And precisely because the Americans failed they had to deal with the fact that Cuba was lost under the Russian sphere of influence. The red line was the actual nuclear threat, and the solution was focused on finding an agreement about the nuclear threat. Russia could have proposed the same to the US. But it didn't. And the other lesson here is that "the invasion's defeat solidified Castro's role as a national hero and widened the political division between the two formerly allied countries. It also pushed Cuba closer to the Soviet Union". So Russian attempts at invading Ukraine will likely push Ukraine into Western sphere of influence.

So Russian attempts at invading Ukraine will likely push Ukraine into Western sphere of influence. — neomac

It already inspired Finland and Sweden to join NATO.

I think Putin has created a deep abiding hatred of Russia among Ukrainians, so I doubt relations between the two will be normalized as long as Putin is in power.

The red line was the actual nuclear threat, and the solution was focused on finding an agreement about the nuclear threat. Russia could have proposed the same to the US. But it didn't. — neomac

How do you know this?

The Russians have spoken about this red line for decades - you believe no talks happened between the United States and Russia about this situation?

And what good are talks when the United States blatantly states it wishes to cross the mentioned red line, and supports regime change just to prove its intentions?

Russian military incompetence ... — boethius

Stop changing the subject.

The annexion of Crimea, Dombass and Kherson are evidence of imperialist ambitions. We are not talking of just beating Ukraine into Belarusian-type submission here, but of land and people grab.

They snatch children too. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been abducted, deported, and forcibly adopted to the Russian Federation. The United Nations has declared that allegations are "credible", and that Russian forces have sent Ukrainian children to Russia for adoption as part of a large scale program.

You see, Russia has a big demographic problem. Many young people of both sexes have left the country. And yet the new Czar needs children for his future conquests.

The Russians have spoken about this red line for decades - — Tzeentch

It's only been two decades since their economy was devastated, so that red line is fairly young. :razz:

The US didn't annex parts of Cuba nor obtained Cuban neutrality/Cuban demilitarization/regime change. And US reaction was against an actual nuclear threat. — neomac

Not only is your premise here false, you don't even bother to understand the argument.

The point is that "doing something about it" (risking your own troops) is a corollary to "caring about it".

Ukrainian partisans seem to take it for granted that of course NATO can talk about Ukraine joining NATO for over a decade but never actually let Ukraine join NATO.

If it was clear to everyone in the West that Ukraine would never join NATO ... then talking about it, giving some little NATO crumbs of equipment and training and so on, has no moral justification, it is purely a provocation to start a war.

Stop changing the subject. — Olivier5

This was literally the point you were responding to with:

It is not incompatible with imperialism. — Olivier5

A point (Russian incompetence) that Ukrainian partisans have been asserting since the start of the war, and we just had a long exchange about it with many participants here, going into quite a bit of battle field minutia.

It's also a absolutely central point, as the "Russian incompetence" theory justifies war without a plan, since it's only if your opponent will defeat themselves that you don't need an actual plan other than to wait for that to happen, which is quite explicitly Ukrainian war strategy most of the time.

The annexion of Crimea, Dombass and Kherson are evidence of imperialist ambitions. We are not talking of just beating Ukraine into Belarusian-type submission here, but of land and people grab. — Olivier5

I see we agree that Russia has executed effectively on some critical Imperial aims.

The question I have been addressing is what can be done about it.

As I mention above, the available military outcomes are:

1. NATO goes to war with Russia to implement by force the West's moral judgements, which maximises the risk of nuclear war, or
2. Ukraine imposes its will on Russia by force
3. Russia imposes its will on Ukraine by force
4. The war goes on forever — boethius

I argue that 1, 2, and 4 are unlikely compared to 3 as well as not necessarily being in the interest of Ukraine even it was feasible (forever war in particular), and diplomatic resolution is superior to testing which of the 4 military outcomes by further warfare.

A smaller state demonstrating a will to fight and a high cost of winning a war to a larger state is classic asymmetric strategy in war theory ... but not to then try to conquer the larger invading state but to resolve the conflict diplomatically on favourable terms.

Again, the cases people like to mention, in particular Finland, were not battlefield "victories" but fighting to a better diplomatic agreement (that involved "losing", giving up 20% of Finnish territory, and owing war reparations to the Soviet Union ... yet where are people's tears for this outcome in the real world or then arguing Finland should not have settled but kept fighting until they defeated the Soviet Union?).

Right. The aid to the Ukrainians makes the providers proxied elements. Though, I don't think the instigator meant to (ultimately) attack them instead (in this war anyway). Or maybe someone disagrees with this? — jorndoe

I really don't know what the second sentence means. Who is the "instigator," and who does "them" refer to?

