I mean, that would be my guess too. Then he would hopefully, be forced into a negotiation, which has not happened yet, before considering the use of nukes. Given the inner turmoil in Russia, people fleeing and protesting and so on, the timer is on for Putin, much more than at any stage during this war.

We can hope this doesn't cause him to break and go for broke, or he could be thrown out by the military. Too many variables in the equation.

More useful comments on tactical nukes from former British army officer and former commander of the UK & NATO Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Forces, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon…..

It is likely that these launchers would need to travel hundreds of miles to get into a position where they could attack Ukraine, as they only have a range of up to 500 kilometers (310 miles). But from a mechanical perspective it’s unlikely, in my opinion, that they would get that far.

I believe Putin’s tactical nuclear weapons are unusable. Even if their vehicles do work, the minute they turn their engines on to move they will be picked up by US and NATO intelligence.

I hope the private discussions the Biden and Putin administrations have apparently been having are along the lines of, ‘you move your tactical nukes and NATO will take them out with long range precision guided missiles’.

The most likely nuclear scenario is, I believe, an attack by Russia on a nuclear power station in Ukraine. This could have a similar effect to a tactical nuclear explosion but would be easier to deny for the Russians, who accuse Ukraine of deliberately bombing their own power stations.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/28/opinions/how-close-putin-nuclear-war-de-bretton-gordon/index.html

However this war ends, Ukraine will end up with a large incentive to develop nuclear weapons and missiles capable of reaching strategic targets in Russia in order to avoid future attacks. — Count Timothy von Icarus

For a country that freely gave away it's nuclear deterrent, it has already hinted that it would do this. If Ukraine wouldn't be in NATO, this would be the totally logical policy. Hence it's far better for Ukraine to join NATO after this war as developing a nuclear weapon is still quite costly in this World.

I think Putin wants to stop where he is and just defend the (soon to be) annexed territories. If they're part of Russia, attempts to take them back are supposed to be an attack on Russia. — frank

That's what Russia wants the West to think, at least.

Given the inner turmoil in Russia, people fleeing and protesting and so on, the timer is on for Putin, much more than at any stage during this war.

We can hope this doesn't cause him to break and go for broke, or he could be thrown out by the military. Too many variables in the equation. — Manuel

As I said earlier, if Putin opts to use tactical nukes, he is playing Russian roulette, and not only in figuratively.

However, let's remember that when Russia annexes the territories of "Novorossiya", then it's the scenario that it has trained for in past exercises: that NATO attacks Russia and they end they conflict with using nuclear weapons. So it's a possibility...if it becomes a full-scale route in Ukraine. So I think it's a possibility, however small.

I believe Putin’s tactical nuclear weapons are unusable. Even if their vehicles do work, the minute they turn their engines on to move they will be picked up by US and NATO intelligence.

I think this is a little too much bragging from Hamish de Bretton-Gordon. Is NATO going to attack them when the launchers move out of their garrisons? Hell no! Hence you are talking about a truck-size target that can be stored in any storage facility, garage, cowshed or where ever. It can be anywhere. The idea that NATO could pick up all the tactical nukes is simply ludicrous. In fact, just how elusive the HIMARS launchers have been tells how difficult this really is.

And what if the launchers are now in Belarus. as Putin has said? (See here) Is NATO going attack out of the blue Belarus?

Let's look at history:

1) During the Cuban missile crisis the US was blissfully ignorant about the deployed Russian tactical nukes in Cuba. Hence if US Marines would landed in Cuba as in one plan, the beaches would have been nuked. At least Fidel Castro was very eager to use them if the Americans would attack. The existence of Russian tactical nukes in Cuba was only later found out, which horrified people like former defense secretary McNamara.

2) During Desert Storm Saddam Hussein launched Scud missiles against Israel from the Western Desert of Iraq. The US lead alliance put a lot of airpower to hunt them down and inserted special forces there also, which meant that a lot F-15E and other fighter bombers flew across the desert in vain to find the mobile launchers. To my knowledge, no Scud-launchers were found and destroyed. (If the Special Forces would have done that, you bet there would be the motion picture about it. Now we have the memoir of a SAS soldier in Bravo Two Zero which tells how this didn't happen). And Iraq is a Goddam desert and Iraq's military isn't the sharpest tool in town.

Hence I think this goes a bit to the propaganda side...

Vlad Vexler gives an interesting account of the psychology driving the invasion. In a nutshell, the ideological/existential clash between Russia and the West is the curious one of the West being driven by its techno-utopianism view of humanity and Russia simply being undecided about what its glorious imperial destiny is all about.

In Googol's words, Russia can't give a "why". It just hurtles ... and everyone else ought to get out of the way.

And then Putin hates the West because it has twice now infected Russia with its dangerous ideology. First there was Lenin importing communism. Then it was the US pushing neoliberalism after the Soviet collapse.

So the West has its own familiar worldview. It got swept up in its Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution to become a fossil fuel driven dream of endless growth and social progress. Economics and politics have become fused into machine designed to deliver this destiny. The natural expectation is to become one planet united under free trade liberalism.

But Russia was left off to one side as its own vast Tsarist empire with fuzzy borders, unsure if it was really Western or Eastern, just sure that it was a sacred enterprise, a true fount of culture and humanity. And increasingly aware of the difficulties of maintaining a stable sphere of influence given the fast pace development of Western Europe, with Asia starting to industrialise as well.

So the key, says Velxler, is the West is tied to a destiny predicated on teleological growth, and Russia is tied to a destiny which is just about existing as some kind of impressive imperial spectacle. It doesn't want to be made over in crass imitation of what the West thinks of as the human ideal.

This gives a neat view of why both sides think they are right at a metaphysical level. And hence why both finds the other "unreasonable".

