalemate which will lead them to eventually accept some type of truce or even peace deal, I think is highly probable. And I'd rather see that sooner than later. — Benkei

I also agree that a negotiated peace is the best outcome, but definitely this is not a "win" according to Zelensky standards and it's difficult to say a war was won when 20% of territory is ceded.

Russians merely tactically retreat form Kharkiv or was it an actual gain? — Benkei

There's been a lot of internet debate on "tactical retreat" vs. "just retreat", which I think is worth clarifying to said internet denizens.

The mini controversy seems to take place under the erroneous conception that tactical retreat is synonymous with "brilliant military manoeuvre" and that you "actually wanted to retreat all along".

This is of course not true.

Tactical retreat can refer to a re-positioning, a deceptive pre-planned trap, or just then retreating under pressure as a tactic, and in all cases is not by definition the best move.

It's "tactical" when it is used as a manoeuvre to reposition and inflict casualties on the advancing forces, which may or may not be successful. It's "successful" if the pros outweigh the cons, obviously.

Which definitely, as you note, we cannot easily evaluate. We don't know the cost to Ukraine in pushing the Russians out of Kharkiv and we don't know what Russia plans on doing next.

Russians merely tactically retreat form Kharkiv or was it an actual gain? Are the Russians having problems with their supply lines or are these news items exagerrated? Is Western material support sufficient or not? I can't tell and I don't think anyone on this site can accurately gage it. — Benkei

I think it's safe to assume everything is exaggerated in Western media.

However, NATO could definitely pour far more arms into Ukraine than it currently has. Could have provided Himars and satellite targeting of those from day 1 of the war, likewise flood Ukraine with AA systems, along with NATO tanks and far more artillery.

NATO has not. So what one needs to ask to understand the situation is "what's the evaluation criteria of what to send and not send". Why only 16 Himars trucks when the US has over hundred such systems.

Of course, NATO mostly simply doesn't explain the criteria, Ukraine must be happy with what it gets, but on occasion claims their criteria is they send as much support as they can ... until their own defence is compromised.

Well, that's really not plausibly true at all, as if that was the criteria Ukraine would at least get a bit of everything already. If the current US stockpile of shorter range Himars missiles really was running "dangerously low" then they'd have already supplied some of the longer range missiles that are at full stock.

Other weapons systems that Ukraine doesn't get at all, like F16's (not to mention F-35's), obviously US could spare at least some (especially aircraft that's being phased out of the US air fleet). Would require training ... but Ukrainians have be doing training for months in UK and other NATO nations (and non-NATO nations like Finland too). It can't take that long to train a fighter pilot on a new aircraft, and even if it did the war may go on for years so better to get started.

What can we deduce from NATO arms supply policy is that the criteria is not support Ukraine up until some imaginary standard of compromising own security (which doesn't really hold water in itself ... should everyone be willing to take some risks for this holy war?).

Rather, quite obviously, the policy is to supply arms and training enough to Ukraine to not suffer embarrassing defeat but not risk actually winning on the battlefield either.

US and NATO do not care about the Donbas and whether Ukraine has it or Russia has it.

The policies that actually matter: new cold war and arms sales bonanza and securing a hard-power future where US is top dog in it's little club, while also undermining European security with a flood of advanced weaponry on the black market. These policies are achieved by a prolonged war where Ukraine support is calibrated to neither win nor lose.

Russia may also want exactly the same thing: cutoff from the West, alternative financial system booted up, alternative component supply lines worked out, permanent justification for the war economy, increased arms sales to non-NATO partners, increasing uncertainty and price of everything it sells.

Of course, the key partner to do all that is China, but that maybe why the invasion was launched after a long meeting between Xi and Putin.

And the Western idea that China is unhappy about Russia's "anti-Western-liberal-order" moves in Ukraine, is just stupid.

True, China has economic leverage over Russia, but Russia has commodity leverage over China. and as we've just seen with the EU, it's pretty big leverage. Russia actually has more leverage over China than the EU because the EU is at least food self sufficient whereas China has major problems there and is facing much harsher climate change impacts.

