there is no opposite to "possible". And to use "impossible" as the opposite to "possible" is to stray from the definition "what may or may not be". — Metaphysician Undercover
I use a different definition, but the ends are the same. — Mww
And.....what benefit in them is there for me?
— Mww
— Srap Tasmaner
If I know that P, then it follows that P. That’s helpful for you, because it means you can learn about the state of the world from my reports of what I know, without having to go see for yourself. — Srap Tasmaner
Above I spoke hypothetically of having a stack of boxes one of which I intended to mark. How do you conceptualize what we are doing when we reason in this way? — Srap Tasmaner
We don't know with deductive certainty. But that's not the relevant or appropriate standard. The relevant standard is to look out the window and see whether it's raining.
— Andrew M
But this is just going around in a vicious circle. The example says that someone might be hosing the window. So according to the example, looking out the window doesn't give us the certainty required to know whether it is raining. — Metaphysician Undercover
The gist of which is that if I see that it is raining, I also thereby know that it is raining. If I remember that I have an appointment, then I thereby also know that I have an appointment. — Srap Tasmaner
— Insofar as the point being made by Mww is about our conceptual apparatus and its role in our mental acts, I’ve got nothing helpful to say about that. — — Srap Tasmaner
In knowledge-first terms, I know it is raining because I already know what it is to be raining.
A precise reduction to the thread’s original question. I know what is true because I already know what it is to be true. I know what is true because I already know what truth is. — Mww
Most epistemologists agree that while knowing entails believing truly, believing truly does not entail knowing. Someone does not know something he believes truly on the say-so of his guru, who invents things to tell him at random without regard to their truth or falsity. Although merely believing truly involves a sort of success—getting the answer right—it also involves, unlike knowing, a sort of cognitive malfunction. Thus knowledge is a more full-blooded success condition than true belief. Knowledge first epistemology understands cases of cognitive malfunctioning in terms of their deviation from cases of cognitive functioning, as opposed to treating the two kinds of case more symmetrically. — Knowledge First Epistemology, Timothy Williamson - The Routledge Companion to Epistemology
When I say "the book is possibly in my room" I'm not saying "the book isn't actually in my room". — Michael
Otherwise telling you where something might be is telling you where not to look.
Your position doesn't appear consistent with common use. — Michael
I use a different definition, but the ends are the same. Possibility is merely one of the ways to think about things; a thing is possible or that thing is impossible, but that does not make the conceptions themselves opposites. All they do is condition the thought of the thing. Just as cause is not the opposite of effect; just as necessary is not the opposite of contingent. — Mww
As a temporal sort of modality, that seems fine. Once I have marked a box, would either of you say that it is true of each of the other boxes that, though it is not the box I marked, it might have been the one that I marked? If actuality is the closing off possible futures, can we not imaginatively consider an early time at which the actual present was only a possible future, one among many? — Srap Tasmaner
Above I spoke hypothetically of having a stack of boxes one of which I intended to mark. How do you conceptualize what we are doing when we reason in this way? Am I talking about a possible future in which I do have a stack of boxes? — Srap Tasmaner
As I said, the two (possible and actual) are not opposed to each other. But obviously, saying "the book is possibly in my room", is to say something completely different from saying "the book is actually in my room". — Metaphysician Undercover
... since actual is defined as what is, it is a logical conclusion that the possible is non-actual. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is false. That the book is possibly in my room isn't that the book isn't actually in my room. — Michael
"Possible" refers to what may or may not be. "Actual" refers to what is and is not. If you say that the book is possibly in your room, then you are saying that it may or may not be in your room. This is logically distinct from saying that it actually is in your room, or actually is not, according to the definitions. Therefore the conclusion I stated is sound. — Metaphysician Undercover
You asserted the latter, which is false. — Michael
You misquoted me. I said "non-actual". — Metaphysician Undercover
What we believe as "actual", is what is, of necessity..... — Metaphysician Undercover
.....and therefore not one of the possible. — Metaphysician Undercover
So what's the difference between "not actual" and "non-actual"? — Michael
That aside, either if something is possible then it isn't actual or something can be both possible and actual. So which is it? — Michael
Kant says no....That which exists is in the sum of the possible. The sum of the real, the actual, cannot exceed the sum of the possible, therefore is contained by it. — Mww
Depending on what you mean by "not actual", "possible" does mean "not actual". This is because the two concepts are mutually exclusive, inconsistent with one another, such that if something is truthfully said to be possible, it cannot at the same time be truthfully said to be actual. — Metaphysician Undercover
The idea that the possible can be summed can be shown to be incoherent, because the possible can be assumed to be infinite. — Metaphysician Undercover
incoherent to say "that which exists is the sum of the possible" — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle (...) demonstrates that in an absolute sense, the actual must be prior in time to the possible. — Metaphysician Undercover
It just isn't the same sort of actuality which is known to us — Metaphysician Undercover
this sort is contingent actualities — Metaphysician Undercover
It's a special type of actuality known by theologians. — Metaphysician Undercover
What’s incoherent in the successive accumulation of the real? When the accumulation is the content of the possible, the quantity is irrelevant. It is whatever it is. — Mww
Agreed. That in quotation marks and taken from my comment, indicates I said it. But I didn’t. I said that which exists is in the sum of the possible. — Mww
So possibility is likely some sort of feature of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
...there is no opposite to may or may not be. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is because the two concepts are mutually exclusive, inconsistent with one another, such that if something is truthfully said to be possible, it cannot at the same time be truthfully said to be actual. That's what I explained to say one when you believe the other, is to be dishonest. — Metaphysician Undercover
The former, as I explained — Metaphysician Undercover
But to say that the future is as yet undetermined, for instance, or that we cannot change the past, if those are to be substantive claims, have to mean something besides the future is future and the past is past. What underwrites that understanding of the temporal modalities? — Srap Tasmaner
I think we can say more, and the way to say more is to turn to mathematics, from which time has been deliberately excluded. See what you still have without time. What we find is that there are ways to make issues we are familiar with most often in temporal terms tractable for reason in non-temporal terms. — Srap Tasmaner
I would have thought the opposite to "may or may not be" was "must or must not be". — Luke
If what is actual is not (also) what is possible, then what is actual is (also) what is necessary.
If what is actual is (also) what is necessary, then this precludes free will. — Luke
Clearly this is opposed to common use. — Michael
This thread's going swimmingly. — Banno
When you say that the book is possibly in your room, you imply that the book may be elsewhere. — Metaphysician Undercover
Regardless, it is "the sum of the possible" which is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem is that when we turn to the temporal nature of reality, what is, is what is necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover
And what is, is in the same category as what is not, as its opposite. Now we would have two very distinct opposites of "necessary", what is possible, and what is not. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, this is exactly the problem with defining "possible" like you propose, which I explain above. It renders "necessary" as extremely ambiguous and misleading. — Metaphysician Undercover
But I'm not implying that the book isn't actually in my room. — Michael
However, if I recall correctly, you made the absurd claim earlier that "possible" is not the opposite of "impossible". — Luke
Then you have likewise rendered "possible" as extremely ambiguous and misleading. — Luke
When you say that the book is possibly in your room, you imply that the book may be elsewhere.
— Metaphysician Undercover
But I'm not implying that the book isn't actually in my room. — Michael
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