Putin comes in after the West's neoliberal shock treatment proved so disastrous in the 1990s - an experiment in the Western dream of unstoppable growth imposed on Russian soil. And he views the USSR era as likewise the importation of flawed Western metaphysics.

Communism, like neoliberalism, was another theory based on economic determinism – change the economic structure and you change the people.

So the thesis is that Russia's sense of empire and destiny has always been vague by Western standards – as the West has very concrete notions of economic determinism and progressive ambitions.

That is why what Russia really wants in this world seems hazy. It doesn't have an empire plan as such. Even communism as a world revolution, a definite project, was a foreign import. But Vexler says under Putin this inchoate sense of self has turned hard and fascist. Putin has worked on making the state and the people one. And the mission is to push back at the West and its ever-pressuring economic utopianism.

"What good is the world for us, if it is a world without Russia?" Putin says rather nihilistically.

So is the war with Ukraine rational or irrational, competent or incompetent? Vexler paints Putin's Russia as a superpower without any particular teleological plan – something the West could negotiate with – but a huge sense of having been imposed upon for far too long and is now fused into a fascist body politic ready to be reckless about shoving everyone as far away as possible.

The idea that NATO could pick up all the tactical nukes is simply ludicrous. In fact, just how elusive the HIMARS launchers have been tells how difficult this really is.

I think this goes a bit to the propaganda side.... — ssu

Sure, he may overstate. But surveillance and drones have also come a long way since Cuba and Iraq. And Russian logistical incompetence is a thing.

I’m not following. How could lobbing a few tactical nukes in the current war - now framed as a legitimate defence of mother Russian territory - make any difference to the strategic arsenal of subs, missiles and cruise missiles? — apokrisis

I am not convinced that the line between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is a thing. Thankfully, we don't have any precedent to guide us in the matter. If the Russians start shelling civilians with small nukes instead of with cluster bombs and the like, suppressing that fire will draw NATO and company to become more directly involved. They have said as much. That has a strategic tang to it.

The reason I related its use to the logic of MAD is that once one introduces nukes into the battlespace, it doesn't make sense to send just a few. You need to use as many as you can before the response comes. It is what Zappa referred to as a One-Shot Deal.

Some threats, perceived or otherwise:

NATO a threat to Russia

• put forth by Putin and compadres as major/existential
• Georgia, Ukraine, Finland, Sweden, ...
• in speeches (schools, Valdai, whatever mentioned earlier) Putin also seems out to sell a picture of "The West" as doomed culturally/politically, a threat of sorts to Russia (countered by his alleged ideals), incidentally supported in part by his church (parallel thread)
• hindrance of free Kremlin movement/action

Russia a threat to Ukraine

• realized/reality since Crimea grab
• nuclear threats raised, extends beyond Ukraine
• Ukraine NATO membership conceded both by NATO and Ukraine but not put to paper

Secondary:

Russia a threat to Moldova, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia

• depends on Ukrainian situation, except perhaps Moldova (Transnistria)
• by extension most of Europe

Putin and team a threat to Russia(ns)

• especially in case of unchecked escalation

Probably missed some. Feel free to extend/correct.

EDIT: added links

The reason I related its use to the logic of MAD is that once one introduces nukes into the battlespace, it doesn't make sense to send just a few. — Paine

The battle space is Ukraine. If you are in Idaho or wherever, you don’t say let’s go MAD. You say sorry for your loss, guys.

The issue is how to frame Putin’s thinking. A persuasive view is that he sees himself in an existential battle with NATO and the West. Ukraine is just the current focus of a general strategy of constant escalation.

So his game is to ratchet up the pressure however he can. He doesn’t know exactly how much he will actually gain, but shaking the tree hard enough is bound to knock off some of the fruit.

Reading the nuclear talk in that light, his goal would be to put the world in such a state of funk that he gains an advantage. He must gamble with Russia’s only real card - a nuclear arsenal - and promote a climate of genuine fear.

So going nuclear in a delimited tactical fashion wouldn’t be to win in Ukraine and then declare hostilities over. It would be part of the bigger project of destabilising the West by crossing one of its bright lines and raising the question “now what?”.

The danger is that escalating chaos is his goal, not some negotiated face-saving solution to the Ukraine invasion. It is a game of chicken and the West would have to figure out how to play in this updated version of MAD in which a whole new bunch of bright lines would have to be established by the international community.

In short, Putin isn’t trying to find solutions. He is trying to create problems.

Of course some folk believe Putin just wants a fair deal on a Crimean corridor, a chastened NATO, and we can all get back to what we were doing before February. Putin is not a nostalgic imperialist. His demands are kind of reasonable from a certain light. Etc, etc.

So going nuclear in a delimited tactical fashion wouldn’t be to win in Ukraine and then declare hostilities over. — apokrisis

I don't know what Putin's ambitions are. But if he thought using tactical nukes would give him Ukraine, I think he would use them.

I hear what you are saying how their use would require a frantic discussion amongst those who oppose Putin. On the other hand, the incremental levels of support of Ukraine from the West do have the strategic benefit of matching emerging threats with emerging counter measures. The US., in particular, is saying they will suppress this fire, in whatever form it takes. The more 'tactical' a method is used by the Russians, the more the suppressing of that fire supports the tactics the Ukrainians are currently employing.

Suddenly, clearing Ukrainian air space would not look so provocative.

I see you like Vexler. I agree with his argument that the whole 'NATO as a threat narrative' is a scam. It boils down to complaining that they won't let Putin be an asshole without consequences.

I mean, it's a dumb question. What is the answer supposed to be: "well, after we've come under nuclear attack, I might start having second thoughts about the doctrine of retaliation?"Or maybe "hmmm, I suppose I be paralyzed by fear and unable to act?" All you can really say about strategic deterrence is "yes, no doubt should exist, we will retaliate." Hell, you'd say that even if you're arsenal didn't actually work. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The question is not dumb and the answer is not "we will retaliate".

