Can you not articulate what the potential difference is? — frank

As I noted, that is the subject of this thread.

As I noted, that is the subject of this thread. — T Clark

Okey dokey.

The set of things to be explained exists but is empty.
— Srap Tasmaner

Can a set of things to be explained be empty? The set of explanations of things that exist may be empty, but that thing to be explained must be a member of the set of all things. — Mww

I only meant that we can talk about the set of statistical anomalies that the Bermuda Triangle is thought to be a member of and then discover that it is not.

There's a story, probably apocryphal, that Frederick the Great once gathered his court scientists and philosophers together and asked them to explain why a dead fish weighs more than a live one. They went around in turn each offering a theory, and once they had all offered their explanations, he pointed out that it does not.

1). I know my subjective experience is true. I have feelings and emotions. They exist. (my mind)

2). I know I am an object. My body exists. I am observable.

3). I know that others are objects in the physical world/universe. They are observable.

4). But I also know that these objects (people) are also subjects like myself (they have a mind). — Benj96

It's interesting you say this. I would say I do not 'know' these things to be true although I have reasonable confidence in some of them. I don't take my feelings as an indication of reality. We feel deeply and wrongly and capriciously all the time. It might be 'true' that I am experiencing anger, for instance, but what realty is this emotion corresponding to or produced by and what alternative, equally true emotion might have come to me instead?

To say something is observable is to privilege empiricism and to make assumptions about the observer and what is being observed. How does one rule out idealism, for instance?

I generally make assumptions that the world I see and appear to interact with is real - as far as this word goes, in TC's sense (human scale only). I don't think it's easy or useful to do otherwise. But I don't imagine I have access to truth or reality as such, just a pragmatic response and some tentative models of reality that work reasonably well.

There's a story, probably apocryphal, that Frederick the Great once gathered his court scientists and philosophers together and asked them to explain why a dead fish weighs more than a live one. They went around in turn each offering a theory, and once they had all offered their explanations, he pointed out that it does not. — Srap Tasmaner

:cool:

Reality is that which corresponds to a sensation in general..... — Mww

I don't believe reality is what corresponds to sensation. I said reality only makes sense in comparison or relation to sensation. — T Clark

Yeah, my bad. I was speaking from an ontological perspective (reality is....), you were speaking from an epistemological perspective, (making sense by relation). We each are justified in our perspectives, in that your making sense of reality is far down the methodological line from my sensation of it. You cannot make sense without my sensation, and my sensation is worthless without your relations.

Yeah, my bad. I was speaking from an ontological perspective (reality is....), you were speaking from an epistemological perspective, (making sense by relation). — Mww

I much admire the clarity of that post.

Taking the theme further, realist logic has it that a given statement has a truth value regardless of the whether that value is known, and so uses two truth states - true and false. Antirealism uses three truth states, true, false and a third that is neither - we might call it "undecided".

So we can ask, given your quantum coin, should we make use of a realist or antirealist grammar?

...assuming (the coin) does have a definite state (given other plausible assumptions) leads to contradiction per Bell's Theorem. — Andrew M

So the statement "The coin shows heads" implies a contradiction by Bells theorem, as does the statement "the coin shows tails", and prima facie we drop biconditional logic as a description of how things are (Putnam's realistic view) or we include measurement as fundamental to physics (shut up and calculate) - see Quantum Logic and Probability Theory for a discussion of the options, which become very complex very quickly.

But this is to wander off into speculation best left to physicist.

The term 'real' is used in various ways and to some extent it may come down to commonsense picture, or that which is confirmed intersubjectively. Even within psychiatry, while there is some acknowledgement of cultural beliefs and differences, there is an adherence to a general realist worldview. This is the basis for ideas of what is delusional and, for example, if one believes that they have magical powers they are likely to be seen as delusional. To some extent, there may be a shared understanding of delusion in the psychiatric and philosophy perspective in Western culture.

Nice list. Thanks for pointing me to WordHippo.

I'm trying to decide the best way of dealing with the ideas of "real" or "reality" are, given quantum mechanics. The options, as I see them 1) Reality only applies at the classical level. 2) Reality exists at the quantum level, but it is a different kind of reality. 3) There is a broader meaning of "reality" which encompasses both classical and quantum scales. 4) There is no such thing as reality.