Picture if China was taking the same actions in Canada or Mexico, despite US warnings. Would we say they were taking those warnings seriously? After all, it could be argued, China didn’t annex Canada or incorporate it into a defensive alliance — it was only talking about it.

How would that scenario play out? Would we therefore EXCUSE the US for invading Canada? Of course not. But it shouldn’t come as a shock. Nor should we invent stories about how the US President’s “real” motive is to conquer all of the Western Hemisphere.
— Mikie

Note that in this scenario, the US would annex large parts of Canada, just as Putin is doing in Ukraine. Therefore, it would be a land grab, a manifestation of imperialism — Olivier5

And I suppose this reaction to China's involvement -- as inexcusable as it would be -- would somehow prove that the US had "imperial ambitions" there all along, despite there being no evidence of it prior to China's actions? Nonsense.

There's no evidence of US "imperialist ambitions" in Canada today. I don't think that's controversial.

If, hypothetically, starting in 2025, China were on the doorstep, supplying weapons, training thousands of troops, and continually pushing for Canadian membership in a "defensive alliance," despite years of US warnings about this being a "red line," and then a reaction occurred in 2031 where the US annexed parts of Canada -- I suppose this would somehow make the claims true today? Of course not.

Likewise, there were no claims of Russian "imperial ambitions" prior to 2014. After that, it of course became the official reason. With no mention of the prior six years' warnings from Russia, which were recognized even within the US:

William Burns, who is now the head of the CIA, but was the US ambassador to Moscow at the time of the Bucharest summit, wrote a memo to then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that succinctly describes Russian thinking about this matter. In his words: “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.” NATO, he said, “would be seen … as throwing down the strategic gauntlet. Today’s Russia will respond. Russian-Ukrainian relations will go into a deep freeze…It will create fertile soil for Russian meddling in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.”

After the 2008 summit, Putin (reportedly enraged) had stated:

“if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.”

So yes, we can engage in revisionism if we'd like, and make up a story about how Putin was planning all along to take over the former territory of the Soviet Union, but almost no one was claiming that prior to 2014, which was as unsurprising an event as the US annexing parts of Canada in the above scenario. The difference: the US wouldn't wait six years to do so.

Your endless NATO caca arguments fail to account for the annexion of Crimea, Dombass and Kherson. This is the proof of imperial ambitions, which you have conveniently decided to ignore because it undermines your narrative... — Olivier5

On the contrary, I've repeatedly addressed them. I've now done so again, above. What you are ignoring/dismissing, conveniently, is what led to the takeover of Crimea. It wasn't imperialist ambitions.

True, we can believe Putin -- out of sheer caprice -- suddenly developed an urge to take Crimea, and make other projections on what the "real motives" were by speculating about the inner workings of his soul; or we can look at the facts: the actions and statements leading up to the event.

David V Gioe, William Styles (Sep 16, 2022):
Vladimir Putin’s Russian World Turned Upside Down

I, for one, don't want to see a Russia "limp[ing] along". If anything, I'd reserve that for their autocrats. Prosperity felt by the regular Russian on the street (or out yonder) is preferable. :up:

The nuke rattling can also backfire. Russia's Western neighbors don't host nukes (as best we know), surely that would have included Ukraine, had they become a NATO member. On the other hand, Russia's nuke placements are on neighbors' doorsteps. And Russia bulging seems likely to carry such weaponry along, or threaten to, which might elicit a reaction; after all, not everyone airs nuclear threats.

The systematic re-culturation efforts could be added to the domestic measures put in place by the autocrats (mentioned by Gioe and Styles), as an indication of the uncertain future prospects if the Ukrainians were to surrender.

In direct contrast to Russia’s frightful trajectory, the world is witnessing the full-throated and inspiring political birth of a Ukrainian nation-state, its founding myth strengthened by the shared trauma of conflict and common hardships — Gioe and Styles

Ukraine is clearly now a nation with an inarguably separate identity to Russia

Putin’s latest invasion has hardened and consolidated Ukraine’s national resolve—arguably creating the very thing he sought to strangle at birth, a politically confident and culturally separate nation, through his own reckless actions

The struggle against a regress into autocratic regimes is real enough.

Elon Musk suggested a peace plan on Oct 3, 2022 and put it to the vote.