Nearly certainly, the question and answer is setup before hand, precisely to just nuclear sabre rattle.

Maybe watch the video before commenting.

The interviewer does not say "will the UK retaliate if it comes under nuclear attack", the question does not even include a scenario, just that the PM is brought down to the bunker to order a nuclear attack (implying it's not even her decision) and the question is actually just how she feels about it.

The prime minister of the UK then does not demonstrate any understanding of what was just said, and (very likely) went with a pre-penned response by (I assume) whoever the interviewer was implying controls her actions in the scenario, and so simply declares she'd do it no hesitation. But that wasn't the question, and then the interviewer reiterates that again and she just delivers her response again.

Likely what happened was the Q and A was setup before hand, but the interviewer took creative license or then what to ask wasn't clear enough, and, in any case, the interviewer would assume the prime minister of the UK would be able to interpret words about the use of nuclear weapons correctly and think 2 seconds for an appropriate response.

My guess would be that the interviewer was asked to frame the question presuming the nukes needed to be launched (so not a policy question) and so that the PM could just affirm her willingness to do so as part of classic MAD protocol. However, the interviewer discovers it's difficult to frame a question that presumes nukes need to be launched (especially to the PM who is presumably the deciding person on this) so the scenario doesn't really make any sense, and to avoid "assuming you're launching nuclear weapons ... would you be launching nuclear weapons?" in order for things to make sense then if you are assuming nukes are being launched then a sensible question in that framing would be something like "how would you feel about that?".

Everyone else in the nuclear chain of command makes sense to ask "you are ordered to carry out a nuclear strike, do you do your duty?" and the journalist mistakingly starts with this framing, but (seems midway through) the journalist realises that makes no sense to ask a PM so he recovers by switching to the question of feeling.

A half-way competent politician would then correct the framing of the journalist (who has no onus of making sense) and then answer a properly framed question and not answer a word salad, especially on the subject of nuclear weapons.

A half-way competent politician would either reframe the question as "if you are asking if all other courses of action have been exhausted and [with the other people involved] it is decided a nuclear launch is the only option remaining, then yes the UK will make use of it's nuclear weapons to defend the United Kingdom and our allies" or then "of course I [and the rest of the people involved] will do everything possible to avoid a nuclear war, but if those terrifying circumstances arise we will not hesitate to defend the United Kingdom and our allies".

However, not correcting the framing of a question as serious as the use of nuclear weapons and then answering the wrong question (the question was about feeling and not duty) simply demonstrates a lack of cognitive competence in terms of interpreting what people are saying, self-awareness (being the PM discussing nuclear weapons), and of course a total and complete lack of emotion and empathy (to not even address the feelings question when it is asked the second time! she simply is unable to process the information as she lacks the emotional capacity to do so, which also explains the tax cuts to the rich in the middle of a energy cost crisis) from someone you'd very much want to be cognitively competent (as they have the power to launch nuclear weapons).

Now, I get it, the political right nowadays has a mental and emotional expectation from the highest offices of governance of literally elementary school, but that reference point is dumb. Demonstrating the prime minister of the UK has as much composure, argumentative sophistication and understanding of social interactions as an 8 year old is not an appropriate standard of high state office.

I see you like Vexler. I agree with his argument that the whole 'NATO as a threat narrative' is a scam. It boils down to complaining that they won't let Putin be an asshole without consequences. — Paine

I am skeptical about grand metaphysical explanations of world events, but speaking of 'NATO as a threat narrative', Foreign Policy reports that Russia’s Stripped Its Western Borders to Feed the Fight in Ukraine:

Of an original estimated 30,000 Russian troops that once faced the Baltic countries and southern Finland, as many as 80 percent of them have been diverted to Ukraine, according to three senior European defense officials in the region, leaving Russia with only a skeleton crew in what was once its densest concentration of military force facing NATO territory.

Now, defense officials across the Nordic-Baltic region are questioning how, and when, Russia could ever reconstitute its military forces along NATO’s northeastern flank, particularly as Finland and Sweden stand poised to join NATO.

“The redeployment of ground forces has been necessary because there is a desperate shortage of trained soldiers,” wrote Harri Ohra-aho, an intelligence advisor to the Finnish defense ministry and the former uniformed chief of defense intelligence, in an email. “It has nothing to do with the NATO threat (which hasn’t existed except in the rhetoric of the Russian leadership).”

I don't know what Putin's ambitions are. But if he thought using tactical nukes would give him Ukraine, I think he would use them. — Paine

Yes, until now nuclear deterrence has limited arms shipments to Ukraine and things like:

Suddenly, clearing Ukrainian air space would not look so provocative. — Paine

As NATO denied Zelensky's request for a no-fly zone despite being a literal social media deity.

However, what would precede the use of nuclear weapons would be a framing war of who's provoking who, such as the long range missiles.

The US is giving (not selling) arms to Ukraine, providing training and managing strategy and tactics "indirectly" via "advice", and providing the intelligence required for planning and targeting. These are obvious acts of war along with the sanctions.

Of course, as long as NATO maintains it's current policy of not supporting the Ukrainians "too much" there's no reason for Russia to use tactical nuclear weapons, but of course that possibility and the strategic and diplomatic problem it would create has been the deterrence so far for the policy to drip-feed support to Ukraine to ensure Russia cannot actually lose.

Again, if that wasn't the policy, why is US sending more HIMARS to Ukraine now? Obviously they aren't "essential" to US defence, so why not just send them before if you want Ukraine to win?

Also, there's still a bunch of escalation steps available between now and the use of tactical nuclear weapons, of which the Nord Stream attacks are a next step.

Definitely, circumstances would need to be that China and India would not change their current policies (or then that's what the Kremlin believes), which is a high bar.

↪boethius This also reads like fiction.