I'm willing to go with 3 as long as we keep in mind that it has to remain consistent with our everyday reality. I'm not even sure that's possible. — T Clark

I also go with 3.

No physicist questions the reality of the experimental equipment that they are using when performing these experiments, or of the measured outcomes.
— Andrew M

I wonder if that's true. — T Clark

I just meant in their capacity as a physicist. The quantum mechanics issue is ostensively about counterfactual definiteness, not factual definiteness.

However the tension you raise with option 3 is especially acute with the Wigner's friend thought experiment. From the friend's point-of-view, she observes a definite result. From Wigner's point-of-view, he observes interference effects which indicates indefiniteness.

However the tension you raise with option 3 arises is especially acute with the Wigner's friend thought experiment. From the friend's point-of-view, she observes a definite result. From Wigner's point-of-view, he observes interference effects which indicates indefiniteness. — Andrew M

If I could check something - Wigner's friend agrees that Wigner sees interference effects; and WIgner agrees that his friend sees a definite result?

That is, they agree as to what each of them sees.

Arguably, there is then 'a way that things are', but one that has two differing, yet agreed, descriptions.

I much admire the clarity of that post. — Banno

I appreciate the comment!

Taking the theme further, realist logic has it that a given statement has a truth value regardless of the whether that value is known, and so uses two truth states - true and false. Antirealism uses three truth states, true, false and a third that is neither - we might call it "undecided".

So we can ask, given your quantum coin, should we make use of a realist or antirealist grammar? — Banno

I think a realist grammar is fine. We are already used to sentences like the Liar and "The King of France is bald", with different strategies available.

So the statement "The coin shows heads" implies a contradiction by Bells theorem, as does the statement "the coin shows tails", and prima facie we drop biconditional logic as a description of how things are (Putnam's realistic view) or we include measurement as fundamental to physics (shut up and calculate) - see Quantum Logic and Probability Theory for a discussion of the options, which become very complex very quickly. — Banno

See also the TPF discussion here on quantum logic. But it's worth noting that it has never replaced classical logic for reasoning about quantum systems.

So instead of dropping biconditional logic, I'm inclined to view statements like "The coin shows heads" as requiring an understood and shared context. If we understand that the quantum coin's state can be continuous (as represented by a qubit) rather than discrete (as represented by a bit), then a statement like "The coin shows heads" will be true when the coin is in a definite heads state and false otherwise. Similar to the statement "The traffic light is green" where green and red don't exhaust all the possible options.

If I could check something - Wigner's friend agrees that Wigner sees interference effects; and WIgner agrees that his friend sees a definite result? — Banno

Yes. In terms of the thought experiment, Wigner can wait ten minutes, then enter the lab (collapsing the lab wavefunction) and the friend will report having seen the definite result ten minutes earlier which Wigner can now verify.

That is, they agree as to what each of them sees.

Arguably, there is then 'a way that things are', but one that has two differing, yet agreed, descriptions. — Banno

Yes, that's correct. But it's worth noting that there is not universal agreement about that. There was a lot of discussion on the Nature paper, "Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself" a few years ago. Scott Aaronson blogged about it at the time.

There was a lot of discussion on the Nature paper... — Andrew M

That's a clever, intriguing paper. Thanks. So where I above supposed that there may be two differing but agreed descriptions, the paper argues that there may be disagreement between what each observer deduces that the other observer sees; but Aaronson suggests this relies on the contradiction of a measurement not measured.

We've an assortment of differing uses for similar terms floating around now. There's the realism/antirealism of ontology, the realistic view espoused by Putnam, and the realism of counterfactual - definiteness you mentioned. it's not going to be easy to keep these distinct in a forum such as this.

There's the realism/antirealism of ontology, — Banno

Per Chalmers, ontological realism just says that statements of idealism or materialism are truth apt. Ontological anti-realism denies this.

It's probably best to give a quick definition of the kind of realism you want to talk about.

I missed your reply. As I said to Mww, I think that the problem here is the issue of "purely" mental entities, that is, thinking about objects absent being in front of them.

Then there's also issues pertaining to fiction, Harry Potter and so forth, which enter the conversation. There's also the issue of memory, of not remembering if an event "really" happened the way you recall it.