That he’s an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. That’s wrong. It’s wrong because there’s no evidence supporting it, no matter how often it’s repeated in the media or on this thread. If you think there is evidence, happy to discuss that.
— Mikie

I’m responding only for my arguments. If you want to talk about “imperialism”, you better clarify what you mean by it in a way that is clear what you would take as an evidence for the concept to apply, because otherwise we are just quibbling over a terminological issue. See here: “Imperialism is the state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other areas,[2][3] often through employing hard power (economic and military power), but also soft power (cultural and diplomatic power).” — neomac

It would help if you quoted the entirety of my response:

“Only”? I blame Putin for the war. NATO was a reason given for invasion — one that was given for years, clearly and consistently. The conclusion? That he’s an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. That’s wrong. It’s wrong because there’s no evidence supporting it, no matter how often it’s repeated in the media or on this thread. If you think there is evidence, happy to discuss that.

There is no evidence that the was an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. The answer given is about Crimea as evidence. This has been addressed before as well.

I will just quote Mearsheimer, an expert on these matters, who puts it more succinctly than I could:

The Conventional Wisdom

It is widely and firmly believed in the West that Putin is solely responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis and certainly the ongoing war. He is said to have imperial ambitions, which is to say he is bent on conquering Ukraine and other countries as well—all for the purpose of creating a greater Russia that bears some resemblance to the former Soviet Union. In other words, Ukraine is Putin’s first target, but not his last. As one scholar put it, he is “acting on a sinister, long-held goal: to erase Ukraine from the map of the world.” Given Putin’s purported goals, it makes perfect sense for Finland and Sweden to join NATO and for the alliance to increase its force levels in eastern Europe. Imperial Russia, after all, must be contained.

While this narrative is repeated over and over in the mainstream media and by virtually every Western leader, there is no evidence to support it. To the extent that purveyors of the conventional wisdom provide evidence, it has little if any bearing on Putin’s motives for invading Ukraine. For example, some emphasize that he said that Ukraine is an “artificial state“ or not a “real state.” Such opaque comments, however, say nothing about his reason for going to war. The same is true of Putin’s statement that he views Russians and Ukrainians as “one people“ with a common history. Others point out that he called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” Of course, Putin also said, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” Still, others point to a speech in which he declared that “Modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia.” But as he went on to say in that very same speech, in reference to Ukraine’s independence today: “Of course, we cannot change past events, but we must at least admit them openly and honestly.”

To make the case that Putin was bent on conquering all of Ukraine and incorporating it into Russia, it is necessary to provide evidence that first, he thought it was a desirable goal, that second, he thought it was a feasible goal, and third, he intended to pursue that goal. There is no evidence in the public record that Putin was contemplating, much less intending to put an end to Ukraine as an independent state and make it part of greater Russia when he sent his troops into Ukraine on February 24th.

In fact, there is significant evidence that Putin recognized Ukraine as an independent country. In his July 12, 2021, article about Russian-Ukrainian relations, which proponents of the conventional wisdom often point to as evidence of his imperial ambitions, he tells the Ukrainian people, “You want to establish a state of your own: you are welcome!” Regarding how Russia should treat Ukraine, he writes, “There is only one answer: with respect.” He concludes that lengthy article with the following words: “And what Ukraine will be—it is up to its citizens to decide.” It is hard to reconcile these statements with the claim that he wants to incorporate Ukraine within a greater Russia.

In that same July 12, 2021, article and again in an important speech he gave on February 21st of this year, Putin emphasized that Russia accepts “the new geopolitical reality that took shape after the dissolution of the USSR.” He reiterated that same point for a third time on February 24th, when he announced that Russia would invade Ukraine. In particular, he declared that “It is not our plan to occupy Ukrainian territory” and made it clear that he respected Ukrainian sovereignty, but only up to a point: “Russia cannot feel safe, develop, and exist while facing a permanent threat from the territory of today’s Ukraine.” In essence, Putin was not interested in making Ukraine a part of Russia; he was interested in making sure it did not become a “springboard“ for Western aggression against Russia, a subject I will say more about shortly.

One might argue that Putin was lying about his motives, that he was attempting to disguise his imperial ambitions. As it turns out, I have written a book about lying in international politics—Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics—and it is clear to me that Putin was not lying. For starters, one of my principal findings is that leaders do not lie much to each other; they lie more often to their own publics. Regarding Putin, whatever one thinks of him, he does not have a history of lying to other leaders. Although some assert that he frequently lies and cannot be trusted, there is little evidence of him lying to foreign audiences. Moreover, he has publicly spelled out his thinking about Ukraine on numerous occasions over the past two years and he has consistently emphasized that his principal concern is Ukraine’s relations with the West, especially NATO. He has never once hinted that he wants to make Ukraine part of Russia. If this behavior is all part of a giant deception campaign, it would be without precedent in recorded history.