I really think people here have a tendency to extrapolate all sorts of stories from a minimum of facts. — Benkei

As @Isaac mentions, the question of "show me one plausible scenario" requires extrapolation to answer.

However, I am at least putting undisputed facts about the past together, rather than telling a story about the future Russian state collapse with neither plausibly sufficient, if any, facts nor any historical precedent that states have any tendency at all to collapse in such situations before.

What are facts:

1. War has been going on since 2014 with Russian language and culture suppression, that, at minimum, is likely to attract the Kremlins attention as a problem to deal with.

2. We know there have been giant gas fields discovered in the Donbas and around Crimea (experts, industry and nations certainly believe it's there in any case).

3. Russia heavily invests in modernising its armed forces since 2014 as well as preparing for sanctions. That the Russian economy and currency survive essentially maximum sanctions is I think good evidence they adequately prepared for the latter, and that one of the first things they do is launch a hypersonic missile is good indication of the former; the war launched, by definition, after accomplishing these pre-conditions.

4. We know Putin went to Xi to get, if not a blessing, a common understanding on the war and what China's policy would be.

5. We know Germany rejected approving Nord Stream 2 and the West has been "punishing" Russia over Crimea and the Donbas war in various ways since 2014.

6. We know energy crisis is hurting the West at China, India et. al. benefit, in at least relative terms.

7. Lastly, we know Putin is a sophisticated enough in his thinking and planning to navigate the halls of power for several decades without any major self-inflicted harms to himself or Russia, and certainly doing better than his predecessor which is the only objective comparison standard. Certainly anyone can lose their grip on reality at any moment, but there is no indication that's true of Putin so far.

8. We know that Russia prepared and successfully carried out rapid occupation of a majority of the 4 regions they are in the process of annexing.

The proposal of the Western media and many sympathisers is that these facts are unrelated by any coherent viewpoint from Putin, the Kremlin or the Russian military. That it's all one big miscalculation at best and irrational at worst (that's the acceptable spectrum of opinion on the issue).

Now, regardless of whether a plan ultimately will works or not, is independent of whether a plan makes sense and certainly if a plan exists in the first place. I can lose pretty badly but still have a reasonable plan of action given my capacities and the circumstances.

Indeed, especially if you believe the West is intrinsically superior, US the super power and Russia a joke, then if the USA is "out to get Russia" (which their propaganda since well over a decade would suggest, framing Russia as the adversary, moving missiles closer to Russia, attacking directly Russian interests such as Syria, supporting a coup in Ukraine etc.), then it's entirely possible we are seeing the best geopolitical plan possible ... yet it may still not work due to intrinsic weaknesses.

For example, if we were to duel in some way on your area of professional expertise, I would assume I would lose but that doesn't mean I can't come up with a good plan, try to surprise you in some way, make things chaotic and create chances of victory by mere happenstance roll of the dice than meticulous planning.

Indeed, the right kind of chaos favours the weaker party ... which is exactly why we maybe seeing chaos right now. But chaos can also favour the equal or even stronger party (a solid structure can more easily withstand chaos that can easily overwhelm an unprepared adversary) ... which is exactly why we maybe seeing chaos right now.

Who is weak geopolitically and who is strong cannot be determined by observing Western media.

A. US has aircraft carriers and a lot of bases and high-tech spying, strategic isolation from conventional attack at home, technology expertise and tech multi-national corporations, world reserve currency but lot's of debt, obviously nuclear weapons, and allies (that the current trajectory will significantly weaken economically and diplomatically speaking)

B. Russia and China together have critical commodities, production capacity of tangible goods, some high tech weapons and large land armies impractical for NATO to attack, no debts and in fact lot's of different reserves, also lot's of spies but more focus on lower-tech humans, and if not allies then many friends who are strengthening economically and diplomatically in the current trajectory (at least in relative terms).

The world currently is more ideologically aligned with Russia and China than the US and NATO. Authoritarianism in all its forms is on the ascendancy (even in NATO).

If you can:

A. Knock out the US' allies as relevant parties to world affairs (i.e. isolate the US).
B. Fracture the world economy so US tech multinationals are less relevant and setup an energy arbitrage situation providing China, India and co. competitive advantage across the board.
C. Create an alternative to the USD as world reserve currency.
D. Create a situation where nations are desperate for real access to goods and commodities rather than debts to purchase them.
E. Counter US military power with some key leverage points (hypersonic missiles) and building a non-sea based Asian trade system.
F. If your lower-tech intelligence can at least mitigate US higher-tech intelligence enough to operate.

Then you will unseat the US as the world's superpower.

The war in Ukraine in combination with real environmental and depletion problems, puts pressure on all the above points.

Of course, for it to be some "plan" you'd have to know things in advance such as the West bringing down massive sanctions.

However, you don't actually have to "know" that, you just have to be sophisticated enough to simply have two ways things can go: detente and peace with the West or then extreme escalation: Simply put the choice on the table by starting a big war. The EU, if not the US, definitely took the blue pill of continuing to live in their illusions. As for the US, certainly a formidable opponent and, at the least, we can certainly suspect Russia and China to at least believe direct confrontation was and still is a worthwhile contest compared to the alternatives.

nor any historical precedent that states have any tendency at all to collapse in such situations before. — boethius

Did you forget the USSR and the German very very Democratic Republic?

Did you forgot the USSR and the German very very Democratic Republic? — Olivier5

The Nazi state did not collapse in WWII, but they lost the war maintaining the state even under conditions of sending children to fight to keep defending the state and even after Hitler died.

Russia and the West did not roll into a failed state but accepted surrender of an intact state and then oversaw state transition and reorganisation.

If anything, Nazi Germany is a testament to just how resilient states apparatus is, even under the most brutal of conditions of literally fighting to the bitter end far beyond any rational hope or moral theory of any kind whatsoever other than state worship.