The one place where the issue does not arise, or at least not nearly as frequently, is when we speak about an apple in front of us, or a tree, or a road and so on.

If we talk about something, and we understand each other (roughly), then we are speaking about that thing being talked about, even if that thing has no world-correspondence. So, we speak of fictional entities, or mythical ones, or even fake entities (fake money, fake products, etc.)

But there are "real" fake things, there really is fake currency and products that are not as comes as advertised (buying fools gold, thinking it's actual gold) . So, I fail to see the problem being much more than linguistic.

Nice list. Thanks for pointing me to WordHippo. — Banno

Well, I wouldn't have got there but for you and Austin! To compare and contrast how the word 'real' is used in a variety of contexts is fascinating. I now need a dummy's guide to Austin!
The full list below, I later discovered that each item is linked to its own set of synonyms.
For example:
Adjective
Of, or concerned with, the actual doing or use of something, rather than with theory and ideas
Includes practical, existential, empiric and dozens more.
Each in turn can be clicked on to reveal...yes, even more!
Lost in words, you will never be lost for words...unless you are...for quite some other reason.

Adjective
Actually being or existing
Officially recognized as possessing certain qualifications or meeting certain standards
Free from any intent to deceive or impress
Rightly so called
Important or serious in nature
Absolute in nature
(informal) Honest in a blunt manner
(informal) To be under no illusion, or to be serious about a matter
Not romantic
Essential, innate or inherent to something
Characterized by the lack of artificial additives or preservative treatment
Used to emphasize the extent of something unpleasant or bad
Of, or concerned with, the actual doing or use of something, rather than with theory and ideas
Denotes a humble and unpretentious attitude towards life
In bodily form
Legally, officially or formally in effect
Having all its feathers
Most intimate or private
Still in existence

Adverb
To a very large or great degree
(informal, for real) In a genuine, true, serious, or earnest manner

Determiner
A large amount or degree of
— WordHippo

'Having all its feathers' - Really?!! :chin:

As I noted, that is the subject of this thread.
— T Clark

Okey dokey. — frank

:smile:

Did the repetition wear you down?
TC picking up some political techniques; avoidance of questions à la robotic Truss.

That's the subject of this discussion.
— T Clark

You stated that what is usually considered to be reality may be distinct from reality as viewed from a philosophical perspective.

Can you not articulate what the potential difference is? — frank

TC either can't or he can but won't.
The question then is: Why won't he?
The answer: 'That's the subject of this discussion. I won't discuss it'.
Why not?
And so on...

TC is having fun. Along the lines of:

There's a story, probably apocryphal, that Frederick the Great once gathered his court scientists and philosophers together and asked them to explain why a dead fish weighs more than a live one. They went around in turn each offering a theory, and once they had all offered their explanations, he pointed out that it does not. — Srap Tasmaner

[ emphasis added]

It is an enjoyable thread...listening to and learning from different perspectives but where does it lead? Is it meant to lead anywhere...increased understanding or confusion? Both and more :sparkle:

There's a story, probably apocryphal, that Frederick the Great once gathered his court scientists and philosophers together and asked them to explain why a dead fish weighs more than a live one. They went around in turn each offering a theory, and once they had all offered their explanations, he pointed out that it does not. — Srap Tasmaner

:cool:

I only meant that we can talk about the set of statistical anomalies that the Bermuda Triangle is thought to be a member of and then discover that it is not. — Srap Tasmaner

Understood, thanks. Some aid in distinguishing the real from reality, then?

As my ol’ buddy Janis Joplin once said....”of great social and political import”....regarding Frederick: So....of all the scientists and philosophers gathered around the throne, unless Kant was off on some sabbatical, he was most probably the one told his “philosopher-king” the fish weight had nothing to do with its being alive or dead. Kant dedicated pre-critical papers to Frederick; Fredrick influenced Kant’s appointment to the chair of logic and metaphysics at Konigsberg. Kant thought Frederick the epitome of enlightened monarchs; Frederick thought Kant a hero for supporting Newtonian physics, which was anathema in purely philosophical circles, the gap between the two having yet to be critically established. But it put Prussia firmly on the continental academic map, so Frederick was all for it, plus, locally, it bruised the Pietist ego, which couldn’t possibly be a bad thing.