So, true, we cannot evaluate the conditions on the ground, exact casualty statistics, but we can evaluate what is and isn't sent to Ukraine and infer the actual criteria is not-win but not-completely-lose. And if that's the criteria than what we see fits that hypothesis: Ukraine is unable to take Kherson (a strategically vital position for the Russians) but can take a bunch of more-or-less buffer space around Kharkiv. Ukraine asks for more arms and longer range missiles to continue the momentum ... US hums-and-haws and warns Russia about using tactical nuclear weapons (which would provide easy victory in military terms ... some on the internet, like Zeihan, are claiming tactical nukes aren't effective, but that's really dumb).

On the subject of Ziehan.

I do think he's a good faith actor genuinely believing what he says, and has lot's of interesting facts and I think generally is at least discussing the relevant topics, just with extreme US bias (which is good perspective to have for the sake of argument in any case).

However, sometimes his analysis is basically "what the hell are you smoking?"



He feels using tactical nuclear weapons wouldn't be effective (wrong, they are very effective at blowing stuff up) and Russia won't use them (very likely, it's obviously a massive line to cross that Russia would have crossed already if that was the plan).

... but then goes onto casually state Russia may flatten European cities with Nukes?

But also Russia, even Putin, doesn't want to end the human condition and have all out WWIII. I'm honestly unable to follow the reasoning: "tactical Nukes ... nah, but sure let's nuke entire cities?"

And the reason not to use tactical nukes is because that will frustrate the ultimate goal of taking key strategic locations Poland and Romania ... but also Ukraine will defeat Russia.

An alternative strategic view of the "Russia has already lost" narrative, is as follows:

Obviously Russia hasn't already lost, but still holds most of Donbas, Kherson, Crimea and the space in between.

Before this new offensive, even the Western narrative was shifting towards questions like "can Ukraine win?" and "is supplying arms enough?" and "time to discuss the diplomatic resolution of the war?"

So, Ukraine knows it needs a win to keep its Western backing and Russia knows it too, offensive is for sure coming before the fall and winter. The mud may figuratively freeze Ukrainian offensives (Scott Ritter posted above is quite convinced of this), and then winter may literally freeze Ukrainians on the front line where the supply line is stretched out 1000 km, easily targeted, and likely much easier in winter with IR signatures much more apparent.

It was certainly in the realm of possibility a few weeks ago that Ukraine actually break through and take Kherson, or then anywhere from there to Donbas. For example, an attack East of the Dnieper, if it were to succeed all the way to the coast would isolate the Russians on the West side of the river. These sorts of things would be major strategic blows and major embarrassment, followed by re-damming the canal that supply Crimea.

The retreat from Kharkiv regions is certainly some embarrassment, but no-where near anything the embarrassment and actual strategic problem of the fall of Kherson, or punching through the "land bridge" all the way to the coast at any point.

It's said Russians repositioned significant forces from Kharkiv region to reinforce other places on the front. The logic certainly is that they don't intend to defend Kharkiv if the offensive comes there.

So, the situation is now that Ukraine has certainly a propaganda win, that they critically needed; however, battle field conditions are not clear and momentum of the offensive seems to have stalled back to incremental gains on both sides. There's certainly no collapse of the Russian lines and critical strategic locations are being overrun. The territories exchanged are at the moment highly debatable in military significance.

What's next?

Russian strategy since the withdrawal of Kiev offensive, has been clearly to stop armoured offensives and advance with significant artillery bombardment (basically bombard a place until Ukrainians leave it), minimising casualties, and making "geopolitical moves" until Winter.

Russia has successfully navigated the sanctions and their partnerships with China, India, basically the entire rest of the world outside the West, as well as just closed various deals in the SCO meeting, including Iran. Time will tell what significant this all has, but seems in the positive direction for Russia. There's a theory that sanctions are "eroding" Russia economy, but I find that implausible given the economic links with China and positive revenue flows. This is in no way comparable to North Korea or Venezuela, of which sanctions didn't "work" in those far more favourable conditions. I find it far more plausible that any direct infrastructure problems happened in the initial sanctions shock and alternative components worked out since. True, some Western equipment may simply be impossible to repair, but if you have money you can just purchase an entire substitute from China, maybe a bit less efficient but economies don't entirely collapse due to efficiency drops in various capital equipment. Likewise, for normal people's lives, there been plenty of time now to adjust to new jobs and habits.