As for the Soviet Union, again this involved no state collapse as the USSR was a supranational governance of different states and the collapse of the USSR was an orderly transition to new state reorganisation of state power, as far as legal structures go.

Whole reason the current war is happening is precisely because the fall of the Soviet Union did not involve any state collapse, neither Ukraine nor Russia, but mere reorganisation of the existing state power within the Soviet Union.

An analogy on a small scale would be Brexit, which clearly does happen.

However, even if you want to consider them both state collapse, neither are examples of states collapsing under the conditions of having gained territory in a war and suffering less losses than their opponent.

The original proposed mechanism for state collapse was the sanctions, which are still there, but again there are no examples of state collapse due to sanctions. So, no surprise that didn't work for the first time this time. If anything, sanctions make the state weaker in some ways but stronger internally relative their own population.

The new proposed mechanism is state collapse due simply to an unpopular war ... arguably supported by a majority of Russians, so, again, has never caused state collapse before and there has so far been no argument put forward here nor elsewhere that "this time it's different".

Your writing increasingly resembles the average putinista's rambling nowadays. No logic, no focus. Headless chicken gesticulation.

Let's not make things more complicated than they are. This war could be over tomorrow and everything back to normal if the regime had the good sense of offing Mr. Putin. One bullet would be enough.

Let's not make things more complicated than they are. This war could be over tomorrow and everything back to normal if the regime had the good sense of offing Mr. Putin. One bullet would be enough. — Olivier5

Who's disputing that Russia could withdraw entirely from Ukraine, whatever definition, tomorrow?

Question was what geopolitical strategy might there be to explain ... Russia obviously not doing the above and in the process of withdrawing.

If you want to say Russia is in the wrong and no amount of Ukrainian KIA is too little to demonstrate that moral conviction (just not you personally), even without any theory of a pathway to victory now or later, and, largely due to that lack of a feasible plan,Russia wins, ok, feel free to argue that's a good moral and political idea.

However, was I commenting on that one way or another?

And what's "One bullet to the head would be enough" other than wishful thinking that A. that is likely to happen and B. that would change Kremlin policy rather than consolidate it?

And yet you say my analysis is off the mark?

Sometimes your side loses a contest, doesn't matter who was right or wrong, just how reality plays out.

Furthermore, the entirety of my last posts is trying answer the simple question of why would Putin and Xi start this contest of geopolitical confrontation.

Certainly they thought it was a good idea at the time, or why would they do it?

People are free to argue they thought it was a good idea for other reasons (that the war would certainly be over in 3 days and the preparation for a longer war and sanctions was coincidence) or then free to argue that perhaps they did have a plan that seemed good to them, perhaps what I propose hits some key points, but they will nevertheless lose before the mighty-might of the USA. Likewise, there's also the theory available that Russia feels cornered and these are moves from a weaker position; that they cannot actually accomplish any of the key points, or then those points don't matter, but it is a "good try" to avoid the much stronger US position and containment strategy.

The question was basically demonstrate any plausible geopolitical sense at all for Putin's actions, so I've proposed one as a starting point for discussion.

There are certainly alternatives available to what I propose in terms of what the Kremlin's real plan was and is, as well as the chances of success, which I do not say it must and will succeed but only that there are reasons to believe it is possible to come out stronger in comparative terms after such a conflict (indeed, even if the conflict is a blunder and bad for everyone, it improves Russia and China's relative position of geopolitical strength anyways; intentions, plans, actions and results are all related but also distinct from each other).

Certainly USA does not risk state collapse anymore than Russia, and arguably less, so it's a question of changing relative geopolitical balance of power and paying a price to try to do so.

And definitely I would agree Putin is taking serious risks to do so, my argument is only that there is facts around that support the idea the risks are calculated and the whole thing is not a miscalculation, essentially by definition, for the simple reason that the West disapproves.

The war does not achieve Western values and ambitions as manifest by Western social media; that is for certain, but that in itself does not make it a mistake from some other point of view. Maybe from Putin's point of view NATO is evil.

You may say you don't care about Putin's point of view. Ok, but then you don't care about diplomacy with Putin, and if you don't care about diplomacy you are essentially committing to the idea that unlimited Ukrainian suffering and dying is justified to demonstrate your (a non-Ukrainian) commitment to rebuking diplomacy with Putin.

Since this isn't really a coherent argument, but rather reactionary ideological emotionalism maintained in a cocoon of tweets and memes and the soothing voices of ex-generals, then it is no surprise, from this point of view, that fantasy is required to support such an emotional state suppressing any and all rational criticism (that can distinguish between wish and responsible action); you know, fantasy of the kind that Putin will be shot tomorrow and it will all end in a sea of flowers in rifles and the rise of the Russian 60s hippy collapsing the Russian state in a red haze of rad techno tunes. Revolution. Fresh.

The US is giving (not selling) arms to Ukraine, providing training and managing strategy and tactics "indirectly" via "advice", and providing the intelligence required for planning and targeting. These are obvious acts of war along with the sanctions. — boethius

This was basically totally normal during the Cold War.

That the other side aided his ally/proxy was totally in line. So in line that actually there was far more "military advisors" operating the complex hardware in Third World countries than now. Especially the Soviet Union was good at this... and had it's military forces in civilian clothes.

(The Parade step shows just who these advisors are:)


So you start again...

However, I am at least putting undisputed facts about the past together, rather than telling a story — boethius

And then continue...

