We tend to fetishise reason as a sort of transcendental virtue. And while I think reason is non-negotiable for civilised discourse, it may also be used to achieve lamentable outcomes. — Tom Storm

And this is another aspect I think. Reason is also social and dialogic/dialectical in nature. Even when we think, we reason internally as an internal discussion.

Whatall premises? How so? — Vera Mont

Here's my thinking. Non-trivial premises come from one of two places 1) They are established using deductive logic from previous premises or 2) They are established by inductive logic from empirical observations. If you follow every chain of deductions backwards, you will ultimately come to at least one premise that has to be established empirically.

How do people turn empirical observations into generalizations that can be used as premises? 1) They look at patterns they or others have seen before with other observations or, if that doesn't work or if they haven't seen similar observations before 2) They generate new generalizations that can be tested. If you follow every chain of generalizations backwards, you will ultimately come to at least one that has to be established based on a new generalizations.

How do people generate new generalizations from observations? I do it by pouring information into my brain, letting it spin around for a while until a pattern emerges, an insight. Intuition. Generating a new premise, a hypothesis, is not a logical process. It requires that something new be created where there was nothing before. Then that new idea can be tested using empirical methods. You have to have a hypothesis before you can apply logic. Before you can be rational.

Even when we think, we reason internally as an internal discussion. — Pantagruel

This is not my personal experience. Most of my useful thinking, things other than worrying or fantasizing, takes place subconsciously. It pops up and then I have to apply reason to check whether or not it makes sense.

How do people generate new generalizations from observations? — T Clark

Why can't we suppose that much of the reasoning we do every day begins, not with a generalization generated by the thinker, but by a 'given' circumstance. That, I guess would be empirically observable:

Situation: I am standing on a hard surface in the dark.
Problem: I am not satisfied to stand here until daybreak (Memory has kicked in with two pieces of information: it's night and it usually ends with sunrise)
I don't see any of that as irrational.

Situation: I am standing on a hard surface in the dark.
Problem: I am not satisfied to stand here until daybreak (Memory has kicked in with two pieces of information: it's night and it usually ends with sunrise) — Vera Mont

You're not describing a new generalization. This is something you learned when you were three-years-old. Memory is not reason.

I don't see any of that as irrational. — Vera Mont

Again, non-rational is not the same as irrational.

:up: Clearly explained!

If thinking is strategic, is it therefore also rational? — Pantagruel

No. There are uninformed or fallaciously-derived "strategies".

Is it possible to be a criminal, and also rational, in the strictest sense of the word?

Yes. It is often not irrational to break rules norms or conventions.

What about reasonable?

I can't tell what you mean – how do you distinguish between "thinking" "rational" and "reasonable"?

My short shorthand for these terms ...

thinking: reflective inquiry / practices (i.e. meta-rational, meta-reasonable ... e.g. conjecture-making/testing, reflective equilibrium, philosophical hermeneutics, conceptual analysis, etc)

rational: inferential rule-following (e.g. means adequate to ends (goals) which, however, do not undermine / invalidate ends (goals))

reasonable: context-specific rule/exception-making and goals-setting which may be inferential or not

And being discursive in nature, these terms connote primarily social, not subjective, practices (Peirce-Dewey, Witty)

Is ethics rational? — Pantagruel

Not always.

Or is it just rational to be ethical?

It's reasonable, I think; but, of course, that depends on what you mean by "ethical".

Again, non-rational is not the same as irrational. — T Clark

I am often stunned that this needs to be said and how nice to read it.
So, I followed this back...

How do people generate new generalizations from observations? I do it by pouring information into my brain, letting it spin around for a while until a pattern emerges, an insight. Intuition. Generating a new premise, a hypothesis, is not a logical process. It requires that something new be created where there was nothing before. Then that new idea can be tested using empirical methods. You have to have a hypothesis before you can apply logic. Before you can be rational. — T Clark

Exactly. It is as if we can manage without intuition, often. Or, it is as if everything in science, say, is reasoned and empirical. Conclusions are formed, hopefully, after testing and rational analysis, but the process of science requires intution and other non-rational processes. Often if one asserts this, one is told 'but they are fallible.' Well, sure. And of course reasoned/rational processes are also fallible. But yes, intuition is fallible but necessary. We can't weed it out and function. And then as a related issue, some intuition is better than other intuition. Some people's intuition that is is better than other people's.