Unless Ukraine does succeed in some catastrophic breakthrough, the next phase in the war is slowing either retaliation or then genuine need to slow Ukraine down by hitting infrastructure and then seeing how the gas situation plays out in winter.

If everything on the front line is stabilised again by winter, nothing much happening for the months between now and February, when the gas shortages and prices really start to hit home, talk of negotiated settlement with Russia may build back momentum again.

Moods change, today people cheer on the Ukrainians because they're told they're "winning", and people like winners, but if that narrative flips again, mood can easily change to "time to end the war" and "it's gone on long enough" and "it's better to make peace with Russia", obviously fuelled by gas pains.

Diplomatically, the whole thing could be wrapped up by the EU in about a week, by coming up with a resolution Russia can accept and more-or-less forcing Ukraine to accept it whether the like it or not. EU leaders simply choose not to try to resolve the conflict, but at some point real economic domestic pressures may simply overwhelm any churchillian fantasies or just distaste at losing face to Russia, and the leaders that spearhead peaceful resolution will get the credit for doing "what needs to be done" and being on the side of peace and so on, and putting things behind us; if gas prices go down, it will be a political win.

It's only a (highly debatable) political win today insofar as the full consequences of the war aren't felt by people. At some point Europeans aren't going to care much about some strange idealistic fight that has no clear end point in Ukraine, and will want their leaders to fix economic problems (that are far easier to fix with cheaper gas and oil).

My prediction is the main European leaders will push for a peaceful resolution the moment all the smaller European countries start to essentially capitulate diplomatically for the gas. If there's no prospect to the end of the war with more fighting, and an essentially pro-Russian factions starts to grow bigger within the EU itself, the more powerful European leaders will have no other choice than to attempt to make peace and put things back "to normal".

This my best guess to the basic thoughts of the Kremlin at the moment: everyone comes crawling back for the gas, sooner or later.

Not to say this strategy will succeed, but I think this is in broad strokes what the Russians are trying to accomplish.

even if all of that is true (which I don't think any of us are in a position to say with certainty one way or the other), should they? Is it worth the deaths and destruction? Surely there's more to morality than beating the Russians at all costs? — Benkei

I am not 100% certain of much. Let's not pretend that things are impossible to tell in the specific case of Ukraine... There's more info on Ukraine than on many other issues.

And yes, Ukrainians in majority think that it is worthwhile to chase the Russians from Ukraine. You are welcome to disagree, but our opinion is not really important here. We're not fighting this war.

And yes, Ukrainians in majority think that it is worthwhile to chase the Russians from Ukraine. You are welcome to disagree, but your opinion is not really important here. You're not fighting this war. — Olivier5

This is obviously untrue in itself and your opinion on @Benkeis opinion or anything Ukraine would likewise be unimportant and you should have just been repeating that from the beginning.

However, if our if our tax dollars are being used to finance Ukraines war effort and supply arms and also government implementing sanctions to harm Russia ... how is that not our direct issue as European citizens?

Sure, if Ukraine was doing its thing entirely alone, under its own power and resources, it would be less relevant to non-Ukrainians.

But that's not remotely the case.

if our if our tax dollars are being used to finance Ukraines war effort and supply arms and also government implementing sanctions to harm Russia ... how is that not our direct issue as European citizens? — boethius

Sure, EU citizens are welcome to demonstrate or argue against what the EU does, ie the EU sanctions or the EU support to Ukraine. But they are not the one deciding to fight or not, and to negotiate or not, or whether it's worthwhile to resist or not.

EU citizens are welcome to demonstrate or argue against what the EU does, ie the EU sanctions or the EU support to Ukraine. But they are not the one deciding to fight or not, and to negotiate or not, or whether it's worthwhile to resist or not. — Olivier5

So by that token your comments about Russian military policy have been out of place. It is carried out by Russians and affects Ukrainians. Nothing to do with you, a matter only for Russians and Ukrainians to comment on.