1. War has been going on since 2014 with Russian language and culture suppression, that, at minimum, is likely to attract the Kremlins attention as a problem to deal with. — boethius

Russian language and culture suppression made Putin do it!!! Gentlemen! Here are the facts, not stories,... :snicker:

Russia heavily invests in modernising its armed forces since 2014 as well as preparing for sanctions. That the Russian economy and currency survive essentially maximum sanctions is I think good evidence they adequately prepared for the latter, and that one of the first things they do is launch a hypersonic missile is good indication of the former; the war launched, by definition, after accomplishing these pre-conditions. — boethius

So according to you Russia's commitment to modernizing it's armed forces is proven by a single test firing of an experimental missile? The massive footage of Russia scraping the bottom of the barrel with 50 year-old tanks sent to Ukraine, with the mobilization troops in conditions that show total unpreparedness for them doesn't refute this modernization, because they test whatever exotic missile they have? Incredible pro-Russian propaganda. :rofl:

7. Lastly, we know Putin is a sophisticated enough in his thinking and planning to navigate the halls of power for several decades without any major self-inflicted harms to himself or Russia, and certainly doing better than his predecessor which is the only objective comparison standard. Certainly anyone can lose their grip on reality at any moment, but there is no indication that's true of Putin so far. — boethius

Whow. I really haven't heard such blazing over the top apologism from anyone in this thread for Putin.

Yeah, I think I'll stop as this is pointless.

This was basically totally normal during Cold War. — ssu

I don't disagree, they are still acts of war.

And, my position is that basically the policy framework is the same as in the cold war with each side doing as much as they can "get away with" to obstruct or weaken the other.

Of course, there's no objective standard of what acts of war are ok and which aren't, it's somewhat subjective to the other side.

For example, bringing nuclear missiles to Cuba turns out was "too much" for the Americans, and the Soviets therefore backed off to maintain the basic policy framework.

In this situation in Ukraine, what would be "too much" for the Russians I honestly don't know, but what's clear is that (so far) support to Ukraine has been in this policy framework of not harming Russia in any vital way.

On a spectrum that involves giving nuclear weapons access to Fidel ... what US is doing in Ukraine is pretty low-key in comparison.

Of course, as always, MAD policy requires trying to make the other side believe you're willing to use nuclear weapons, so how far is the rhetoric to the actual use of nuclear weapons I honestly have no clue, but obviously closer than before the war.

What we can analyse is that the US does not have any obvious response to Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. It's obviously not an act that would trigger all out nuclear war, nor even that a nuclear response would be reasonable. Of course, US would like Russians to believe they are unreasonable. So, who is deterring who more to not-do-what is the question.

Likewise, we may not know what the US would do, but there are obvious ramifications with Russia's friends and own population and so on, so launching nukes to win a battle is not some sort of casual decision. I'd argue tactical nuclear weapons are a big advantage to have in a war, but there's still plenty of other reasons not to use them, some of which may explain why they have so far not been used.

Fucks sake man. You complain about strawmanning then you go ahead and treat...

Russian language and culture suppression ... is likely to attract the Kremlins attention — boethius

...as...

Russian language and culture suppression made Putin do it!!! — ssu

Come on! Nowhere in the argument laid out is there even the slightest hint that these factors in any way compelled Putin to act. If you guys really can't come up with any more serious objection than this lame attempt to make any Western-critical analysis sound pro-Putin then it really is pointless your taking part in a discussion forum on the topic. If all you want is an echo chamber, try Facebook.

Making mountains from soundbites is a cancer in modern politics. There is a sea of solid, legitimate reasons to dislike Liz Trusts without resorting to that.

Context matters. This is like Tucker Carlson's latest shitty attempt to prove the US attacked the Nord Stream pipeline by playing a soundbite from a response specifically about Nord Stream 2, which never even opened, and was already canceled after the invasion began.

The context here is a hypothetical where the PM of a country with what is essentially a "no first strike" doctrine gets dragged down to a bunker and given the "Letters of Last Resort," which are specifically to be used in the event of a nuclear strike on the UK or a decapitation strike that kills the PM and other senior leadership in an expected attempt to disrupt C&C before a nuclear strike.

Generally, countries don't explicitly rule out first strikes because a rival might think they can destroy another country's arsenal or command and control apparatus in a first strike and thus avoid or severely limit any reprisal. Only China and India have official no first use policies. However, the Letters are specifically for situations where the UK has already been attacked.

On a side note, I find the concept fairly interesting. There are supposedly five letters with the options:

-retaliate with a nuclear strike;
-do not retaliate with nuclear weapons;
-the crew should use their own judgement;
-place the submarine under an allies control, often the US in a NATO context
-if all hope is lost, find Harry Potter

Russia isn't going to use nuclear weapons. They already hold enough territory to claim victory and there is very little chance of Ukraine mounting the types of offensives that would allow them to retake it, especially after the mobilization.

All of this nuclear fear-mongering is based on the assumption that Russia is losing and Putin is desperate. I don't think this is the case at all. Considering the amount of troops they have had deployed it's plausible that their initial war goals have already been reached.

Mearsheimer even considers the possibility that after the initial successes Russia expanded its wargoals.

Russian language and culture suppression made Putin do it!!! Gentlemen! Here are the facts, not stories,... :snicker: — ssu

These are facts. And the point of this fact is simply to establish the obvious that the Kremlin has obviously been thinking about conflict in Ukraine since 2014, if not before. So, maybe they came up with some sort of game plan in that minimum 8 year period.

The subject is what geopolitical overall strategy may the Ukraine war be apart of. That the war in Donbas is a viable or sufficient or even relevant justification for the invasion or not is a different question.

So according to you Russia's commitment to modernizing it's armed forces is proven by a single test firing of an experimental missile? The massive footage of Russia scraping the bottom of the barrel with 50 year-old tanks sent to Ukraine, with the mobilization troops in conditions that show total unpreparedness for them doesn't refute this modernization, because they test whatever exotic missile they have? Incredible pro-Russian propaganda. :rofl: — ssu

Again, this fact simply establishes that the full scale invasion follows successful weapons development.

Perhaps these are connected in some sort of coherent thought about the subject matter.

