Are all Gettier problems fallacious: do the conclusions go beyond what the evidence actually supports? — TheMadFool
You are right that what is at stake is the meanings of "belief", "justification" and "knowledge". But that just means that you need to engage with Gettier's definition of justification which specifies that a justification may be a justification even when the belief is false — Ludwig V
which specifies that a justification may be a justification even when the belief is false — Ludwig V
One problem is that if no belief can be justified unless it is true, all claims to knowledge must be based on an infinite regress and it is hard to see how new knowledge could ever be acquired by anyone and your use of the words would be very different from ordinary use. — Ludwig V
But the Gettier problems are based on the fact (at least I think it is a fact) that truth and falsity do not wait for our actual and empirical process of learning what they are. — Ludwig V
As Williamson notes, "Knowledge doesn’t require infallibility. What it requires is that, in the situation, you couldn't too easily have been mistaken."
— Andrew M
All right. But when you find you are mistaken, you need to withdraw the claim to know. — Ludwig V
Which is the Harman-Vogel paradox that Ludwig V referred to. Jennifer Nagel has a useful survey of some of the responses (contextualism, relativism, interest-relative invariantism, error theory) and her own solution (dual-process theory) in "The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox".
— Andrew M
I’m not sure whether to classify the classic Gettier cases as variants of that paradox or a completely different variety. But I am sure that this paradox is much more difficult and more important than the Gettier cases. I have looked at some of what Jennifer Nagel has written about this. I didn’t find any of the theories particularly appealing. I’m certain it deserves treatment separate from the Gettier cases. — Ludwig V
Indeed. The claim can no longer be justifiably held at that point since knowledge does require truth and the claim in question is now known to be false. — Andrew M
Yes, I agree they deserve separate treatments. In my view, contextualism is a satisfactory response to both. — Andrew M
Another example: justification (to imprison someone) is still justification even when the belief (that they committed a crime) is false. Yikes. I think not. — Benj96
Not an infinite regress. Just a regression to the truth. Where one's belief/ collection of beliefs about what is true matches what is actually the case. That is knowledge. — Benj96
You want us as observers to have a say in whether S suspects or believes that p. But deciding to suspect something is deciding to believe that p may be true or may be false and is up to S. — Ludwig V
"The farmer has some evidence that the familiar silhouette is a cow, but the evidence is unreliable. The evidence does not justify his conclusion and further evidence is required. As it happens, further evidence will reveal that his belief is false. — Ludwig V
Is it not ironic in the Gettier problem John thinks Jack will get the job and that he has ten coins in his pocket, so the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but in fact John gets the job but unknowingly also has ten coins in his pocket? — introbert
The justified false belief that people should not use technology is falsified by the use of technology — introbert
In that case it's better to "suspect" its P because the partial knowledge that you have doesn't exclude the possibility that thus potential P is indeed an actual P. — Benj96
where justification falls short of certainty, it may be inappropriate (depending on the circumstances, such as what is at stake and the probability of error) to rely on it. I’ll admit that “justification” is sometimes used to mean “show” or “prove” and so requires certainty. But I also think that sometimes it is used to mean “reasonable”, which doesn’t. For what it’s worth, I think you’ll find that dictionaries agree. — Ludwig V
But I don't see them as Gettier problem — Ludwig V
I do accept Gettier's definition because your strict definition would rule out many ordinary uses of "know" and transform "know" into a jargon concept useful only to philosophers — Ludwig V
1. Ronald Reagan's bulletproof limo deflected a bullet into his chest.
2. From wikipedia: Gettier created a tradition in the epistemology of JTB by destroying it. Justified False belief: "Gettier's formula creates a clear barrier in analyzing knowledge: Actuality: is a new area of epistemology for analyzing knowledge. Truth: the formula is a criticism of epistemology — introbert
Is it not ironic in the Gettier problem John thinks Jack will get the job and that he has ten coins in his pocket, so the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but in fact John gets the job but unknowingly also has ten coins in his pocket? — introbert
One may be justified in believing that p even if p is false. This opens the door to Gettier cases, no matter how stingy or generous the criteria are. The problems actually arise when S believes the right thing for the wrong, but justifiable, reasons.
How to respond? Well, my response to your farmer is 1) he thought he saw a cow, 2) he didn’t see a cow, 3) there was a cow. I observe that a) 1) and 3) are reasons for saying that he knew and that b) 2) is a reason for saying that he didn’t. I conclude that it is not proven that he knew, and that it is not proven that he didn’t, so I classify the case as unclassifiable. — Ludwig V
However, one of my complaints about the Gettier business is precisely that it pushes us to give a binary answer where it is not appropriate. — Ludwig V
Yes it's clearly not (based on the fact that we have external knowledge pertaining to the set of assumptions (the knowledge that "not all animals are humans".). — Benj96
Your form. P1 All H are A pertains to "All humans are animals." (but not all of them). — Benj96
"All X is P" in standard logic is never understood as "All X is P and all P is X" as you seem to claim now (indeed "all humans are all animals" sounds pretty weird as a sentence). Formal logic is about propositional forms not about the semantics of the terms occurring insides propositions. — neomac
In the original version of the story, it's a bit of cloth that is causally related to the farmer's implicitly disjunctive belief and another disjunct is true. What's different here from the case above where one cow is mistaken for another — and so there's acceptable disjunctive knowledge — is that you cannot see that a bit of cloth is a cow, because it isn't. We are relying on the seeing being factive, and that's already expressed as predication; what causation gives us is an explanation for the acceptability of the predication: you can see that something is a cow only if it is a cow. Which I hope is another way of saying that some cow ought to be causally involved in your formation of cow beliefs. — Srap Tasmaner
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