You misunderstood my point. Try again.

Your 'point' is as transparent as ever. Parrot Western mainstream media and deflect any criticism by transferring all responsibility to this amorphous group 'the Ukrainians' whom you've neither polled, nor surveyed, nor asked, but in whose hands you're happy to place unprecedented levels of firepower, barely traceable, for them to do with what they will.

I was fighting in Ukraine in spring when Russia had invaded Kyiv Oblast and was attacking Irpin, Bucha, Brovary, and other surrounding cities. The biggest challenge fighting Russia is their massive amounts of artillery, which is invaluable for keeping attacking infantry units at bay. Russian infantry to my apprehension looked like chickens with their heads cut off, and were hesitant to attack, quick to pull back, and not decisive at all. I have personally seen Ukrainian Territorial Defense units (which are volunteer “reserve” units) hold back incursions made by Russian regulars (supported by tanks), using only automatic rifles, grenades, RPGs, & other rocket systems. To be fair, it is easier to dig in and defend than it is to attack, and attackers generally incur much higher casualties; but I was not impressed with Russia’s combat performance. There was also a host of logistical concerns Russian invaders had to contend with — not limited to bad roads, muddy conditions, fuel shortages, etc. It’s bad when a long column of Russian tanks are stalled out and you can engage them from the trees with infantry & rocket systems, then fall back & mount more attacks. To be fair again, Russia has been better with logistics since that time, but their overall performance on all but one of the Ukrainian fronts has been lackluster thus far.



As of earlier this month several key bridges around Kherson proper were destroyed by Ukrainian long range rocket systems. There are other ways for Russia to get supplies into the city, but currently defenders are largely cut off from their supply lines. As it stands right now we have not reached a point where this is affecting Russia’s ability to mount a strong defense of Kherson. They have a LOT of artillery stockpiled in the city, and defenders there are better entrenched than they were in the Kharkiv Oblast. In addition the terrain in the south does not offer attacking Ukrainian forces much cover as they mount an offense (there are plains, soft rolling hills, and irrigation canals). This will lead to high casualties on the Ukrainian side. The question in my mind is whether Ukrainian generals will decide to “wait out” the defenders & focus on stopping their supply lines while the defending force’s morale withers away, or whether we will continue to press the attack full force. The first option is attractive but the more time we wait, the longer Russia has to devise a plan to get more supplies & troops into the city from the east.

My point is simply that it is obviously the belligerents who will decide wether or not they keep on fighting. It's not the EU, and it's not little me either. So if you want to understand or to question why the war continues, ask that question to the belligerents. They are better placed to answer.

IOW, you could take the Ukrainian perspective and agency seriously, rather than minimize their role or deny their agency. And this even applies to the Russian perspective, which also needs to be studied if one wants to understand anything about this war. E.g. since the Russians started this war, it's worthwhile thinking about the conditions under which they could be forced or convinced to stop it.

since the Russians started this war, it's worthwhile thinking about the conditions under which they could be forced or convinced to stop it. — Olivier5

Yet...

if you want to understand or to question why the war continues, ask that question to the belligerents. They are better placed to answer. — Olivier5

I was fighting in Ukraine in spring when Russia had invaded Kyiv Oblast and was attacking Irpin, Bucha, Brovary, and other surrounding cities. The biggest challenge fighting Russia is their massive amounts of artillery, which is invaluable for keeping attacking infantry units at bay. Russian infantry to my apprehension looked like chickens with their heads cut off, and were hesitant to attack, quick to pull back, and not decisive at all. I have personally seen Ukrainian Territorial Defense units (which are volunteer “reserve” units) hold back incursions made by Russian regulars (supported by tanks), using only automatic rifles, grenades, RPGs, & other rocket systems. To be fair, it is easier to dig in and defend than it is to attack, and attackers generally incur much higher casualties; but I was not impressed with Russia’s combat performance. There was also a host of logistical concerns Russian invaders had to contend with — not limited to bad roads, muddy conditions, fuel shortages, etc. It’s bad when a long column of Russian tanks are stalled out and you can engage them from the trees with infantry & rocket systems, then fall back & mount more attacks. To be fair again, Russia has been better with logistics since that time, but their overall performance on all but one of the Ukrainian fronts has been lackluster thus far. — Wolfman