Perhaps the best indicator that Putin is not bent on conquering and absorbing Ukraine is the military strategy Moscow has employed from the start of the campaign. The Russian military did not attempt to conquer all of Ukraine. That would have required a classic blitzkrieg strategy that aimed at quickly overrunning all of Ukraine with armored forces supported by tactical airpower. That strategy was not feasible, however, because there were only 190,000 soldiers in Russia’s invading army, which is far too small a force to vanquish and occupy Ukraine, which is not only the largest country between the Atlantic Ocean and Russia, but also has a population over 40 million. Unsurprisingly, the Russians pursued a limited aims strategy, which focused on either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquering a large swath of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine. In short, Russia did not have the capability to subdue all of Ukraine, much less conquer other countries in eastern Europe.

As Ramzy Mardini observed, another telling indicator of Putin’s limited aims is that there is no evidence Russia was preparing a puppet government for Ukraine, cultivating pro-Russian leaders in Kyiv, or pursuing any political measures that would make it possible to occupy the entire country and eventually integrate it into Russia.

To take this argument a step further, Putin and other Russian leaders surely understand from the Cold War that occupying counties in the age of nationalism is invariably a prescription for never-ending trouble. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan is a glaring example of this phenomenon, but more relevant for the issue at hand is Moscow’s relations with its allies in eastern Europe. The Soviet Union maintained a huge military presence in that region and was involved in the politics of almost every country located there. Those allies, however, were a frequent thorn in Moscow’s side. The Soviet Union put down a major insurrection in East Germany in 1953, and then invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to keep them in line. There was serious trouble in Poland in 1956, 1970, and again in 1980-1981. Although Polish authorities dealt with these events, they served as a reminder that intervention might be necessary. Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia routinely caused Moscow trouble, but Soviet leaders tended to tolerate their misbehavior, because their location made them less important for deterring NATO.

The nuke rattling can also backfire. Russia's Western neighbors don't host nukes (as best we know), surely that would have included Ukraine, had they become a NATO member. On the other hand, Russia's nuke placements are on neighbors' doorsteps. And Russia bulging seems likely to carry such weaponry along, or threaten to, which might elicit a reaction; after all, not everyone airs nuclear threats. — jorndoe

NATO in Ukraine presents 2 entirely real security problems to Russia.

First, is forward operating bases and missile bases in Ukraine, which we've seen happen in the Baltics despite the theory being they would be part of NATO but not host forward operating bases ... apparently Iran was such a big threat from that exact direction that missile bases needed to be there regardless.

So, even if NATO stated it would not forward deploy to Ukraine, you can't assume that would hold in the future.

Second, more importantly, long borders with NATO simply create a more volatile situation. Once Ukraine is in NATO it could stage a false flag, if no the Azov or Right Sector today then some more extreme organisation tomorrow. It may not be clear "who started it" etc. It's simply a security headache that any random altercation along a thousand kilometre border could immediately escalate to nuclear war. Not only can you legitimately fear a Ukrainian false flag, you can also fear either a mistake or then false flag of your own troops starting a nuclear war on purpose or by mistake. If fighting suddenly erupts, it may not even be clear to the leaders of any state involved of why, who, what is happening. Each side may interpret events as the other side making some pre-emptive move as the prelude to some military plan sparking a series of escalations.

It's essentially common sense for both Russia and NATO to want to minimise common borders to a manageable amount (the current borders are very small and not really any strategic threat either way: you can't invade Russia through North Norway and the baltic states don't have large enough militaries to be worried about ... and hundreds of thousands of NATO troops would be noticed).

It's also entirely reasonable position for Russia to invade Ukraine preemptively to avoid the far more volatile situation of NATO bordering Russia along hundreds of kilometres and (more importantly) a large country with a large population.

Why people with any sort of strategic military education at all (such as @ssu) argue that sure NATO was talking about allowing Ukraine to join but that everyone knew that wouldn't happen, that the threat was empty, and therefor Russia should not have reacted to an empty threat.

The problem with that argument is that if people are talking about doing something, even if it seems an empty threat tomorrow, if the situation changes and there's a moment of weakness they will likely seize the opportunity, so it is logical to react when you have the capacity to do so.

Now, NATO could have, instead of talking trash, just gone and done it: fly to Ukraine in 2008 or 2014 or anytime since, have everything pre-approved, and sign the documents overnight and "poof" NATOed.

Of course, that is and was never a remote possibility because NATO, including the US, simply doesn't care enough about Ukraine to expend any real political capital in Ukraine's interest. And no, supplying arms is not spending political capital but building up your political capital by doing the arms industry bidding.