The relevance of hypersonic missiles is that, even according to Western analysts, they cannot be shot down with any current technology, and so renders moot the multi-decade anti-missile defence investment of the West to protect key military assets such as bases and aircraft carriers.

US only has a butchers dozen of aircraft carriers so you'd only need a similar amount of hypersonic nuclear missiles to take all or most of them out. Do Russians have enough such missiles? Do they actually work reliably? We don't know.

Whow. I really haven't heard such blazing over the top apologism from anyone in this thread for Putin. — ssu

Again ... the position I'm arguing against is the idea Putin has no plan whatsoever, nothing connects the dots, it's just one mistake and blunder to the next and the Russian state will collapse months ago.

Definitely I would agree an equally compelling case as to the one I've rebutted could involve Putin thinking of some, if not all, of the factors I listed, but nevertheless thought the war would be over by now, that Ukraine would negotiate and not fight (from Putin's perspective at least) beyond any rational reason to do so, and that Russia simply lacks the capacity to sustain the conflict in Ukraine and Geopolitically.

It's called a debate, I've come up with a proposal that argues against that of my opponent (that Putin has no any plausible geopolitical plan; the bar set is basically even remote plausibility, which is a low threshold); the stage is open for anyone to argue my proposal is not plausible or some other proposal is more plausible (such as Putin did have a plan, but it relied on Ukraine settling and we're not in uncharted territories).

Don't undersell their commitment to historical restorations, they're now using T-62s and T-64s, they're using 60-70 year old tank designs.

Although to be fair, I did see a T-72 hit with several AT4s without being destroyed. Granted, it seemed to have severe mobility issues before getting hit, which is why infantry were teeing off on it so easily, but it did survive. And one guy on the crew has the sense to jump out and run off.

I think Russian tanks might actually be benefiting from the ammunition shortage. They were always cooking off before and throwing their turrets ridiculously far. That obviously wasn't from a Javelin alone. Russia just tends to stock their stuff with too much ammunition. This explains the BMP-2 killing destroying the T-80 with its autocannon as well, since it looks like it starts a cook off. Also why the Moskova went down to a fairly small payload (Iran hit a much smaller Israeli ship with a similar payload and it sailed home under its own power, but of course where the hit occurs matters a lot). The Moskova had a ridiculous amount of ordinance for its size and I suspect this is what killed it. Point being, less can be more, provided you have the trucks to keep supplies nearby.


If Russia has some magical wunderwaffen, there is no evidence of it. You might as well also suppose the US has some magical laser interceptor that counter it.

They have a hypersonic glide vehicle, but right now they have to launch it from planes that are already going quite fast, and which can be spotted and hit with standoff weapons.

The whole hypersonic thing is overblown. There have been all sorts of hypersonic weapons for decades. What would be new is a low flying hypersonic delivery vehicle, ideally one that could also maneuver. Low flying hypersonics are harder to detect, but if you have a clear trajectory on them other countermeasures in development like hypersonic interceptor loads fired from 155mm guns can destroy them. Obviously the Israeli laser interception system for mortars and drones is very exciting because you can't beat the speed of light for intercept timing, but there are huge difficulties using it at any long distance.

Making mountains from soundbites is a cancer in modern politics. There is a sea of solid, legitimate reasons to dislike Liz Trusts without resorting to that. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Usually yes, but discussing the use of nuclear weapons I think is an exception.

The West has made mountains of every mention of Putin not even mentioning nukes but indirect language of tools and so on.

When it comes to nukes there is very good reason to make mountains of few words.

Context matters. This is like Tucker Carlson's latest shitty attempt to prove the US attacked the Nord Stream pipeline by playing a soundbite from a response specifically about Nord Stream 2, which never even opened, and was already canceled after the invasion began. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would agree this doesn't prove anything, but it is clearly a direct threat, and if you are threatening to stop Nord Stream 2 in some vaguely unspecified and clearly illegal way (the legal way would be "oh, we'll convince Germany with sound economic arguments") it stands to reason you maybe threatening Nord Stream 1 as well, which accomplishes the same thing.

The context here is a hypothetical where the PM of a country with what is essentially a "no first strike" doctrine gets dragged down to a bunker and given the "Letters of Last Resort," which are specifically to be used in the event of a nuclear strike on the UK or a decapitation strike that kills the PM and other senior leadership in an expected attempt to disrupt C&C before a nuclear strike. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, she does not mention she too agrees it's a last resort, nor implies any understanding there is choices that remain, does not hesitates to say she will "do her duty to launch" (which does not make sense, it's not the PM's duty to launch but duty to decide if indeed the circumstances justify it, and would therefore be other people's duty to launch; that the military believes there is only one further course of military action available does not exclude the civilian authority deciding on another course of action, such as capitulation; exactly why the military is subordinate to the civilian authority in a democracy, in that morality and politics is a wider scope of consideration than the exercise of force and the interests of the people are not synonymous with the interests of the government, much less the leadership or military as such).

Of course, the interaction is supposed to be just basics of MAD: "we'll retaliate!" For, if you do not think your opponent would retaliate, even when retaliation would be a net-loss for your people (inviting both another nuclear strike and more nuclear fallout generally speaking) ... then maybe rational to first strike to force a surrender, which maybe entirely rational to do after a first strike. It's called MAD because it's predicated on making your opponent believe you will not act rationally after a first strike.

On a side note, I find the concept fairly interesting. There are supposedly five letters with the options:

-retaliate with a nuclear strike;
-do not retaliate with nuclear weapons;
-the crew should use their own judgement;
-place the submarine under an allies control, often the US in a NATO context
-if all hope is lost, find Harry Potter — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, she basically says she'll do her duty (to launch) and not choose what she believes as PM to be in the interest of the UK among the 5 options. So, maybe she didn't understand the question (in which case you should ask clarification) or then, as I say, the question and answer was predetermined but the interviewer went off script. Again, do you want someone who isn't paying attention to detail when nukes are being discussed ... in charge of launching said nuclear weapons?