The point: no matter how the mind wanders to come up with stuff, another mind can do things with it the originator hardly intended.

I don't think the sensations are "what are real", i.e. all that is real. I think they are the measure, or at least one measure, of what is real.

If we start from human sensations, shouldn't that which is sensing be just as real as the thing sensed?
— Metaphysician Undercover

Are you asking if we, our selves, are real? It's a good question. I didn't address that in my OP, but I didn't intend to exclude it from the discussion. — T Clark

Right, that's the point. We consider whether or not the thing being measured (through sensation) is real, and we naturally conclude that if we are measuring it, it must be real. But prior to coming to this conclusion, isn't it necessary to do our due diligence toward understanding the thing which is doing the measuring? If the thing doing the measuring isn't real, then what validity does "if we are measuring it, it must be real" have?

The term 'real' is used in various ways and to some extent it may come down to commonsense picture, or that which is confirmed intersubjectively. Even within psychiatry, while there is some acknowledgement of cultural beliefs and differences, there is an adherence to a general realist worldview. This is the basis for ideas of what is delusional and, for example, if one believes that they have magical powers they are likely to be seen as delusional. To some extent, there may be a shared understanding of delusion in the psychiatric and philosophy perspective in Western culture. — Jack Cummins

I came at this question from a philosophical rather than psychological perspective, although I think your point is relevant. As you note, "adherence to a general realist worldview" is a baseline against which other ways of thinking about reality can be compared. That being said, I don't necessarily exclude delusions, hallucinations, or other mental processes from consideration as real. I left that question open in my OP.

However the tension you raise with option 3 arises is especially acute with the Wigner's friend thought experiment. From the friend's point-of-view, she observes a definite result. From Wigner's point-of-view, he observes interference effects which indicates indefiniteness. — Andrew M

I've read through an explanation of Wigner's friend twice and can't figure it out how it applies beyond just plain old "quantum weirdness."

I think you've laid out the types of situations that have to be evaluated in determining what is and what isn't real. As I noted, everyday, humdrum reality is my benchmark. The others should be evaluated in relation to that. That's what's important to me. I don't think the other situations, e.g. mental states or fictional phenomena, matter as much in themselves.

Is it meant to lead anywhere — Amity

Not necessarily. It's meant to go where it goes. Which it seems to be doing pretty well from my perspective.

Right, that's the point. We consider whether or not the thing being measured (through sensation) is real, and we naturally conclude that if we are measuring it, it must be real. But prior to coming to this conclusion, isn't it necessary to do our due diligence toward understanding the thing which is doing the measuring? If the thing doing the measuring isn't real, then what validity does "if we are measuring it, it must be real" have? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a pretty standard thought, at least in eastern philosophies, that the self is an illusion.

But that’s full of mental phenomena, I don’t see a way around that. Take your example of an apple in front of you: you’ll say this is real. Perfect. Now I’m not in front of it, so I have to take your testimony as accurate and I have to imagine that what you mean when you say “this is an apple” will evoke in me, a similar object to what you are seeing. Likewise if I look out my window and say I see a car, a real car, not a toy car, you would have to imagine a car in your head, unless you look at a car. What’s the issue here- this looks to me like “ordinary, humdrum reality”. What’s your concern in such a situation?

But that’s full of mental phenomena, I don’t see a way around that. Take your atime example of an apple in front of you: you’ll say this is real. Perfect. Now I’m not in front of it, so I have to take your testimony as accurate and I have to imagine that what you mean when you say “this is an apple” will evoke in me, a similar object to what you are seeing. Likewise if I look out my window and say I see a car, a real car, not a toy car, you would have to imagine a car in your head, unless you look at a car. What’s the issue here- this looks to me like “ordinary, humdrum reality”. What’s your concern in such a situation? — Manuel

I don't have any problem with what you've written. I'm not saying the memory of an apple is not real. Is it "ordinary, humdrum reality?" Let's see... I guess if you put me in thumbscrews or on the rack and forced me to make a definitive statement as to what everyday reality is, I'd say it is something physical, something made of physical substance, matter or energy, something you can observe directly with human senses.

Thank you for forcing me to say that. Your use of torture devices is forgiven. I didn't realize that's what I think till I wrote it out.