NATO in Ukraine also presents a domestic political problem that people feel the unsafe with their arch nemesis that continuously calls them their enemy on their door step.

Western analysis seems to start from the premise that all Russians think like Westerners and actually want the West to conquer their territory or then just fuck them up generally speaking. We'll be welcomed as liberators!

NATO in Ukraine presents 2 entirely real security problems to Russia. — boethius

According to Putin, NATO was planning to destroy Russia. He saw NATO as an existential threat.

Let's go with that.

According to Putin, NATO was planning to destroy Russia. He saw NATO as an existential threat. — frank

Sure, US neo-cons went on for more than a decade about their "nuclear option" of shutting Russia out of the SWIFT system along with significant sanctions.

They called it the "nuclear option" because it would have (in their minds) the same affect as nuclear weapons and total destruction of Russia, just without the nuclear weapons and not (sufficient) reason for Russia to retaliate.

So, you have guys at the top of the US policy making circles constantly talking about their desire to "nuke you" (just with means of comparable destructive power without actually being nuclear weapons), along with installing forward operating missile bases and wanting to expand the "defensive" alliance forward to the border of Russia.

It legitimately seems threatening words and actions.

Likewise for a decade, Russia is blamed for getting Trump elected and orchestrating some high treasonous plot ... with 200 000 USD of facebook adds from some random add farm? Which was delusional scapegoatism.

History teaches that people who engage in delusional scapegoatism on a large scale often eventually act out violently against the object of their delusions.

One can argue that the threat from NATO was not sufficient justification to start a large war, but the idea NATO, in particular the US, wasn't constantly threatening Russia in action and rhetoric is just absurd.

• Putin's Russia is a present existential threat to Ukraine, to which the Ukrainians are responding

• until Putin's Russia has taken over all of Ukraine, the (supposed (or, say, future-hypothetical)) threat of NATO membership remains

• if Putin’s Russia was to take over all of Ukraine, then Russia becomes an increased substantial threat to others (like Putinian autocracy, nuclear rattling doesn't help)

See where this is going?

- Ukraine remains neutral. — Elon Musk (Oct 3, 2022)

The point stands: the US and NATO did not take Russian concerns seriously — as was demonstrated above[/].
— Mikie

That’s why you are blaming also US/NATO for this war, right? — neomac

The US and NATO are primarily responsible for escalating this war, yes. Ultimately the decision was Putin's, and so I blame him for the war. Person A provoking someone doesn't mean person B has no choice but to slap A in the face. Still, we should be honest about the whole story, and not simply make up stories about why person B reacted.

Either way, if pushing for NATO membership, supplying weapons and military training, etc., is “taking Russian concerns seriously,” as you asserted, then the assertion is indeed baseless and wrong. If their concerns were taken seriously, these actions wouldn’t have been taken.
— Mikie

Taking a threat seriously means that one should not ignore the threat — neomac

Excuse me, but you're changing the words. You didn't say "threat," and neither did I. You said "Russian concerns." Your assertion is that "Russian concerns were taken seriously." They were not.

What were the Russian concerns? Again, they were made very clear after 2008. We can go over the long record again if you'd like, but I think it's fairly obvious. It was obvious to US diplomats, CIA directors, and allies that Russia believed Ukrainian (and Georgian) membership into NATO was an existential threat. Ditto weapons and military training, which were later concerns and likewise voiced consistently and strongly -- not just by Putin.

So, again, your claim is baseless. Russian concerns were not taken seriously.

I prefer living in the US over living in Iraq. The US invasion of Iraq was still wrong.

Even if Russia were a democracy, the war is wrong. The US ignoring the Russian concerns and contributing to escalating the crisis is also wrong.
— Mikie

So what? I’m more interested in testing the rationality of our expectations not in what we find desirable or moral. If all you have to offer is a list of scores based on your moral compass or desiderata, you are not intellectually challenging to me. — neomac

What isn't intellectually challenging is playing games like this. You know very well that I didn't say "threats" above -- and neither did you. You also know very well that the above quotation is in response to the following:

If state A threatens state B in its proximity or state A invades state B, I could react differently depending on which state is democratic or authoritarian, because I prefer democracy over authoritarian regimes. — neomac

[Emphasis mine]

So it's very strange that suddenly you say you're not interested in what we find "desirable or moral." I'm not interested in it either, which was the point. It doesn't matter if we prefer democracy or authoritarianism -- as you stated. What matters are the actions. We should react the same, not according to what we "prefer" (again, your words).