However, if your retort would be that the whole thing is more insight into the "professional sportification" of politics than UK nuclear policy, I would agree.

As for the letters themselves, clearly those are most of the basic options available, and also there's no plausible scenario at the moment where the decision to use nuclear weapons by a member of NATO is not a US decision.

In terms of US policy, again involving very few words, but the policy recently changed from no-first use, to "defend vital interests". Analysts have written a lot about that too; again, I think for good reason.

Don't undersell their commitment to historical restorations, they're now using T-62s and T-64s, they're using 60-70 year old tank designs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, this matters little if Ukraine has does not have better tanks in the situation.

The reason Ukraine is now asking for Western tanks maybe because it is running out of Soviet tanks.

However, Western tanks may not be a practical solution for a lot of reasons.

Russia isn't going to use nuclear weapons. They already hold enough territory to claim victory and there is very little chance of Ukraine mounting the types of offensives that would allow them to retake it, especially after the mobilization. — Tzeentch

I agree this is likely.

All of this nuclear fear-mongering is based on the assumption that Russia is losing and Putin is desperate. I don't think this is the case at all. Considering the amount of troops they have had deployed it's plausible that their initial war goals have already been reached. — Tzeentch

The nuclear fear-mongering has a lot of different reasons.

Even if Putin believes he can't "lose" at this point, he'd still want to deter more weapons shipments to Ukraine.

Even if the US believes Ukraine has already "lost", it would still want to keep sending weapons to Ukraine so that they don't lose even harder or to simply bleed Russia and increase the cost of their victory. Of course, the US would not want Russia to change the dynamic by using nuclear weapons, so would want to deter Russia from crossing that line by presenting escalation pathways, nuclear or then conventional (but then may turn nuclear later if the escalation continues).

The logic right now is that the US is trying to convince Russia it will respond conventionally an impose a cost higher than whatever is gained by the use of nukes in Ukraine. Of course, just as it's not rational for US to nuke Russia for nuking Ukraine, it would not be rational for Russia to nuke the US for a non-nuclear retaliation.

Next step is of course Russia trying to convince the US that Russia's non-nuclear and entirely rational retaliation for a non-nuclear US retaliation wouldn't be worth it for the US.

Of course, in that process of threatening non-nuclear retaliations, at some point one party tries to convince the other "well, ha, if you did that then I would use nuclear weapons, so there, checkmate".

For example, US policy is to view even conventional attack on its carriers as a nuclear attack on US soil. Now, how not-A is viewed as literally A is anyone's ontological guess, but nevertheless that is the stated policy. If you believe the US would carry through on that policy, then you are less likely to attack a carrier (as a state actor at least).

So, even if both parties are still far from any circumstance in which nuclear weapons are likely to be used ... it is still rational to deter the other's current policies with said nuclear weapons.

Then there's also just political rhetoric of the blame game for the home audience as well as setting up the threat of nuclear war as the reason for a resolution of some sort (which does not seem likely but maybe plays a roll if people believe resolution needs to happen at some point).

I don't really disagree with anything you're saying, and I certainly don't have any great desire to defend Truss. It's just that I don't see this particular interaction as a great way to judge why she's (likely) going to be a shit PM.

You have the right reasoning on the Nord Stream comments. US comments about shuttering the second line before it opens imply that it might want to close the other pipeline as well (it hasn't been moving anything anyhow). The problem with Tucker's editing and commentary is that it is meant to strongly imply that Biden was making a statement about wanting to attack the currently damaged pipeline, when in context that is not what he is saying.

Notably, the Western responses to Russian nuclear threats was muted early on. When Putin put his nuclear forces on alert Biden didn't do anything with the US arsenal. The media is always going to pick this stuff up because fear sells, but official statements were fairly muted at the start of the war. There definitely seems to have been a strategy of "if we ignore it and don't rise to the bait, Putin's statement won't have the desired effect of spooking the public and weakening the resolve to publish him for the invasion."

What has changed is that Russia is now losing ground almost everywhere there is fighting and appears to be in danger of losing the war outright. Then Put in gives a speech about annexing territories that he doesn't fully control, where there is active combat, and in the same speech implies that Russia will use nuclear weapons if its territory is threatened, i.e. conquered parts of Ukraine are now parts of Russia that will be defended with the nuclear arsenal is counter attacks continue. He was careful not to make that explicit, but it is still a major escalation from the very vague threats early on, and he has more reason to resort to nuclear weapons as the conventional war gets more unpopular and Russia continues to lose ground. That is the key difference I see from hypotheticals about last resort strikes.

And the point of this fact is simply to establish the obvious that the Kremlin has obviously been thinking about conflict in Ukraine since 2014, if not before. — boethius

Actually, they did thought about far earlier to get Crimea. Just after the Soviet Union collapsed, the debate started like this:

(LA Times, 22nd May, 1992) Running the risk of provoking Ukraine to new heights of fury, Russia’s Parliament on Thursday ruled invalid the 1954 transfer of the balmy Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine.

In a move sure to bring relations between the two superpowers of the Commonwealth of Independent States even closer to the boiling point, the Russian Parliament declared that Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev’s “gift” of the Crimea to Ukraine 38 years ago “lacked legal force.” It called for negotiations on the future of the choice hunk of land.

Although Russian lawmakers stressed repeatedly that they were making no territorial claims on the Crimea, Ukrainian diplomats perceived the resolution as the harbinger of major political--and possibly military--battles.

See here

Perceived very well by the Ukrainian diplomats, actually.

And yet you say my analysis is off the mark? — boethius

I wouldn't refer to it as "analysis". "Unfettered wishful thinking" is more apt. Or simply "verbal diarrhea"...