I thought you were a cop in the USA. :rofl:

I understand from some NATO friends you need about 3 times the manpower to invade, which is why NATO was always convinced the Russians were going to invade because of the huge standing armies when the Warsaw Pact was still existing (after the fall of Berlin, they did find exactly those type of plans). Since Russia only fielded about twice as many soldiers as Ukraine, whatever strategic goals they were considering does not involve occupation of large swathes of Ukraine and should be relatively limited. And if that's the case then what is their real goal?

To be fair again, Russia has been better with logistics since that time, but their overall performance on all but one of the Ukrainian fronts has been lackluster thus far. — Wolfman

The "all but one front" that actually mattered.

If you followed this issue before the war broke out, the "limited war goals" military analysts would talk about was "land bridge to Crimea" (and likely the maximum ambition given the forces assembled); this is what military analysts talked about as a difficult goal to achieve.

Russians achieve it in less than a week:



The idea the Russians have poor performance, no plan, irrational, etc. is just completely dumb propaganda.

Now, if the maximum goal with 200 000 troops was land bridge to Crimea, then the best commanders and forces will be committed to conquering and securing said land bridge. Second tier commanders and troops will be committed to a fixing operation to pressure Kiev and their orders will be largely to advance until resistance is met and to then entrench and wait for artillery, which is what we saw. Of course, supply lines are still vulnerable to ambush and less experienced commanders will still "try some shit" that then maybe fails, but if the goal is to fix Ukrainian troops in the North then it doesn't really matter what areas are conquered or not; i.e. there's no actual military objective in terms of a point on a map, just to keep the pressure on.

Furthermore, yes Russians suffered a lot of casualties, but so too Ukrainians, so to judge the North operation even of itself it would only be a failure if casualties were a lot higher for Russians.

Of course, that brings up the question of why not withdraw sooner if it was a fixing operation. The answer is that they withdrew at the logical time for a fixing operation.

Russian generals main fear after the first week would be if the siege of Mariupol was broken, so the fixing operation needs to stay in place until then.

the siege, which was part of the Russian eastern Ukraine offensive and southern Ukraine offensive, started on 24 February 2022 and concluded on 20 May 2022, when Russia announced the remaining Ukrainian forces in Mariupol surrendered[47] after they were ordered to cease fighting. — Siege of Mariupol

The battle of Kyiv was part of the Kyiv offensive in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine for control of Kyiv, the capital city of Ukraine, and surrounding districts. The combatants were elements of the Russian Armed Forces and Ukrainian Ground Forces. The battle lasted from 25 February 2022 to 2 April 2022 and ended with the withdrawal of Russian forces. — Battle of Kyiv (2022)

Yes, Russians suffer losses in the North but if their strategic priority is Mariupol, it is far better to suffer losses in the North than a offensive in south Ukraine that may relieve the siege of Mariupol. Had Russians not pressured Kiev in the North, the only thing for Ukrainians to do would be try to fight a salient to Mariupol, which would be intensely motivating to save their "Azov heroes" and massive propaganda victory and real, tangible and irreversible embarrassment to Russia that could not be "spun": they had the Azov Nazi's surrounded but their superior "brethren" fought all the way to break the siege; it would be truly a battle worthy for song.

Being pushed back from Kharkiv is, to contrast, not a comparable embarrassment and is reversible by simply regaining that terrain or then victories elsewhere.

And the roughly 2 weeks between the final surrender of Mariupol is not an unusual timing. First, the decision would need to be made that there are no further key objectives which the operation in the North would serve (Russians also want Donbas but do not decide on a major offensive there, but instead withdraw from the North and switch to incrementalist tactics), and second the complete withdrawal would need to be planned and orders delivered to all the key officers and again they may require some days to prepare to withdraw. So, that all that would take about 2 weeks after the Mariupol surrender is entirely reasonable time frame, and without such a hypothesis there's really no alternative to why Russia went to Kiev and why they withdrew when they did (occupation of all of Ukraine was clearly not feasible; the plan was not to conquer all of Ukraine and then they "settled" for South Ukraine, but obviously the plan was the land bridge to Crimea and securing the canal the supplies Crimea with water, and that was achieved).