What was the Russian threat in 2008, exactly? — Mikie

By the end of 2008 Putin was already on the path of centralising power (e.g. by fighting oligarchs since hist first presidency term) while signalling his geopolitical ambitions in his war against Chechnya and Georgia. This was already enough to alarm the West and the ex-soviet union countries (including Ukrainians who have a long history of nationalist tensions with Russia). That’s why NATO enlargement was welcomed by ex-Soviet republics and not the result of military occupation and annexation by NATO, you know. — neomac

Your history is very confused.

That's simply not the case. That wasn't the US's or NATO's position in 2008. I asked what was the Russian threat in 2008 -- because it was in April of 2008 that the Bucharest summit declared that Ukraine and Georgia would be admitted to NATO. Claiming the war in Georgia was a threat, and thus a reason for membership of NATO, is anachronistic. The war in Georgia did not break out until August of 2008. So that claim is nonsense.

The actions in Chechnya was the threat? Problems there had been occurring for years, internal to Russia. There was also no mention of that at the 2008 summit. It was not considered a threat, and it was not a reason for NATO admitting Ukraine or Georgia in April of 2008. It's worth remembering that Putin was invited (and attended) that summit. Strange to invite someone who was considered such a threat.

There was no Russian threat in 2008, which is when this all began, in April of that year in Bucharest. You've provided two examples of why. One was never mentioned by NATO -- or anyone else. The other is absurd, having happened after the summit.

So I ask again: What was the Russian threat in 2008 that began all of this?

Additionally your myopic demands for evidence fails to take into account the initial assumption of my geopolitical reasoning: “You candidly admit that Putin’s perception of the threat was honestly felt (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s not justified) , but that’s pointless to the extent that all geopolitical agents (not only Russia) as geopolitical agent reason strategically. And strategic reasoning comprises threat perception, signalling and management , so if one must acknowledge that Putin/Russia felt threatened by US/NATO (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s unjustified), then one must acknowledge that also US/NATO/Ukraine can feel threatened by Putin/Russia (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s unjustified).”. So US/NATO felt Putin and the rising of Russian revanchism honestly threatening, even if, ex hypothesis, it wasn’t justified. Period. — neomac

Your "reasoning" is, and has now repeatedly been shown to be, very faulty indeed.

It's quite true that if the US/NATO felt that Russian revanchism was threatening, that this should be taken seriously as well -- even if we believe it unjustified. But that was not the case. Neither the US, nor NATO, believed this was true in 2008. That's why it was never stated. It's why Putin was invited to the summit. It's also why you can provide no evidence of it, despite being asked multiple times. So yes, my demands for evidence are quite singular -- because I'm interested in facts, not your rather confused reasoning.

If you have evidence that the US and NATO felt Russia was threatening in April of 2008, when they pushed for Ukrainian and Georgian membership, then provide it.

Or you could actually read the reasons given in the summit. It's online for free. In case you're unwilling to do so, I'll quote a part for you:

NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.

-- From the NATO website.

"Real intentions"? Again, let's stop simply declaring the "real intentions" of the US or Putin, and look at the facts. From the summit communiqué in June 2021 to the Joint Statement in September 2021 to the statements by Blinken in December (after Russia made clear demands about NATO) -- the words were consistent. What about the actions? Well, not only weapons were provided, but extensive military training, including with NATO forces. — Mikie

You are missing the fact that Biden froze the procurement of lethal weapons by the end of 2021 (https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/appeals-ukraine-biden-admin-holds-back-additional-military-aid-kyiv-di-rcna8421) which were a more serious threat for Putin’s war machine than military training, defensive weapons and NATO promises. — neomac

Sorry, but you simply declaring that one thing is more threatening than another is not interesting. Ask the Russians if they felt it was threatening. It is their opinion that matters, not yours. And they've been quite clear, for over decade.

This distinction between "lethal weapons" and "defensive weapons" is kind of ridiculous. Everything the US has ever done, accordion to them, is "defensive." When we invade Iraq, we're "defending" Iraq. So that's already a sign of repeating propaganda. But think about it for a minute: what do you think "defensive" weapons are? They're all completely non-lethal? So machine guns are for "defense," therefore they can't kill? Are the FGM-148 Javelins simply "defensive"? Because those have been supplied as well. They certainly seem lethal to me. They're called "anti-tank missiles."

Furthermore, "lethal weapons" had already been deployed in Ukraine prior to December. Russia troops had already begun mobilizing at this point as well.

And again: NATO/US military support to Ukraine was meant as a deterrent (however weak) — neomac

Again, more propaganda. Everything that NATO/US does is "defensive" and meant merely as "deterrents." Right. Unfortunately, the Russians see it quite differently. They view anti-tank missiles and military drills with NATO -- including Operation Sea Breeze -- as a threat.