You're not describing a new generalization. — T Clark

Of course not. I'm asking why you would need a new generalization in the first place. I'm describing a premise from which a practical, mundane chain of reasoning may start. A situation is identified. Why would it have to be new?
A problem is presented. Information (from observation and memory) is added. Reason is applied.
Either the problem is solved or the chain of reasoning breaks down due to lack of information and the subject fails to solve the problem.

Again, non-rational is not the same as irrational. — T Clark

Okay. How is a real situation in which the subject may find himself non-rational? And why does it matter whether reality follows the rules of this distinction? Suppose reality does throw up a problem that is irrational, or appears irrational to the subject.
"I am standing on a hard, level surface, surrounded by endlessly repeating reflections of myself."
Can he not still apply reasoning to the problem this situation presents?

Clearly explained! — Janus

Thank you. I'm glad it was clear to you. That was the first time I really tried to write out the point I was trying to make, after toying around with it in my mind for a long time. The description I wrote was a good example of what I was trying to describe. It was intuitively clear to me based on my experience of my own thinking process that much, most, of my thinking is not rational. Taking that intuition and putting it into words was a rational act, but in its heart, at its birth, it was not.

Exactly. It is as if we can manage without intuition, often. Or, it is as if everything in science, say, is reasoned and empirical. Conclusions are formed, hopefully, after testing and rational analysis, but the process of science requires intution and other non-rational processes. Often if one asserts this, one is told 'but they are fallible.' Well, sure. And of course reasoned/rational processes are also fallible. But yes, intuition is fallible but necessary. We can't weed it out and function. And then as a related issue, some intuition is better than other intuition. Some people's intuition that is is better than other people's. — Bylaw

Yes. As you note, you don't use intuition and insight as a replacement for reason. They do different things. Reason can't do what intuition does. More than that, reason knows it needs intuition. I guess maybe rationality doesn't. Maybe that's the difference. Reason has the humility to know that it doesn't provide, can't provide, all that's needed.

I'm asking why you would need a new generalization in thAe first place. I'm describing a premise from which a practical, mundane chain of reasoning may start. A situation is identified. Why would it have to be new? — Vera Mont

Okay. How is a real situation in which the subject may find himself non-rational? — Vera Mont

As I've noted in my last couple of posts in this thread, my part in this discussion is itself a good example of what I'm trying to describe. It has been clear to me for a long time, based on my experience of my own thinking process; i.e. intuition, insight; that much of thinking is not rational. The description I've provided is just about the first time I've tried organizing my thoughts on this subject and putting them into words. That has been what I would call a rational process, but it's roots are in experience, not reason.

How do people generate new generalizations from observations? I do it by pouring information into my brain, letting it spin around for a while until a pattern emerges, an insight. Intuition. Generating a new premise, a hypothesis, is not a logical process. It requires that something new be created where there was nothing before. Then that new idea can be tested using empirical methods. You have to have a hypothesis before you can apply logic. Before you can be rational. — T Clark

Yes. Another thought is that when reasoning, there are moments of 'microintuitions'. They can be all sorts of things - moments of feeling into semantics, the 'I have checked that enough' qualia, 'it feels like some step is missing here' qualia, tiny thought experiments where one circles around a step in reasoning, quick dashes into memory looking for counterevidence and so on. All these little tweaks and checks.

Yes. Another thought is that when reasoning, there are moments of 'microintuitions'. They can be all sorts of things - moments of feeling into semantics, the 'I have checked that enough' qualia, 'it feels like some step is missing here' qualia, tiny thought experiments where one circles around a step in reasoning, quick dashes into memory looking for counterevidence and so on. All these little tweaks and checks. — Bylaw

Could this be described as alternating phases of syntheticity and analyticity? Analytic thinking seems to fit the bill as a kind of framework of rationality. Whereas syntheticity, which in its very nature involves leaps, seems better described as a process of reason.

So, most people will reject the conclusion of an argument if they dislike it, or if it conflicts with the body of beliefs they already hold, or if they think it would be immoral to believe such a conclusion, or if they find it an ugly belief to hold. And they will do that regardless of how good the argument is.

Note: the perfectly rational person is not necessarily going to be the perfect philosopher. For there may be truths about reality that we do not have overall reason to believe. The ideally rational person recognizes what they have overall reason to believe and believes it. That we have epistemic reason to believe x does not entail that we have overall reason to believe it.