Do you see a contradiction?

You have a good memory. I worked for a police department many years ago. I do real estate investment now =]

Russia’s goals are summarized well by boethius — among other things securing the Donbas, defending Crimea and securing recognition of their sovereignty over that territory, establishing an overland route to Crimea from the east, etc. Earlier in the war, Russia’s goals were more ambitious. But where boethius attributes the unfulfilment of those goals (e.g. taking Kyiv) to being a strategic diversion, I disagree, and attribute it to incompetence. Putin thought Kyiv could be taken in days, and his “yes men” mirrored that sentiment. This was not a brilliant tactical stroke, rather an embarrassing failure where Russia incurred catastrophic casualties. The number of casualties that we incurred at Irpin? Less than 60.

The sheer number of tanks, for example, that Russia lost during the incursion into Kyiv Oblast is staggering. Prior to the invasion they had 13,000 tanks (probably lower because they self-report to an extent). They lost over 2,000 in Ukraine in less than 7 months. That’s a minimum of 15% of their total tank force (probably more). Russia had already downsized its tank force because it couldnt keep them serviced properly. One thing to bear in mind is that Russia lost some of their better, modern tanks in Kyiv Oblast, and has been forced to use older tanks to bolster their depleted tank force elsewhere. This is something I have not only seen personally, but you can see in videos of engagements on the other fronts. One question to bear in mind is why would Russia send some of their best to simply “create a distraction”? Some of their best units slaughtered. An unacceptable number of Russian generals and colonels killed. High losses among their mid-level officer ranks that will takes many years to replenish. This was not a diversionary tactic. This was a strategic miscalculation in part caused by corruption and nepotism at the highest ranks, along with overconfidence, inexperience, and failed strategy (which of course is not surprising when such a system doesn’t produce the best, but instead the best connected.

The problem is that boethius is trying to render a post factum analysis of the situation as a whole without taking into account the original mindset of those planning the invasion. This is a salient feature to leave out since it speaks to the issue of [in]competency. It is essentially revisionist history (and moreover, excuse making). This is to be expected when glossing over critical details like some of the ones I provided above.

The idea the Russians have poor performance, no plan, irrational, etc. is just completely dumb propaganda. — boethius

So the truth is that Putin is doing a good job executing a rational plan. Sounds legit. :lol:

Ziehan's analysis – that the real ambition is to push all Russia's boundaries back to defensible mountain passes before demographic collapse leaves its armies starved of recruits – is always going to be more plausible.

It's what they've been doing for many years in dribs and drabs under Putin. With a politically disengaged US and a Europe dependent on Russian oil, plus a need to keep the Russian population under his spell, now was a time to see just how much he could grab in terms of a Russian annexation of a connecting Crimean land corridor and regime change in Kyiv.

If the special operation achieved these limited aims in weeks, then onwards and upwards. The geopolitical logic was still the old Russian dream of control of the steppes all the way to defensible borders. That means Poland to the edge of Warsaw, the Baltic States, etc.

So where would you argue halting Putin's ambitions? You would let him eat your hand, but not your arm?

It would be lovely if every one could just declare eternal peace and brotherhood around the negotiating table. But again, the geopolitically reality is that Russia has always needed to have its effective borders fixed way beyond even Ukraine or - in its own eyes - perish as an identity. The leadership can also read the future in terms of the demographics. Even if Putin goes, the same logic will guide those who replace him without the complete democratic overhaul that never happened the last time, and still seems utterly improbable unless it is finally de-nuked and carved back up into ethnic regions too small to trouble the world.

Stop excusing Russia's failed adventure. Give us some real analysis here. What is the least cost off-ramp for everyone now given that Russian weakness has been fully revealed and Europe would be foolish to believe the project to integrate politically and economically could be restarted even in 20 years.