10 thousand trained troops a year (Obama), Trump supplying "defensive weapons," and Biden's long-held and continued hawkishness toward Russia (including what I've already gone over) -- hardly what you describe.
— Mikie

Again you are forgetting the issue of the lethal weapons. Not training, not NATO expansion, not defensive weapons, not the hawkish claims were the serious threat, otherwise Putin would have started his special operation much earlier. The serious military threat was the offensive weapon system provided to the Ukrainians against Putin’s expansionist ambitions. — neomac

See above. This "lethal weapons" and "defensive weapons" distinction is really absurd. It's also not your decision to decide what was and wasn't a "serious military threat." I suppose Sea Breeze wasn't a "serious military threat" to Russia, in your view? Nonsense.

But even if we take your premises seriously, what exactly are you referring to by the "offensive weapon system"? You understand that Russia had mobilized before Biden delayed the $200 million supply, right?

Also in December, Putin said: “what they are doing, or trying or planning to do in Ukraine, is not happening thousands of kilometers away from our national border. It is on the doorstep of our house. They must understand that we simply have nowhere further to retreat to. Do they really think we do not see these threats? Or do they think that we will just stand idly watching threats to Russia emerge?”
— Mikie

Retreat from what? — neomac

From NATO expansion.

Did Putin have evidence that Ukraine or NATO wanted to invade Russia? Or are we always talking about perceived strategic threats? — neomac

Suddenly evidence is important, and not "myopic"? Interesting.

Putin didn't have evidence, because that's not what Putin was claiming. Putin never claimed NATO wanted to "invade" Russia. Your failure to even minimally understand Russia's position here is telling.

You keep presenting facts according to the Russian perspective but you didn’t explain yet why the West should act according to Putin’s way of framing the issue and related demands (NATO membership, no military training, no weapons for Ukraine) while letting Ukraine fall prey to Russia. How is that right? — neomac

I've not once suggested that we let Ukraine "fall prey to Russia." I support US helping Ukrainians defend their country.

If Russia did something wrong in invading Ukraine according to your moral compass, what do you think it’s sensible to do about it? — neomac

Encourage and facilitate peace negotiations. The most immediate action would be a ceasefire.

So here we stand:
You are blaming also US/NATO for this war in Ukraine
You do not ground your judgement based on geopolitical strategic concerns, only on your cute moral compass (honesty, impartiality, peace&lovefulness) — neomac

Maybe you're just incapable of having a rational discussion. But I'll repeat, yet again:

No, I'm not blaming the US and NATO for the war. The US and NATO were primarily responsible for escalating the war. That's a crucial difference. The blame for invasion is Putin's.

The second accusation is just pure irrationality, given that it was YOU who mentioned "preference," not me. As demonstrated above.

I never once mentioned "honesty, impartiality", or "lovefulness."

I have indeed mentioned peace. For good reason.

• Putin's Russia is a present existential threat to Ukraine, to which the Ukrainians are responding

• until Putin's Russia has taken over all of Ukraine, the (supposed (or, say, future-hypothetical)) threat of NATO membership remains

• if Putin’s Russia was to take over all of Ukraine, then Russia becomes an increased substantial threat to others (like Putinian autocracy, nuclear rattling doesn't help)

See where this is going?

- Ukraine remains neutral.
— Elon Musk (Oct 3, 2022) — jorndoe

You do realise Elon cribbed his proposal from me.

For certain the EU has enormous leverage in the situation and can easily use it to broker a peace deal.

A recipe for a resolution could go something like this:

- Ukraine enters the EU on some fast track process.
- Russia gets sanctions dropped and Nord Stream 2.
- Russia pays for rebuilding of Ukraine (which is obviously just recycling some of the massive profits of dropping sanctions).
- The territorial question is of course the tricky part, but that could be resolved by agreeing to have another vote after peace is restored, people return to these regions; something that the world community would accept as legitimate, outside observers etc. If holding onto the territories is an obstacle to a peace deal that Russia actually wants, "giving the territory back" is problematic after annexation, however, the various regions having another vote in x time could be a reasonable compromise for everyone. "Will of the people" At least in principle Ukraine is "fighting" for the right of self determination, and Russia is claiming these regions can leave Ukraine and join Russia based on a vote, and presumably the EU is democratic and maybe even the US, so there's at least no issue in principle. Of course, you'd want to come to this deal before these regions are officially annexed, as Russia wouldn't want the precedent of one of its territories being able to vote to leave. — boethius

(September 24th - Boethius)

Only thing I got wrong (compared to Elon's proposal) was that it was Elon, not the EU, that has enormous leverage to broker a peace deal.