So, the dedicated philosopher may not be perfectly rational — Bartricks

But standards of rationality change. Slavery was an accepted institution in ancient Greece. The slave Epictetus was a Stoic, which makes sense. But then so was Marcus Aurelius. So rejection of an argument at a social level could be the institution of a new rational standard.

Well, first I should say that I often use rationality and reason interchangeably. (I am not arguing they should be used that way, just confessing). Further, I am used to syntheticity/analyticity in relation to statements. Whereas intuition can be non-verbal. Again, I am confessing, not saying those nouns have to relate just to statements. I am contrasting the attempts at using language logically (and thus deduction, induction and abduction to arrive at conclusions or reject conclusions with processes that are generally not verbal, at least in a step by step process (perhaps a conclusion is spat out in word form), and also some parts of the process are black boxed. We don't know what is happening in full. This can be an intuition honed by an expert over a long time. It might be a process that someone (seems to be at least) gifted at from an early age (for some reason). And it doesn't have to be exotic stuff: detectives, art appraisers, poker players. We all use intuition all the time: when moving through crowds, when assessing people and situations, and then on down to microlevels like in the process of reading, say. But, if you want, let me know your sense of the difference between reason and rationality and also syntheticity and analyticity and perhaps I can give a competent response.

But, if you want, let me know your sense of the difference between reason and rationality and also syntheticity and analyticity and perhaps I can give a competent response. — Bylaw

To the extent that synthesis means linking together what is apparently unconnected it is consistent with the function of intuition for sure. The ordinary language use of reason captures my sense of it. Reason the noun is a faculty. But reasoning the verb also characterizes the thinking people use every day to solve challenges of every kind, from the most mundane to the most exotic. Rationalizing or rationalization, as was discussed, is more of a forcing of something to fit into a formalized schema, with the implication that the rationalization may not be accurate in some way. Rationalization has something of the procrustean about it. Whereas reason is more organic and practical.

t standards of rationality change. Slavery was an accepted institution in ancient Greece. The slave Epictetus was a Stoic, which makes sense. But then so was Marcus Aurelius. So rejection of an argument at a social level could be the institution of a new rational standard. — Pantagruel

Use of the word ‘standard’ could imply the difference between more and a less rational forms of thinking. Is that how you meant it? Or did you just mean to indicate different kinds of rationality?

Could this be described as alternating phases of syntheticity and analyticity? Analytic thinking seems to fit the bill as a kind of framework of rationality. Whereas syntheticity, which in its very nature involves leaps, seems better described as a process of reason. — Pantagruel

Are you upholding the analytic/synthetic distinction here?

The description I've provided is just about the first time I've tried organizing my thoughts on this subject and putting them into words. That has been what I would call a rational process, but it's roots are in experience, not reason. — T Clark

I see. We're talking about different aspects of thought.

But reasoning the verb also characterizes the thinking people use every day to solve challenges of every kind, from the most mundane to the most exotic. Rationalizing or rationalization, as was discussed, is more of a forcing of something to fit into a formalized schema, with the implication that the rationalization may not be accurate in some way. Rationalization has something of the procrustean about it. Whereas reason is more organic and practical. — Pantagruel

So, presumably more formal types of thinking, like in a well written philosophical essay, would be rigorous reasoning.

If I look, however, at

Reasoning the verb also characterizes the thinking people use every day to solve challenges of every kind, from the most mundane to the most exotic. — Pantagruel

I would think that not only are there microintuitions ongoing in such processes, but also full out intution. At least, that's how my problem solving day goes. Rapid estimates, gut reactions to people, reading of body language in small decisions during a meeting, guesses crosscultural potential meanings (crosscultural in the broadest sense not just dealing with someone of another nationality), rapid assessments (so, qualitative) of all sorts of things, scattered in and amongst dashes of deduction and induction and abduction. So, it seems to me intuition is a tool in the reason toolbox.

Rationalization, yes, to me has a perjorative sense. But rationality does not for me.

Are you upholding the analytic/synthetic distinction here? — Joshs

I'm acknowledging it, not sure what you mean by upholding it? And yes, I do think that standards of rationality vary both historically and culturally. Unless you want to proclaim some kind of transcendental standard, but then I'm not sure that would accurately represent the typical meaning of rationality.