This reads like fiction.

Thanks for the expression of your feelings. I’m sure the argument is in the post.

The idea the Russians have poor performance, no plan, irrational, etc. is just completely dumb propaganda.
— boethius

So the truth is that Putin is doing a good job executing a rational plan. Sounds legit. :lol: — apokrisis

You literally cite me right above your sentence, where I use the words "irrational", "no plan" and "poor performance" (discussing the Russian military) and you then paraphrase that as talking about Putin doing a good job. I.e. you literally respond to my comment pointing out propaganda with the propaganda of wildly misrepresenting my statement and throwing Putin in there when I wasn't talking about Putin.

The discussion was about Russian military planning and performance (responding to @Wolfman assertion that Russian infantry run around like headless chickens), which has nothing to do with Putin or civilian leadership in general: a competent military managed by people who can think, can be sent to fight an unjust and foolish war ... cough, cough, Iraq, Afghanistan, cough, Vietnam, cough, cough, cough.

And evaluating Putin's job performance (or the political decisions in general, such as going to war in the first place) is a completely different matter, that will be mostly about value judgements, international relations and economic consequences, and not so much military strategy and tactics. Discussion that would certainly be fruitful.

I'm an anarchist and so don't like authoritarians, but I do not view authoritarianism as irrational and certainly for people that do just want a strong man then Putin's actions are very rational.

If Putin was a peacenik good vibes loving hippy with dreadlocks living in a tent on the Kremlin commune lawn and smoking the herb all day talking about oneness and shit, then suddenly launched this war; ok, sounds irrational. However, Putin isn't a peacenik good vibes loving hippy.

Given Putin's state of beliefs (which are entirely typical for nation-state leaders both now and since thousands of years), the war in Ukraine and broader global economic conflict was and is certainly a big gamble. That it has "worked" so far (Russia hasn't collapsed economically or politically, hasn't been isolated in international relations, and the land bridge to Crimea and Kherson is occupied) should be evidence enough that the plan has been well thought out and, indeed, executed competently by Russian military and civilian leaders.

That does not mean the plan will ultimately work, maybe the Russian government will collapse tomorrow, but the Russian successes so far and things being so "on edge" militarily and politically, is really abundant evidence that it was a rational gamble to make (if you have the kind of goals Putin has).

Ziehan's analysis – that the real ambition is to push all Russia's boundaries back to defensible mountain passes before demographic collapse leaves its armies starved of recruits – is always going to be more plausible. — apokrisis

This idea seems just completely unsupported. Russia simply doesn't have the military manpower to push all the way into Poland and Romania anytime before these demographic changes happen anyways. Zeihan also doesn't explain how Russia would plan to deal with NATO and why nuclear weapons are not a better deterrent that preserves what younger generation you have ... which killing most of them in a war with NATO would be counter-productive to fixing demographic problems.

If the special operation achieved these limited aims in weeks, then onwards and upwards. The geopolitical logic was still the old Russian dream of control of the steppes all the way to defensible borders. That means Poland to the edge of Warsaw, the Baltic States, etc. — apokrisis

As has been discussed several times, Russia did not assemble a force remotely capable of occupying all of Ukraine and, from even before the war, offered extremely minimal peace terms compared to occupying all of Ukraine. Without occupying all of Ukraine there no way to go "onwards and upwards" in a military conquest of Eastern Europe.

So where would you argue halting Putin's ambitions? You would let him eat your hand, but not your arm? — apokrisis

This is just annoying. You start your post disputing my statement the Russian military has competent performance and planning given its achievements so far, but then seamlessly transition to Russia as the great bogeyman of Geopolitics capable of conquering nearly all of Eastern Europe.

You can't have it both ways, on the one hand ridiculing the Russian military capabilities and Putin's political acumen, but on the other presenting Russia as the doom of mankind that, if not stopped, will devour the whole world (or then at least Eastern Europe) somehow.

↪apokrisis This reads like fiction. — Benkei

This is what's so interesting about Zeihan, is that he brings up all sorts of interesting facts and history ... and somehow manages to weave a tale that reads like fiction.