And I suppose this reaction to China's involvement -- as inexcusable as it would be -- would somehow prove that the US had "imperial ambitions" there all along, despite there being no evidence of it prior to China's actions? Nonsense.

There's no evidence of US "imperialist ambitions" in Canada today. I don't think that's controversial. — Mikie

Which is precisely why Canada has nothing to fear from the US, and is not seeking protection elsewhere....

It legitimately seems threatening words and actions. — boethius

Seems? It actually was threatening. The US wanted to destroy Russia, like wipe it off the map. Putin had no choice.

Seems? It actually was threatening. The US wanted to destroy Russia, like wipe it off the map. Putin had no choice. — frank

Insane hyperbole is a not good analytical tool.

We can acknowledge that NATO threatens "Russia" in various ways, some big and some small, without believing NATO has some actual plan they are actually intent on actually doing to "wipe Russia off the map".

We can attribute plenty other intentions to the US / NATO to explain their various threats, such as scapegoatism (of losing to Trump), need of an "other" to justify war expenditures (when the writing's on the wall in the middle east), wanting a conflict to sell natural gas to Europe (and make money), politicians laundering a bit of said money through corrupt AF Ukraine, and so on, resulting in stoking tensions without much care of the potential consequences. Aka. business as usual.

Everything isn't a nefarious plot all the time.

Everything isn't a nefarious plot all the time. — boethius

That's pretty naive.

Which is precisely why Canada has nothing to fear from the US, and is not seeking protection elsewhere.... — Olivier5

Exactly. Likewise for US/NATO-Ukraine/Georgia in 2008. The reasons for membership were not some imperialist threat from Russia. No one made that claim.

If, hypothetically, starting in 2025, China were on the doorstep, supplying weapons, training thousands of troops, and continually pushing for Canadian membership in a "defensive alliance," despite years of US warnings about this being a "red line," and then a reaction occurred in 2031 where the US annexed parts of Canada -- I suppose this would somehow make the claims true today? Of course not.

Likewise, there were no claims of Russian "imperial ambitions" prior to 2014. After that, it of course became the official reason. With no mention of the prior six years' warnings from Russia, which were recognized even within the US — Mikie

That's pretty naive. — frank

I'm just more optimistic than you it seems.

I'm just more optimistic than you it seems. — boethius

:victory:

The reasons for membership were not some imperialist threat from Russia. No one made that claim. — Mikie

Oh really? What were the reasons for Ukraine and Georgia and all the others to seek NATO membership, oh wise one?They wanted to visit Brussels?

Oh really? What were the reasons for Ukraine and Georgia and all the others to seek NATO membership, oh wise one?They wanted to visit Brussels? — Olivier5

There are all kinds of reasons for joining NATO. An imperialist threat from Russia was not one of them in 2008. Which is why you cannot provide one reference supporting such a claim.

There was no Russian imperialist threat before the 2008 summit. No one claimed that. That claim was made after 2014.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

An imperialist threat from Russia was not one of them in 2008 — Mikie

While he was invading Georgia? What kind of evidence were you looking for?

Yes, I'm sure the war in Georgia, which occurred in August, was a big reason at the NATO summit.

Yes, I'm sure the war in Georgia, which occurred in August, was a big reason at the NATO summit. — Mikie

Oh yeah. I guess that came later the same year.

, Åslund's proposal is better than Musk's. But, from the looks of it, that ship has sailed, train has left the station, the genie is out of the bottle; Putin's Empire The Russian Federation has rolled their submission-machine out. Shams won't do, though, even if in-the-works for 8 years. NATO is, first and foremost, a threat to free Kremlin movements/actions.

• Putin's Russia is a present existential threat to Ukraine, to which the Ukrainians are responding
• until Putin's Russia has taken over all of Ukraine, the (supposed (or, say, future-hypothetical)) threat of NATO membership remains
• if Putin’s Russia was to take over all of Ukraine, then Russia becomes an increased substantial threat to others (like Putinian autocracy, nuclear rattling doesn't help)
See where this is going? — jorndoe

If Putin is actually going down the nuclear path, then Moscow will get all eyes-on, attention. I don't imagine they think that'd be a good move for Russia, or anyone at all. Anyone know specs of the Russian dirty / tactical nuclear bombs? (radius, time until area is safe, materials, yield, emp, delivery systems) — jorndoe

This is alarming. It really is like preparing the narrative groundwork for using nukes.

After all, you could argue that making the Ukrainian territories Russian "made it possible" officially to use conscripts in Ukraine. Yet this also makes it possible to use nukes as the doctrine goes.