I see divergences in reasoning and objectives emerging. At this point I would question (following @Bartricks detailed differentiation between various types of reasoning) whether this isn't indicative of the different "governing paradigms of reason" of different individuals. Something that should be taken into consideration in attempting to formulate a shared concept of reason?

Is it possible to be a criminal, and also rational, in the strictest sense of the word? — Pantagruel

Laws defines criminals.

Speaking of a war existing between Ukraine and Russia is criminal in Russia.

So yes, you can be totally rational and a criminal. Besides, I don't think rational and ethical are synonymous.

Yes, I was questioning in a more organic sense, if someone is criminally disposed, could that person ever truly be considered to be rational. Not in the sense of breaking some law which might be extremely culturally relative (like getting an abortion in a Republican state). But in the sense of pathologically stealing or harming others.

Well, thinking of "pathologically stealing or harming others" seems to have the idea in it that ethics can be universal and absolute. In many cases it is so.

Yet even rationality, that actions are logical depends the logical system. And the premises. After all, it's quite rational to defend yourself. And so, just where you put the line between justified defense, excessive defense or unethical defense, when a "pre-emptive attack" isn't justified. As the saying the saying goes, best defense can to be to attack.

Are you upholding the analytic/synthetic distinction here?
— Joshs

I'm acknowledging it, not sure what you mean by upholding — Pantagruel

I had this in mind:

“The analytic/synthetic distinction” refers to a distinction between two kinds of truth. Synthetic truths are true both because of what they mean and because of the way the world is, whereas analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning alone. “Snow is white,” for example, is synthetic, because it is true partly because of what it means and partly because snow has a certain color. “All bachelors are unmarried,” by contrast, is often claimed to be true regardless of the way the world is; it is “true in virtue of meaning,” or analytic. The existence of analytic truths is controversial. Philosophers who have thought they exist include Immanuel Kant, Gottlob Frege, and Rudolf Carnap. The philosopher most famous for thinking that they do not is W. O. Quine.”

I would add that among those philosophers who follow Quine in rejecting the analytic/ synthetic distinction are Davidson, Sellars, Putnam, Brandom, McDowell and Rorty.

More on Quine from Wiki

“"Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is a paper by analytic philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine published in 1951. According to University of Sydney professor of philosophy Peter Godfrey-Smith, this "paper [is] sometimes regarded as the most important in all of twentieth-century philosophy".[1] The paper is an attack on two central aspects of the logical positivists' philosophy: the first being the analytic–synthetic distinction between analytic truths and synthetic truths, explained by Quine as truths grounded only in meanings and independent of facts, and truths grounded in facts; the other being reductionism, the theory that each meaningful statement gets its meaning from some logical construction of terms that refer exclusively to immediate experience.”

More so I am thinking about analyticity as a mode of thought (leading to analytic knowledge). And syntheticity. Aligning with deduction and induction (where induction presumably includes intuitive elements, as mentioned). Whether are not there are analytic truths, it is still possible to think analytically or deductively. Reasoning in the mode of the deductive-nomological model I guess you could say.

Also, I don't think thinking is strategic. I'm not even sure what that means. Certainly a lot of our thinking is not goal oriented. — T Clark

Thinking, from the perspective of an individual is (IMO) almost always strategic and goal driven. Perhaps the objective(s) of the thinking being done aren't always about outer world goals, or immediate ones for that matter. I tend to view the mind (and the associated thinking, however seemingly mundane or counterproductive) as being more of a long-term planning module within the human apparatus.

I tend to view the mind (and the associated thinking, however seemingly mundane or counterproductive) as being more of a long-term planning module within the human apparatus. — Bret Bernhoft

I am very much on board with this. I see all of our thought (that is not trivially practically oriented - thirsty, get a drink) as being driven by long-range long-term goals which then realize through subsidiary objectives. Part of the problem in a reductive-causal analysis of action is that, yes, you can have some set of primary environmental conditions that would account for an action, but the underlying motives are going to be subject to subtle (or substantial) changes as the nature of the long term goal evolves in conjunction with ongoing feedback. I get in the car to go to work. But I am going to work because I have an overarching goal. Maybe to buy a new car. But if I change an even higher level goal - from magnificent consumerism to environmental harmony - then maybe I will sell my car and find a different way to work.